UbkARt 

JNJVCt^SlTY  OF 
CAUFOR>ilA 
SAN  D1E«0 


1^1 

V.  I 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


WITH  REMARKS  ON  THE  NATURE 
OF  REALITY 


BY 
REV  JOHNSTON    ESTEP    WALTER 

Author  of  "The  Perception  of  Space  and  Matter" 


Volume   I 


JOIINSTON     AND     PenNEY 

West  Newton  Pa 
1901 

f5^ 


^^^""^  ■  CxLfS 


k  !  B  R  A  R  Y 

P  PS\  INSTITUTION 


SCR 

OF  OCEA" 
UNIVERSITY 
LA  JOLL 


RAPHY 
CALIFORNIA 
FORNIA 


'6^4-3 


Copyright,  1901,  by 

JOHNSTON    ESTEP    WALTER. 


NOTE. 

The  whole  of  this  work  was  ready  for  the  press 
several  years  ago.  After  some  recent  revision,  Vol- 
ume I.  is  now  offered  to  the  public.  Volume  II., 
which  completes  the  work,  and  which  may  soon  fol- 
low in  publication,  contains  Books  III.  and  IV.  Of 
these  books,  the  former  treats  of  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Extra-Mental  or  External.  The  chief  topics  are 
the  perception  of  matter,  of  space,  of  objective  time 
and  causation;  the  cognition  of  finite  spirits,  and  of 
God.  Book  IV.  treats  of  the  Extremes  of  Knowl- 
edge. The  notions  of  infinity  and  perfection,  the 
necessity  and  universality  of  knowledge,  the  certainty 
and  criterion  of  knowledge,  are  the  principal  themes. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


FIRST  VOLUME. 


Introduction 


Page 
II 


Knowledge  —  The  Science  of  Knowledge  —  Monism  — 
Kant  —  Dualism  —  Locke  —  Common  and  learned 
thought  —  Order  of  discussion. 


BOOK   I. 

COGNITION     OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES 
AND    OF    REAL    MIND. 


F»ART  I. 

COGNITION  OF  THE  MENTAL  STATES. 


CHAPTER    I. 

Cognition  of  Pri;sknt  Mental  Status,  or  Con- 
sciousness        29 

Consciousness  not  a  special,  but  a  general  faculty  of  mind, 
or  a  common  property  of  all  faculties  —  It  is  immediate 
knowledge,  embracing  only  the  present,  and  not  either 
the  past  or  the  extra-mental  —  Its  relation  to  memory 
—  Unconscious  mental  states. 
(5) 


6  table;    op    contents. 

CHAPTER    II. 

Page 
Cognition  of  Past  Mental  States,  or  Memory. 

Cognition  of  Subjective  Time 41 

Memory  not  a  special  intellectual,  but  a  general  faculty 
of  mind,  holding  to  past  mental  affections  a  relation 
similar,  in  universality,  to  that  which  consciousness 
holds  to  present  affections  —  Character  of  the  relation 
of  the  act  of  memory  to  the  act  remembered  —  Reten- 
tion and  reproduction  the  primary  functions  of  memory 
—  Relation  of  memory  to  the  physical  organism  —  The 
primary  basis  of  memory  are  the  mind's  permanence 
and  retention  of  after-effects  of  its  experiences  —  Mem- 
ory as  a  species  of  mediate  knowledge  —  Subjective 
Time  —  The  thought  of  time  not  created  by  a  timeless 
mind,  but  the  revelation  of  the  real  time  or  permanence 
of  the  mind  —  There  could  be  no  thought  of  time  apart 
from  real  time  —  Synthetic  function  of  mind  in  the  cog- 
nition of  long  times. 


CHAPTER    III. 

Is  the  Knowledge  of  the  Mental  States  Rela- 
tive?        61 

Meaning  of  the  phrase,  "The  Relativity  of  Knowledge" 
—  Comparison,  or  the  discovery  of  resemblance  and 
difference,  is  necessarj"^  to  the  knowledge  of  the  mental 
states  —  The  comparison  is  between  different  degrees 
and  qualitatively  different  states  —  But  if  the  states  of 
mind  are  known  only  in  comparison,  they  do  not  derive 
their  character  from  comparison  —  They  have  their  dis- 
tinct, and  we  may  say  permanent,  character  in  compari- 
son —  Comparison  not  a  creative  function  of  mind. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

Classification  of  the  Mental  States  and  their 
Chief  Compositions 73 

The  threefold  division  of  the  mental  phenomena  into  the 
intellectual,  emotional,  and  volitional  —  Defects  of  this 
division  —  Sir  W.  Hamilton  —  The  principal  classifica- 


Table    of    contunts.  7 

PagB 

tion  of  the  mental  phenomena  is  based  on  their  rela- 
tions to  one  another  and  to  the  mind  —  There  are  three 
classes  of  primary  mental  phenomena,  Sensations, 
Emotions,  and  Volitions  —  Sensations  —  Emotions. 
Their  originality.  Theories  of  their  derivation  —  Voli- 
tions. Their  originality  —  Range  and  freedom  of  will 
—  The  primarj'  phenomena  of  mind  are  the  elementary 
materials  of  all  intellection. 


PART  II. 

CHAPTER    I. 
Cognition  op  Rijai.  Mind 97 

Diversity  of  views  on  the  subject — Cognition  of  mind 
wrongly  confused,  in  discussion,  v/ith  the  cognition 
of  matter  —  The  views  of  Locke  —  Of  Kant  —  Of 
Hume  —  Of  J.  S.  Mill  —  Of  James  —  Exclusion  of 
mental  substance  from  psychology,  and  inclusion  of 
material  substance  —  Mental  substance  —  Knowledge 
of  mental  substance  —  This  knowledge  is  immediate  in 
phenomena,  and  not  mediate  or  inferential  —  Memory 
in  the  knowledge  of  mind  —  Knowledge  of  mind  com- 
pared with  the  knowledge  of  matter  —  Berkeley  and 
Hume  —  Unknown  properties  of  mind  —  Mind  known 
as  a  temporal,  causal  and  spatial  unit  —  Knowledge  of 
the  permanence  of  mind  —  Knowledge  of  the  causality 
or  power  of  mind  —  Knowledge  of  the  spatial  exten- 
sion of  mind. 


CHAPTER    H. 
Is  THE  Knowledge;  of  Real  Mind  Relative  ?. ...    146 

The  question  whether  the  knowledge  of  real  mind  is  rela- 
tive, must  be  kept  distinct  from  the  question  whether 
the  knowledge  of  the  mental  states  is  relative  —  Mind 
not  known  out  of  relation  to  its  own  states,  but  may 
be  known  without  necessary  comparison  with  other 
distinct  realities  —  This  is  possible  because  of  the  pecu- 
liar relation  that  mind  holds  to  its  own  diverse  states, 
phenomena  —  The  monistic  doctrine  that  both  subject 
and  object  are  wholly  within  mind  and  but  different 
modes    of   mind  —  Bain  —  Spencer  —  The   doctrine   of 


o  table    of    contents. 

Pack 
some  dualists  that  subject  and  object  are  both  giveti 
in  consciousness  —  Sir  W.    Hamilton  —  Subject  alone 
is  in  consciousness;    object  proper  entirely  outside. 


BOOK   II. 

INTELLECTION. 


CHAPTER    I. 
General  Nature  oe  Intellection 165 

The  Intellect  is  the  faculty  of  synthetic  knowledge 
proper,  the  second  main  stage  of  knowledge  —  What 
are  the  materials  of  the  intellect,  and  their  source?  — 
Locke's  theory  of  the  sources  of  the  materials  of  knowl- 
edge —  Sensation  and  Reflection,  or  External  and 
Internal  Sense  —  Locke's  two  sources  of  the  materials 
of  knowledge  are  both  really  internal  and  but  one, 
sensation  being  a  mode  of  reflection  or  consciousness 
—  Kant's  doctrine  of  external  and  internal  sense  as  the 
sources  of  the  matter  of  knowledge  —  His  two  senses 
are  in  fact  only  one,  the  external  being  but  a  mode 
of  the  internal  —  Sir  W.  Hamilton  on  external  percep- 
tion and  self-consciousness  —  The  materials  of  thought 
or  intellection  are  the  sensations,  emotions,  and  voli- 
tions; and  all  are  alike  of  purely  internal  origin  — 
Does  the  intellect  make  of  itself  any  contribution  to  the 
materials  furnished  to  it?  is  it  both  constructive  and 
creative?  —  The  comparative  passivity  and  activity, 
or  receptivity  and  productivity,  of  the  mind  in  knowl- 
edge —  Locke  —  Kant  —  The  mind  is  receptive  of  exci- 
tation; but  it  is  productive  of  all  elements  of  know- 
ledge, and  it  alone  is  productive  —  "Matter"  and 
"form"  arise  from  the  same  sources  in  the  mind,  and 
are  never  separate  —  The  intellect  is  only  synthetic  or 
constructive,  and  not  originative  or  creative.  Illus- 
trated by  sense-perception  and  the  cognition  of  rela- 
tions —  Presuppositions  of  intellection.  Unity  of 
consciousness  and  the  mind.  Memory.  Impelling 
emotions. 


table;    of    contents.  •  9 

CHAPTER    II. 

Page 
Perception   221 

Perception  is  the  intellect  considered  as  the  franier  of  our 
notions  of  external  objects  and  the  external  world  — 
Perception  employs  sensations,  volitions,  and  emotions 
as  its  materials  —  Sensations,  (i)  General  nature  and 
classification  —  (2)  Arc  piire  modes  of  mind.  Theory 
that  sensations  are  composite  modes  of  mind  and  body. 
Theory  that  sensation  and  nervous  motion  are  "faces" 
of  the  same  thing  —  (3)  Qualities  of  sensations,  (a) 
Special  quality — {h)  Duration.  Is  a  property  of  sen- 
sations in  themselves.  We  know  absolute  duration.  — 
(c)  Extension.  Is  a  property  of  sensations  in  them- 
selves. Color  and  extension.  Sensations  are  extended 
on  the  basis  of  the  extension  of  the  mind  —  Physical 
conditions  of  mental  extension.  Ocular  and  tactual. 
Localization  of  sensations  —  Theory  thai  the  extension 
of  sensations  is  the  product  of  creative  mental  syn- 
thesis—  The  cognition  of  the  extension  of  sensations  is 
original,  simple,  and  absolute  —  The  notion  of  exten- 
sion not  derived  from  the  n<.(tion  of  time.  Is  as  cer- 
tainly original  as  the  notions  of  time  and  power  —  The 
primary  notions  of  extension  are  simple;  the  notions  of 
large  extensions,  composite.  Extended  sensations 
must  be  reckoned  among  the  simple  original  elemen- 
tary materials  of  knowledge  —  Our  knowledge  of  ex- 
tension is  not  only  of  relative,  but  also  of  absolute 
extension  —  Perception  is  constructive;  but  not  origi- 
native —  It  forms  close,  permanent  groups  from  orig- 
inal materials  embraced  in  the  general  unity  of  con- 
sciousness —  Memory  in  perception  —  Perceptions,  like 
the  materials  out  of  which  they  are  made,  are.  in 
themselves,  purely  subjective. 


CHAPTER    III. 
Imagination    266 

Imagination  a  mode  of  the  intellect  —  The  representa- 
tions of  the  imagination  are  individual  notions  —  It 
employs  all  the  elementary  materials  of  knowledge, 
sensations,  emotions,  and  volitions,  as  these  are  repro- 


lO  Table      OF'      CONTENTS. 

Page 
duced  by  memory  —  Imagination  distinguished  from 
perception  —  Presuppositions  of  imagination  —  Rank 
among  the  intellectual  faculties  —  Is  imagination  crea- 
tive?—  All  its  productions  may  be  accounted  for  by 
what  it  receives,  in  materials  and  direction,  from  real 
experiences  —  Causes  of  imaginative  intellection. 


CHAPTER    IV. 
Logical    Thought 279 

Logical  intellection  as  an  advance  upon  the  perceptive 
and  imaginative — The  primary  logical  operations  are 
Conception,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning  —  These  all 
modes  of  judgment  —  General  character  of  judgment  — 
Logical  intellection  has  most  directly  to  do  with  the 
subjective  modes  and  notions,  not  with  the  external 
things  to  which  they  may  refer  —  Words  as  signs  of 
thought  —  Conception  —  General  notions  or  con- 
cepts —  Names  —  In  what  does  the  generality  of  con- 
cepts consist.'^  —  The  causes  of  concepts  —  Logical 
judgment — Propositions  —  Reasoning  is  judgment 
that  passes  from  the  known  to  the  unknown  —  The 
causes  of  reasoning,  in  its  earlier  and  its  later  opera- 
tions —  Laws  of  association  of  ideas  —  Uniformity  of 
nature  —  Reasoning  antecedent  to  the  impulsion  of  all 
emotions,  propensities,  beliefs. 


CHAPTER    V. 
Language  and  Symbols 296 

Language  as  a  medium  of  communication  —  Language 
as  a  help  to  the  inner  processes  of  thought — (i)  To 
memory  —  (2)  Abbreviates  thought — ^(3)  Supports 
imagination  and  the  logical  faculty  in  all  their  more 
complicated  and  advanced  operations. 


INTRODUCTION. 


All  knowledge  is  in  and  by  the  modes  of  the  mind. 
The  facts  of  the  individual's  consciousness  form  the 
beginning  and  basis  of  all  knowledge.  Things  are 
known,  therefore,  only  as  we  are  capable  of  knowing 
them,  or  according  to  the  grasp  and  nature  of  the 
faculties  of  our  mind;  and  there  is  no  ground  for 
affirming  the  existence  of  anything  which  is  not 
revealed  immediately  in  the  mental  modes,  or 
mediately  by  them,  through  their  correspondence  to 
or  representation  of  it. 

The  science  of  knowledge  has  for  its  great  aim  to 
discuss  the  origin,  extent,  and  certainty  of  human 
knowledge.  It  considers  the  basis  and  beginning  of 
knowledge;  the  nature  and  extent  of  immediate 
knowledge;  the  nature  and  extent  of  mediate 
knowledge;  every  cognitive  movement,  in  its  origin 
and  reach,  in  its  correctness  and  worth,  from  the  basis 
of  knowledge,  by  way  of  perception,  imagination, 
inference,  surmise,  behef,  and  by  every  other  mode  of 
procedure,  if  there  be  others;  in  short,  it  seeks  to 
explain  the  whole  structure  of  knowledge,  as  to  its 
origin,  its  progressive  formation,  its  trustworthiness 
in  each  step  and  part. 

The  important  relation  between  knowledge  or 
thought  and  being  implies  a  corresponding  relation 
between  the  science  of  thought  and  the  science  of 
being. 

Philosophers  fall,  as  to  the  science  of  knowledge, 
(11) 


12  THE      PRINCIPIrDS      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

into  the  two  grand  divisions  of  Monists  and  Dualists. 
Both  divisions  recognize  the  question  of  the  relation 
which  thought  holds  existentially  to  being,  and  the 
relation  which  the  science  of  thought  holds  to  the 
science  of  being,  as  of  primary  importance;  and  derive 
their  names  from  the  answers  they  give  to  this  ques- 
tion. 

The  most  thorough-going  class  of  Monists  affirm 
that  thought  and  being  are  the  same.  Starting  from 
what  must  be  granted  by  all  parties  as  a  true  principle, 
namely,  that  our  only  immediate  knowledge  is  in  the 
modes  of  the  mind,  and  that  all  knowledge  is  through 
these  modes,  they  leap  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is 
nothing  existentially  distinct  from  or  beyond  the  pure 
mental  modes  or  pure  thought;  that  thought  contains 
in  itself  all  so-called  substance  and  attributes  of  sub- 
stance, which  are  by  many  erroneously  supposed  to  be 
distinct  from  or  outside  of  thought;  that  the  real 
being  of  things  is  in  the  thought  of  them.  Of  course, 
on  this  view,  the  science  of  thought  and  the  science  of 
being  are  inseparable,  are  the  same.  The  Monists  in 
general  regard  dualism  depreciatingly  as  the  first 
philosophy  of  man,  or  the  philosophy  of  the  "uncrit- 
ical many":  but  their  own,  as  the  philosophy  reached 
from  this  primitive  one  by  the  critical  and  cultivated 
mind  advanced  in  history. 

The  apparent  tendency  of  the  present  time 
towards  idealism  and  monism  receives  its  strongest 
impulse  from  the  teachings  of  Kant.  The  great 
author  of  Die  Kritik  dcr  reinen  Vernunft  held  that  the 
human  mind  knows  and  can  know  only  phenomena  — 
that  is,  pure  mental  afifections  and  forms;  and  that 
nature,  or  the  apparent  universe,  is  "made"  out  of 
these  affections  and  forms  by  the  synthetic  power  of 


INTRODUCTION.  1 3 

the  mind.  He  admits,  at  least  generally,  the  exist- 
ence of  noumena,  things-in-themselves,  real  mind  and 
real  matter;  but  emphatically  contends  that  they  are 
unknown  and  unknowable.  He  never  successfully 
answers,  however,  the  pertinent  question,  how  any- 
thing can  be  said  both  to  exist  and  to  be  unknowable. 
The  natural  results  of  his  teaching  were  not  long  in 
following.  Noumena,  things-in-themselves,  said  to 
be  unknowable,  and  so  loosely  and  distantly  related  to 
the  only  things  that  could  be  known  —  phenomena, 
were,  regarded  as  having  being  distinct  from  thought, 
gradually  let  go,  by  the  strictly  logical  reasoning,  that 
what  is  unknowable  can  not  be  said  to  be;  and  this 
movement  from  Kant  has  reached  the  most  elaborate 
and  thorough-going  form  of  idealism  and  monism 
known  to  the  history  of  philosophy,  namely,  the  the- 
orv  of  Dialectic  evolution. 

Some  earnest  inquirers,  repelled  by  the  extremes 
of  the  later  idealistic  theories,  have  raised  the  cry, 
Back  to  Kant!  But  a  return  to  Kant  will  not  bring 
them  to  solid  ground  and  rest;  because  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  extreme  and  absolute  idealists  have  been 
drawn  too  logically  from  Kant's  principles  and  skepti- 
cism, to  admit  of  quitting  those  and  holding  on  only 
to  these.  Kant  was  a  man  of  extraordinary  analytic 
and  critical  acumen;  but  his  positive  contributions  to 
the  science  of  knowdedge,  and  we  might  add  ethics 
and  the  doctrine  of  freedom,  have  been,  by  many, 
vastly  overrated.  Through  the  accidents  of  philo- 
sophical developm.ent  and  controversy,  his  artificial 
system  of  intellection  has  risen  to  a  remarkable  prom- 
inence; and  we  m.ust  write  with  more  reference  to  it 
than  its  positive  and  real  merits  can  require. 


14  THK    PRiNCiPivEs    OF    knowledge;. 

The  monistic  philosophy  of  knowledge  and  being 
is  the  result,  for  the  most  part,  of  the  effort  of  men  to 
understand  and  explain  the  First  and  the  unity  of  all 
things.  The  impulse  of  the  human  mind  to  discover 
the  First  Principle  of  the  universe,  or  to  embrace  all 
things  in  a  single  system.,  having  a  single  general  law 
or  principle  of  existence  and  activity  binding  all  parts 
together  and  holding  all  apparent  differences  and 
oppositions  in  subjection,  —  one  of  the  most  signifi- 
cant and  noble  impulses,  when  in  its  normal  strength 
and  action,  —  has  been  the  occasion  of  some  of  the 
most  extraordinary  theories  of  knowledge  and  being. 
Part  of  these  theories  entirely  reverse  the  order  of 
rank  between  God  and  man,  give  to  human  thought 
and  consciousness  the  supremacy  that  belongs  only  to 
the  divine.  They  force  the  plurality  and  extent  of 
existence  into  a  fictitious  unity,  and  sometimes,  in 
effect,  into  the  narrow  comprehension  of  the  human 
mind. 

In  opposition  to  Monists,  Dualists  or  Realists  or 
Dualistic  Realists  (these  three  terms  I  shall  hereafter 
use  as  synonymous)  hold  that  thought  and  being, 
thinking  and  creating,  are  not  the  same,  or  absolutely 
the  same;  and  that  the  science  of  thought  and  the 
science  of  being,  though  to  an  extent  inseparable,  are 
not  the  same.  As  to  the  relation  of  thought  and 
being,  they  maintain  that  thought  and  thinker  are  to 
be  distinguished;  that,  in  the  words  of  Locke,  "think- 
ing is  the  action  and  not  the  essence  of  the  soul,"  and 
much  less  is  it  the  essence  of  things  external  to  the 
soul  (esse  is  not  pcrcipi) ;  or,  that  the  Monists  affirm 
of  the  relation  between  thought  and  all  being  what 
can  be  true,  at  the  most,  in  a  sense,  only  of  the  relation 
between  thought  and  mental  being.     They  maintain. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 5 

moreover,  the  existence  of  very  important  differences 
within  being;  first,  the  existence  of  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent individual  minds,  and  the  distinct  existence 
of  finite  minds  and  the  Divine  Mind;   and,  secondly, 
the  existence  of  diverse  substances,  as  mind  and  mat- 
ter.    Regarding  the  fundamental  question  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  individual  human  mind  to  the  universe, 
they  hold  that  it  has  a  certain  place  in  the  time  of  the 
universe,  and  a  certain  position  in  its  space.     As  the 
individual  awakens  to  full  consciousness,  he  discovers 
that  the  beginnings  of  his  knowledge  or  thinking  are 
not  the  beginnings  of  things;   that  the  world  existed 
a  long  time  before  he  began  to  think,  and  will  ver)'^ 
probably  continue  to  exist  after  his  cognitive  facul- 
ties have  closed  upon  it.     He  likewise  discovers,  as 
Copernicus  discovered  of  the  earth  on  which  he  is 
placed,  that  he  is  not  the  spatial  center  of  creation; 
but  that,  though  he  is  the  center  of  thought  in  all  its 
extent,  he  holds  a  definite  place  manifestly  very  far 
from  the  real  center  of  the  realm  of  being.     He  per- 
ceives, in  gfeneral,  as  to  his  place  and  relative  impor- 
tance, that  he  is  a  very  small  and  short-lived  creature, 
compared  with  the  vast,  mighty,  and  long-standing 
frame  of  the  world.     As  to  being,  we  must  begin,  it 
seems,  with  the  first  cause,  God;  being  is  theocentric, 
not  anthropocentric.     But  as  to  knowledge,  we  must 
begin  with  the  ego;  for  all  things,  the  material  world, 
our   fellow-beings,   and   God   himself   (though   he   is 
infinitely  greater  in  knowledge,   power,   immensity, 
than  the  ego),  are  known  only  through  the  afifections 
of  the  ego. 

But  while  Dualists  maintain  these  important  dif- 
ferences between  thought  and  being  and  within  being, 
they  at  the  same  time  hold  that  unity  pervades  all 


l6  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

differences.  Thought  and  thinker  should  be  distin- 
guished, but  they  are  yet  inseparable;  and  all  things, 
mind  and  matter,  all  the  individuals  of  both,  have 
proceeded  from  the  same  Maker,  and  constitute  but 
one  general  system.  Among  different  objects,  as 
also  between  mind  and  matter,  there  are  many  im.por- 
tant  interactions  and  relations.  Things,  though  dis- 
tinct, are  yet  radiations  from  the  same  creative  Power; 
and  have  many  relations  with  one  another  which  were 
antecedently  implied  in  their  primal  coexistence  in 
the  center  of  origins.  Moreover,  the  Deity,  having 
created  all  things,  preserves  and  sustains  them  by  his 
immanence,  while  he  is  at  the  same  time  also  tran- 
scendent. The  doctrine  of  Dualists  thus  holds  a  place 
between  the  doctrine  of  absolute  separateness  and 
that  of  absolute  identity.  The  great  mystery,  how- 
ever, implied  in  the  fact  of  the  same  realities  being 
both  distinct  and  united,  both  independent  and  depen- 
dent, created  and  free,  is  not  ignored. 

We  may  say  the  deepest  question  between  mon- 
ists  and  dualists,  the  deepest  question  of  the  science 
of  thought  and  of  being,  of  all  science,  concerns  the 
degree  of  closeness,  so  to  speak,  of  the  relation  that 
the  Supreme  Being  holds  to  things  —  to  finite  minds, 
to  matter  and  its  motions,  and  to  space;  and  philo- 
sophic theories  for  the  solution  of  this  question  range 
from  the  most  close-bound  pantheism  and  monism  to 
the  loosest  dualism  —  the  dualism  that,  for  example, 
regards  space,  matter,  moral  law,  as,  in  origin,  inde- 
pendent of,  and  coeternal  with,  God. 

Locke  may  be  taken  as  a  principal  representative 
of  dualism  in  modern  times.  As  is  well  known,  he 
held  to  the  distinction  between  mind  and  matter,  and 
mind  and  mind;    first,  that  the  Divine  Mind,  though 


INTRODUCTION.  1 7 

the  creator  and  supporter  of  all  species  of  spiritual  and 
material  being,  is  yet  distinct  from  them  or  transcen- 
dent to  them;  secondly,  that  the  ego  is  distinct  from 
other  finite  minds  and  objective  being,  though  they 
have  all  proceeded  from  and  are  sustained  by  the  same 
creative  Power.  Further,  he  held  that  thought  and 
the  mind  are  different;  that  sensations,  and  the 
"operations  of  the  mind"  included  under  "reflection," 
are  to  be  distinguished  from  the  mind,  or,  as  already 
observed,  that  "thinking  is  the  action  and  not  the 
essence  of  the  soul."  '  He  taught  that  our  sensa- 
tions or  perceptions  give  us  a  representation  of  the 
external  world,  in  respect  to  certain  qualities,  as  it 
really  is.  It  may  be  added  that  the  progress  or 
growth  of  knowledge,  in  Locke's  view,  is  from  the 
single  sensations  and  mental  operations,  by  combina- 
tion, etc..  to  the  complete  structure  or  full  body  ot 
our  knowledge;  and  not,  contrariwise,  from  the 
indefinite  and  general  to  the  particular. 

It  must  yet  be  acknowledged  that,  notwithstanding 
the  general  dualistic  character  of  Locke's  philosophy, 
the  most  celebrated  and  conspicuous  idealistic  and 
monistic  theories  of  modern  times  have  taken  their 
departure  from  it.  This  has  resulted,  in  part,  from 
tw^o  chief  defects  of  Locke's  philosophy,  namely,  his 
obscure  and  imperfect  views  regarding  the  relation  of 
ideas  or  thought,  on  the  one  side,  to  the  mind,  and. 
on  the  other  side,  to  c.vfra-nicntal  objects,  —  defects 
which,  clear  to  students  of  philosophy  two  centuries 
after  I,ocke  wrote,  are  not  to  be  spoken  of  in  special 
disparagement  of  him.  Holding  that  thought  is  the 
action  and  not  essence  of  mind,  he  yet.  by  implica- 


(i)   Essay.   Book   II..   Ch.   xix..  Sect.  4. 
(2) 


^^V3 


i8  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

tion  at  least,  severs  thought  and  mind  too  far,  putting- 
a  sort  of  gulf  between  them;  and  from  his  indeter- 
minate teaching,  in  the  second  place,  regarding  the 
relation  of  ideas  to  external  objects,  combined  with 
this  previous  error,  there  issued,  first  in  order,  the 
.  immaterialism  of  Berkeley,  and,  afterwards,  the  nihil- 
ism or  absolute  idealism  of  Hume. 

The  relation,  however,  of  the  speculations  of 
Berkeley  and  Hume  to  those  of  Locke  must  be  con- 
sidered with  more  critical  attention  and  penetration 
than  it  has  been  usually  considered,  if  these  two  phil- 
osophers are  to  get  nothing  more  than  what  they 
really  merit  and  I.ocke  nothing  less.  Their  philoso- 
phy proceeds  not  from  the  principles,  but  the  defects 
of  Locke's;  not  in  the  line  of  its  general  tendency, 
but  contrariwise;  more  by  way  of  mere  skepticism, 
than  by  way  of  just  criticism  and  logical  development; 
and  is  therefore  in  relation  to  Locke's,  rather  a  post  hoc 
than  a  propter  hoc. 

Berkeley,  starting  from  Locke's  indefinite  and 
imperfectly  developed  doctrine  of  the  relation  and  cor- 
respondence of  ideas  to  external  realities,  unfolded  his 
peculiar  system  of  idealism  or  immaterialism,  denying 
wholly  the  existence  of  matter.  He  assumes  as 
fundamental  that  no  class  of  ideas,  of  sensations  and 
perceptions,  can  be  said  truly  to  represent  material 
objects  in  any  particular,  and  that  therefore  no  such 
objects  can  be  said  to  exist:  that  the  so-called  mater- 
ial world  has  no  existence  independent  of  and  distinct 
from  the  mind  or  its  ideas,  and  that  all  being  con- 
sists of  spirits  and  ideas.  Berkeley,  however,  after 
all,  never  showed  that  his  idealism  was  a  leo'itimate 
departure  from  Locke's  philosophy,  by  showing  that 
the  principles  and  realistic  tendency  of  the  latter  were 


INTRODUCTION.  1 9 

wrong  and  wrong-going,  were  not  only  not  con- 
firmed by  proof,  but  could  not  be.  He  simply  made 
contradictory  assumptions.  A  skeptic  was  not 
bound,  we  suppose,  to  do  more  than  this;  and  in  rela- 
tion to  Locke,  Berkeley  is  mainly  a  skeptic,  not  a 
thorough  critic  and  logical  successor  and  supplanter. 
Berkeley,  accordingly,  proceeded  on  his  own  line  of 
speculation;  but  as  far  as  anything  which  was  done  by 
him  is  concerned,  there  was  left  fully  open  the  possi- 
bility of  a  legitimate  development  from  Locke  in  the 
direction  of  his  leading  tendencies,  in  vrhich  his  real- 
ism might  be  maintained,  clarified,  and  established,  by 
the  rectification,  extension,  and  establishment  of  his 
maim  theoretic  principles;  and,  consequently,  the 
possibility  also  of  the  refutation  of  the  Berkeleian 
principles  by  the  establishm.ent  of  the  Lockian. 

Hume,  under  the  stimulus  of  Berkeley,  proceeding 
from  Locke's  defective  view  of  the  relation  especiallv 
of  ideas  to  the  mind,  as  Berkeley  had  proceeded  from 
his  defective  view  of  the  relation  of  ideas  to  extra- 
mental  things,  developed  his  theory  of  nihilism, 
which,  in  accordance  with  Berkeley,  denies  the  exist- 
ence of  material  substance,  and,  beyond  Berkeley, 
denies  the  existence  of  spiritual  substance;  and  leaves 
nothing  in  being  but  ideas  floating  in  the  void,  having 
no  relation  with  one  another  except  what  they  have 
externally.  But  what  was  just  said  of  Berkeley's  rela- 
tion to  Locke,  is  true  also  of  Hume's;  and  what  is 
true  of  the  idealism  of  these  two  celebrated  men,  may 
be  said,  in  general,  of  all  forms  of  materialism  that 
have  ever  claimed  descent  and  respectability  from 
Locke. 

The  history  of  Locke's  philosophy,  among  the 
people  of  his  own  land  and  language,  is  curious,  both 


20  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

with  regard  to  those  who  have  opposed  it,  and  those 
who  have  taken  more  or  less  from  it.  Within  the  last 
centiir}^  there  have  been  very  few  apparently  of  the 
philosophic  who  have  accepted  it  fnlly,  both  as  to  its 
matter  and  method  or  theory  of  knowledg-e,  both  as 
to  its  realistic  principles  and  its  view  of  the  origin  and 
architectonic  of  knowledge.  Those  who  have  adopted 
his  a  posteriori  method  have  rejected  his  realism,  as, 
for  example,  the  present  school  of  Hartley  and  Hume; 
and  those  who,  like  the  school  of  Reid,  have  accepted 
fully  his  realism,  have  rejected  his  method.  In  the 
latter  division  is  found  the  great  body  of  Christian 
thinkers.  The  method  of  Christian  thought  has  been 
for  a  long  time  chiefly  the  a  priori;  and  it  has  been 
maintained  as  the  true  one  with  the  usual  fervor  and 
tenacity  of  religious  convictions,  and  with  powerful 
attacks  upon  sensationalism  and  monism.  Owing  to 
the  strong  tendency  of  those  who  adopted  Locke's 
method  to  run  into  theories  of  monism,  both  idealistic 
and  materialistic,  it  has  long  been  common  among 
theologians  to  denounce  his  method  as  the  antecedent 
of  modern  materialistic  and  ideahstic  systems,  and  of 
the  atheism  and  heterodox  ethics  that  often  accom- 
pany those  systems,  —  results  so  unpalatable,  so 
antagonistic  to  the  common  dualistic  view  of  the 
world  and  the  strong  religious  convictions  of  the 
English  mind.  Honoring  Locke  as  a  patriot  and  a 
man  of  pure  and  exalted  religious  and  moral  princi- 
ples and  practice,  they  have  condemned  him  or  apolo- 
gized for  him  as  a  philosopher  and  as  the  real  though 
unwilling  and  innocent  cause  of  the  many  evils  in 
theory  and  practice  which  they  suppose  have  sprung 
from  his  method  of  philosophizing. 

The  most  popular  and  generally  accepted  form  of 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

philosophy  for  a  considerable  time  has  been  a  mix- 
ture of  Lockian  and  Kantian  elements;  1)iit.  at  the 
same  time,  the  depreciation  of  Locke,  as  a  philoso- 
pher, in  comparison  with  Kant,  has  been  with  many  a 
commonplace  of  philosophic  criticism.  Latterly 
there  has  been  a  revived  inclination  towards  the  sup- 
pression of  the  realism  of  Locke,  and  towards  the 
fuller  acceptance  of  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  with  its 
monistic  implications.  This  inclination  is  in  part  due 
to  powerful  foreign  influences,  —  to  the  increased  and 
deeper  study  of  the  works  of  leading-  German  phil- 
osophers, and  to  the  residence  of  philosophic  youth 
at  German  universities,  where  some  of  them  too  read- 
ily learn  to  depreciate  many  of  the  great  leaders  of 
English  thought,  especially  to  disparage  Locke  in 
comparison  with  Kant. 

It  is  an  assumption  of  the  present  work  that,  since 
the  idealistic  diversion  from  Locke,  led  by  Berkeley 
and  Hume,  there  has  remained  an  unfilled  space  for  a 
consistent  and  adequate  theory  of  a  posteriori  dualistic 
realism ;  and  the  work  may  be  regarded  as,  in  part,  an 
attempt  to  supply  the  proper  theory.  That  diversion 
the  author  must  regard  as  a  grave  departure  from  the 
true  course  of  philosophy.  The  true  course  of  phil- 
osophy, as  it  appears  to  him,  was  directly  onward  to 
the  rectification  and  completion  of  the  Lockian  a 
posteriori  dualism,  shunning  idealism  and  monism,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  apriorism,  on  the  other.  How  far 
the  author  has  succeeded  in  this  attempt,  or  in  making 
any  contribution  towards  the  success  of  such  an 
attempt,  his  readers  must  be  left  to  decide  for  them- 
selves. 

In  the  controversv  between  Monists  and  Dualists 


22  the;    principi.e;s    of    knowledge;. 

there  has  been  on  both  sides  some  lack  of  entire  sub- 
mission to  the  strictly  scientific  spirit,  which  deserves 
some  consideration  here.  The  only  opinions  and 
principles  worthy  of  regard  and  acceptation  in  phil- 
osophy are  those  which,  no  matter  where  they  have 
come  from  or  first  appeared,  can  maintain  themselves 
under  the  close  and  long  inspection  and  trial  of  mmds 
seeking  only  to  reach  truth' and  to  avoid  error. 

The  Monists  depart  somewhat  from  this  rule 
through  the  disposition,  prevalent  with  them,  to 
depreciate  "common"  thought,  consciousness,  or 
sense,  the  thinking  of  the  "uncritical,"  the  "many," 
or  the  "vulgar,"  and  to  insist  on  the  absolute  neces- 
sity of  "rationalizing"  it.  The  earnestness  and  not 
infrequent  dogmatism  with  which  this  is  done  can  be 
understood  in  part  from  the  fact  that  "common" 
thought  is  most  decidedly  dualistic,  and  has  always 
stubbornly  resisted  every  effort  of  Monists  to  explain 
or  convert  it  into  something  else. 

On  the  other  hand,  because  of  this  very  distinct 
dualistic  character,  many  Dualists  have  greatly 
exalted  "common"  thought,  and  have  held  that,  in  the 
"primitive,"  "native"  and  "spontaneous"  notions  of 
the  human  mind,  their  philosophy  has  a  remarkable 
and  sufticient  confirmation. 

Both  these  views  are  extreme.  Common  or 
unlearned  thought  neither  deserves  the  reproaches  of 
Monists,  nor  merits  the  unmeasured  exaltation  of 
Dualists.  The  Monists  have  in  their  favor  the  dif^fi- 
culty,  which  all  who  are  conversant  with  the  problems 
and  progress  of  knowledge  will  admit,  of  getting 
through  first  appearances  down  to  realities.  This 
difticulty  occurs  more  manifestly,  perhaps,  in  external 
perception  than  in  any  other  cognition.     All  philo- 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

sophical  thinkers  will  grant,  at  least,  that  external 
things  are  not  precisely  what  they  appear  to  be;  and 
that  it  has  been  no  brief  and  easy  problem  to  tell  just 
what  is  appearance  and  what  reality.  But  while  this 
is  true  of  knowledge,  there  are  no  sufficient  grounds 
for  the  wholesale  disparagement  by  Monists  of 
unlearned  thinking  and  its  "rude  unities."  The  mis- 
takes and  errors  which  can  be  charged  against  it  are 
not  so  great  as  to  warrant  their  assertions  of  its  great 
need  of  "rationalization."  Common  thought  to 
some  extent,  no  doubt,  needs  scientific  elucidation 
and  supervision.  These  philosophers,  however,  are 
to  be  understood  by  the  "rationalization"  of  common 
thought  to  mean,  not  simply  elucidation,  just  inter- 
pretation, and  removal  of  imperfections,  while  its 
essential  constitution  remained;  but  the  changing  of 
its  character  wholly,  interpreting  it  into  the  very 
opposite  of  itself,  into  some  form  of  monism  or  iden- 
tity. 

No  one  would  wish  to  be  thought  to  disregard  the 
disparity  in  general  between  disciplined  and  undis- 
ciplined thinking  and  the  value  of  learning;  but  the 
history  of  the  human  mind  shows  with  a  good  deal  of 
plainness  that  the  learned  mind  may  be  exalted  too 
high  in  comparison  v.ith  the  unlearned.  Instances 
are  not  infrequent  in  history  of  unlearned  thinkers,  in 
questions  even  of  speculation,  and  in  great  moral, 
social,  and  political  questions  and  movements,  getting 
nearer  the  truth,  either  in  independent  action  or  in 
deciding  between  confiicting  leaders,  than  learned  and 
disciplined.  Things  seem  to  have  been  hidden  from 
the  wise  and  prudent  and  revealed  unto  babes.  The 
unlearned  many  doubtless  need  the  guidance  of  the 
learned  and  disciplined  few,  and  under  such  guidance 


24  the;      PRINClPlvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

have  in  many  instances  been  brought  on  to  the  accept- 
ance and  enjoyment  of  most  valualDle  truth,  and  in 
cases,  too,  where  the  truth  at  first  seemed  to  them 
absurd  and  met  with  their  vehement  opposition ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  leaders  themselves  have  been 
at  times  directed  by  the  impartial,  unbiased,  and  real- 
istic thought  of  the  unlearned,  or  have  been  held  back 
by  their  opposition  or  inertia,  more  or  less  self-con- 
scious, from  going  into  no  one  knows  what  extremes 
and  extravagances.  Ordinary  consciousness  must  be 
led  by  the  cultivated;  but  undoubtedly  the  best  inter- 
ests of  science  and  humanity  have  sometimes  been 
served  by  its  resistance  to  leadership  and  assumption 
of  some  independence;  and  it  has  brought  back  to 
itself  many  flights  of  speculative  thought.  Interdum 
valgus  rectum  videt.  i  The  decided  and  persistent 
antagonism  of  ordinary  thought  to  monistic  theories 
will  not  turn,  I  believe,  in  the  end,  to  the  discredit  of 
ordinary  thought  or  to  the  disadvantage  of  phil- 
osophy. 

Minds  that  have  the  advantages  of  discipline  and 
great  erudition  are  not  free  from  the  liability  of  having 
their  originality  hampered  by  an  overload  of  learning; 
of  being  shackled  by  prejudices  and  preconceptions, 
or  beguiled  by  the  conceit  of  knowledge  and  of  dis- 
covery or  innovation;  and  of  being  set  in  grooves. 
How  these  causes  have  operated  in  the  minds  of  the 
learned  to  the  rejection  and  perversion  of  facts  and 
principles  is  a  well-taught  lesson  of  the  history  of 
science.  On  the  other  hand,  with  the  disadvantage 
of  small  learning  and  little  culture,  there  may  be  at 
times  deep  and  true  insight  and  comprehension,  and 


(i)   Horace,  Lib.  II.,  F,p.  i.  63. 


INTRODUCTION, 

25 

power  and  freedom  to  go  farther  with  safety  than 
cultivated  and  artificial  minds.  Common  sense,  or 
the  thought  of  the  many,  may  therefore  be  well  con- 
trasted sometimes  with  the  specidations  and  spirit  of 
the  philosophic  few. 

In  what  has  just  been  said,  I  trust  that  no  grounds 
have  been  afforded  for  the  charge  of  having  put  too 
high  a  value  upon  uncritical  thought,  and  too  low 
upon  critical;  of  favoring  the  old  fashion  of  referring 
metaphysical  and  ethical  questions  in  a  manner  to  the 
decision  of  savages  or  the  lowest  tribes  of  men,  or  of 
showing  undue  deference  to  the  convictions,  native 
notions,  or  instincts  of  the  unsophisticated  m.ind;  and 
not  duly  favoring  the  application  of  scientific  methods 
and  canons.  What  I  would  maintain  is,  sim.ply,  that 
ordinary  thought  may  be  undervalued  and  may  be 
overvalued;  that  both  have  been  done,  the  one  with 
as  much  pretension  and  dogmatism  as  the  other;  and 
that  doing  the  one  is  fraught  with  as  much  evil  to 
science  as  doing  the  other.  The  test  of  principles 
and  theories  is  not  to  be  placed  in  the  minds  where 
they  originated  or  first  find  reception;  neither  in  the 
fact  that  they  are  the  product  of  the  free,  spontaneous, 
and  fortunate  insight  and  action  of  the  uncultivated 
intellect,  or  are  supported  by  the  intense  convictions 
of  the  many;  nor  in  the  fact  that  they  are  the  product 
of  the  more  regular  operations  of  the  cultivated  and 
brilliant  intellect;  but  first  and  above  all  in  their 
power  to  endure  the  close  and  continued  considera- 
tion of  earnest,  impartial,  and  truth-seeking  minds. 

The  order  of  discussion  in  this  work  will  be  deter- 
mined bv  the  fundamental  distinction  of  immediate 


26   .  the;    principles    oe    knowledge. 

and  mediate  knowledge,  and  by  the  natural  order  of 
knowledge. 

In  Book  T.  we  shall  consider  the  cognition  of  the 
modes  of  the  mind  and  real  mind,  this  being  especially 
the  sphere  of  immediate  knowledge. 

In  Book  TI.  we  shall  treat  of  the  synthetic  or  con- 
structive operations  of  knowledge,  the  operations  of 
sense-perception,  imagination,  and  the  logical  facul- 
ties; but  of  them  only  in  their  pure  subjective  char- 
acter, without  any  regard,  or  special  regard,  to  their 
relations  to  external  things,  —  thus  still  keeping 
within  the  region  of  immediate  knowledge. 

In  Book  III.  we  shall  pass  beyond  the  region  of 
immediate  knowledge,  to  the  knowledge  of  the  exter- 
nal —  of  matter,  spirits,  and  outer  relations. 

Book  IV.,  the  last,  will  be  devoted  to  the  extremes 
of  knowledge,  —  to  its  farthest  reaches  and  compre- 
hension regarding ^pace,  time,  and  causation;  to  its 
highest  certainty,  and  the  criterion  of  it;  and,  in  gen- 
eral, to  the  peculiarities  of  knowledge  in  its  most 
advanced  stages  and  on  its  boundaries. 


BOOK    I. 

COCxNITION     OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES 
AND    OF    REAL    MIND.^ 


F>ART  I. 

COGNITION  OF  THE  MENTAL  STATES. 


(i)  The   term   tnincl   is   here   used   in   the   widest   sense,   as 
denoting  the  whole  spiritual  nature  of  man. 


COGNITION  OF  THE  MENTAL  STATES. 


CHAPTER    I. 

COGNITION     OF    Pi^ESENT    MENTAL    STATES.     OR 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

We  have  no  knowledge  earlier,  more  direct,  or 
more  certain,  than  that  of  the  mode.s  of  the  mind. 
Moreover,  the  knowledge  of  all  else  is  in  and  through 
these  modes;  and,  therefore,  our  knowledge  of  them 
properly  comes  to  be  considered  first  of  all. 

The  cognition  of  the  mental  modes  is  commonly 
assigned  to  the  faculty  Consciousness.  By  some, 
consciousness  has  been  regarded  as  a  faculty  distinct 
from  other  faculties  of  the  mind,  —  for  exami)le,  those 
of  volition  and  emotion,  just  as  the  latter  are  from  one 
another;  and  as  standing  in  a  manner  apart  from 
them  and  taking  cognizance  of  their  operations.  The 
more  common  and  correct  view,  however,  is.  that  con- 
sciousness is  not  a  distinct  faculty  of  mind,  but  rather 
a  common  property  of  all  known  faculties,  or  the  gen- 
eral faculty  of  which  all  special  faculties,  as  they  are 
known,  are  but  modes,  the  genus  of  which  the}'  are  the 
species.  "Consciousness,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
well,  in  general,  "is  not  to  l)e  considered  merely  as  a 
separate  and  specific  faculty  of  self-knowledge,  —  as 
that  power  which  is  conversant  about  the  other  intel- 
lectual operations  and  passions,  from  which  it  is  dis- 
tinguished, as  about  its  peculiar  objects;   but,  on  the 

contrary,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  general  ex]M-ession 
(  29  ) 


30  the;    principIvES    of    knowledge;. 

for  the  primary  and  fundamental  condition  of  all  the 
energies  and  affections  of  our  mind,  inasmuch  as  these 
are  known  to  exist.  P'or  while  knowledge,  feeling, 
and  desire,  in  all  their  various  m.odificatipns,  can  only 
exist  as  the  knowledge,  feeling,  and  desire  of  some 
determined  subject,  and  as  this  subject  can  only 
know,  feel,  desire,  inasmuch  as  he  is  conscious  that  he 
knows,  feels,  and  desires,  it  is  therefore  manifest  that 
all  the  acts  and  passions  of  the  intellectual  self  involve 
Consciousness  as  their  generic  and  essential  quality. 
....  While  Consciousness,  in  reference  to  the  sub- 
altern capacities  of  the  intellectual  subject,  may  be 
considered  as  their  absolute  and  universal  form,  so 
these  subordinate  capacities,  in  reference  to  this  uni- 
versal concomitant  of  their  existence,  may  with  pro- 
priety be  regarded  as  the  relative  and  special  modifica- 
tions of  Consciousness."  ^ 

But  contrary  to  the  apparent  import  of  the  above 
extract.  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  at  times,  and  some  other 
writers,  are  inclined  to  regard  consciousness  as  having 
a  peculiar  relation  to  the  so-called  faculties  of  knowl- 
edge or  cognition,  as  these  are  distinguished  from  the 
faculties  of  emotion  and  volition.  They  make  con- 
sciousness in  a  special  sense  intellectual.  This  view^ 
has  been  thus  stated:  "Consciousness  is  an  act  of 
knowledge,  and  is  therefore  an  act  purely  and  simply 
intellectual  —  an  exercise  of  the  intellect  only.  The 
states  observed  may  be  psychical,  i.  c,  indififerently 
states  of  intellect,  sensibility,  or  will,  but  the  act  by 
which  they  are  known  is  intellectual  only. "2 

A  fundamental  assumption  apparently  made  here 


(i)   Edition  of  Rcid's  ]Vorks,  p.  929. 
(2)  Porter,  The  Humsn  Intellect,  p.  88. 


COGNITION     OI'     PRESENT    MENTAL    STATES.  3 1 

is,  that  the  intellect,  or  the  function  or  faculty  of 
knowledg-e,  is  a  faculty  coordinate  with  the  faculties 
of  sensibility  and  volition ;   or  is  as  independent  of,  or 
distinct  from,  these  two  faculties,  as  either  of  them  is 
from  the  other.     This  doctrine,  the  occasion  of  great 
confusion,  and  not  in  regard  to  consciousness  only,  is, 
I  conceive,  a  fundamental  error.     The  consciousness 
of  any  modification  of  mind,  a  sensation,  emotion,  or 
volition,  belongs  to  the  modification  itself,  is  in  and  of 
it,  is  implied  in  it  as  a  constituent  element,  or  is  identi- 
cal with  it.     Consciousness  is  not  something  distinct 
from  the  modification,  is  not,  especially,  in  any  sense 
or  manner,  the  act  oi  a  faculty,  as  the  intellect,  con- 
sidered as  diiierent  from  and  coordinate  with  the  fac- 
ulties of  sensibility  and  volition,  but  is  truly  generic  or 
universal.     An  act  of  sense-perception,  or  any  other 
so-called  cognitive  or  intellectual  act,  is  a  pure  mode 
of  mind  and  a  mode  of  consciousness.     Aii  emotion, 
or  anv  other  affection  of  the  sensibility,  is  a  pure  mode 
of  mind  and  a  mode  of  consciousness.     The  sense- 
perception   has,   indeed,   a   reference   to   an   external 
realitv:  but  in  itself,  with  this  reference,  it  is  still  only 
a   pure   modification   of   mind   and   of  consciousness 
like  emotion.     The  emotion  is  no  more  and  no  less 
a  modification  of  consciousness  than  the  sense-percep- 
tion.     It  is  as.  truly  an  act  of  knowledge.     It  is  an  act 
of  presentative  or  internal  knowledge.     There  is  no 
pure  act  of  consciousness  apart  from  and  above  a 
special  affection  of  mind.     The  remark  is  well  made: 
"Consciousness  seems  indeed  to  be  badly  described 
when  it  is  restricted  to  simple  recognition  or  knowl- 
edge of  mental  modifications:    as  such  it  is  not  con- 
vertible with  every  mental  modification  experienced, 
and  vet  we  can  not  throw  out  of  consciousness  either 


32  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  distinctive  element  of  feeling,  desire,  or  voli- 
tion." I  Consciousness,  in  brief,  is  the  fundamental 
form  of  all  classes  of  mental  affections  and  acts  — 
sensations,  emotions,  volitions.  It  is  not  "intellectual 
only,"  but  is  sensational,  emotional,  or  volitional, 
according  as  we  are  conscious  of  a  sensation,  emotion, 
or  volition;  and  it  is  also  of  these  affections  as  they 
are  combined  in  complex  modes. 

Consciousness  is  immediate  knowledge,  and 
embraces,  therefore,  present  modes  of  mind  only,  not 
past  modes  of  mind,  and  less  qualities  of  extra-mental 
things.  The  cognition  of  present  modes  of  mind 
should  hence  be  considered  bv  itself,  as  being  distin- 
guished  by  important  differences  from  the  cognition 
of  past  modes  and  of  external  qualities.  It  should  be 
emphasized  that  tlie  knowledge  of  the  present  modes 
of  mind  is  of  perfect  immediacy.  There  is  no  separa- 
tion as  to  time,  space  or  material  between  the  know- 
ing and  the  thing  knov^n;  there  is  no  manner  of 
interval,  gulf  or  break;  in  other  words,  the  knowing 
and  the  thing  known  are  one  and  the  same  —  in  this 
case  thought  and  thing  are  identical.  It  is  this  iden- 
tity, or  perfect  immediacy,  which  makes  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  mental  modes  the  highest  order  of  cer- 
tainty. Doubt  can  not  enter  consciousness  and  nega- 
tive a  present  state  of  mind.  Every  conscious  present 
state  absolutely  excludes  doubt  of  itself  as  light 
excludes  darkness.  'J'he  certainty,  then,  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  mental  modifications  is  of  the  first 
order,  —  there  can  be  no  greater;  and  the  certainty  of 
the  existence  of  other  things  may  be  said  to  vary  with 
the  degree  of  their  respecti\'e  remoteness  from   the 


(i)  Veitch,  HaiJiiltoii   (.Phil.   Classics),  p.  97. 


COGNITION     OF    PRESENT    MENTAL    STATES.  33 

mental  states  or  the  mind,  or  with  the  number  of 
media  between  them  and  the  mind. 

Views  much  opposed,  however,  to  the  above  doc- 
trine of  immediacy  and  identity  have  been  earnestly 
maintained.  Some  regard  it  is  impossible  that  know- 
ing- and  the  thing  known  should  be  absolutely  imme- 
diate to  one  another  and  the  same;  they  assume  that 
"a  thing  can  not  at  the  same  instant  be  both  subject 
and  object  of  thought,"  and  that  we  can  more  easily 
understand  the  cognition  of  something  which  pre- 
cedes, or  is  in  some  way  different  from,  the  knowing 
act  itself.  This  assumption  is  more  plausible  than 
true.  No  doubt  we  are  much  indebted  for  our 
knowledge  of  the  mental  modes  to  the  representations 
of  them  afforded  us  by  memory  when  they  are  past; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  conscious  or,  as  we  say,  self- 
knowing  states  of  mind  are  very  generally  the  condi- 
tions of  memories;  we  recollect  what  we  were  previ- 
ously conscious  or  immediately  cognizant  of,  and  the 
vividness  of  recollection  is  proportional  to  the  vivid- 
ness of  the  previous  consciousness.  The  identity  in 
consciousness  of  the  knowing  and  the  affection  known 
we  seem  to  be  required  to  accept  as  a  primordial  and 
fundamental  fact  in  which  a  mind  differs  from  everv- 
thing  else. 

Our  knowledge  in  consciousness  of  the  mental 
modes  has  been  unfavorably  contrasted,  on  account  of 
their  subtilty,  interrelations,  evanescence,  with  the 
knowledge  of  permanent,  palpable,  easily  distin- 
guished and  manipulated  material  objects.  For 
instance,  it  has  been  said:  "Mental  states  are  not 
abiding  and  steady  objects  like  those  which  form  the 
subject-matter    of    physical    observation.   .   .  .  \\n-iat 

passes  within   us,   in   our  thoughts  and   feelings,   is 
(3) 


34  THK      PRINCIPLES      OI?      KNOWLEDGE. 

unstable  and  changing.  The  botanist,  when  he 
spreads  out  a  plant  in  front  of  him,  or  the  chemist, 
when  he  conveys  a  substance  into  his  retort,  can 
observe  at  leisure  the  appearance  of  the  objects  under 
certain  quite  definite  conditions."  '  There  is  truth  in 
such  statements  as  this,  but  there  is  also  often  misun- 
derstanding and  exaggeration.  When  a  botanist  is 
observing  a  plant  which  he  holds  in  his  hand,  he  is 
really  conscious  or  immediately  cognizant  only  of  the 
percept  of  the  plant,  which  percept  is  a  pure  complex 
mode  of  his  own  mind.  The  permanent  and  extended 
plant  has  its  own  existence  external  to  and  indepen- 
dent of  the  mind;  but  it  is  known,  not  immediately, 
but  only  mediately,  through  the  pure  subjective  per- 
cept. The  percept  is  indeed  phenomenally  projected, 
and  peculiarly  interpreted;  none  the  less,  in  itself,  it 
is  a  pure  mode  of  mind.  Then,  while  the  botanist  is 
examining  a  plant,  the  only  immediate  object  of  his 
examination  is  his  own  percept,  which  endures  or  is 
constantly  renewed  through  the  constant  excitation 
of  his  mind  by  the  plant.  In  a  case  of  this  kind, 
therefore,  it  is  wrong  and  unreasonable  to  affirm  that, 
during  the  act  of  observation,  the  mental  state  or  the 
percept  and  the  extra-mental  object  differ  greatly  as 
to  uniformity  and  steadiness,  or  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  percept  is  inferior  to  that  of  the  external  object. 
On  the  contrary,  the  knowledge  of  the  percept  is  in 
every  respect  superior  to  that  of  the  object.  Cer- 
tainly all  the  steadiness  directly  known  is  the  steadi- 
ness of  the  subjective  percept  rather  than  that  of  the 
external  object. 

As  has  been  alreadv  observed  above,  the  onlv  facts 


(i>   Hoeffciing,  Psychology  (Lowndes  tr.),  p.   i6. 


COGNITION     OF     PRESENT    MENTAL    STATES.  35 

of  consciousness  are  the  present  mental  modes.     Past 
mental  modes,  and,  more  emphatically,  extra-mental 
objects  or  properties,  never  enter  the  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness.     In    opposition   to    this,    however,    even 
some  dualistic  writers,  though  admitting  that  we  are 
not  conscious  of  past  modes  of  mind,  vigorously  con- 
tend that  we  are  conscious  of  external  or  material 
realities  or  qualities;  that,  for  instance,  the  act  of  per- 
ception requires  the  presence  in  consciousness  of  the 
material  object  perceived.     It  is  held  that  sensations 
and  sense-perceptions  are  complex  phenomena,  in  the 
sense  of  being  modes  of  both  mind  and  body  as  these 
are  united;    and  that,  in  these  complex  modes,  attri- 
butes of  body  or  matter  come  within  the  sphere  of 
consciousness.     Says  Sir  W.  Hamilton:    "I  hold  that 
Sensation  proper  being  the  consciousness  of  an  affec- 
tion, not  of  the  mind  alone,  but  of  the  mind  as  it  is 
united  with  the  body,  that  in  the  consciousness  of 
sensations  relatively  localized  and  reciprocally  exter- 
nal, we  have  a  veritable  apprehension,  and,  conse- 
quently,   an    immediate    perception    of    the    affected 
organism,  as  extended,  divided,  figured,  etc."  i     The 
same  writer  sometimes  asserts  that  it  is  "impossible 
that  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  act  without  being  con- 
scious of  the  object  to  which  that  act  is  relative."  2 
In  the  term  "object"  is  included  material  object.     But 
the  doctrine,  taught  also  in  substance  by  many  Mon- 
ists,  is  untenable.     It  denies  what  is  a  primary  fact  of 
knowledge.      The    perceptive   act   and   the   material 
object  to  which  that  act  is  "relative"  are  perfectly 
separated  just  in  this  manner,  that  the  former  is  in 


U)   Edition  of  Rcid's  Works,  p.  884. 
(2)  MefapJiysici,  p.   147. 


36  THE      PRlIsTCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

consciousness  and  the  latter  wholly  outside.  No 
motion  or  property  of  even  the  cerebral  elements, 
which  are  supposed  to  be  in  proximate  relation  to 
mind,  ever  enters  tjie  illuminated  sphere  of  conscious- 
ness. The  inclusion  of  the  mental  modes  in  con- 
sciousness, and  the  absolute  exclusion  of  every  physi- 
cal property,  is  one  of  the  most  noteworthy  and 
important  facts  pertaining  to  human  knowledge.  As 
only  the  mental  modes  appear  in  consciousness,  the 
most  general  problem  of  knowledge  may  be  said  to  be, 
to  understand  how  we  ever  cognize  anything  besides 
or  beyond  a  present  mode  of  mind,  as  a  past  occur- 
ence, the  permanent  mind,  an  extra-mental  object. 
A  significant  fact  regarding  consciousness  is  its 
dependence  upon  change,  contrast,  discrimination. 
We  are  never  conscious  of  a  mental  affection  by  itself 
alone,  out  of  relation  to  others;  but  only  in  our  dis- 
crimination of  it  from  another  or  others  antecedent 
or  simultaneous.  All  consciousness  involves  the 
consciousness  of  difference  and  resemblance.  The 
mind  is  excited  to  consciousness  by  discriminable 
afifections.  It  has  been  held  that  temporal  change  or 
memory  is  necessary  to  consciousness.  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton declares  that  memory  is  an  "undeniable  condi- 
tion of  consciousness."  i  He  holds  that,  discrimina- 
tion being  a  condition  of  consciousness,  memory  is 
also ;  for  without  memory  there  could  be  no  contrast- 
ing of  a  present  with  a  past  state  of  mind.  "Change," 
he  savs  again,  "is  necessary  to  consciousness,  and 
change  is  only  to  be  apprehended  through  the  fac- 
ultv  of  remembrance."  2  Bu.t  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  contrast  or  discrimination  is  not  possible 


(\j  Metapliysirs,  p.  141.     (2)   lb.,  p.  679. 


COGNITIOX    or    l-RESKNT    MENTAL    STATES.  37 

only  between  a  present  and  a  past,  or  the  remembrance 
of  a  past,  state  of  mind,  or  between  successive  diverse 
states.  There  are  contrasts  between  simultaneous 
mental  affections;  there  are  simultaneous  sensations 
that  are  different  in  quality  and  separate  in  space; 
and,  so  far  as  contrast  makes  consciousness  possible, 
these  contrasts  make  it  possible,  they  may  "start"  or 
"shock"  the  mind  into  momentary  consciousness, 
even  without  change  or  real  transition.  We  are  con- 
scious of  different  visual  impressions  or  perceptions 
in  an  instantaneous  light,  as  an  electric  flash,  and  it  is 
not  probable  that  the  change  from  the  mental  state 
preceding  the  flash,  or  the  remembrance  of  that 
state,  is  necessarv  to  the  consciousness  of  the  simul- 
taneous  different  impressions.  But  we  must  at  the 
same  time  admit  that  there  is  seldom  or  never  a  state 
of  consciousness  exclusive  of  remembrance.  Con- 
sciousness always  or  almost  always  combines  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  original  affection  or  affections  with 
the  consciousness  of  the  remembrance  of  a  past  affec- 
tion. Still,  this  association  with  the  consciousness  of 
remembrance,  even  if  it  be  quite  invariable,  does  not 
seem  to  be  indis])ensable  to  momentary  conscious- 
ness. Such  consciousness  is  possible  in  the  discrimi- 
nation of  simultaneous  original  mental  affections  or 
presentations.  To  say  the  least,  discriminable  pre- 
sentations often  help  to  consciousness;  they  contrib- 
ute to  the  vividness,  the  grade,  intensity,  matter,  of 
consciousness. 

We  have  been  concerned  heretofore  exclusively 
with  conscious  states  of  mind.  It  has  long  been  a 
question  of  importance  in  mental  philosophy,  wdiether 
there  are  unconscious  states  or  activities  of  mind; 
and  the  question  deserves  brief  attention  here.     Psy- 


38  THE      PRINCIPI.es      of      KNOWLEDGE. 

chologists  have  been  much  divided  on  this  question; 
and  this  has  been  the  resnh  chiefly  of  preceding  vari- 
ance respecting  the  nature  or  permanency  of  the  mind. 
SpirituaHstic  psychologists  generahy  admit  uncon- 
scious or  latent  mental  modifications;  but  they  differ 
as  to  their  extent.  Some  assume  them  as  conditions 
or  causes  of  conscious  effects,  where  others  reject 
them.  What  some  regard  as  the  effect  of  uncon- 
scious mental  activity,  others  regard  as  the  effect  of 
conscious  mental  activity  which  was  immediately  for- 
gotten. Materialistic  psychologists,  of  course,  deny 
unconscious  activity  of  mind;  and  ascribe  to  "uncon- 
scious cerebration''  what  the  spiritualists  ascribe  to 
unconscious  mentality. 

First,  as  to  the  first  rise  or  origin  of  consciousness. 
It  would  seem  that  consciousness  must  originate  from 
a  preceding  unconscious  mental  energy  or  basis.  It 
is  not  probable  that  it  is  generated  by  pure  physical 
causes,  as  by  the  association  or  motion  of  the  cerebral 
elements.  The  rise  of  consciousness  has  no  doubt 
an  important  physical  condition;  but  this  condition 
can  not  be  taken  as  its  real  cause.  It  is  very  improb- 
able that  such  heterogeneous  things  as  the  union  or 
motion  of  material  elements  and  consciousness 
should  be  related  to  each  other  as  real  cause  and 
effect.  There  is  no  equivalency  between  them.  It 
must  therefore  be  presumed  that  mind  precedes  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness  rises  in  the  mind  as,  so  to 
speak,  self-illumination.  It  is  a  potentiality  or  possi- 
bility of  pre-existing  mind.  It  has  its  primary 
ground  in  mind.  Bu.t,  none  the  less,  the  passing  of 
mind  from  unconsciousness  to  consciousness  must  be 
admitted  to  be  one  of  the  deepest  mysteries.  We 
can  only  suppose  that  it  is  not  a  creation,  but  a  devel- 


COGNITION     OF    FRKSENT    MENTAL    STATES.  39 

opment  from  preceding  adequate  menta!  condition 
and  cause.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  appears  to  ree:ard  con- 
scious mental  movement  as  the  higher  intensity  of  a 
rDovement  which  in  lower  intensity  is  unconscious. 
"Consciousness,"  he  says,  ''is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
aught  different  from  the  mental  modes  or  movements 
themselves'';  it  "is  just  the  movements  themselves 
rising  above  a  certain  degree  of  intensity."  ^ 

Secondly,  we  must  presuppose  not  only  that  there 
is  an  unconscious  micntal  energy  or  basis  for  the  first 
rise  of  consciousness;  but  also  that  there  always 
remain  unconscious  mental  modes  or  activities  which 
are  the  ground  of  conscious  effects.  It  seems  impos- 
sible, for  example,  to  give  a  reasonable  account  of  tl'te 
great  functions  of  memory,  retention  and  reproduc- 
tion, without  supposing  an  unconscious  permanent 
mental  basis.  Just  as  unconscious  mental  energy 
precedes  and  is  the  ground  of  the  first  appearance  of 
consciousness,  so  persi.stent  after-effects  in  mind  of 
prior  conscious  states  are  the  necessary  ground  of  the 
memories  of  those  states.  It  has  been  well  con- 
tended, in  discussions  of  memory,  that  sensations, 
passions,  vohtions.  do  not  sink  as  such  into  uncon- 
sciousness, or  that  there  are  no  unconscious  sensa- 
tions, etc.;  for  these  and  all  other  classified  mental 
modes  never  exist  out  of  consciousness;  but  we  seem 
required  to  suppose  that  conscious  mental  modes 
leave  in  the  mind  some  sort  of  persistent  traces,  ves- 
tiges, after-effects,  which  are  the  ground  of  the  recol- 
lection of  them. 

Materialistic  psychologists  deny  permanent  men- 
tal after-effects  as  the  ground  of  memories,  and  hold 


(i)  Edition  of  Rcid's  Works,  p.  932. 


40  THK      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

that  permanent  cerebral  changes  or  paths  are  the  sole 
ground  of  memories.  The  term  "unconscious  cere- 
bration" is  by  some  employed  to  express  this  view. 
This  term,  however,  is  really  as  objectionable  as  the 
term  "unconscious  .sensation";  for  as  there  is  never 
unconscious  sensation,  so  there  is  never  cerebration 
that  is  not  unconscious.  There  can  be  no  division  of 
cerebration  into  conscious  and  unconscious,  because 
all  cerebration  is  absolutely  unconscious.  What  is 
often  meant  by  this  inappropriate  term  is  probably 
simply,  that  what  some  impute  to  imconscious  mental 
modes  or  operations  is  due  solely  to  cerebration. 
vSome  aflirm  the  general  proposition  that  "matter  and 
the  unconscious  are  identical."  Against  the  above 
doctrine  of  memory,  however,  stands  the  same  serious 
objection,  in  el'fect,  which  stands  against  the  doctrine 
that  consciousness  has  its  first  origin  in  a  material 
ground.  Because  of  the  marked  heterogeneity 
between  brain  change  and  memory,  it  appears  impos- 
sible, notwithstanding  their  manifest  close  relation, 
that  they  should  be  united  in  the  relation  of  real  cause 
and  effect. 

But  we  shall  not  pursue  the  subject  of  the  uncon- 
scious further  at  this  place;  for,  owing  to  its  close 
relation  to  the  subject  of  memory,  and  especially  to 
the  fundamental  question  of  the  existence  and  cogni- 
tion of  real  mind,  additional  consideration  of  it  here 
would  require  us  to  anticipate  too  much  the  discus- 
sion of  these  latter  subjects. 


CHAPTER    II. 

COGNITION   OF   PAST   MENTAL  STATES.   OR   MEM- 
ORY. —  COGNITION  OF  SUBJECTIVE  TIME. 

Memory,  the  faculty  of  conserving  and  recalling 
or  reproducing  our  past  mental  states  or  experiences, 
is  commonly  treated  as  one  of  the  so-called  cognitive 
or  intellectual  faculties,  and  with  more  distinctness 
and  positiveness  than  ever  consciousness  is  so  treated. 
But  this  view  of  memory  seems  to  be  as  partial  and 
defective  as  the  corresponding  view  regarding  con- 
sciousness. As  to  universality,  memory  and  con- 
sciousness are  almost  alike.  Consciousness  is  the 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  present  mental  modes, 
simple  and  complex,  of  all  classes,  including,  of 
course,  the  modes  of  memory  itself  as  present  repre- 
sentations. Memory  is  the  mediate  or  representative 
knowledge  of  the  past  mental  modes,  simple  and  com- 
plex, of  all  classes. 

Memory  and  consciousness  being  alike  in  attach- 
ing to  all  classes  of  mental  phenomena,  perceptions, 
emotions,  volitions,  the  grand  difference  between 
them  regards  immediacy  or  directness  of  knowledge, 
or  the  relation  of  the  act  knowing  to  the  act  known. 
In  consciousness,  the  knowing  and  the  act,  the  sensa- 
tion or  emotion,  known,  are  simultaneous  and  identi- 
cal; and  there  is  no  question  as  to  the  manner  of  the 
relation  of  the  two,  because  of  their  identity; 
although,  indeed,  the  fact  that  the  knowing  and  the 
known   are   one   rem.ains  ultimate   and   inexplicable. 

But,  in  memory,  the   most  important   and   difficult 
( 41 ) 


42  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

questions  appear  at  this  point  of  the  relation  between 
the  knowing  and  the  act  known,  or  the  remembering 
and  the  act  remembered.  Is  the  act  of  remembering 
a  Hteral  awakening  or  revival  of  the  act  remembered, 
or  are  they  numerically  and  thoroughly  distinct?  Are 
they  qualitatively  the  same  or  difi'erent?  What  is  the 
condition  of  knowledge  considered  as  stored  away  in 
the  repertory  of  the  memory,  and  not  actually  remem- 
bered or  thought  of?  These,  and  the  like,  are  among 
the  peculiar  and  most  important  questions  regarding 
memory. 

The  common  mode  of  describing  remembrance  as 
a  reproduction  or  awakening  of  past  mental  phenom- 
ena, if  taken  strictly,  implies  an  identity  of  remem- 
brance and  the  phenomenon  remembered.  Some 
psychologists  expressly  teach  that  no  sensation,  or 
conscious  phenomenon,  ceases  to  exist.  A  sensa- 
tion sinks  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness,  and, 
after  having  remained  in  that  state  for  a  time,  may 
rise  again  into  consciousness  or  be  remembered.  The 
sensation  and  the  remembrance  of  it  are  regarded  as 
identical,  as  two  states  of  the  same  continued  mental 
mode.  This  view  is  somewhat  favored  by  the  fact 
that  the  representation  of  memory  resembles  the 
original  phenomenon.  But  as  to  this  subtile  question, 
it  seems  the  more  probable  theory  that  the  remember- 
ing and  the  experience  remembered,  as  they  are  tem- 
porally different,  are  numerically  different,  like,  for 
example,  two  successive  sensations  on  the  same  tactile 
spot;  and  that  remembering  is  properly  represen- 
tation. 

But  if  the  two  phenomena,  the  remembering  and 
the  remembered,  are  temporally  and  numerically  dif- 
ferent, they  are,  as  is  commonly  supposed,  qualita- 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MKNTAL     STATES.  43 

tively  the  same.  Memories  are  fainter  or  less  vivid 
phenomena  of  the  same  character  as  the  originals. 
Every  experience  and  its  memory  are  generally  held 
to  have  the  same  physical  seat  or  tract;  and  memory 
is  supposed  to  l)e  the  attendant  of  the  weaker  excita- 
tion, produced  by  internal  causes,  of  that  tract.  ^ 

The  chief  functions  of  memory  are  Retention  or 
Conservation,  and  Reproduction  or  Recollection. 
Recollection  includes  representation,  and  the  peculiar 
conviction  tliat  the  representation  resembles  a  past 
affection.  W'hen  I  remember  a  sensation  or  percep- 
tion. I  have  the  conviction  that  T  truly  represent  a 
fact  of  my  own  past  experience. 

What  account  now  are  we  to  give  or  receive  of 
the  wonderful  fact  of  the  mind's  retention  of  its  past 
knowledge  or  experience?  There  are  two  general 
theories  of  this  fact,  which  may  be  denominated  the 
spiritualistic  and  materialistic.  In  the  former  it  is 
maintained  that,  though  memory  has  its  important 
phvsical  conditions,  it  is  yet  in  itself  wholly  a  mental 
process,  that  it  is  the  continuous  activity  of  the  same 
unitary  agency,  that  it  has  its  real  or  fundamental 
cause  solely  within  mind,  that  its  innermost,  its  pri- 
mary,  support  is  mental,   not   physical.     Therefore, 


(i)  Professor  Bain  remarks:  ""What  is  the  manner  of 
occupation  of  the  brain  with  a  resuscitated  feeling  of  resistance, 
a  smell,  or  a  sound?  There  is  only  one  answer  that  seems 
admissible.  Th.c  renewed  feeling  occupies  the  very  same  parts, 
and  in  the  iunie  manner,  as  the  original  feeling,  and  no  other  parts, 
nor  in  any  other  assignable  manner."  (Setiscs  and  Intellect.  .3rd  Ed., 
p.  338.)  Some  psychologists,  however,  are  inclined  to  the 
view  that  the  cerebral  seats  of  the  two  phenomena  are  partly  or 
wholly  difYerent.  For  instance,  Ziehen  says  that  the  phenom- 
ena of  "mental  blindness"  and  "deafness"  make  it  probable  that 
"sensation  and  idea  depend  upon  different  cortical  elements." 
(Phys.  Psychology,  p.  155.) 


44  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  original  phenomenon,  as  a  sensation,  the  subse- 
quent recollection,  and  the  intermediate  retention, 
are  not  to  be  assigned  to  different  realities  or  agen- 
cies; it  can  not  be  said  that  the  extremes,  the  sensa- 
tion and  its  recollection,  are  mental,  and  the  inter- 
mediate retention  non-mental;  but  the  three  facts 
are  but  stages  of  the  continuous  activity  of  the  one 
mind.  Though  retention  is  unconscious,  it  is  still 
within  mind,  within  the  total  unity  of  the  mind's 
activity  or  being.  According  to  the  materialistic  the- 
ory of  memory,  there  are  not  only  physical  condi- 
tions of  retention,  but  these  conditions  are  the  sole 
cause  or  ground  of  retention.  There  is  no  permanent 
and  conserving  mind;  but  only  a  permanent  and  con- 
serving Ijrain.  The  present  remembering  act  receives 
its  knowledge  and  con\dction  of  the  past  directly  from 
the  permanent  physical  organ  alone. 

Every  theory  of  memory  must  leave  unsolved  mys- 
teries; but  the  spiritualistic  theory  seems  more  con- 
sonant with  the  facts  by  its  presuppositions  of  a  per- 
manent mental  life,  and  of  the  whole  of  memory  as  a 
unitarv  activitv  within  that  life.  On  this  theorv,  then, 
how  are  we  to  conceive  especially  of  the  relation  of  the 
original  experience  to  retention,  and  of  the  relation  of 
retention  to  recollection?  What  is  the  character  or 
form  of  the  retention  of  past  experience;  what  is  the 
form  of  the  basis,  in  retention,  of  recollection?  It 
might  seem  easier  to  account  for  the  whole  process  of 
memory,  on  the  assumption  that  an  original  affection 
of  mind  does  not  cease  to  exist,  and  that  the  recollec- 
tion of  it  is  but  a  different  mode  of  its  own  self;  that, 
for  example,  the  same  perception  sinks  into  uncon- 
sciousness and  afterwards  emerges.  But  it  is  hard  to 
believe  in  an  unconscious  perception  or  sensation; 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MTiMTAL     STATES.  45 

and  we  seem  to  be  obliged  to  hold  that  a  perception 
and  the  memory  of  it  are  nnmerically  different  affec- 
tions or  phenomena  of  mind.  Then  the  question 
arises,  how  can  successive  dift'erent  phenomena  be 
held  together  in  the  unity  of  memory?  or.  how  can 
we  account  for  the  fact  that  the  present  remembering 
act  embraces  the  conviction  that  it  resembles  a  past 
experience? 

If  a  sensation  has  no  existence  beyond  our  con- 
sciousness of  it,  we  must  yet  suppose  that  it  leaves 
behind  itself  in  the  mind  an  unconscious  vestige  or 
trace.  What  the  particular  character  of  this  trace  is, 
or  what  is  its  particular  difference  from  the  sensation, 
is  entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  introspection.  We 
can  only  name  it  by  the  most  vague  terms,  as  vestige, 
residuum.  But  something  of  the  sort  seems  indis- 
pensable to  memory.  It  is  the  necessary  connecting 
link  between  a  sensation  and  the  remembrance  of  it. 
The  transitory  sensation  must  leave  a  permanent  after- 
effect in  mind,  which  permanent  after-effect  is  the 
permanent  possibility  or  the  ground  of  the  transitory 
recollection  of  the  sensation.  Rut  how  such  an  effect, 
which  is  different  from  the  sensation  by  which  it  was 
caused,  can  be  the  ground  of  the  conviction  that  our 
recollection  of  tlie  sensation  resembles  the  sensation, 
it  is  impossible  to  tell. 

In  general,  it  seems  clear  that  we  must  assume  the 
permanence  and  identity  of  the  mind  as  indispensable 
to  memory.  If  we  take  a  sensation,  its  after-effect, 
and  the  recollection,  as  different  facts,  we  must  hold 
that  memory  would  be  impossible,  if  these  were  not 
the  modes  of  the  same  permanent  mind.  We  are 
indeed  unable  to  explain  the  connection  of  sensation, 
after-effect,  and  remembrance,  or  to  explain  the  emer- 


46  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

gence  of  a  rememl^rance  from  its  mental  antecedents; 
but,  none  the  less,  are  we  compelled  to  assume  the 
unity  of  the  miiid  with  these  differences,  and  the  per- 
manence of  the  mind  with  this  succession.  The  per- 
manence of  the  unitary  mind  is  the  fundamental  con- 
dition of  memory.  We  remember  a  past  experience 
only  because  the  present  act  of  remembrance  and  the 
past  experience  are  modes  of  the  same  enduring  mind ; 
or  because  the  mind  has  endured  from  the  past  act  to 
the  present,  bearing  in  itself  a  permanent  vestige  of 
the  past  act.  Particularly,  the  special  conviction  of 
memory  as  to  the  past  has  its  ground  in  the  perma- 
nence of  the  mind;  it  is  a  conscious  expression  of  that 
permanence. 

The  varying  states  of  the  permanent  mental  after- 
efTfects  of  presentations  account  for  the  well-known 
facts  that  we  have  more  vivid  remembrance  of  experi- 
ences that  are  recent,  that  are  fully  attended  to,  and 
that  are  frequently  repeated.  A  recent  after-eflect 
may  be  reasonably  supposed  to  be  more  energetic 
than  an  old  one.  Again,  an  experience  which 
engaged  our  full  attention  leaves  a  stronger  after- 
effect; and  repetition  of  an  experience  strengthens 
and  confirms  its  after-effect.  Further,  associations  in 
our  remembrances  have  their  ground  in  the  confirmed 
associations  of  the  permanent  after-effects  of  experi- 
ences. 

The  materialistic  hypothesis  of  memory  rejects 
permanency  of  mind;  and  conseciuently  also  persist- 
ent mental  traces  of  past  experiences,  and  unconscious 
mental  modes.  Retention  is  made  a  function  espe- 
cially of  the  brain.  In  place  of  the  permanent  mind, 
this  hvpothesis  puts  the  permanent  brain.  In  place 
of  permanent  mental  residual  effects,  it  puts  perma- 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MF.NTAL     STATES.  47 

nent  cell  or  structural  modifications  of  the  brain.  The 
unconscious  is  identified  with  the  material.  The 
mind,  in  general,  is  described  as  a  pure  continuous 
succession  of  phenomena,  having  direct  relation  to 
nothing  permanent  except  the  permanent  brain. 
According  to  the  logic  of  some,  apparently,  the  only 
mind,  or  the  wliole  of  mind,,  is  the  present  transitory 
thought. 

This  hypothesis  has  its  occasion  and  support,  in 
part,  in  the  manifest  facts  of  the  dependence  of  mem- 
ory on  physical  conditions.  The  dependence  of  men- 
tal action  on  physical  action  can  not  be  denied:  and 
in  the  operations  of  memory  it  is  perhaps  more  clear 
and  striking  than  in  any  others.  Illness,  exhaustion, 
age,  enfeeble  memory.  Drugs,  febril  delirium,  excite- 
ment, awaken  long-forgotten  events.  From  such 
facts  as  these  many  psychologists  conclude  that  mem- 
ories not  only  are  subject  to  cerebral  conditions,  but 
have  their  real  ground  or  fundamental  cause  in  these 
conditions. 

Retention  or  conservation  of  past  experiences  is 
especially  reckoned  to  the  physical  organ  alone,  no 
account  whatever  being  taken  of  the  permanent  con- 
serving mind  or  of  permanent  changes  in  it.  For 
instance,  according  to  Professor  James,  "organized 
neural  paths"  are  the  only  ground  of  retention,  or  sim- 
ply are  retention.  The  retention  of  a  past  event,  he 
says,  "is  no  mysterious  storing  up  of  an  'idea'  in  an 
unconscious  state.  It  is  not  a  fact  of  the  mental  order 
at  all.  It  is  a  piu'ely  physical  phenomenon,  a  mor- 
phological feature,  the  presence  of  these  'paths,' 
namely,  in  the  finest  recesses  of  the  brain's  tissue. 
The  recall  or  recollection,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
psycho-physical  phenomenon,  with  both  a  bodily  and  a 


48  the;    principles    op    knowledge. 

mental  side.  The  bodily  side  is  the  functional  excite- 
ment of  the  tracts  and  paths  in  question;  the  mental 
side  is  the  conscious  vision  of  the  past  occurrence,  and 
the  belief  that  we  experienced  it  before."  i  This 
statement  places  retention  solely  in  the  physical 
organ,  and  seems  to  set  forth  the  doctrine  that  there 
is  a  commixture,  in  memory,  of  permanent  retaining 
brain-paths  and  the  present  passing  recollecting 
thought.  All  retention  of  past  mental  experiences  is 
in  the  brain-tracts,  which,  as  it  appears,  communicate 
their  stores  to  the  present  thought.  The  latter 
derives  nothing  whatever  regarding  the  past  from  any 
other  source  than  the  l:¥'ain-tracts.  This  all  can,  of 
course,  be  put  into  words;  but  no  human  mind  can 
form  any  consistent  conception  from  the  words. 

First,  as  to  the  doctrine  that  brain-tracts  conserve 
past  knowledges  or  mental  experiences.  Even  the 
most  enthusiastic  cerebralist  mu.st  admit  that  there  is 
something  quite  unintelligible  and  mysterious  in 
such  conservation.  The  brain  may  certainly  hold  its 
own  permanent  structural  changes  (as  paper  and  cloth 
preserve  ureases),  or  fixed  lines  of  molecular  motion. 
A  line  along  which  motion  occurred  concomitantly 
with  a  sensation  or  other  presentation,  may  become 
a  permanent  line  of  motion.  But  this  does  not  war- 
rant the  assumption  that,  in  such  lines,  the  brain  con- 
serves, besides  its  own  changes,  also  the  past  mental 
experiences  which  occurred  with  the  rise  of  those 
changes;  or  in  them  alone  possesse^s  the  permanent 
possibihty  of  the  recall  of  the  experiences.  Against 
such  an  assumption  would  seem  to  militate,  first,  the 
fact  of  the  constant  mutation  of  the  brain  substance 


(i)  Psychology,  I.,  p.  655. 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MENTAL     STATES.  49 

throug-h  waste  and  repair.  How  can  there  be  any 
permanent  retention  of  ])ast  experiences  by  the 
material  organ,  when  it  is  undergoing  continued 
change  in  its  molecular  constituents?  To  this,  how- 
ever, the  reply  may  be  made,  that  the  brain  may  retain 
structural  forms,  or  '"tendencies,"  "dispositions."  to 
motion  along  fixed  lines,  while  the  elements  of  the 
structures  or  lines  are  continually  changing;  just  as  a 
scar  retains  its  form,  and  the  features  of  the  counte- 
nance long  remain  nearly  the  same.  But  while  this 
reply  may  be  reasonable,  it  does  not  relieve  the  diffi- 
culty. Forms  and  dispositions  may  have  superiority 
to  the  elements,  in  point  of  permanency;  but  this  yet 
does  not  help  us  the  least  towards  understanding  how 
cerebral  paths  and  processes  can  conserve,  besides 
themselves,  past  mental  experiences,  or  be  the  sole 
ground  or  possibility  of  recognitive  knowledges. 

Especially  the  very  great  unlikeness  between  every 
mental  phenomenon,  presentation  and  representation, 
and  any  conceivable  cerebral  form  or  process,  appears 
to  be  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  any  theory  of  the 
physical  retention  of  pa.st  mental  experiences.  It 
seems  for  this  reason  impossible  that  mental  experi- 
ences should  sink  or  disappear  in  brain-paths,  and 
have  their  retention  cr  ground  solelv  in  them,  whence 
they  revive  into  the  conscious  recollections.  Other 
facts,  which  will  be  more  fully  considered  hereafter, 
strengthen  the  case  against  the  theory  that  the  sole 
basis  of  retention  is  corporeal.  Of  them  is  the  fact, 
that  our  knowledge  of  the  brain  is  wholly  a  mode  of 
the  mind;  and  the  great  probability  that  the  very 
permanence  of  the  brain  itself,  which  many  so  unhesi- 
tatingly and  so  fully  assume  in  antagonism  to  the 
permanence  of  the  mind,  could  not  possibly  be  known 


50  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

Otherwise  than  through  the  known  permanence  of  the 
mind.  This  priority  of  the  mind  in  knowledge,  while 
of  great  importance,  does  not,  however,  it  should  be 
observed,  give  us  sufficient  warrant  to  become  spirit- 
ualistic unitarians  or  monists  and  to  hold  that  the  per- 
manent and  extended  brain  is  but  a  mode  of  our  mind 
or  thought;  just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  indubitable 
physical  conditions  of  memory  do  not  w'arrant  us 
in  becoming  materialistic  monists  and  holding  that 
retention  has  its  only  ground  in  the  material  organ; 
but  it  supports  the  belief  that  the  'primary  cause  or 
deepest  ground  of  retention  is  mental. 

The  physiological  theory  of  memory  is  closely 
related  to,  or  appears  to  be  but  a  phase  or  part  of  the 
general  assumption  that  brain-process  generates  from 
itself  mental  phenomenon:  it  has  no  more,  and  no 
less,  value  than  that  general  assumption.  We  admit 
that,  if  a  cerebral  motion  can  produce  from  itself  a 
sensation,  then  it  seems  not  inconsistent  to  suppose 
that  a  permanent  cerebral  change  resulting  from  that 
motion  may  be  the  sole  seat  and  origin  of  the  recollec- 
tion of  the  sensation.  But  the  marked  heterogeneity 
between  every  mental  phenomenon  and  cerebral 
process  appears  decisively  to  contradict  every  form 
of  the  materialistic  hypothesis.  As  to  memory,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  of  the  close  relation  of  mental  phe- 
nomenon and  brain-change.  Injury,  disease,  exhaus- 
tion, of  the  brain  directly  affect  memory.  Special 
excitements  of  the  brain  by  fever,  drugs,  occasion  very 
eccentric  ])henomena.  Memory  rises  and  declines 
with  the  progress  to  maturity,  and  with  the  decline,  of 
the  body.  Such  facts  require  us  to  admit  brain-pro- 
cesses as  important  conditions  or  occasions  of  mem- 
ories; but  they  do  not  require  us  to  admit  them  as  the 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MENTAL     STATES.  5 1 

real  cause  or  origin  of  memories.  Fever  and  hash- 
eesh excite  indeed  very  remarkable  resuscitations  of 
past  experiences;  but  still  they  can  not  be  the  only 
cause,  through  their  effects  on  the  brain,  of  these 
phenomena.  There  is  such  lack  of  correspondence  or 
e(iuivalence  between  the  character  of  the  cause  and 
the  character  of  the  effect.  Furthermore,  only  remi- 
niscences or  modes  of  mind  appear  in  consciousness, 
])rocesses  or  modes  of  the  brain  never.  This  striking 
difference  in  relation  to  consciousness  seems  to  indi- 
cate a  difference  in  existence.  Finally,  a  very  serious 
practical  conclusion,  which  deserves  notice  here, 
would  seem  to  follow  from  the  identity  between  brain- 
process  and  memory  which  the  materialistic  psycholo- 
gists are  so  eager  to  maintain;  namely,  that  memory 
must  share  in  the  ultimate  fortunes  or  disintegration 
of  the  brain.  If  this  identity  were  true,  we  w-ould 
seem  to  be  forced  to  the  admission,  that  the  "con- 
scious memory  of  man  dies  with  his  death."  ^ 

The  extreme  unlikeness  between  any  thinkable 
brain-motions  and  memories,  and  the  priority  of  the 
mind  in  knowledge,  warrant  not  only  the  rejection 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  materialistic  generation  of  mem- 
ories, but  warrant  also  the  denial  of  any  real  com- 
mixture of  the  cerebral  and  mental  in  memory;  as, 
that  retention  is  solely  a  function  of  the  brain,  and 
that  recollection  is  mental,  or  in  part,  or  on  one  side, 
mental.  Memory  in  itself  is  wholly  mental.  The 
retention  and  the  recall  of  past  experience  are  wholly 
within  mind.  As  we  have  already  remarked,  the 
original  experience,  the  retention,  and  the  recollection 
must  be  supposed  to  form  a  unitary  continuous  men- 


(i)   Ilering,  On  Memory,  p.  27. 


52  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

tal  succession,  to  be  the  successive  actions  of  the  same 
identical  agency.  If  there  were  not  this  unity,  there 
would  be  no  memory.  The  original  experience  has 
its  corresponding  physical  change,  the  permanent 
retaining  mental  mode  has  its  corresponding  perma- 
nent physical  change;  recollection  has  its  correspond- 
ing physical  re-excitement;  but  the  psychical  events 
are  not  generated  by  the  physical  and  are  not  mingled 
with  them:  they  constitute  a  pure  mental  succession, 
part  conscious,  part  unconscious.  The  same  undivided 
agent  must  have  the  original  experience,  must  retain 
it,  and  must  recollect  it.  We  shall  hereafter  find  rea- 
son for  the  belief  that  the  mind  is  as  permanent  as  the 
brain,  as  capable  therefore  of  conserving  permanent 
modes  as  the  brain,  and  of  affording  grounds  in  its 
permanent  modes  for  recollections.  Finally,  espe- 
cially the  great  unlikeness  of  cerebral  motion  and  any 
act  of  memory  favors  the  practical  belief  that  a 
change  is  possible  in  the  human  being,  by  which  mem- 
ory may  be  wholly  or  partly  liberated  from  its  physical 
conditions,  and  to  that  extent  exist  and  operate  inde- 
pendently of  them.  Death  may  bring  such  a  change; 
so  that  a  man's  memory  perish  not  necessarily  with 
the  inevitable  dissolution  of  his  brain. 

We  now  pass  to  some  additional  consideration  of 
memory  as  one  mode  of  knowledge,  and  comparison 
of  it  with  other  modes.  Memory  is  a  mediate  or  rep- 
resentative, not  an  immediate  knowledge.  It  is  a 
representative  knowledge  directly  of  past  mental 
experiences  only,  not  of  events  that  were  external  to 
mind.  External  events  are  remembered  by  means  of 
the  remembrance  of  our  perceptions  of  them.  In 
the  memory  of  a  past  external  event,  the  remember- 
irg  act  is  believed  to   represent  a  past   knowledge, 


COGNITION     OF     PAST     MENTAI.     STATES.  53 

which   is  believed  to  have   represented   an   external 
event. 

Something  has  been  already  said  in  comparison  of 
consciousness  and  memory.  Consciousness  is  knowl- 
edge of  the  present  phenomena  of  mind,  and  is  imme- 
diate. Memory  is  the  knowledge  of  the  past  phe- 
nomena, and  is  mediate;  it  is  a  present  representation 
of  a  past  experience.  There  is  no  consciousness  or 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  past.  In  memory  there 
is  indeed  consciousness  of  the  act  of  representation, 
but  not  of  the  past  act  represented.  The  representa- 
tion is  in  consciousness,  but  the  object  of  the  repre- 
sentation, the  past  act,  is  outside. 

It  is  important  to  discriminate  memory  as  a  mode 
of  representative  knowledge.  How  does  it  differ 
from  the  other  primary  mode  of  representative  knowl- 
edge, namely,  the  knowledge  of  extra-mental  objects? 
how,  in  brief,  does  the  knowledge  of  the  past  differ 
from  the  knowledge  of  the  external?  At  this  point, 
before  there  has  been  any  consideration  of  the  cogni- 
tion of  the  extra-mental,  we  can  not  go  far  in  com- 
parison of  our  mediate  knowledge  of  the  past  with  our 
mediate  knowledge  of  the  external.  We  observe 
here,  especially,  that,  while  memory  is  representative 
knowledge,  it  is  not  inferential  knowledge,  like  our 
perception  of  the  external.  In  the  latter  knowledge, 
the  representing  perception  and  the  external  object 
represented  are  existentially  separate;  and  the  con- 
viction that  the  perception  truly  represents  the  exter- 
nal object  is  the  result  of  a  mode  of  reasoning  or  infer- 
ence. The  chasm  between  the  subjective  perception 
and  the  object  is  crossed  by  inference.  But  in  mem- 
ory, on  the  other  hand,  the  representation  and  the 
past  event  represented  are  but  successive  modes  of 


54  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  one  mind :  and  stand  therefore  to  each  other  in  a 
close  and  peculiar  relation.  For  this  reason,  the  con- 
viction that  the  representation  resembles  an  event  of 
our  own  past  experience,  is  no  product  of  reasoning; 
but  arises  in  consciousness  immediately,  without  the 
help  or  occasion  of  any  reasoning  whatever,  and 
appears  perfect  from  the  first. 

Memory  as  a  mode  of  mediate  knowledge  is,  then, 
siti  generis.  The  interval  between  our  past  and  pres- 
ent experience  is  not  crossed  by  inference.  Our 
knowledge  or  belief  of  the  past,  though  a  representa- 
tion, is  not  the  effect  of  any  reasoning  or  synthesis; 
but  is  an  immediate,  spontaneous  product,  expres- 
sion, revelation,  of  the  special  relation  of  the  present 
act  remembering  and  the  past  act  remembered  to  the 
permanent  identical  mind,  or  to  each  other  as  its 
modes.  The  permanence  of  the  mind,  running  right 
through,  so  to  speak,  the  successive  transitory  experi- 
ences, is  the  foundation  of  the  recognitive  knowledge. 
Isolated  successive  experiences,  having  no  relation  to 
a  unitary  permanent  agent,  could  never  be  known  as 
successive  or  afford  the  knowledge  of  succession  or 
time.  But  with  all  this,  memory  remains  very  much 
a  mystery.  We  have  no  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
relation  which  the  present  thought  holds  to  the  past 
through  the  intermediate  stage  of  retention;  and  our 
belief  of  the  past  must  be  regarded  as  a  primary  and 
inexplicable  fact  of  mind.  There  have  been  many 
attempts  to  demonstrate  how  the  present  mental 
mode  becomes  convinced  of  its  hold  upon  a  past  men- 
tal mode;  but  these  too  often  end  in  an  intricate  and 
confusing  statement  of  the  simple  fact. 


COGNITION     OF     SUBJECTIVE     TIME.  55 

COGNITION     OF     SI^BJECTIVE     TIME. 

Memory  gives  directly  the  knowledge  of  sub- 
jective time,  which  is  our  first  knowledge  of  time,  and 
the  foundation  of  all  our  knowledge  of  it.  In  the 
cognition  of  subjective  time  we  attend  especially  to 
the  measure  of  the  remoteness  of  the  past  event  which 
in  recollection  we  are  convinced  we  represent.  The 
knowledge  of  time  involves  the  primary  mystery  of 
memory.  Cognition  of  the  past  is  a  present  cogni- 
tion ;  and  the  great  enigma  here  is  to  understand  how 
the  present  has  apprehension  of  the  past. 

The  views  of  Kant  regarding  the  cognition  and 
existence  of  time  have  long  had  wide  influence.  Kant 
holds  that  time  has  no  existence  outside  or  indepen- 
dent of  our  mind,  but  is  wholly  within  mind.  "Time 
....  in  itself,  apart  from  the  mind,  is  nothing."  i 
He  regards  time  as  he  regards  space,  as  a  "form"  of 
sense  "lying  a  priori  in  the  mind."  And  he  goes 
much  further  than  this.  Time  is  not  only  wholly 
subjective;  but,  as  subjective,  it  is  nothing  but  a  phe- 
nomenon or  illusion.  It  is  no  real  property  of  mind, 
or  real  property  or  relation  of  the  experiences  of  the 
mind;  it  is  no  ontological  fact.  As  a  phenomenon, 
it  does  not  correspond  to,  or  present,  anything  real  in 
mind.  The  mind  in  itself  is  timeless.  Its  afifections 
are  not  in  reality  in  temporal  arrangement;  they  have 
no  real  difference  of  present  and  past;  they  are  simul- 
taneous or  coexistent  or  timeless.  Accordingly, 
though  time  is  said  to  be  wholly  subjective,  it  is  yet 
as  little  a  real  property  of  mind,  as  it  is  of  anything 
external  to  or  distinct  from  mind.  Kant  makes  time 
simply  the  mode  in  which  the  timeless  mind  arranges 


(i)  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Hartenstein,  1867,  p.  68. 


56  THE      PRTNCIPLKS      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

its  timeless  afi'ections.  Our  affections,  having  in 
themselves  no  distinction  of  present  and  past,  or 
being  only  coexistent,  the  mind  causes  them  to  appear 
in  temporal  order.  In  fine,  the  doctrine  comes  to 
this:  time  is  but  an  appearance  or  illusion  produced 
or  created  by  the  timeless  mind;  or  it  is  a  phenom- 
enal form  created  by  the  mind  for  its  affections. 

The  Kantian  hypothesis  in  general  is  acceptable  to 
many;  but  it  seems  to  teach  what  is  unwarrantable 
and  impossible.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  suffi- 
cient reason  for  imputing  any  creative  power  to  the 
mind,  even  as  respects  only  phenomena  or  appear- 
ances. The  mind  has  certainly  remarkable  and 
important  synthetic  or  constructive  power;  but  in  all 
its  constructive  activity  there  is  no  proof  of  the  crea- 
tion of  either  a  real  or  phenomenal  quality  or  thing. 
The  assumption  that  the  timeless  mind  creates  a  phe- 
nomenal relation  of  its  experiences,  that  is,  the  tem- 
poral, which  is  so  contrary  to  their  supposed  real  rela- 
tion, which  so  misrepresents  and  conceals  that  rela- 
tion, we  may  safely  reject,  until  better  evidence  is 
brought  to  its  support  th^n  the  assertions  furnished 
by  the  school  of  Kant.  Subjective  time,  let  it  be  in 
itself  what  it  may,  phenomenal  or  real,  should  not  be 
regarded  as  a  product  of  the  mind's  own  synthesis  or 
creation. 

Again,  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  believing 
in  such  a  degree  of  severance  or  unlikeness  and  aliena- 
tion between  phenomena  or  thought  and  mental  real- 
ity as  is  assumed  by  the  Kantian  theory  of  time. 
Time,  duration  or  succession  can  not  be  onlv  a  phe- 
nomenon detached  from  mind,  a  form  hovering  in  a 
timeless  mind.     We  must  assume  a  much  closer  rela- 


COGNITION     OF     SUBJECTIVK     TIME.  57 

tion  and  correspondence  l)et\veen  the  idea  of  time  and 
the  mental  reality. 

We  seem  to  stand  nearer  facts  and  good  reasons 
in  holding-  that  time  is  an  original  and  real  property 
of  mind,  and  relation  of  its  experiences,  than  in  hold- 
ing it  to  be  only  an  appearance  detached  from  and 
contrary  to  the  real  character  of  the  mind  and  created 
bv  the  mind.  It  is  hard  to  l>elie^•e  that  the  idea  of 
time,  which  is  always  present,  and  is  so  prominent 
and  important  in  all  our  mental  life,  should  be  but  an 
appearance  entirely  unlike  the  real,  the  real  being 
timeless.  Thought  can  not  be  so  much  an  illusion, 
and  so  little  a  presentation  of  reality.  We  must  con- 
tend that  the  idea  of  time  can  not  exist  in  a  timeless 
mind.  The  idea  would  l)e  impossible,  apart  from  real 
time.  It  is  an  appearance  which  has  a  real  ground 
or  corresponding  reality.  There  would  be  no 
appearance  if  there  were  not  the  reality.  Mind  itself 
has  time  or  is  temporal;  its  affections  are  themselves 
really  successive,  or  past  and  present;  and  the 
thought  of  time  is  only  the  expression  of,  and  is 
inseparable  from,  the  real. 

To  state  a  main  point  of  our  doctrine  in  a  different 
form,  it  may  be  maintained  that  the  idea  of  time  is 
itself  temporal;  that  the  presenting  thought  possesses 
as  its  own  property  vidiat  it  presents.  This  view  does 
not  require  the  conclusion  that  the  thought  of  a  time 
must  be  as  long  as  the  time  thought  of.  Such  a 
conclusion  would  be  only  less  unreasonable  than  the 
assumption  that  the  thought  of  time  is  a  timeless 
thought.  Certainly  we  can  think  of  a  very  long  time 
in  a  very  short  time.  In  a  minute  or  two  we  can 
appreciate  great  periods  of  history,  yea,  even  the 
immense  cycles  of  geology  and  astronomy;    l)ut  this 


58  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

fact  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  thesis,  that  the 
thought  of  time  is  itself  temporal. 

While  we  deny  that  mind  has  a  creative  function 
as  respects  time,  we  must  admit  that  it  has  a  very 
important  synthetic  or  constructive  function.  Our 
ideas  of  long  times,  times  longer  than  our  own  experi- 
ence or  personal  knowledge,  are  constructions  of  our 
intellect.  But  they  are  not  formed  out  of  timeless- 
ness  or  timeless  elements.  They  are  formed  from 
ideas  of  short  timics;  ultimately,  from  the  primitive 
and  simple  ideas  of  time  in  which  the  presentation  is 
as  long  as  the  time  presented.  There  is  indispensable 
synthesis,  but  no  creation.  A -timeless  activity  does 
not  produce  time.  Succession  is  not  generated  from 
a  coexistent  manifold.  We  end  with  long  times, 
because  we  started  with  short  ones  as  original  and 
simple  facts  of  experience  and  materials  for  synthesis. 

After  all  that  can  be  said  of  the  perception  of  time, 
there  will  yet  remain  a  great  mystery  regarding  it,  as 
there  remains  regarding  memory.  The  mystery  per- 
tains not  to  the  cognition  of  times  longer  than  our  life 
or  personal  experience;  for  this  cognition,  though  a 
very  remarkable  fact,  may  be  regarded  as  the  result  of 
synthesis.  It  pertains  to  our  primitive  and  simple 
perceptions  of  time.  These  perceptions  are  of  the 
intervals  between  the  closely  succeeding  affections  of 
our  mind.  The  mystery  is.  How  do  we  cognize,  with 
a  present  affection  of  mind,  a  past  affection  of  a  par- 
ticular length  of  antecedence?  How  are  a  present  and 
a  past  affection  combined  in  the  unity  of  time,  or 
known  as  terms  of  one  succession?  As  to  this  pro- 
found fact,  we  can  only  assume,  and  this  we  seem 
obliged  to  assume,  that  it  has  its  ground  of  possibility 


COGNITION     OF     SUDJECTIVK     TIME.  59 

in  the  permanence  of  the  mind.  The  mind  endures 
between  the  successive  and  transitory  affections;  and 
every  primitive  cognition  of  a  time  interval  arises 
from  the  relation  of  the  successive  affections  to  the 
one  permanent  mind  or  from  their  relation  to  one 
another  as  its  affections.  The  cognition  may  be 
regarded  as  a  revelation  or  expression  of  the  perma- 
nence of  the  mind  between  the  successive  phenomena. 
Relating  mental  events  then  in  time  or  succession  is 
not  a  productive  process,  but  rather  the  passive 
experience  of  the  permanent  and  identical  mind,  i 

The  measurement  or  estimation  of  subjective  time 
is  a  matter  of  much  interest  and  importance;  but  we 
can  not  go  into  it  fully  here.  There  are  striking- 
variations  in  our  estimates  of  durations  of  the  same 
real  length.  When  the  mind  is  absorbed  in  pleasure, 
it  faintly  notes  time,  and  underestimates  it.  When 
suffering  pain,  it  is  inclined  to  overestimate  time. 
Further,,  our  estimation  of  a  time  is  influenced  by  the 
multiplicity  of  our  experiences  within  it.  Great 
variety  of  experiences  makes  a  time  appear  longer 
than  otherwise  it  would.  Such  causes  render  our 
measurements  of  time  variable  to  a  degree;    never- 


(i)  Professor  Green  teaches  a  doctrine  very  different  tiom 
this.  He  says:  "The  relation  of  events  to  each  other  as  in 
time  impHes  their  equal  presence  to  a  subject  which  is  not  in 
time."  '"There  is  an  absolute  difference  between  change  and 
the  intelligent  consciousness  or  knowledge  of  change."  (Prolcg. 
to  Ethics,  p.  55  and  p.  58.)  But  there  is  no  sufficient  warrant 
for  these  unqualified  assertions.  Mental  events  are  known  as 
in  time  on  the  double  ground  of  their  own  real  succession  and 
the  real  permanence  of  their  subject.  The  knowledge  of  mental 
change  could  not  exist  apart  from  real  change.  The  thought 
is  possible  only  in  the  reality.  Thought  is  inseparable  from  the 
reality  and  the  same. 


6o  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

theless,  the  primary  ground  of  the  measurements  of 
the  time  of  our  experiences  are  the  real  time  intervals 
between  them.  Therefrom  it  results  that  the  individ- 
ual's measurements  of  time  have  a  substantial  uni- 
formity, and,  it  may  be  added,  that  there  is  the  gen- 
eral belief  that  we  live  in  a  uniformly  progressing 
time. 


CHAPTER    III. 

IS    T?IE    KNOWLEDGE    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES 

RELATIVE? 

It  is  a  doctrine  widely  accepted  by  philosophers 
that  difference  or  contrast  is  an  indispensa1)le  condi- 
tion of  consciousness  and  knowledge;  "that  we  only 
know  anything,  by  knowing  it  as  distinguished  from 
something  else;  that  all  consciousness  is  of  difference; 
that  two  objects  are  the  smallest  number  required  to 
constitute  consciousness;  that  a  thing  is  only  seen  to 
be  what  it  is,  by  contrast  with  what  it  is  not."  This  is 
one  of  the  chief  meanings  of  the  much-used  expres- 
sion, "the  relativity  of  knowledge." 

This  doctrine  is  affirmed  of  all  knowledge  —  the 
knowledge  of  subjective  things,  the  knowledge  of 
objective  things,  the  knowledge  of  subjective  and 
objective.  For  example,  it  is  said  that  an  affection  of 
mind  can  be  known  only  in  comparison  with  another 
or  others;  that  subject  and  object,  ego  and  non-ego, 
mind  and  matter,  are  known  only  as  they  stand  in  con- 
trast with  one  another;  that  subject  has  no  meaning 
and  would  not  be  known  without  object.  We  are 
now  concerned  with  this  doctrine  in  its  application 
to  the  mental  modes  —  with  the  question  whether 
we  cognize  one  mental  mode  only  as  we  are  con- 
scious of  its  difference  from  another,  or  of  its  differ- 
ence accompanied  with  resemblance. 

A  number  of  distinct  points  must  be  taken  account 
of  in  the  consideration  of  this  subject;  as,  Does  con- 
trast or  comparison  always  accompany  the  conscious- 

(  61  ) 


62  the:    principles    of    knowledge. 

ness  of  a  mental  state?  Does  it  necessarily  accom- 
pany? If  necessarily,  what  kind  or  degree  of  it?  How 
far  is  the  knowledge  of  the  individual  state  or  term 
affected  or  modified  by  the  comparison  in  which  it  is 
known  ? 

That  knowledge  of  the  mental  states  can  not  take 
place  without  the  perception  of  contrast  and  resem- 
blance, and  that  it  consists  in  this  perception,  is  but 
the  repetition  and  advancement  of  the  principle  of 
Locke,  that  "knowledge  is  the  perception  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas."  One  thing 
must  be  granted  to  this  view,  that  as  a  matter  of  fact 
all  our  cognitions  do  take  place  with  comparison. 
This  results  at  least  from  the  great  multiplicity  and 
variety  of  the  phenomena  of  which  the  mind  by  its 
internal  nature  is  capable,  and  from  their  very  rapid 
and  numerous  successions  and  coexistences.  Every 
sensation  or  feeling  is  attended  or  quickly  followed  by 
others,  and  contrasts  and  agreements  between  simul- 
taneous original  modes,  or  between  present  original 
modes  and  the  memories  of  past  modes,  may  occur 
every  second.  Thus  from  the  mom.ent  of  the  dawn 
of  consciousness  onward,  because  of  the  marvelously 
varied  and  rapid  experiences  of  the  mind,  comparison 
among  them  is  always  possible,  and  is  continually 
taking  place. 

But  the  contrasts  and  comparisons  which  mani- 
festly may  and  do  take  place  with  all  acts  of  knowl- 
edge or  states  of  consciousness,  owing  to  the  wealth 
of  the  faculties  and  the  circumstances  of  the  mind,  do 
not  of  themselves  prove  that  they  are  necessary  to 
knowledge,  that  consciousness  can  not  exist  without 
them,  that  consciousness  of  one  sensation  or  mode  of 
mind,  without  comparison  with  any  other,  is  impos- 


IS  KNOWLEDGE  OF  MENTAL  STATES  RELATIVE  ?         63 

sible.  The  necessity  of  contrast,  and  the  respect  and 
measure  in  which  it  is  necessary,  can  only  be  proved 
and  determined  by  facts  bearing  positively  on  these 
points. 

There  are  different  species  and  measures  of  con- 
trasts pertaining  to  the  mental  states.  First,  there  is 
the  simple  contrast  in  the  rise  of  an  affection  from 
non-existence  into  existence.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says 
of  this:  "The  first  or  simplest  act  of  comparison  is  the 
discrimination  of  existence  from  non-existence;  and 
the  first  or  simplest  judgment  is  the  affirmation  of 
existence,  in  other  words,  the  denial  of  non-exist- 
ence." I  Secondly,  besides  the  contrast  of  existence 
and  non-existence,  or  of  cessation  and  renewal,  there 
is  that  of  degrees  of  the  same  continuous  affection. 
A  third  species  of  contrast  is  between  qualitatively 
different  affections,  successive  or  simultaneous. 

Of  these  modes  of  contrast,  the  first  is  hardly 
entitled  to  consideration  in  the  discussion  of  con- 
sciousness; for.  while  the  difference  between  exist- 
ence and  non-existence  is  very  important  to  the  exist- 
ing thing  itself,  we  may  doubt  whether  it  alone  can 
awaken  consciousness.  The  comparison  of  existence 
with  non-existence  is  the  comparison  of  something 
with  nothing,  or  is  really  no  comparison  at  all.  There 
is  but  one  thing  present;  and  the  absolute  contrast 
or  negation  implied  in  pure  non-existence  hardly 
forms  a  real  determination  for  consciousness.  We 
hear,  indeed,  from  some,  that  Being  and  Not-Being 
or  Nothing  are  both  different  and  the  same.  While 
this  may  be  stated  in  a  manner  that  may  escape  the 
charge  of  being  sheer  absurdity,  yet,  in  fact,  the  only 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.  465. 


64  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

contrasts  that  really  appear  in  knowledge,  or  at  least 
in  the  awakening  of  consciousness  and  knowledge,  are 
those  amons:  different  somethings  or  modes,  incliid- 
ing  different  degrees. 

Difference  of  degree  in  the  mental  affections  gives 
us,  if  not  different  existences,  yet  at  any  rate  different 
e.vistings,  and  therefore  something  more  than  the  con- 
trast of  existence  and  non-existence;  and  affords  a 
real  basis  for  comparison  and  discrimination.  The 
difference  of  qualities  is  clearly  a  mutual  determina- 
tion. Now  it  seems  necessary  to  admit  that  differ- 
ence of  degree  or  difference  of  quality  not  only  always 
exists  in  consciousness,  but  is  indispensable  to  it. 
Some  well-known  facts  apparently  prove  that  a  uni- 
form or  unvarying  sensation  excites  no  consciousness 
or  is  unfelt;  as,  for  example,  our  insensibility  to  the 
pressure  of  the  air  on  the  body,  to  the  weight  of  the 
body,  and  to  the  contact  of  clothing.  A  sensation,  as 
a  sound,  which  was  at  first  strange  and  striking,  we 
cease  to  regard  because  of  uniform  continuousness. 
From  such  instances,  it  seems  that  the  contrast  or 
shock  of  differences  in  intensity  and  vividness  is  neces- 
sary to  consciousness  and  the  very  beginning  of 
knowledge.  Degrees  of  intensity  serve  to  define  and 
individualize  one  another.  In  the  absence  of  dis- 
tinctness of  qualities,  one  degree  of  an  affection  forms 
a  limit  or  demarkation  for  another,  and  therel^y  makes 
definite  thought  of  it  possible. 

Where  difference  of  degree  is  wanting,  difference 
of  quality  seems  to  be  necessary.  An  unvarying 
affection  is  known  only  by  being  marked  off  from 
another  or  others.  To  say  that  an  affection  is  this 
implies  the  ability  to  say  it  is  not  that.  To  know  is  to 
draw  a  definite  line.     An  affection  that  has  no  limits, 


IS  KNOWLEDGE  OF  MENTAL  STATES  RELATIVE?         65 

that  meets  with  or  is  confined  by  no  distinct  surround- 
ing, or  only  by  pure  non-existence  or  nothingness,  is 
unknown.  The  mind  appears  to  awaken  in  the  act  of 
discriminating  degrees  or  qualities.  Always  to  think 
the  same,  is  not  to  think. 

So  far  the  doctrine  of  relativity  as  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  mental  phenomena  seems  to  be  true.  But 
manv  have  gone  bevond  this  into  verv  erroneous 
extremes.  Some  have  not  only  affirmed  the  necessity 
of  comparison  in  knowledge,  but  have  made  the  com- 
parison everything,  to  the  entire  depreciation  of  the 
individual  things  compared.  They  hold  that  the 
knowledge  of  a  mental  state  is  dependent,  as  to  con- 
tent, as  well  as  to  possibility,  upon  the  other  states 
with  which  it  is  compared;  that  a  mental  state  appears 
to  be  Avhat  it  is  by  reason  of  its  relation  to  others,  or 
by  reason  of  the  others  to  which  it  is  related,  and  has 
no  independent  or  absolute  character  in  conscious- 
ness. Comparison  itself  has  been  made  expressly 
and  in  effect  a  source  of  knowledge,  a  productive  or 
creative  activity.  Prof.  A.  Bain  remarks:  "I  believe 
it  correct  to  say,  first,  'Along  with  whatever  any  intel- 
ligence knows,  it  must,  as  the  ground  or  condition  of 
its  knowledge,  have  some  cognizance  of  a  quality  in 
contrast  to  what  is  known.'  It  is  the  contrast  that 
really  determines  what  the  knowledge  is  as  well  as 
makes  it  possible.  To  know  light,  we  must  know 
something  else  that  afit'ects  the  mind  differently,  as 
darkness.  New  contrasts  give  new  knowledge.  The 
naming  of  a  quality  gives  us  no  information,  unless  we 
can  find  out  the  contrasts  whereb}^  it  sprang  up."  ^ 
"Any  single  thing  is  unknowable  by  us;  its  relative 


(i)  Emotions  and  Will,  2nd  Ed.,  pp.  597,  598. 
^5) 


66  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

opposite  is  a  part  of  its  very  existence."  ^  Substan- 
tially the  same  doctrine  is  a  favorite  one  with  the 
Hegelians.  vSays  Prof.  E.  Caird:  "  'Every  finite 
thing  is  itself,  and  no  other.'  True.  Hegel  would 
answer,  but  with  a  caveat.  Every  finite  thing,  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  finite,  has  an  essential  relation  to  that 
which  limits  it,  and  thus  it  contains  the  principle  of 
its  destruction  in  itself.  It  is,  therefore,  in  this  sense, 
a  self-contradictoi-y  existence,  which  at  once  is  itself 
and  its  other  —  itself  and  not  itself.  It  is  at  war  with 
itself,  and  its  very  life-process  is  the  process  of  its  dis- 
solution." ^ 

This  doctrine  of  relativity  has  been  applied  alike  to 
the  intensity  or  degree,  the  special  quality,  and  the 
time  or  duration,  of  sensations.  Whatever  a  sensa- 
tion is,  in  any  of  these  properties,  depends,  we  are 
told,  on  the  sensations  with  which  it  is  related.  We 
must  admit  that,  as  to  the  intensity  and  vividness  of 
sensations,  there  is  a  measure  of  truth  in  the  doctrine. 
Some  "phenomena  of  contrast"  seem  to  make  it  clear 
that  in  many  instances  these  attributes  of  sensations 
are  determined  by  relation  or  comparison. 

But  what  is  true  of  the  intensity  of  sensations,  is 
not  true,  or  to  the  same  extent  true,  of  their  particular 
quality.  There  may  be  no  consciousness  of  quality 
without  contrast;  nevertheless,  quality  has  indepen- 
dence and  constancy  in  contrast.  Perfect  or  unquali- 
fied independence  can  not  be  claimed;  but  a  very 
considerable  degree  can  be,  enough  to  make  possible 
the  identification  of  a  sensation  in  very  different  rela- 
tions.    If  this  were  not  the  case,  the  uniformity  and 


(i)  Note  in  Mill's  Analysis:  IT.,  p.  12. 
(2)   Hegel,  p.  136. 


IS  KNOWLKDGE  OF  MENTAL  STATES  RELATIVE  ?         67 

constancy  which  nndoiil^tedly  belong  to  the  experi- 
ence of  the  individual  would  seem  to  be  impossible; 
and  also  the  uniformity,  constancy  and  sameness  of 
experiences  which  are  a  first  condition  of  all  human 
association  and  fellowship.  Sensations,  then,  we 
maintain,  have  an  absolute  content  or  quality. 
Though  every  act  of  consciousness  or  knowledge  is 
some  extent  of  comparison,  still  the  affections  com- 
pared have  their  independent  and  permanent  char- 
acter, —  permanent,  that  is,  in  preserving  uniformity 
in  repetitions  and  diverse  relations;  the  same  sensa- 
tions, in  quality,  are  occasioned  by  the  same  nervous 
processes.  If  a  sensation  is  known  only  in  compari- 
son with  others,  the  others  are  known  only  in  com- 
parison with  it;  the  determination  or  definition  is 
reciprocal;  and  this  reciprocity  would  seem  to  require 
independence  of  quality  in  the  contrasted  terms.  In 
short,  the  necessity  of  change,  or  contrast,  or  com- 
parison, to  the  beginning  and  to  every  degree  of 
knowledge,  does  not  require  us  to  admit  that  absolute 
qualities  and  units  or  measures  do  not  exist  and  can 
not  be  known  as  they  exist. 

Advocates  of  the  extreme  doctrine  of  relativity  as 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  special  quality  of  sensations, 
impute  great  superiority  to  relations  over  the  terms 
related;  and,  especially,  in  many  cases,  ascribe  a  pro- 
ductive or  creative  function  to  the  relating  activity  of 
mind,  to  comparison,  intellection,  for  which  there  is 
little  warrant.  Surely  nothing  is  more  important  in  a 
relation  than  the  terms  related.  Without  them  the 
relation  is  nothing.  Remove  them  and  the  relation 
collapses  as  a  bridge  w'hen  its  abutments  are  washed 
away. 


68  the;    principles    op    knowledge. 

Generally  superiority  is  reckoned  to  relations  over 
the  phenomena  related,  on  the  ground  of  the  assump- 
tion that  the  relating  action  of  mind  is  in  an  important 
measure  generative  or  creative.  The  particular  char- 
acter of  the  terms  related  is  said  to  be  the  product  of 
the  act  of  relatino^;  and  sometimes  the  relating  and 
the  character  of  the  terms  related  are  so  distinguished 
from  the  producing  action  of  the  intellect,  as  that  the 
former  are  called  product,  and  the  latter  process.  Here 
a  productive  power  is  reckoned  to  intellection  similar 
to  that  which,  as  we  saw  in  the  preceding  chapter,  is 
bv  some  reckoned  to  it  in  the  rise  of  the  thousfht  of 
time  or  succession  from  the  non-temporal  or  the 
coexistent.  Professor  Green  says  of  intelligence:  "It 
is  through  it  that  the  sensation  of  the  present  moment 
takes  a  character  from  comparison  with  the  sensation 
of  a  moment  ago,  and  that  the  occurrence,  consisting 
in  the  transition  from  one  to  the  other,  is  presented  to 
us.  It  is  essential  to  the  comparison  and  to  the  char- 
acter which  the  sensations  acquire  from  the  compari- 
son." "If  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  connected  experi- 
ence of  related  objects,  there  must  be  operative  in 
consciousness  a  unifying  principle,  which  not  only 
presents  related  objects  to  itself,  but  at  once  renders 
them  objects  and  unites  them  in  relation  to  each  other 
by  this  act  of  presentation."  i 

The  just  importance  of  intellection  in  knowledge 
must  not  be  neglected  or  denied;  but  so  great  pro- 
ductive or  creative  efficiency  as  the  school  of  Profes- 
sor Green  attribute  to  it,  is  an  unsupported  assump- 
tion.    We  certainly  have  connected  experience;   and 


(i)  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  31  and  p.  34. 


IS  KNOWT.EDGK  OF  MENTAL  STATp:S  RELATIVE  ?         69 

the  members  of  this  experience  may  to  an  extent 
quahfy  one  another.  Further,  there  is  certainly  more 
in  comparison  than  the  mental  states  concerned  taken 
as  individuals.  In  comparison  there  is  unity  of  con- 
sciousness: there  is  revealed  the  unity  of  the  mind,  or 
the  ownership  by  the  one  mind  of  the  different  phe- 
nomena. There  is  real  synthesis  of  phenomena.  But 
we  have  no  warrant  for  postulating  creative  intelli- 
gence for  our  combined  experiences.  Diverse  sensa- 
tions stand  related  to  one  another  because  they  are 
affections  of  the  one  mind.  In  the  knowledge  of  their 
relation,  there  is  no  special  act  of  productive  intellec- 
tion. If  they  are  simultaneous,  they  are  simply 
embraced  in  the  unity  of  consciousness.  If  they  are 
successive,  they  are  so  in  fact,  and  are  so  known,  on 
the  sfround  of  the  Dermanence  of  the  mind;  time 
being  a  real  property  of  mental  substance.  What  we 
know,  is  what  is.  There  is  no  productive  relating 
process.  In  our  simplest  relating  of  the  mental  phe- 
nomena, there  is  no  difference  of  product  and  process. 
JDifTerent  phenomena  and  the  knowledge  of  their  rela- 
tion are  inseparable.  What  exists  is  known,  not 
because  it  is  made  by  intellection,  but  because  it 
exists.  Above  the  simplest  relating  of  phenomena, 
there  is  no  doubt  much  synthesis  and  construction  by 
the  intellect,  as  in  the  formation  of  percepts;  but  no 
creation.  The  only  creative  intelligence  is  that  of 
God;  who  made  the  mind  of  man  and  endowed  it  in 
its  independence,  so  to  speak,  with  all  its  faculties  or 
permanent  possibilities  of  varied  alTections  and  of 
comparing  and  synthesizing  them. 

We  hold,  then,  particularly  as  to  the  special  quality 
of  sensations,  that  our  knowledge  is  not  a  product  of 


70  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  creative  activity  of  our  intelligence;  in  knowing, 
our  intellect  is  active,  but  not  creative.  We  hold, 
further,  affirmatively,  as  to  quality,  that  our  knowl- 
edge is  both  relative  and  absolute.  Our  knowledge 
is  relative;  for  a  sensation  is  known  only  as  finite,  as 
limited,  or  with  a  relative  affection;  "to  think  it  is  to 
condition  it."  But  our  knowledge  is  also  absolute; 
for  a  sensation,  in  its  finiteness  or  in  its  relation,  is 
itself  and  no  other.  The  limiting  or  relative  affection 
does  not  make  it  what  it  is,  or  make  it  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  what  it  was.  Dependence  as  to  knowl- 
edge can  not  be  construed  to  be  dependence  as  to 
character.  Hence,  to  say  of  an  affection  of  mind, 
because  of  its  relativity  in  consciousness,  that  it  is 
made  by  that  "which  is  not  itself,"  or  "it  is  itself  and 
not  itself,"  or  "its  relative  opposite  is  part  of  its  very 
existence,"  is  to  posit  an  extravagant  and  unwarrant- 
able thesis. 

What  has  been  said  as  to  the  existence  and 
knowledge  of  the  distinctive  quality  of  sensations, 
may,  in  substance,  be  repeated  as  to  the  existence  and 
knowledge  of  t,he  duration  or  time  intervals  of  sensa- 
tions. Our  knowledge  of  the  time  of  a  sensation  is 
relative,  because  we  always  know  the  time  of  a  sensa- 
tion, as  of  every  other  affection  of  mind,  in  compari- 
son with  the  time  of  another  or  others.  But  our 
knowledge  of  the  time  of  sensations  is  more  than  rela- 
tive. It  is  both  relative  and  absolute.  The  time  of  a 
sensation  is  real,  not  merely  phenomenal;  and  our 
knowledge  includes  the  knowledge  of  the  real.  Rela- 
tivity does  not  exclude  absoluteness.  The  latter  may 
not  be  possible  without  the  former;  but  it  is  not 
impossible  with  it. 


IS  KNOWLEDGE  OF  MENTAL  STATES  RELATIVE?         7  I 

But  we  must  admit  that  our  absolute  knowledge 
of  subjective  times,  or  our  knowledge  of  the  real  and 
independent  length  of  subjective  times,  is  not  perfectly 
exact  and  unvarying.  As  has  been  already  remarked, 
our  judgments  of  times  are  often  not  strictly  true  to 
their  real  lengths.  In  some  instances  we  think  that 
our  experiences  are  longer,  in  others  that  they  are 
shorter,  than  they  really  are.  All  that  can  be  claimed, 
then,  is  that  our  judgments  or  estimates  are  approxi- 
mately true.  This  much  may  be  maintained.  It  is 
the  ground  of  the  universal  conviction  that  time  is  a 
uniform  progression,  and  of  the  general  uniformity 
and  constancy  of  our  estimates.  In  the  measurement 
of  the  time  of  its  experiences,  the  mind  often  calls  to 
its  aid,  or  relies  upon,  an  objective  standard  or  meas- 
urer, as  the  clock.  But  it  is  a  very  important  fact, 
which  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  (though  it  often  is 
lost  sight  of),  that  the  existence  of  the  objective  clock, 
as  also  its  accuracy  and  trustworthiness,  are  known 
to  us  solely  through  the  pure  subjective  affections  or 
states.  Hence,  however  important  and  however 
much  employed  are  objective  measurers,  still  the  pri- 
mary measurement  of  subjective  time,  and  the  founda- 
tion of  all  measurement  of  it,  is  the  mind's  own  direct 
estimate.  The  mind's  judgments  of  the  times  of  its 
experiences,  we  have  admitted,  are  not  perfect  in 
exactness  and  constancy;  but  they  approximate  the 
real;  and  their  approximation  is  generally  so  close 
that  we  get  along  in  our  individual  and  social  life 
nearly  as  well  probably,  in  many  of  our  interests,  as 
we  would  if  they  were  always  strictly  accurate  and 
unvarying.  We  observe,  finally,  that,  contrary  to  the 
view    of    the    knowledge    of    subjective    time    here 


72  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

expressed,  many  psychologists  have  held,  on  the 
ground,  in  part,  of  the  variableness  of  our  estimates  of 
time,  that  the  knowledge  of  time  is  only  relative,  and 
in  no  sense,  or  degree,  or  measure  of  approximation, 
absolute.  This  seems  to  be  an  error  pregnant  with 
very  serious  consequences. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

CLASSIFICATION    OF   THE    MENTAL   STATES    AND 
THEIR  CHIEF  COMPOSITIONS. 

The  consideration  of  the  classification  of  the  men- 
tal phenomena  has  importance  here  especially  for 
the  ascertainment  of  the  elements  and  the  chief  struc- 
tures of  knowledge,  and  the  delimitation  of  intelli- 
gence. The  primary  mental  phenomena  are  the 
elementary  materials  of  knowledge. 

It  has  been  common,  since  Kant,  to  divide  the 
mental  states  into  three  grand  classes,  namely,  those 
of  Knowledge  or  Intellect,  of  Feeling,  and  of  Will. 
Before  this  a  twofold  division  was  common,  into  the 
phenomena  of  Understanding  and  Will,  the  feelings 
being  distributed  under  theee.  The  threefold  divi- 
sion, though  at  this  time  very  generally  accepted  by 
psychologists,  is  yet  far  from  being  uniformly  under- 
stood; and  needs  to  be  subjected  to  a  renewed  critical 
consideration  and  discussion,  for  the  establishment  of 
its  real  scientific  value,  and  for  the  more  definite  and 
clear  settlement  of  the  lines  of  discrimination  and  limi- 
tation. There  is  especial  need  of  careful  and  clear 
determination  of  the  relation  the  intellectual  states 
hold  to  the  other  classes.  There  is  need  also  of  mark- 
ing the  line  between  feeling  or  emotion  and  volition. 
It  is  manifest  that  many  who  accept  the  three  divi- 
sions leave  no  real  difference  between  emotion  and 
volition,  but  make  them  essentially  the  same,  or  only 
stages  in  the  same  act. 

The  gravest  defect  of  the  above  triple  division  is 

(73) 


74  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

its  lack  of  strict  logicalness.  The  terms  of  the  division 
are  not  coordinate  and  mutually  exclusive.  Knowl- 
edge does  not  exclude  feeling  and  willing.  These 
latter  are  certainly  modes  of  knowledge;  they  are 
states  of  consciousness  or  immediate  knowledge.  It 
should  be  here  observed,  that  our  knowledge  consists 
of  two  great  divisions,  immediate  and  mediate  knowl- 
edge, or  rather  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  and  the 
knowledge  of  things  external  to  the  mind.  These 
divisions  may  be  stated  in  another  form,  employing 
Locke's  definitions  of  knowledge:  part  of  our  knowl- 
edge is  the  "perception  of  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  any  of  our  ideas,"  i  and  of  the  subject  to 
which  they  are  related;  the  other  part  is  the  knowl- 
edge or  inference  of  the  "conformity  between  our 
ideas"  2  and  external  realities.  Now  advocates  of  the 
triple  classification  of  the  mental  phenomena  are  too 
much  disposed  on  occasion  to  limit  the  term  knowl- 
edge or  cognition  to  the  perception  of  things  exter- 
nal, or  to  those  states  of  mind  which  have  a  direct 
reference  to  the  external.  But  no  matter  how  direct 
and  strone:  mav  be  the  reference  of  some  states  of 
mind  to  the  external,  still  in  themselves,  and  as 
including  this  reference,  they  are  pure  states  of  mind; 
and,  therefore,  the  first  and  chief  classification  of  them 
is  based,  not  on  their  relation  to  the  external,  but  on 
their  relation  to  the  other  states  of  mind.  Other 
modes  of  mind  are  as  really  facts  of  consciousness  or 
immediate  knowledge  as  they,  and  on  this  account 
they  can  not  rightly  alone  be  called  knowledge. 


(i)  Locke,  Essay,  IV.,  i.  i,  2. 

(2)  lb.,  IV.,  iv.  I,  3.  Locke's  definitions  of  knowledge  are 
partial.  Extending  and  combining  them  we  obtain  the  full  defi- 
nition of  knowledge. 


CLASSIFICATION    OV    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  75 

The  classification  of  the  mental  states  which  we 
have  been  considering  is  earnestly  maintained  by  Sir 
\\\  Hamilton,  and  its  currency  among  English-speak- 
ing people  owes  much  to  him.  But  his  exposition, 
like  that  of  others,  makes  it  plain  that  a  tangle  is  inevi- 
table so  long  as  knowledge  is  classed  as  coordinate 
with  feeling  and  willing.  Of  the  differential  char- 
acteristics of  cognition  and  feeling,  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
says:  "In  the  phaenomena  of  Cognition,  conscious- 
ness distinguishes  an  object  known  from  the  subject 
knowing.  This  object  may  be  of  two  kinds:  it  may 
either  be  the  quality  of  something  different  from  the 
ego:  or  it  may  be  a  modification  of  the  ego  or  subject 
itself.  In  the  former  case,  the  object,  which  may  be 
called  for  the  sake  of  discrimination  the  object-object, 
is  given  as  something  different  from  the  percipient 
subject.  In  the  latter  case,  the  object,  which  may  be 
called  the  subject-object,  is  given  as  really  identical  with 
the  conscious  ego,  but  still  consciousness  distin- 
guishes it,  as  an  accident,  from  the  ego;  —  as  the  sub- 
ject of  that  accident,  it  projects,  as  it  were,  this  sub- 
jective phaenomenon  from  itself,  —  views  it  at  a  dis- 
tance, —  in  a  word,  objectifies  it.  This  discrimina- 
tion of  self  from  self  —  this  objectitication  —  is  the 
quality  which  constitutes  the  essential  peculiarity  of 
Cognition.  In  the  phaenomena  of  Feeling,  —  the 
phaenomena  of  Pleasure  and  Pain,  —  on  the  contrary, 
consciousness  does  not  place  the  mental  modification 
or  state  before  itself;  it  does  not  contemplate  it  apart, 
—  as  separate  from  itself,  —  but  is,  as  it  w^ere,  fused 
into  one.  The  peculiarity  of  Feeling,  therefore,  is 
that  there  is  nothing  but  what  is  subjectively  sub- 
jective; there  is  no  object  different  from  self,  —  no 
objectification  of  any  mode  of  self.     We  are.  indeed. 


76  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

able  to  constitute  our  states  of  pain  and  pleasure  into 
objects  of  reflection,  but  in  so  far  as  they  are  objects 
of  reflection,  they  are  not  feelings,  but  only  reflex 
cognitions  of  feeling."  i  Tt  must,  however,  be  held, 
on  the  contrary,  that  feelings  and  volitions  are  "sub- 
ject-objects," are  known  or  distinguished  in  con- 
sciousness, as  really,  if  not  as  vividly,  as  any  so-called 
cognitive  phenomena.  They  are  objects  of  con- 
sciousness or  internal  knowledge.  They  are  also 
"objects"  of  reflection  or  memory;  but  they  would 
never  be  so  if  they  had  not  been  previously  known  in 
consciou.sness,  that  is,  immediately  and  in  themselves. 
Moreover,  objectification  or  externalization  of  cogni- 
tions is  wholly  phenomenal,  not  real.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  apparent  objectification,  cognitions,  as  phe- 
nomena, in  themselves,  remain  entirely  subjective. 
No  phenomena  are  more  really  and  more  fully  pure 
subjective  states.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  again  distin- 
guishes knowledge  and  feeling,  perception  and  sensa- 
tion, thus:  "Perception  is  only  a  special  kind  of 
knowledge,  and  sensation  only  a  special  kind  of  feel- 
ing."  -  But  this  distinction  as  thus  stated  can  not 
hold:  for  the  reason  that  sensation  itself  is  a  true 
mode  of  internal  perception  or  knowledge.  In  such 
instances,  vSir  W.  Hamilton  arbitrarily  limits  the  term 
knowledge  to  external  knowledge.  Rejecting  there- 
fore the  above  tripartite  division  of  the  mental  phe- 
nomena, we  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  another. 
The  first  and  principal  classification  of  the  psy- 
chical phenomena  grounds  itself  on  the  relations  of 
these  phenomena  to  one  another,  or  on  their  internal 


(i)  Metaphysics,  pp.  571,  572. 
(2)    .Metaphysics,  p.  335. 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    THF    MENTAL    STATES.  77 

resemblances  and  differences;  and  disregards  their 
relations  to  things  beyond  the  mind.  As  we  classify 
external  objects  on  their  relations  to  one  another 
without  special  regard  to  their  relations  to  our  mental 
states,  so  we  may  classify  the  mental  states  on  their 
relations  to  one  another  without  special  regard  to 
their  relations  to  external,  objects. 

There  are  three  primary  faculties  of  mind,  namely, 
Sense,  Emotion,  and  Will;  or,  there  are  three  classes 
of  primary  mental  phenomena,  Sensations,  Emotions, 
and  Volitions.  ^     These  phenomena  are  alike  original, 

(i)  By  faculties  we  mean  functions,  or  rather  distinct  per- 
manent potentialities  or  conditions,  in  the  one  mind,  of  phe- 
nomena. The  fundamental  cause  of  a  sensation  is  not  the 
external  stimtilus.  but  a  potentiality,  or  power,  or  condition,  in 
the  mind  itself.  The  external  stimulus  is  only  the  occasion  of 
a  potentiality  passing  to  actuality.  The  permanent  potentiality 
or  possibility  in  mind  of  sensation,  may  be  called  the  faculty  of 
sensation.  In  latter  times,  there  has  been  much  zealous  oppo- 
sition to  "faculties."  This  opposition  has  arisen  from  several 
causes.  In  some  instances  it  has  been  occasioned  by  mistake 
as  to  the  meaning  of  those  psychologists  who  have  assumed 
faculties.  They  have  been  supposed  to  destroy  the  unity  of  the 
mind.  It  may  be,  however,  that  some  writers  have  occasionally 
inade  faculties  too  independent  of  one  another,  or  have  isolated 
them  too  much,  and  have  not  put  due  stress  on  the  unity  of 
mind  to  which  they  are  subject.  Others  have  opposed  faculties 
because  of  their  assumption  that  there  is  but  one  primary  form 
or  type  of  mental  activity,  as  sensation  or  sense-perception,  and 
that  the  other  phenomena,  as  feeling  and  volition,  are  but  deri- 
vatives from  it.  'Sensations  are  the  simple  elements  out  of 
whose  reciprocal  action  the  totality  of  the  rest  of  the  soul's  life 
is  assumed  to  originate."  They  then  deny  that  there  are  dis- 
tinct original  potentialities  or  powers  in  the  indivisible  mind 
corresponding-  to  the  apparent  classes  of  phenomena.  Again, 
others  reject  faculties  because  they  deny  the  existence  of  a 
permanent  mind.  They  regard  the  mental  phenomena  as  only 
a  continuous  stream,  having  no  relation  to  an  abiding  spiritual 
subject.  It  must  be  admitted  that  faculties  stand  or  fall  with 
the  permanency  of  the  mind. 


78  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

iinderived.  They  have  the  same  relation  to  con- 
sciousness and  to  memory;  they  are  alike  modes  of 
consciousness,  and  are  all  conserved  by  memory.  In 
emotions  are  included  appetite,  desire,  fear,  anger, 
love,  joy,  grief.  In  both  sensations  and  emotions  are 
included  the  pleasures  and  pains.  The  latter  may  be 
regarded  as  attributes  of  sensations  and  emotions,  but 
not  the  essential  or  fundamental  attributes.  Feeling 
is  a  general  name  for  sensations  and  emotions;  tone, 
for  the  pleasures  and  pains.  It  should  be  remarked 
that,  while  the  different  kinds  of  mental  phenomena 
are  distinguishable,  they  are  yet  not  separable.  They 
are  always  related  in  consciousness,  and  known  in 
their  relations.  As  observed  by  »Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
"we  are  able  to  distinguish  as  simple,  by  an  ideal 
abstraction  and  analysis,  what  is  never  actually  given 
except  in  composition."  i  It  must  never  be  lost  sight 
of  that,  while  it  is  important  for  purposes  of  science 
to  distinguish  the  diverse  modes  and  faculties  of  mind, 
all  modes  are  but  modes  of  the  one  mind,  all  faculties 
are  but  the  different  ways  in  which  the  one  mind 
exerts  itself,  all  relations  of  modes  are  based  on  the 
unity  of  the  mind. 

I.  Sensations  are  easily  discriminated  in  con- 
sciousness from  the  other  primary  mental  phenomena. 
The  difference  between  a  sound  or  color,  and  fear, 
or  desire,  or  ^'olition,  is  perfectly  clear  and  certain. 
But  to  define  sensations  with  reference  to  the  other 
phenomena  and  distinguish  them  as  a  class,  they  are 
states  of  mind  that  do  not  require,  or  are  not  condi- 
tioned bv,  antecedent  states  of  mind.     Unlike  sensa- 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.  281. 


CLASSIFICATION     OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  79 

tions,  the  emotions  and  volitions  are  conditioned  by 
preceding  phenomena. 

We  ha\'e  been  taking  sensations  as  simple  affec- 
tions of  mind.  But  it  is  held  by  many  psychologists 
that,  though  they  appear  as  simple  in  consciousness, 
they  are  really  composite.  It  is  said  of  some  appar- 
ently simple  sensations  that  they  must  be  composite, 
because  their  physical  conditions  or  corresponding 
nervous  processes  are  composite.  To  this,  however, 
it  may  be  replied  that  a  sensation  might  be  simple 
while  its  nervous  condition  was  multiple.  ^  Lotze 
observes  on  this  question  of  the  "'chemistrv  of  sensa- 
tions": "After  all  our  experience  up  to  the  present 
time  it  remains  uncertain  whether  this  intermingling 
into  new  resultants  has  not  in  all  cases  already  taken 
place  among  the  physical  excitations  in  the  nerve  or  in 
the  central  portions  of  the  nervous  system."  ^  There 
seems  to  be  no  decisive  argument  derivable  from  the 
study  of  the  sensations  of  hearing  and  of  others, 
against  our  regarding  as  elementary  the  sensations 
that  appear  simple  and  unanalyzable  in  consciousness, 
even  those  of  which  the  relative  nervous  processes  are 


(i)  Mr.  H.  Spencer  thus  conjectures  of  sensations,  and  of 
all  other  classes  of  mental  affections:  "There  may  be  a  single 
primordial  element  of  consciousness,  and  the  countless  kinds 
of  consciousness  may  he  produced  i)y  the  compounding  of  this 
element  with  itself  and  the  recompounding  of  its  compounds 
with  one  another  in  higher  and  higher  degrees:  so  producing 
increased  multiplicity,  variety,  and  complexity."  (Psychology, 
I.,  p.  150.)  It  is  not  evident  that  the  best  psychology  will  result 
frorw  reading  off  the  mental  experiences,  not  according  to  the 
revelation  of  consciousness,  but  rather  according  to  the  sup- 
posed requirements  of  the  elements,  structure  and  action  of  the 
nervous  organism,  and  from  giving  superiority  to  mediate 
knowledge  over  immediate. 

(2)  Mctaphysic  (Bosanquet),  p.  45S.  • 


8o  TIIE      PRINCIPLES      OF      knowledge:. 

known  to  be  complex;  or  against  the  assumption  that 
epistemology  may  build  safely  upon  these  sensations 
as  elementary  or  ultimate.  It  should  yet  be  noted 
that  the  same  simple  sensation  may  have  distinguish- 
able attributes^  as  special  quality,  intensity,  duration, 
and  extension. 

2.  Emotions  are  a  class  of  mental  phenomena 
coordinate  in  originality  with  sensations.  They  are 
discriminable  in  consciousness  in  a  clear  manner  from 
sensations.  Nothing  in  the  mind  seems  more  certain 
than  the  difference  between  colors,  touches,  painful 
sensations,  and  anger,  desire,  fear.  Emotions  differ 
as  a  class  from  sensations,  in  being  conditioned  by 
preceding  phenomena  of  mind.  The  rise  of  anger, 
fear,  desire,  requires  the  perception  or  representation 
of  an  object. 

But  with  many  writers  nothing  is  more  confidently 
disputed  than  the  originality  of  the  emotions.  They 
hold  them  to  be  certainly  derived  or  composite.  It  is 
maintained  that  the  only  original  phenomena  of  mind 
are  sensations,  and  that  all  others,  including  the  emo- 
tions, are  developed  or  composed  from  them.  We 
read  such  declarations  as,  "Everything  is  in  sensa- 
tion," "Sensations  are  in  soul-life  what  the  elements 
are  in  chemistry." 

One  thing  we  must  admit  at  once,  namely,  that  the 
emotions  follow  sensations  in  the  order  of  appearance. 
But  this  fact  of  sequence  can  not  be  regarded  as  con- 
clusive proof  of  derivation.  One  affection  of  mind 
might  precede  and  be  the  occasion  of  the  rise  of 
another,  and  yet  not  be  its  cause  or  generator.  An 
affection  of  mind  might  follow  and  be  excited  by  oth- 
ers, and  yet  have  its  real  source  or  cause  in  a  distinct 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  8 1 

original  mental  condition  or  potency;  and  be  coordi- 
nate in  this  respect  with  its  antecedents. 

There  are  various  theories  of  the  constitution  and 
origin  of  the  emotions.  For  instance,  some  contend 
that  the  emotions  are  identical  with  or  arise  from 
states  of  mind  which,  according  to  the  common  opin- 
ion, precede  them.  Others  hold  that  they  are  identi- 
cal with  or  composed  of  states  or  sensations  which, 
according  to  the  common  opinion,  follow  them. 
Again,  others  combine  these  two  views. 

"The  emotions,"  says  Professor  Bain,  "as  com- 
pared with  the  Sensations,  are  secondary,  derived,  or 
compound  feelings."  They  are  coalescences  of  "sen- 
sations and  ideas."  i  For  example,  he  declares  that 
"the  emotion  of  Terror  originates  in  [is  not  merely 
excited  by]  the  apprehension  of  coming  evil."  2  Mr. 
H.  Spencer  holds  that  fear  is  essentially  the  memory 
of  injuries.  He  says  of  fear  and  anger:  "Every  one 
can  testify  that  the  psychical  state  called  fear  consists 
of  mental  representations  of  certain  painful  results; 
and  that  the  one  called  anger  consists  of  mental  repre- 
sentations of  the  actions  and  impressions  which  would 
occur  while  inflicting  some  kind  of  pain."  "^ 

Every  one  can  testify,  no  doubt,  that  fear  presup- 
poses the  memory  of  evil  or  painful  results,  that  if 
there  were  no  memory  there  would  be  no  fear;  but 
not  that  it  consists  of  such  memory.  To  testify  that 
fear  is  the  same  ?s  or  consists  of  representations  of 
painful  results  or  coming  evil,  would  be  to  misrepre- 
sent the  facts  of  consciousness.  Fear  is  a  special 
vivid  emotion  clearlv  distinct  in  consciousness  from 


(i)  Emotions  and  Will,  2nd  Ed.,  p.  35.     (2)  lb.,  p.  53. 
(3)     Psychology,  I.,  p.  483- 

(6) 


82  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

the  representation  of  pains.  Though  a  very  fitting 
sequent  to,  thoiigli  a  very  close  associate  of,  such  rep- 
resentation, it  is  yet  a  different  mode  of  experience. 
Further,  it  is  conceivable  that  there  might  be  repre- 
sentation of  pains  or  pain-producing  objects,  without 
the  faintest  degree  of  fear.  Though  this  representa- 
tion and  fear  form  a  succession  which  is  eminently  fit, 
which  is  essential  to  complete  life,  yet  fear  does  not 
seem  to  follow  necessarily  from  the  representation,  as 
if  it  were  involved  in  or  composed  by  it.  Memory 
might  stop  with  itself,  without  being  followed  by  the 
emotion.  Fear,  we  contend,  is  a  distinct  advance  on 
memory;  it  is  something  superadded;  it  is  a  new 
spontaneous  variation  of  experience.  To  identify 
fear  and  the  memory  of  pains  is  psychological  con- 
fusion. The  oneness  of  fear  and  the  memory  of  pain- 
ful sensations  is  supposed  to  be  confirmed  by  th€ 
similarity,  between  fear  and  painful  sensation,  of 
bodily  manifestation.  So  far  as  such  similarity  exists, 
it  may  result,  in  part  at  least,  from  the  fact  that  fear 
often  rises  inmiediately  iipon  painful  sensation,  being 
immediately  concerned  as  to  the  continuance  of  it; 
and  therefore  may  have  an  original  share,  with  the 
sensation,  in  the  outward  expression,  or  become  an 
associate  in  that  expression. 

What  we  have  said  here,  with  brevity,  regarding 
the  emotion  of  fear,  is  true,  in  substance,  of  desire. 
This  emotion  is  not  identical  with  the  representation 
of  pleasure-giving  objects  and  the  memory  of  pleasing 
sensations.  Tt  fitly  follows  these  mental  events,  and 
would  not  follow  if  they  had  not  preceded;  but  it  does 
not  consist  of  them,  it  is  not  gendered  by  them. 
Memory  of  the  past  might  exist,  it  is  conceivable, 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    THF    MENTAL    STATES.  83 

without  the  least  measure  of  this  forward-looking 
emotion.  Desire  is  an  advance  upon  memory  or  rep- 
resentation; it  is  a  new  addition,  a  qualitatively  differ- 
ent affection,  rising  from  a  cause  in  mind  distinct 
from  that  of  sensation. 

Instead  of  identifying  emotions,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  with  what  are  commonly  thought  to  be  states  of 
mind  antecedent  to  them.  Professor  James  identifies 
them  with  sensations  that  are  commonly  thought  to 
be  sul^sequent.  This  acute  and  genial  writer  denies 
that  emotion  intervenes  between  percept  or  idea  and 
bodily  movement  and  is  the  immediate  occasion  of  the 
latter;  but  claims  that  emotion  follows  the  bodily 
movement,  and  is  identical  with  the  muscular  and 
other  organic  sensations  occasioned  by  the  movement. 
"Our  natural  way,"  he  says,  "of  thinking  about  these 
coarser  emotions  [grief,  fear,  rage]  is  that  the  mental 
perception  of  some  fact  excites  the  mental  affection 
called  the  emotion,  and  that  this  latter  state  of  mind 
gives  rise  to  the  bodily  expression.  My  theory,  on 
the  contrary,  is  that  the  bodily  changes  follozv  directly 
the  perception  of  the  exciting  fact,  and  that  our  feeling  of 

the  same  changes  as  they  occur  is  the  emotion 

The  more  rational  statement  is  that  we  feel  sorry 
because  we  cry,  angry  because  we  strike,  afraid 
because  we  tremble,  and  not  that  we  cry,  strike  or 
tremble  because  we  are  sorry,  angry,  or  fearful,  as 
the  case  may  be."  ^  "7/  ive  fancy  some  strong  emotion, 
and  then  try  to  abstract  from  our  consciousness  of  it  all 
the  feelings  of  its  bodily  symptoms,  zve  find  we  have 
nothing  left  behind.''  2 

Contrary  to  this  paradoxical  hypothesis,  we  feel 


(i)  Psychology,  II.,  pp.  449,  450.     (2)  lb.,  p.  451. 


84  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

bound  to  stand  for  the  common  doctrine  that  emo- 
tion comes  in  between  percept  and  bodily  agitation  as 
a  specific  and  clear  mode  of  experience,  distinct  from 
all  muscular  and  visceral  sensations  that  follow.  This 
doctrine  seems  to  be  favored  by  the  strictest  intro- 
spection; and  has  considerable  justification  from  the 
distraction  of  psychologists,  some  of  these,  as  we  see, 
confounding  emotion  with  mental  states  that  imme- 
diately precede  and  condition  it,  while  others  are 
confounding  it  with  the  states  that  immediately 
follow. 

We  must  grant  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  close 
relation  between  emotion  and  physical  changes  is  too 
evident  to  admit  of  doubt,  and  that  the  sensations 
accompanying  the  physical  changes  are  often  too  little 
attended  to,  and  have  more  importance  in  life  than  is 
usually  allowed  them.  But,  however  significant  are 
these  facts,  they  do  not  justify  the  theory  that  physical 
changes  follow  directly  upon  perception,  without  the 
intervention  of  emotion,  and  emotion  follows  directly 
upon  the  physical  changes. 

It  is  supposed  that  the  independence  of  emotion 
possessed  by  the  bodily  changes,  and  the  dependence 
of  emotion  on  them,  are  proved  or  supported  by  such 
facts  as  that  we  can  take  on  an  emotion  by  voluntarily 
imitating  as  far  as  possible  the  physical  movements 
that  accompany  the  emotion;  and  can  repress  an  emo- 
tion by  inhibiting  these  movements.  These  facts 
deserve  regard;  but  they  furnish  no  decisive  support 
to  the  hypothesis.  Mimicking  the  physical  expres- 
sion of  an  emotion  brings  on  the  emotion,  not  solely 
as  its  direct  eft'ect,  but  by  raising  and  sustaining  such 
ideas  or  representations  as  are  the  usual  occasions  or 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  85 

conditions  of  the  emotion.     Again,  inhibition  of  phys- 
ical expression  does  not  suppress  an  emotion  solely  by 
its  direct  action;  for  the  inhibition  involves  opposition 
to  or  disapprobation  towards  the  emotion  itself,  and 
this  disapprobation  operates  directly  as  repression  on 
the    emotion.     When    expression    is    wholly    unre- 
strained,   the    emotion    is    wholly    unrestrained,  no 
considerations    of    prudence,    conscience    or    reason 
resisting    it.       Other    facts,    as,    for    instance,    the 
tendency  of  wine  and  certain  drugs  to  call  up  particu- 
lar emotions,  must  be  treated  somewhat  in  the  same 
manner.     The  emotions  are  not  caused  by,  or  made 
up  of,  the  sensations  excited  by  the  bodily  changes 
produced  by  the  nutritive  or  other  elements;    but 
rather  are  excited  by  the  thoughts  and  representations 
(these  may  often  be  but  vague)  called  up  and  sup- 
ported by  the  changes  and  sensations.     It  may  be  that 
emotions  are  occasionally  and  in  part  stimulated  by 
the  somatic  changes  and  sensations,  because  of  previ- 
ous association  with  the  emotions  in  instances  where 
the  latter  were  aroused  directly  by  antecedent  per- 
cepts or  ideas. 

Emotions  and  the  organic  sensations  concur  and 
become  closely  associated  because  of  the  fact  that 
emotions  do  not  rise  to  their  culmination  instantly, 
but  gradually ;  and  in  their  lower  and  weaker  degrees 
induce  physical  changes  and  sensations  which  become 
their  accompaniments  and  grow  in  strength  with 
themselves.  This  near  association  may  give  plausi- 
bility to  the  derivative  hypothesis  we  are  considering; 
but  it  does  not  prove  it.  If  we  strive  to  think  away 
the  whole  mass  of  organic  sensations  accompanying 
fear,  the  emotion  still  seems  to  remain  as  a  specific 


86  THK      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE;. 

mode  of  experience.  We  may  not  refer  the  emotion 
definitely  to  a  corporeal  seat;  but  it  seems  yet  to  abide 
as  an  irreducible  residuum.  The  same  is  true  of  the 
other  primary  emotions  of  which  we  have  been  treat- 
ing. In  moments  of  high  passion,  the  organic  sensa- 
tions appear  to  be  drowned  by  the  passion.  We  con- 
clude, therefore,  in  general,  that  the  denial  that  emo- 
tion ordinarily  enters  as  a  distinct  mode  of  mind 
between  percepts  and  the  bodily  manifestation  and 
becomes  the  direct  occasion  of  this  manifestation, 
must  result  from  excentric  inattention  or  oblivious- 
ness respecting  a  definite  fact  of  consciousness,  or 
from  some  such  cause;  or  else  it  proves  that  there  is  a 
radical  difference  in  the  operations  of  different  minds. 

3.  We  pass  now  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the 
Volitions,  which  are  the  third  and  last  general  class  of 
the  primary  conscious  mental  states.  Volitions,  as 
the  emotions,  differ  from  sensations  in  being  condi- 
tioned bv  antecedent  states  of  mind.  The  antecedent 
states  are  representations  of  objects,  results,  or  ends, 
and  of  the  actions  requisite  to  attain  these;  and  also 
impulses  pressing  to  action.  The  difference  of  emo- 
tion and  volition  from  one  another  is  a  clear  fact  of 
introspection.  Love,  anger,  grief,  desire,  are  very 
unlike  choice,  resolution,  or  decision.  As  a  class, 
volitions  are  conditioned  by  the  emotions;  and  as  a 
class,  emotions  condition  volitions,  but  are  not  condi- 
tioned by  them.  There  is  no  volition  without  appe- 
tite, passion,  desire;  but  the  latter  may  operate  with- 
out having  volition  either  as  a  direct  antecedent  or 
consequent. 

One  of  the  most  important  matters  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  will  is  to  define  its  range.     On  this  point 


CI,ASSIFICATI0N    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  87 

there  are  great  differences  among  psychologists. 
Some  make  will  coextensive  with  all  action  of  mind. 
To  it  is  reckoned  all  rellex,  instinctive,  imitative,  auto- 
matic or  spontaneous,  movement  of  mind  and  body. 
The  truth  is  that  the  range  of  will,  though  of  very 
great  significance,  is  rather  narrow.  During  all  life 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  the  activity  of  mind  and  body 
that  is  not  initiated  or  directed  by  the  resolutions  of 
the  will.  Volition  proper  is  always  conditioned  by 
antecedent  sensation,  perception  or  representation ;  it 
is  always  purposive.  A  leading  and  general  function 
of  will  is  the  effort  of  attention.  It  is  a  special  fact  of 
will,  that  a  primary  or  cardinal  decision  controls  a 
considerable  extent  and  variety  of  action,  and  makes 
volition  in  many  instances  predictable. 

The  difference  between  the  voluntary  and  involun- 
tary action  of  mind  is  one  of  the  most  certain  sub- 
jective contrasts,  and  is  fundamental.  But  it  is  a  dif- 
ference that  is  often  ignored  or  deemed  unimportant 
or  non-essential.  This  is  a  sign  of  the  powerful  drift 
of  many  psychologists  towards  a  mechanical  or  fatal- 
istic interpretation  of  human  volition.  Contrary  to 
these,  the  difference  must  be  held  to  be  radical.  It  is 
the  same  as  the  difference  between  simple  succession 
and  succession  with  power  or  causation,  which  were 
so  arbitrarily  confounded  by  Hume;  or  as  the  differ- 
ence between  spontaneous  and  willed  attention. 

We  have  been  assuming  that  volition  is  an  inde- 
pendent and  primordial  or  original  phenomenon  of 
mind,  coordinate  with  sensation  and  emotion.  But 
the  originality  and  coordination  of  volition  has  been 
more  hotly  disputed  than  that  of  emotion.  The  nega- 
tive doctrine  has  a  ground  of  plausibility  in  the  fact 


88  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

that  volition  is  conditioned  by  preceding  states  of 
mind,  and  is  nearly  associated  with  both  preceding 
and  succeeding  states.  It  is  concluded  that  volition 
is  identical  with,  or  but  a  derivative  from,  one  or  more 
of  these  conditioning  and  associate  phenomena. 

That  volition  is  conditioned  by  antecedent  states 
of  mind  is  a  primary  fact  which  we  have  already  fully 
admitted.  There  is  no  real  volition  without  a  repre- 
sentation of  an  object  or  end,  and,  especially  in  voli- 
tion that  relates  to  the  external,  of  the  action  proper 
to  reach  the  end.  This  is  the  primary  conditioning 
state  of  volition.  But  with  all  its  importance,  it  is  yet 
not  the  cause,  but  only  the  occasion,  of  volition.  The 
latter  is  not  identical  with  it.  A  volition  is  a  resolu- 
tion, a  decision,  a  fiat;  the  difference,  the  unlikeness, 
between  it  and  representation  is  manifest.  Again, 
volition  is  not  a  necessary  issue  from  representation. 
There  are  often  representations  and  percepts  of  desir- 
able objects  not  followed  by  volition.  We  may  easily 
not  will  to  obtain  a  pleasing  object  which  we  clearly 
perceive.  It  must  be  maintained,  therefore,  that 
while  voHtion  does  not  and  can  not  occur  without 
antecedent  cognition,  and  while  it  never  goes  beyond 
the  range  of  such  cognition,  yet  it  is  not  the  same  as, 
or  a  necessary  evolution  from,  the  latter;  but  is  an 
original  mode  of  mental  activity,  having  antecedent 
cognition  as  the  primary  occasion  of  its  rise.  In 
this  wise  the  will  is  free,  without  being  anarchical. 

Another  conditioning  state  for  volition  is  emo- 
tion or  emotional  impulse.  The  mind  in  willing  is 
always  urged  by  some  impulse,  just  as  it  is  .always  led 
by  some  representation.  But  emotion  is  no  more 
the  cause  of  volition  than  is  representation ;   it  is  only 


CI.ASSIFICATION    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  89 

an  occasion  or  stimulns.  Volition  is  not  the  same  as 
emotion;  bnt.  as  choice,  decision,  causation,  is  clearly 
distinguished  from  k.  The  difference  between  desire 
and  the  fiat  that  starts  the  movement  to  attain  the 
object  of  desire,  is  a  definite  and  certain  fact  to  careful 
attention.  Men  in  all  ages  have  not  been  in  error  in 
asserting  it.  Further,  volition  is  not  a  necessary  out- 
come of  emotion.  It  is  indeed  always  preceded  and 
influenced,  but  yet  it  is  not  necessitated,  by  emotion. 
There  is  no  adequate  evidence  to  show  that  volition 
must  follow  impulse,  that  it  is  included  within  or  gen- 
erated by  the  latter. 

"  'Tis  one  thing  to  be  tempted,  Escalus, 
Another  thing  to  fall." 

When  volition  refuses  to  follow  one  impulse,  it  is,  no 
doubt,  stimulated,  but  it  is  not  wholly  determined,  to 
the  refusal  by  another  impulse.  When  urged  on  dif- 
ferent sides  by  dififerent  emotions,  the  will,  or  the  mind 
in  willing,  possesses  independent  power  of  choice  or 
determination,  which  it  exercises  in  view  of  the  objects 
set  before  it  by  perception  and  representation.  We 
conclude,  therefore,  that  when  a  full  account  is  taken 
of  the  character  and  potency  of  emotion,  volition  is 
found  to  be  a  residual  phenomenon,  as  really  inde- 
pendent and  original  as  emotion. 

Latterly,  many  writers  have  contended  that  the 
muscular  sensations  are  an  important,  if  not  the  lead- 
ing, factor  in  volition.  It  is  said  that  volition  consists 
of  the  idea  of  a  movement  combined  with  the  muscular 
sensations,  especially,  attending  the  movement;  that 
the  idea  and  the  sensations  of  the  executed  motion 
are  all.  In  this  manner  many  psychologists  treat  of 
volition,  with  volition  left  out.     The  importance  of 


po  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

the  muscular  sensations  and  their  intimate  relation 
with  attention  and  volition  must  not  be  disregarded; 
but  certainly  there  is  a  clear  difference  of  character 
between  volition  and  present  or  remembered  muscular 
sensations,  or  them  and  the  other  sensations  of  motion 
associated  with  them.  In  real  voluntary  motion, 
between  the  thought  of  the  motion  and  the  sensa- 
tions of  the  executive  organs,  volition,  as  conscious 
resolve,  decision  or  causation,  surely  intervenes.  To 
this  we  must  adhere  with  the  tenacity  due  a  primary 
fact  of  mind. 

The  principal  reasons  for  holding  volition  to  be  a 
primordial  phenomenon  of  mind,  distinct  from  sensa- 
tion and  emotion,  are  its  clear  unlikeness  to  and  sep- 
aration from  them.  This  separation  and  manifest 
and  considerable  unlikeness  peremptorily  forbid  the 
supposition  that  volition  is  identical  with  either,  or 
with  any  combination,  of  the  others,  or  is  but  a  trans- 
formation or  necessary  issue  or  effect  of  them.  A 
secondary  reason  of  much  importance  is  furnished  by 
certain  remarkable  phenomena  that  closely  associate 
themselves  with  volition;  as  the  consciousness  of 
freedom,  and  the  feeling  of  guilt.  It  would  seem  that 
these  phenomena  should  never  arise,  if  volition  were 
not  a  distinct,  independent  mode  of  the  mind's  energy 
or  action. 

The  freedom  of  the  will  is  by  many  emphatically 
denied;  i  the  apparent  consciousness  of  it  is  held  to 
answer  to  nothing  real  in  mind,  but  to  be  only  a  "sub- 


(i)  ".  .  .  .  There  can  not  be  any  such  thing  as  free  will." 
(Spencer,  Psy.,  1.,  p.  503.)  "Physiological  Psychology 
acknowledges  no  freedom  of  will."  (Ziehen,  Plivs.  Psychology, 
p.  28.) 


CIvASSlFlCATlON    OF    THE    MENTAL    STATES.  pi 

jective  illusion."  The  illusion  is  by  some  supposed 
to  arise  from  the  mind's  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of 
the  antecedents  and  causes  of  its  volitions.  If  this 
conjecture  be  true,  then  we  would  appear  to  be 
obliged  to  draw  at  least  the  significant  practical  con- 
clusion, that  all  the  higher  moral  and  social  life  of 
the  world,  all  administration  of  justice,  is  governed 
by  a  delusion. 

But  these  assumptions  are  unreasonable.  That 
the  conviction  of  freedom  should  rise  in  mind,  when 
in  mind  there  is  in  reality  only  non-freedom  or  neces- 
isitation;  that  the  conviction  of  guilt  should  rise 
where  there  is  not  the  least  real  responsibility,  or 
where  an  immoral  choice  is  in  fact  impossible,  is 
incredible.  That  these  convictions  should  come  into 
consciousness  as  delusions  and  Hes,  falsifying  the  real 
condition  or  facts  of  mind,  and  grossly  deceiving  us, 
must  always  seem  impossible.  This  absurd  sort  of 
development,  this  instance  of  the  rise  of  a  thing  out 
of  its  very  opposite  and  contradiction,  belongs  to  the 
same  unreasonable  and  inadmissible  class  as  the  sup- 
posed development  of  the  idea  of  time  out  of  the 
timeless. 

The  only  natural  and  just  conclusion  regarding 
the  remarkable  convictions  of  which  we  are  treating 
is,  that  they  are  phenomena  which  truly  answer  to  or 
express  what  in  mind  is  real.  This  is  their  only  suf- 
ficient ground,  their  only  adequate  reason.  We  have 
the  consciousness  of  freedom,  because  the  will  actu- 
ally exercises  the  power  of  alternative  choice,  is^ctu- 
ally  capable  of  causative  agency,  and  is  not  subject  to 
full  determination  by  other  modes  of  mind,  or  to 
internal  mechanical  necessitation.     We  have  the  feel- 


92  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

ing  of  guilt,  because  the  mind  in  instances  really 
decides  for  a  course  of  action  when  it  could  have  and 
ought  to  have  decided  for  a  different  one.  i  In  short, 
these  convictions  require  that  volition  should  be  a 
function  of  mind  distinct  from  and  independent  of 
sensation  and  emotion.  They  corroborate  the  princi- 
ple, that  the  difference  between  the  voluntary  and 
involuntary  action  of  mind  is  fundamental  and  certain. 

Sensations,  emotions,  and  volitions,  and  the  mem- 
ories of  them,  are  the  elementary  data  of  knowledge. 
All  constructions  of  the  intellect  are  formed  from 
them.  To  adapt  an  old  and  familiar  epistemological 
saying,  there  is  nothing  in  intellection  which  was  not 
before  in  sensation,  emotion,  or  volition. 

The  great  constructive  function  of  mind,  intellec- 
tion, is  properly  considered  as  including  only  the 
higher  grades  of  the  mental  comparison  and  elabora- 
tion. Comparison  is  coextensive  with  consciousness. 
Every  act  or  phenomenon  of  mind  is  known  only  in 
relation  with  another  or  others.  The  simplest  activity 
of  the  mind,  then,  implies  comparison.  But  this  sim- 
plest comparison  and  relating,  as  to  quality  and  dura- 
tion, is  not  intellection  proper;  but  only  the  more 
complex  and  architectonic. 

The  great  processes  of  intellection  are  Perception, 
Imagination,  and  Logical  Thought;  and  its  chief 
products,  accordingly,  are  percepts,  images,  aiid  logi- 


(i)  Kant  says  that  "if  ph*nomena  are  things  in  them- 
r^elves,  there  can  be  no  freedom."  (Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  2)72-)  But 
this  is  only  one  of  his  dogmatic  assumptions.  Phenomena  at 
least  truly  correspond  to  and  represent  things  in  themselves. 
Mind  or  will  is  not  an  inexplicable  mixture  of  reality  and 
illusion. 


CLASSIFICATION     OI'     THE    MENTAL    STATES.  93 

cal  concepts  and  judgments.     Memory  is  involved  in 
all  intellection;    it  supplies  the  record  of  past  experi- 
ences which  are  always  employed.     But  though  its 
service  to  intellection  is  of  the  highest  importance, 
memory  can  not  be  properly  regarded,  as  is  done  by 
some,  as  a  faculty  or  function  of  intellect  coordinate 
with  perception  and  imagination.     It  is  not  a  special 
constructive  faculty  like  these.     As  we  have  already 
observed,  memory  is  to  be  regarded  rather  as  a  gen- 
eral function  of  mind  similar  to  consciousness.     As 
consciousness  is  the  knowledge  of  all  present  states  of 
mind  simple  and  composite,  so  memory  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  all  past  states  of  mind  simple  and  composite. 
Accordingly,  presentations  and  the  representations  of 
memory  constitute  the  two  main  divisions  of  the  most 
comprehensive  classification  of  the  mental  phenomena. 
As  was  iust  remarked,  the  sensations,  emotions, 
and  volitions,  and  the  reproductions  of  them  by  mem- 
ory, constitute  the  original  data  of  intellection.     All 
the  three  classes  are  employed  by  the  different  func- 
tions of  the  intellect.     For  instance,  our  full  notion 
of  a  fellow-man,  of  his  physical  and  mental  attributes, 
which  may  be  rightly  called  a  percept,  is  constructed 
from  our  own  experiences  of  these  different  kinds, 
which  are  taken  as  true  representations  of  the  experi- 
ences and  attributes  of  the  man.     And  these  classes  of 
phenomena  supply  the  whole  of  the  data  of  the  intel- 
lect.    They  include  all  matter  and  form.     The  most 
elaborate  intellectual  formations  contain,  or  employ 
no  materials  besides  what  are  given  with  them.     The 
intellect  furnishes  no  matter  or  form  from  itself.     It  is 
not  a  creator,  but  only  an  architect;   or  it  is  only  the 
advanced  revelation  of  the  unity  and  unifying  power 
of  the  mind. 


PART  II. 

COGNITION  OF  REAL  MIND. 


COGNITION    OF    REAL    MIND. 


CHAPTER    L 

In  now  passing  from  the  consideration  of  the  cog- 
nition of  the  mental  states  to  that  of  the  cognition  of 
real  mind  or  the  substance  of  mind,  we  enter  upon 
what  is  probably  the  most  important  topic  belonging 
to  the  science  of  knowledge.  Great  perplexity  and 
conflict  of  views  prevail  regarding  it.  In  the  first 
place,  there  is  the  primary  conflict  as  to  whether  there 
is  a  substance  of  mind.  Some  contend  that  no  such 
thing  as  is  commonly  called  mental  substance  exists; 
that  the  temporal  series  or  the  process  of  mental  phe-- 
nomena  is  itself  the  only  mind  and  the  whole  of  mind. 
Asrain,  among:  those  who  hold  to  the  existence  of  a 
mental  substrate,  there  is  the  subordinate  conflict  as 
to  the  mode  of  its  existence  with  reference  to  the 
mental  states,  and  the  mode  of  cognizing  it.  Some 
af^rm  that  real  mind  exists,  but  is  forever  unknow- 
able, or  is  known  only  inferentially  or  mediately 
through  the  mental  states  and  merely  as  having  exist- 
ence, and  not  immediately  or  in  consciousness;  that 
we  know  only  the  phenomena  of  mind,  but  not  real 
mind.  Others  hold  that  real  mind  is  known  in  and' 
with  the  phenomena  or  states  of  mind,  immediately,  in 
consciousness,  —  in  inseparable  association  with  phe- 
nomena, with  the  same  directness  and  certainty. 

The  discussion  of  the  cognition  of  real  mind  has: 
been   unnecessarily  and   disadvantageously   confused 

(7)  '  (97) 


98  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      knowledge;. 

with  that  of  the  cognition  of  real  matter.  Many 
assume  that  mind  and  matter  are,  except  as  to  the 
fact  of  bare  existence,  both  aHke  unknowable;  and 
that  this  fact  of  bare  existence  is  known  of  both  in 
the  same  way,  with  the  same  degree  of  directness 
and  certainty,  through  phenomena.  Others  assume 
that  mind  and  matter  are  both  really  known,  and 
known  with  the  .same  immediateness,  in  or  with  phe- 
nomena. These  ditterent  assumptions  are  based,  in 
the  different  cases,  on  anterior  assumptions  regarding 
the  relations  of  phenomena  to  mind  and  matter. 

The  question  of  the  relation  of  phenomena  or 
ideas,  especially  sensations,  to  mind  and  matter  is  a 
fundamental  question  of  philosophy,  and  is  as  old  as 
philosophy.  The  differences  regarding  it,  which  con- 
tinue as  to  important  points  to  this  day,  are  seen 
clearly  in  the  diverse  theories  of  perception.  It  is 
curious  to  observe  the  progression  and  gradation  of 
views  on  this  subject.  In  the  earliest  theories  of 
knowledge  ideas  were  considered  as  things  distinct 
from  the  mind,  passing  from  external  objects  into 
mind.  Afterwards  they  were  considered  as  standing 
in  a  more  intimate  relation  to  mind  than  to  external 
things,  the  relation,  however,  being  left  indefinite,  as 
in  the  teaching  of  Locke.  Again,  ideas  have  been 
held  to  be  modifications  of  mind.  Finally,  ideas  have 
been  identified  with  nu'nd.  This  doctrine  of  idealism 
and  identity  is  more  commonly  expressed  by  saying 
that  Thought  and  IBeing  are  the  same.  Being  Jiere 
including  material  or  non-mental  Being  as  well  as 
mental.  Thus  theories  range  from  the  extreme  of 
entire  separation  of  ideas  and  mind,  to  the  extreme 
of  absolute  identity. 

It   was   above   remarked   that    Tocke's   indefinite 


COGNITION     or     RKAL     MIND.  99 

and  imperfect  teaching  on  this  subject  is  the  most 
serious  defect  of  his  philosophy  of  mind.  He  dis- 
tinctly asserts  that  thought  is  the  action  or  operation, 
and  not  the  essence,  of  the  soul;  but  he  makes  no 
precise  and  positive  statements  in  regard  to  the  con- 
nection between  them:  how  close  thought  is  to  the 
mind;  how  it  proceeds  from  the  mind,  if  it  does,  and 
stands  with  the  mind;  how  it  is  in,  or  is  an  operation 
of,  the  mind.  Philosophers,  as  is  well  known,  have 
long  been  divided  on  the  question  whether  Locke 
regarded  the  ideas  of  sensation,  or  sensations  and  per- 
ceptions, as  entities  in  the  mind,  but  different  from  it. 
or  as  states  of  mind,  owing  their  constitution  and 
character,  but  not  their  occasion,  to  the  internal  ener- 
gies of  the  mind.  He  expressly  refuses  to  call  per- 
ceptions modifications  of  the  mind,  i  His  view  of 
the  relation  of  ideas  to  matter  or  external  things  is 
equallv  indefinite.  Locke  left  the  subject  very  much 
as  he  found  it. 

Kant,  though  he  wrote  a  century  later  than  Locke, 
is  not  a  day  in  advance  of  him  on  this  subject.  His 
theory  of  knowledge  appears  to  imply  that  bright  phe- 
nomena and  the  sphere  of  consciousness  are  severed 
alike  from  real  mind  and  real  matter  (the  former  alone 
being  known,  but  mind  and  matter  unknown),  some- 
what as  the  flame  of  a  lamp  suspended  over  the  wick, 
or  an  ignis  fatuus  hovering  over  the  bog  where  it  was 
generated,  or  a  luminous  atmosphere  surrounding  a 
dark  and  unknown  body;  and  by  thus  sundering 
thought  and  things,  especially  thought  and  mind, 
gave  occasion  for  reaction  to  the  opposite  extreme  of 
identifying  thought  and  things. 

(i)   Exau::  of  F.  Malcbraitchr's  Of^i)iioii.  Sect.  48. 


lOO  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE     KNOWLEDGE. 

As  to  our  knowledge  of  mental  and  material  sub- 
stance, Locke  remarks:  "All  our  ideas  of  the  several 
sorts  of  substances  are  nothing  but  collections  of  sim- 
ple ideas,  with  a  supposition  of  something  to  which 
they  belong  and  in  which  they  subsist;  though  of  this 
supposed  something  we  have  no  clear,  distinct  idea  at 
all."  I  "The  idea  we  have  of  spirit,  compared  with 
the  idea  we  have  of  body,  stands  thus:  the  substance 
of  spirits  is  unknown  to  us;  and  so  is  the  substance  of 
body  equally  unknown  to  us."  2  "Whensoever  we 
would  proceed  beyond  these  simple  ideas  we  have 
from  sensation  and  reflection,  and  dive  further  into 
the  nature  of  things,  we  fall  presently  into  darkness 
and  obscurity,  perplexedness  and  difficulties,  and  can 
discover  nothing  further  but  our  own  blindness  and 
ignorance."  3  In  the  following  passages,  however,  he 
affirms  some  inequality,  making  the  knowledge  of 
spirit  more  certain  than  the  knowledge  of  body;  that 
is,  in  case  "existence"  and  "being,"  which  Locke  dis- 
tinguishes from  thinking,  reasoning,  pleasure  and 
pain,  are  the  same  as  "substance."  "Every  act  of  sen- 
sation, when  duly  considered,  gives  us  an  equal  view 
of  both  parts  of  nature,  the  corporeal  and  spiritual. 
For  whilst  I  know,  by  seeing  or  hearing,  etc.,  that 
there  is  some  corporeal  being  without  me,  the  object 
of  that  sensation,  I  do  more  certainly  know  that  there 
is  some  spiritual  being  within  me  that  sees  and 
hears."  ^  "We  have  the  knowledge  of  our  own  exist- 
ence by  intuition ;  of  the  existence  of  God  by  demon- 
stration; and  of  other  things  by  sensation.  As  for 
our  own  existence,  we  perceive  it  so  plainly  and  so 


(i)  Essay.  II.,  x\iii.   37.  (2)  Jb.,  II.,  xxiii.  30. 

(3)  lb.,  II..  xxiii.  32.  (4)  lb..  II.,  xxiii.  15. 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  lOl 

certainly,  that  it  neither  needs  nor  is  capable  of  any- 
proof.  For  nothing  can  be  more  evident  to  us  than 
our  own  existence;  I  think,  I  reason,  I  feel  pleasure 
and  pain  —  ran  any  of  these  be  more  evident  to  me 
than  my  own'  existence?  If  I  doubt  of  all  other  things, 
that  very  doubt  makes  me  perceive  my  own  existence, 
and  \vill  not  suffer  me  to  doubt  of  that.  For  if  I 
know  I  feel  pain,  it  is  evident  T  have  as  certain  percep- 
tion of  my  own  existence,  as  of  the  existence  of  the 
pain  I  feel;  or  if  I  know^  T  doubt,  I  have  as  certain 
perception  of  the  existence  of  the  thing  doubting,  as 
of  that  thought  which  I  call  doubt.  Experience,  then, 
convinces  us  that  we  have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of 
our  own  existence,  and  an  internal  infallible  percep- 
tion that  we  are.  In  every  act  of  sensation,  reason- 
ing, or  thinking,  we  are  conscious  to  ourselves  of  our 
own  being;  and,  in  this  matter,  come  not  short  of 
the  highest  degree  of  certainty."  ^ 

Kant  affirms  plainly  and  frequently  the  unknow- 
ableness  of  real  mind  and  matter,  in  a  manner  like  that 
of  Locke  in  places;  but  differs  from  him  in  hinting 
that  both  realities  may  be  of  the  same  essence. 
Although,  indeed,  Locke  held  that  the  Deity  might 
endow  matter  with  the  power  of  thought;  that  we 
"possibly  shall  never  be  able  to  know  whether  any 
mere  material  being  thinks  or  no";  ^  and  that, 
whether  our  own  thinking  substance  "be  a  material  or 
immaterial  substance,  can  not  be  infallibly  demon- 
strated from  our  ideas;  though  from  them  it  may  be 
proved  that  it  is  to  the  highest  degree  probable  that 
it  is  immaterial."  ^      Kant  savs  of  external  thinsfs: 


(i)  Essay,   IV.,  ix.     See  xi.  1-3. 

(2)  Essay.  IV.,  iii.  6. 

(3)  First  letter  to  the  Bishop  of  W'orcister. 


I02  THE      PRINCIPLKS      OF      KNOWLEDGE;. 

"Objects  in  themselves  are  not  at  all  known  to  us, 
and  what  we  call  external  objects  are  nothing  but 
mere  representations  of  our  sensibility,  whose  form  is 
space,  but  whose  true  correlate,  /.  c,  the  thing  in 
itself,  is  not  at  all  known  by  them,  nor  can  be  known, 
but  concerning  which  indeed  there  is  never,  in  experi- 
ence, any  inquiry";  '  and  of  the  soul:  "The  internal 
sense,  by  means  of  which  the  mind  views  itself  or  its 
internal  state,  gives,  indeed,  no  perception  of  the  soul 
itself  as  an  object."  -  '"The  objects  of  experience  as 
such,  including  our  own  subject,  have  only  the  value 
of  phenomena,  while  at  the  same  time  things  in  them- 
selves must  be  supposed  as  their  basis.  .  .  .  The 
thinking  subjeet  is  to  itself  in  internal  intuition  only  a 
plienomenon.''  3 

Regarding  the  sameness  in  nature  of  real  mind  and 
matter,  Kant  says:  "The  difficulty  which  has  occa- 
sioned this  problem  [of  explaining"  the  community  of 
the  soul  with  the  body]  consists,  as  is  well  known,  in 
the  presupposed  difiference  in  nature  between  the 
object  of  the  internal  sense  (the  soul)  and  the  objects 
of  external  senses,  since  the  formal  condition  of  the 
perception  of  the  former  is  only  time,  of  the  percep- 
tion of  the  latter  also  space.  But  if  it  be  considered 
that  both  species  of  objects  do  not  differ  from  one 
another  internally,  but  only  so  far  as  one  appears 
external  to  the  other,  consequently  that  what  is  the 
basis  of  the  phenomena  of  matter  as  a  thing  in  itself 
may  perhaps  not  be  so  different,  the  difffculty  van- 
ishes." 4  "The  transcendental  object  which  is  the 
basis  of  external  phenomena,  as  also  that  which  is  the 


(i)    Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  64.  (2)    lb.,  p.  58.     See  p.  3-17. 

(3)  Practical  Reason  (Abbott),  pp.  90,  91. 

(4)  Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  289.     See  p.  611. 


COGNITION      OF     REAL     MIND.  IO3 

basis  of  internal  intuition,  is  in  itself  neither  matter 
nor  a  thinking  being,  but  only  a  to  us  unkno^Vn 
ground  of  phenomena,  from  which  we  derive  our 
empirical  notions  of  either  kind.''  i 

Starting  from  the  teachings  of  Locke  and  Berke- 
ley regarding  the  loose  relation  of  ideas  to  the  mind, 
Hume  advanced  the  theory  that  the  only  mind  that  is 
known  and  exists  is  merely  the  series  of  our  ideas. 
This  series  has  no  relation  to  a  mental  substance  or 
permanent  subject;  such  a  subject  is  not  known  and 
does  not  exist.  He  says:  "What  we  call  a  ;;;///(/  is 
nothing  but  a  heap  or  collection  of  different  percep- 
tions, united  together  by  certain  relations,  and  sup- 
posed, though  falsely,  to  be  endowed  with  a  perfect 
simplicity  and  identity."-  .\gain:  "All  our  particu- 
lar perceptions  are  different,  and  distinguished  and 
separate  from  each  other,  and  may  be  separately  con- 
sidered, and  may  exist  separately,  and  have  no  need 
of  anything  to  support  their  existence."  3  "Every  dis- 
tinct perception  which  enters  into  the  composition  of 
the  mind,  is  a  distinct  existence,  and  is  different,  and 
distinguishable,  and  separable  from  every  other  per- 
ception, either  contemporary  or  successive."  4 

There  are  two  main  principles  in  Hume's  theory  of 
mind:  First,  the  bundle  or  series  of  perceptions  that 
compose  mind  is  a  broken  series,  its  terms  "exist 
separately";  there  is  no  junction  or  connecting- 
medium  among  the  terms,  but  apparently  only  abso- 
lute voids  or  breaks.  Secondly,  certain  relations  are 
known  to  exist  between  the  separate  terms,  viz.,  the 


(i)  Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  604. 

(2)  Phil.  Worhs  (Treatise),  I.,  p.  260. 

(rO  Ih.,  p.  312.  (4)  lb.,  p.  320. 


I04  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE;. 

relations  of  resemblance,  nearness  in  time,  nearness  in 
space,  and  causation.  But  upon  a  little  consideration 
it  becomes  quite  evident  that  these  principles  contra- 
dict one  another,  that  their  discordancy  destroys  the 
theory.  If  the  perceptions  forming  the  mind  be  as 
"loose  and  separate"  as  they  are  represented  to  be, 
then  tlie  cognition  of  resemblance,  contiguity,  and 
causation  is  impossible;  or,  if  this  cognition  is  pos- 
sible, the  relations  of  the  perceptions  can  not  be  as 
they  are  represented. 

There  can  be  no  cognition  of  resemblance 
between  the  terms  of  the  mind-series,  if  they  exist 
separately.  The  severance  of  the  terms,  the  absence 
of  any  ''real  connection"  in  the  form  either  of  mere 
medium  or  of  substrate,  means  the  absence  of  all 
ground  of  comparison.  Resemblance,  though  it 
might  exist,  certainly  could  not  be  known.  If  con- 
sciousness could  be  in  or  of  one  sensation  or  percep- 
tion, how  could  it  embrace  two?  how  could  one  term 
get  and  maintain  hold  of  another,  or  how  could  one 
term  perceive  itself,  or  be  perceived,  as  standing  in 
relation  to  another,  making  comparison  and  the  dis- 
covery of  resemlilance  and  difference  possible?  Again, 
there  could  be  no  cognition  of  the  succession  or  time- 
relation  of  the  mental  terms.  For,  according  to  the 
hypothesis,  the  terms  are  separated,  so  to  speak,  by 
pure  voids  of  time.  F,very  term,  therefore,  must  be 
always  an  entire  stranger  to  every  other  term.  No 
term  can  have  any  hold  upon  the  preceding  or  follow- 
ing. There  is  no  basis  of  communication.  Further, 
nor  could  the  relation  of  causation  be  known  between 
the  terms  of  the  serial  mind,  ev^en  if  it  should  exist. 
The  terms  are  so  loosely  related,  so  stand  apart  from 
one  another,  that  the  transition  of  DOwer  or  influence, 


COGNITION      OF     REAL     MIND.  1 05 

or  any  kind  of  action  of  one  upon  another,  or  con- 
stancy of  succession,  is  made  impossible,  or  at  least 
unknowable.  Because  of  the  postulated  separation 
of  the  perceptions  or  terms  composing  the  mind,  it  is 
perfectly  clear  that  Hume  found  himself  compelled, 
in  order  to  maintain  at  all  the  cognizable  relations  he 
assumes  to  exist  among  the  terms,  to  bring  in,  under 
the  title  "imagination"  and  others,  what  is  identical 
with  the  mental  substrate  he  had  refused. 

Here  it  is  of  interest  to  notice  the  statement  of 
Hume's  theory  of  mind,  and  the  extension  given  to  it, 
by  Mr.  J.  ?.  Mill.  "If,  therefore,"  says  Mr.  Mill,  "we 
speak  of  the  Alind  as  a  series  of  feelings,  we  are 
obliged  to  complete  the  statement  by  calling  it  a 
series  of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  itself  as  past  and 
future;  and  we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  believ- 
ing that  the  Mind,  or  Ego,  is  something  different 
from  any  series  of  feelings,  or  possibilities  of  them,  or 
of  accepting  the  paradox,  that  something  which  e.v 
liypothesi  is  but  a  series  of  feelings,  can  be  aware  of 
itself  as  a  series."  i  To  call  the  mind  a  series  aware 
of  itself  as  a  series,  is  but  a  compact  mode  of  stating 
the  two  grand  principles,  separation  and  union,  of  the 
doctrine  of  Hume;  and  the  same  contradiction  is 
manifest.  A  series,  properly  so-called,  can  not  be 
aware  or  conscious  of  itself  as  a  series.  A  series  cog- 
nizant of  itself  as  a  series  plainly  can  not  be  only  a 
series,  but  must  l^e  much  more  than  a  series.  The 
character  of  mere  series  and  the  character  of  self-con- 
sciousness stand  in  direct  opposition  or  exclude  each 
other.  A  real  temporal  or  spatial  series  is  a  line  of 
distinct  units.     Now  in  such  a  line  of  sensat'ons,  feel- 


(i)  Exam.  }{ainilto:i,  I.,  pp.  26r.  262. 


io6  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

ings,  or  ideas,  if  it  were  possible  for  one  idea  to  know 
itself,  how  could  it  yet  be  possible  for  this  term  to 
know  either  the  one  that  precedes  or  the  one  that  fol- 
lows it,  or  any  of  the  i-emoter  terms?  How  could  it  be 
possible  for  consciousness  or  knowledge  to  pervade 
the  series,  crossing  the  voids  or  breaks  that  separate 
the  terms,  and  to  bring  about  the  unity  of  a  series 
aware  of  itself  as  such?  This  pervasion  and  unifica- 
tion is  inconceivable  and  impossible. 

Mr.  Mill,  however,  recognizes  the  difficulty  here, 
and  says  with  reference  to  it:  "The  true  incompre- 
hensibility perhaps  is,  that  something  which  has 
ceased,  or  is  not  yet  in  existence,  can  still  be,  in  a 
manner,  present;  that  a  series  of  feelings,  the  infinitely 
greater  part  of  which  is  past  or  future,  can  be  gathered 
up,  as  it  were,  into  a  single  present  conception,  accom- 
panied by  a  belief  of  reality."  i  He  remarks  again: 
"This  succession  of  feelings,  which  1  call  my  memory 
of  the  past,  is  that  by  which  I  distinguish  my  Self. 
Myself  is  the  person  who  had  that  series  of  feelings, 
and  I  know  nothing  of  myself,  by  direct  knowledge, 
except  that  I  had  them.  But  there  is  a  bond  of  some 
sort  among  all  the  parts  of  the  series,  which  makes 
me  say  that  they  were  feelings  of  a  person  who  was 
the  same  person  throughout,  and  a  different  person 
from  those  who  had  any  of  the  parallel  successions  of 
feelings;  and  this  bond  to  me  constitutes  my  ego."  - 
These  last  words  are  a  considerable  advance  upon 
Hume,  and  seem  not  very  far  from  the  admission  of  a 
permanent  mental  subject. 

In  recent  years,  Hume's  theory  of  mind,  with  some 


(i)  Exam.  Ha--:iiUon,  I.,  p.  262. 

(2)   Note  in  Mill's  Analysis,  11.,  p.  175. 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  lO/ 

modification,  has  had  a  considerable  revival,  affording' 
a  striking  testimony  to  the  persistent  inflnence  of 
Hume  in  philosophy.  Many  psychologists  of  the 
present  doubt  and  deny  the  existence  of  mental  sub- 
stance as  zealously  as  did  Hume;  but  differ  from 
Hume  in  holding  that  the  abstract  or  pure  succession 
of  phenomena  or  aff'ections  which  constitute  mind  is 
not  a  broken  succession,  a  succession  of  separately 
existing  terms,  but  a  closed  or  continuous  succession, 
a  process,  a  flow,  or  stream.  Professor  James  says  of 
mental  substance;  "It  is  at  all  events  needless  for 
expressing  tJic  actual  snbjcctive  pJienornena  of  co)iscious- 
ness  as  they  appear.  We  have  formulated  them  all 
without  its  aid,  by  the  supposition  of  a  stream  of 
thoughts,  each  substantially  different  from  the  rest 
but  cognitive  of  the  rest,  and  'appropriative'  of  each 
other's  content."  '  And  further:  "My  final  conclu- 
sion, then,  about  the  substantial  Soul  is  that  it 
explains  nothing  and  guarantees  nothing.  Its  suc- 
cessive thoughts  are  the  only  intelligible  and  verifiable 
things  about  it."  -  "The  phenomena  are  enough,  the 
passing  Thought  itself  is  the  only  z'critiablc  thinker."  3 
According  to  these  declarations,  the  only  mind  cog- 
nizable, and  entitled  to  recognition  in  science,  is  the 
continuous  succession,  or  stream,  of  thoughts;  but 
we  are  to  understand  that  the  whole  of  mind  at  any 
one  moment  is  the  passing  thought  with  its  capacious, 
memory.  This  thought  is  a  "perfectly  distinct  ])he- 
nomenon"  from  any  that  preceded  it.  4 

Our  author  observes  that  the  only  obscure  point 
in  his  doctrine  is  the  "act  of  appropriation."     So  far. 


(i)  PsycIwlos:y,  I.,  p.  344.      (2)  lb.,  p.  350.      (3)  lb.,  p.  346. 
(4)  lb.,  p.  340. 


I08  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

at  least,  as  this  act  consists  in  or  implies  remembering, 
it  is  indeed  a  difficulty  of  the  most  serious  kind;  in 
truth,  it  refutes  the  doctrine,  for  it  is  an  act  impossible 
to  the  supposed  mind.  Remembering  may  seem 
easier  to  the  stream-mind  than  to  Hume's  discontinu- 
ous mind,  because  the  former  is  one  step  nearer  the 
character  of  the  permanent  mind;  but  it  is  really  not 
so.  Memory,  or  the  knowledge  of  succession,  is  cer- 
tainly impossible  to  the  serial  mind  of  Hume,  because 
of  the  separation  and  incommunicability  of  its  suc- 
cessive terms.  All  that  can  be  known  is  the  present 
passing  perception.  But  memory  would  seem  to  be 
as  certainly  impossible  to  the  stream-mind,  in  which 
the  successive  thoughts  are  connected  or  contiguous; 
all  knowledge  possible  would  seem  to  be  only  knowl- 
edge of  the  present  as  present.  For,  even  if  we 
should  grant  that  a  present  thought  may  appropriate 
or  possess  the  content  of  its  predecessor,  because  of 
its  close  relation  to  it  in  the  succession,  yet  there  is  no 
seeing  why  the  present  thought  should  think  of  any 
of  its  content  as  having  been  in  the  past,  or  as  repre- 
senting the  past.  The  present  thought  being  ''per- 
fectly distinct"  from  its  predecessor,  and  being  the 
whole  of  mind  for  the  time,  it  is  inconceivable  that  it 
should  be  capable  of  any  thought  or  representation  of 
the  past.  There  remains  for  the  theory  of  the 
stream-mind  the  insuperable  task  of  showing  how  a 
succession  or  stream  of  "perishing  thoughts"  may 
know  itself  as  a  stream;  how  a  member  or  section  of 
the  stream  may  know  itself  as  a  part  of  the  stream; 
or  how  a  thing  that  never  had  a  past  can  recall  or 
think  of  the  past.  The  theory,  in  short,  like  the 
theory  of  Hume,  goes  to  pieces  on  the  problem  of 
memory.     This     conclusion     is     entirely     justifiable. 


COGNITION     OF     REAIv     MIND.  IO9 

unless  we  should  suppose  that  the  brain  can  engender 
thoughts,  and  can,  from  its  cells  and  established  paths 
of  molecular  motion,  impart  to  a  thought  memories  of 
past  thoughts.  But  this  unmitigated  materialism 
brings  too  much  of  the  miraculous  into  psychology 
to  be  acceptable;  and  renders  the  term  psychology 
a  misnomer  for  brainology. 

It  is  a  curious  phenomenon  of  recent  psychology 
and  deserves  notice,  that  many  writers,  in  the  same 
breath  in  which  they  den}--  or  express  grave  doubt  of 
the  permanent  mind  or  mental  substance,  admit  most 
unhesitatingly  and  fully  the  permanent  and  extended 
brain,  without  the  slightest  suspicion  apparently  that 
in  the  circumstances  they  are  doing  else  than  the  most 
proper  thing  in  the  world.     In  stating  the  doctrine  of 
parallelism,  or  the  doctrine  that  every  mental  change 
has    its    corresponding    nervous    change,    that    the 
stream  of  thoughts  is  accompanied  by  a  "stream  of 
cerebral   activity,"'    it   is   assumed   that   the   thought 
stream  does  not  belong  to  and  does  not  require  a  per- 
manent mind,  but  that  the  cerebral  stream  belongs  to 
and  could  not  exist  without  the  permanent  cerebrum. 
The  only  entity  concerned  or  connected  with  either  or 
both  streams  is  the  permanent  extended  pure  material 
brain.      The  assumption  of  the  existence  and  clear 
knowledge    of   the    permanent    and    extended    brain 
immediately  upon  the  denial  or  exclusion  of  the  per- 
manent mind,  contradicts  what  seems  to  be  a  very 
important  truth,  namely,  the  priority  of  the  mind  in 
knowledge,    and    elevates    mediate    knowledge    over 
immediate.     Our  nearest  knowledge  of  any  brain  is 
by  a  percept  composed  chiefly  of  our  visual,  tactual 
and  muscular  sensations,  which   are   pure   states  or 
phenomena    of    our    mind.       These    states    are    the 


no  THE      PRINCIPI<ES      OF      KNOVVLKDGE. 

medium  of  the  knowledge  of  the  brain,  and  are  there- 
fore known  before  the  brain.  Furthermore,  as  tliese 
sense-phenomena  of  mind  are  the  medium  of  the 
knowledge  of  quaUties  of  the  brain,  it  would  seem  as 
certain  that  the  permanence  of  the  mind  is  the  means 
and  the  only  means  of  our  knowledge  of  the  perma- 
nence of  the  brain.  There  is  warrant  for  believing  it 
to  be  a  fundamental  principle  of  knowledge,  that  no 
quality  of  the  brain  or  of  any  other  object  can  be 
known,  unless  it  can  be  represented  by  a  mode  or 
property  of  mind  or  by  an  ideal  abstraction  from  a 
pro])erty  of  mind. 

Influenced  largely  by  Hume's  denial  of  the  exist- 
ence, and  Locke  and  Kant's  denial  of  the  knowable- 
ness,  of  mental  substance,  many  psychologists  are  pro- 
posing to  leave  the  consideration  of  mental  substance 
altogether  out  of  psychology,  and  to  confine  the 
science  to  the  treatment  of  the  pure  detached  succes- 
sion of  the  mental  plienomena,  and  of  their  relation  to 
changes  of  the  cerebral  substance.  They  advise  that 
the  question  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  mental 
substance  be  handed  entirely  over  to  "metaphysics." 
Under  this  proposal  is  sometimes,  no  doubt,  the  tacit 
belief,  that  there  is  no  mental  substance,  and  that  the 
question  of  its  existence  may  be  relegated  to  any 
limbo.  Different  writers  express  themselves  as  fol- 
lows: "Empirical  psychology  does  not  inquire  into 
the  ultimate  nature  of  mind  as  an  entity  or  'substance,' 
or  into  the  closely  connected  question  of  the  meta- 
physical interpretation  of  the  connexion  of  mind  with 
a  seeming  heterogeneous  substance,  t'/^.,  the  bodily 
organism.  At  the  same  time,  the  study  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind  naturalh'  leads  on  to  these  meta- 


COGMTION      OF     REAL     MIND.  Ill 

physical  questions."  i  ''Whether  mental  facts  find 
their  ultimate  basis  in  an  independent  mental  sub- 
stance or  in  the  brain,  the  facts  and  the  science  of  the 
facts  remain  the  same."  -  ''W'e  employ  the  word 
mind  only  in  the  sense  of  consciousness,  as  a  col- 
lective term  for  all  our  inner  experiences  (sensations, 
thoughts,  feelings,  and  resolutions),  and  ask  what 
guidance  experience  affords  as  to  the  connection  of 
these  experiences  with  those  whose  content  is  what 
moves  in  space.  Our  standpoint  is  thus,  to  begin 
with,  purely  empirical  or  phenomenal,  not  metaphysical 
or  ontological."  3  '"Psychology,  the  science  of  finite 
individual  minds,  assumes  as  its  data  (i)  thoughts  and 
feelings,  and  (2)  a  physical  zvorld  in  time  and  space  with 
which  they  coexist  and  which  (3)  they  knozv.  .  .  . 
This  book,  assuming  that  thoughts  and  feelings  exist 
and  are  vehicles  of  knowledge,  thereupon  contends 
that  psychology  when  she  has  ascertained  the  empiri- 
cal correlation  of  the  various  sorts  of  thought  or  feel- 
ing with  definite  conditions  of  the  brain,  can  go  no 
farther  —  can  go  no  farther,  that  is,  as  a  natural 
science.  If  she  goes  farther,  she  becomes  metaphysi- 
cal. ...  I  have  therefore  treated  our  passing 
thoughts  as  integers,  and  regarded  the  mere  laws  of 
their  coexistence  with  brain  states  as  the  ultimate 
laws  for  our  science.*'  4 


(i)  Sully,  Human  Mind,  II.,  p.  366. 

(2)  Baldwin,  Psychology,  p.  i. 

(3)  Hoeffding,  Psychology,  p.  2g. 

(4)  James,  Psychology,  I.,  pp.  vi.,  vii. 

Lotze  thus  gives  utterance  to  the  opposite  doctrine:  "It 
has  been  required  of  any  theory  which  starts  without  presup- 
positions and  from  the  basis  of  experience,  that  in  the  begin- 
ning it  should  speak  only  of  sensations  or  ideas,  without  men- 
tioning the  soul  to  which,  it  is  said,  wc  hasten  without  justifica- 


112  THK      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLKDGE. 

These  writers,  in  urging  the  importance  of  admit- 
ting into  psychology  nothing  of  mind  but  the 
abstracted  succession  of  the  mental  phenomena,  are 
proposing  something  which  they  do  not  accomplish 
themselves,  and  which  can  not  be  accomplished.  So 
often  as,  in  psychology,  they  make  the  assumption,  for 
instance,  that  a  stream  of  perishing  thoughts  can 
know  itself  as  a  stream,  or  that  one  part  of  the  stream 
can  know  another  part  as  having  been  past,  they  are 
certainly  assuming  and  employing  much  more  of  mind 
than  the  pure  dirempted  stream  of  thoughts,  and 
something  more  than  a  permanent  and  remembering 
brain.  Psychology  never  does  and  never  can  get  on 
without  taking  account  of  mental  permanence  as  well 
as  of  mental  succession.  These  two  facts  are  insepar- 
able in  knowledge,  and  are  inseparable  in  science. 
Permanence  is  not  separated  from  succession  only  as 
an  inference  from  it.  Furthermore,  to  many  psy- 
chologists it  must  always  seem  anomalous  to  admit 
material  substance  into  the  science  of  mind  and  to 
exclude  mental  substance,  or  to  admit  the  metaphysics 
of  matter,  and  to  exclude  the  metaphysics  of  mind. 
It  would  be  somewhat  different  if  only  the  stream  of 
cerebral  changes  parallel  to  or  concomitant  with  the 
mental  changes  were  introduced,  v/hile  all  assump- 
tions as  to  the  existence  of  the  cerebral  substance,  the 
permanent  and  extended  cerebrum,  were,  as  is  pro- 
posed respecting  mental  substance,  left  out;  but  this 
is  not  done.      Not  onlv  are  the  concomitant  brain 


tion  to  ascribe  them.  I  should  maintain  on  the  contrary,  that 
such  a  mode  of  setting  out  involves  a  willful  departure  from 
that  which  is  actually  given  in  experience.  A  mere  sensation 
without  a  subject  is  nowhere  to  be  met  with  as  a  fact."  {Mela- 
physic,  p.  423.) 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  II3 

changes  deemed  proper  to  psychology,  but  the  brain 
substance  itself  is  brought  in  and  treated  in  the  freest 
and  fullest  manner.  Those  who  believe  in  psychology 
with  a  soul  as  well  as  with  a  brain,  will  give  proper 
regard  to  the  laws  regulating  the  relation  of  mental 
changes  to  physical  changes ;  but  they  can  not  recon- 
cile themselves  to  the  proposition  to  admit  only 
material  substance  into  psychology,  and  altogether  to 
shut  out  mental  substance. 

Leaving  now  the  consideration  of  the  close  chain 
of  doctrines,  past  and  present,  regarding  the  existence 
and  cognition  of  mental  substance,  we  proceed  to  the 
direct  exposition  of  the  nature  of  mental  substance 
and  the  character  of  our  knowledge  of  it.  The  first 
thing  in  order  is  to  come  to  a  clear  understanding  as 
to  what  is  substance,  and,  especially,  mental  substance. 

It  may  be  proper  here,  by  way  of  introduction,  to 
notice  one  or  two  of  the  most  notable  definitions  that 
have  been  given  of  substance.  Spinoza  defines  it  as 
follows:  "Substance  is  that  which  has  existence  in 
itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself,  /.  e.,  that  the  con- 
ception of  which  does  not  need  for  its  formation  the 
conception  of  another  thing."  i  Spinoza's  definition 
seems  more  suitable  to  the  divine  being  than  to  any 
other  being.  Some  have  defined  substance  as  that 
which  *'has  the  power  to  act  on  something  else,  and  to 
be  acted  on  by  something  else."  Interesting  defini- 
tions of  Being  or  Existence  may  also  be  mentioned. 
The  following  have  been  made:  "Existence  means 
nothing  more  than  persistence";  and,  "To  be,  is  to 
:act." 


(i)  Ethics,  I.,  Def.  3. 
(8) 


,    I- 


114  '^^^^      PRINCIPLES      01''      KNOWLEDGE. 

We  can  get  to  the  definition  of  substance  by  way 
of  the  definition  of  being.  Being  or  reahty  is  that 
which  has  permanence  and  spatial  extension.  Mind^ 
Matter,  .Space  are  species  of  being.  Mind  and  Matter 
are  properly  denominated  substances;  for,  in  addition 
to  permanence  and  extension,  they  possess  activity  or 
power.  Space  is  a  reality,  but  not  a  substance;  for, 
though  it  is  permanent  and  extended,  it  is  not  potent 
or  active,  it  never  resists  us.  If  these  statements  are 
true,  then  definitions  often  given  of  substance  are 
inadequate.  For  instance,  it  seems  to  be  a  great 
defect  in  much  of  the  current  metaphysic  regarding 
matter,  to  make  its  being  consist  of  force,  or  of  per- 
manent or  persistent  force,  alone,  and  to  ignore  or 
deny  its  extension  as  an  original  property.  Persistent 
force  or  action  is  certainly  a  property,  and  a  very 
important  property,  of  matter;  but  it  is  no  more  cer- 
tainly a  property  of  matter  than  extension.  It  is  no 
more  original  and  real  to  knowledge.  To  define  mat- 
ter as  force,  or  a  mode  of  force,  and  to  deny  or  omit  its 
extension,  is  to  the  extent  of  that  great  omission,  a 
misrepresentation  of  the  nature  of  matter.  By  no 
subtilty  or  contrivance  can  extension  be  resolved 
into  force  or  into  mere  sequence.  Matter  is  neither 
forceless  extension  nor  extensionless  force,  but  has 
both  extension  and  force  as  distinct  primary  attri- 
butes. 

Mind  as  a  substance  differs  from  matter  by  the 
very  important  property  of  personality;  that  is,  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  self-conscious,  cognizant  of  other  things, 
and  self-controlling.  Further,  we  must  suppose  that 
mental  power  or  force  is  specifically  difTerent  from 
material  force.  Mental  causation  and  physical  causa- 
tion agree  perfectly  in  the  fact  that  neither  is  pure  sue- 


COGNITION      OF     REAL     MIND.  US 

cession;  that  antecedent  does  not  in  either  case  simply 
precede  consequent,  but  determines  it.  But  the 
forces  in  the  two  causations  are  heterogeneous.  The 
force  in  volition  is  one  thing;  the  force  in  physical 
motion  is  another.  Nevertheless,  there  appear  to  be 
very  important  relations  between  these  forces. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  consider  the  nature  of  our 
knowledge  of  mental  substance  or  real  mind.  A  pri- 
mary characteristic  of  this  knowledge  is  that  it  is 
immediate,  and  not  mediate  or  inferential.  Real  mind 
is  known  simultaneously  and  immediately  with  and  in 
the  mental  states,  modifications,  phenomena,  not  sub- 
sequently to  them  and  inferentially  or  mediately  by 
them.  This  is  possible  because  of  the  intimate  rela- 
tion between  the  states  of  mind  and  mind.  States, 
ideas,  phenomena,  are  not  things  detached  from  the 
mind,  capable  of  floating  into  and  out  of  it,  but  the 
modes  and  operations  of  the  mind,  inseparable  from 
it.  Because  of  this  inseparability,  phenomena  can 
not  be  in  consciousness  and  the  mind  itself  outside. 
Phenomena  become  in  consciousness,  raising  mind 
with  them  or  themselves  borne  up  by  mind.  When 
the  light  of  consciousness  is  struck,  both  phenomena 
and  the  mind  are  revealed.  The  mind  itself  is  to  a 
depth  transparent,  so  to  speak;  the  hght  of  conscious- 
ness penetrates  it,  and  we  immediately  cognize  it. 
Thought  and  thinker  are  given  together  and  at  once. 
They  are  inseparable  in  being  or  existence,  and  are 
inseparable  in  consciousness.  Our  discussion  of  the 
cognition  of  the  mental  states  or  phenomena  before 
and  apart  from  that  of  the  cognition  of  real  mind,  has 
not  therefore  been  because  phenomena  are  known 
before  or  apart  from  real  mind,  or  the  latter  apart  from 
the  former;    but  because  of  the  Conveniejicy  of  the 


Il6  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

analysis  and  the  necessity  made  for  it  by  the  diversity 
of  the  theories  of  knowledge. 

Contrary  to  this  doctrine  of  the  immediacy  of  the 
knowledge  of  mind,  many  realists  and  others  have  held 
that  onr  knowledge  of  mind  is  mediate,  that  it  is  the 
result  of  inference  or  memory.  Des  Cartes  seems  to 
make  our  knowledge  of  mind  inferential  in  his  cele- 
brated saying,  Cogito,  ergo  siwi.  It  is  possible,  how- 
ever, that  he  did  not  mean  his  proposition  to  be  under- 
stood as  expressing  an  inference  as  much  as  it  seems 
to  do;  but  to  be  taken,  rather,  as  identical  with  Cogito, 
scilicet  sum — I  think,  that  is  to  say  I  am;  which  appears 
to  be  a  statement  of  the  simple  doctrine  that  thought 
and  mental  being  are  known  together,  and  of  the 
simple  truth.  Among  late  writers,  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
remarks  thus  on  the  mediacy  of  our  knowledge  of 
mind:  "There  exists  no  intuitive  or  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  self  as  the  absolute  subject  of  thought,  feeling, 
and  desire,  but,  on  the  contrary,  there  is  only  possible 
a  deduced,  relative,  and  secondary  knowledge  of  self, 
as  the  permanent  basis  of  those  transient  modifications 
of  which  we  are  directly  conscious."  ^     Mr.  J.  S.  Mill 


(i)  Ed.  of  Reid.  p.  929.  The  same  writer  says  again:  "The 
notion  of  the  ego  or  self  arises  from  the  recognized  permanence 
and  identity  of  the  thinking  subject  in  contrast  to  the  recog- 
nized succession  and  variety  of  its  modifications.  But  this 
recognition  is  possible  only  through  memory.  The  notion  of 
self  is,  therefore,  the  result  of  memory."  (Metaphysics,  p.  142.) 
"Mind  and  matter,  as  known  or  knowabie,  are  only  two  differ- 
ent series  of  phaenomena  or  qualities;  mind  and  matter,  as 
imknown  and  unknowable,  are  the  two  substances  in  which 
these  two  different  series  of  phaenomena  or  qualities  are  sup- 
posed to  inhere.  The  existence  of  an  unknown  substance  is 
only  an  inference  we  are  compelled  to  make,  from  the  existence 
of  known  phaenomena."  (lb.,  p.  97.)  It  should  be  noted  that 
there  are  other  statements  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  respecting  the 
knowledge  of  self  which  are  not  consistent  with  these. 


COGNITION  OF  REAL  MIND.  II7 

says:  "The  notion  of  a  Self  is,  I  apprehend,  a  conse- 
quence of  Memory.  There  is  no  meaning  in  the  word 
Ego  or  I,  unless  the  I  of  to-day  is  also  the  I  of  yester- 
day; a  permanent  element  which  abides  through  a 
succession  of  feelings,  and  connects  the  feeling  of  each 
moment  with  the  remembrance  of  previous  feelings."  - 
These  latter  writers  impute  too  much  importance 
^o  memory  in  the  knowledge  of  self  or  mind.  We 
must  admit,  no  doubt,  that  memory  is  necessary  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  identity  or  permanence  of  the  mind. 
The  knowledge  of  permanence  requires  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  present  and  of  the  past;  and  of  the  past  we 
have  no  consciousness  or  immediate  knowledge,  but 
know  it  only  by  memory.  Permanence,  however, 
though  a  primary  property  of  mind,  is  not  the  whole 
of  mind;  though  contributing  much  to  the  full  notion 
of  mind,  it  does  not  form  the  whole  of  that  notion. 
We  know  the  one  self  as  certainly  in  diverse  simul- 
taneous states  of  mind,  as  in  diverse  successive  states; 
or  our  experiences  of  the  former  contribute  as  cer- 
tainly to  our  knowledge  of  self,  as  our  experiences  of 
the  latter.  For  example,  we  immediately  know  self 
as  possessing  power,  in  instances  where  volition  and 
mental  effect  are  simultaneous.  We  immediately 
know  self  as  the  one  owner,  in  experiences  of  spatially 
separate  simultaneous  sensations.  There  is,  as  has 
been  contended  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  possibility 
of  consciousness,  or  of  a  contribution  to  conscious- 
ness, without  memory;  and  so  is  there  of  a  knowledge 
of  self.  Discrimination,  we  grant,  is  the  condition  of 
consciousness;  but  discrimination  is  not  possible  only 
through  change  or  succession.     It  is  possible  with 


(i)   Note  in  Mill's  Analysis,  I.,  p.  229. 


Jl8  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

difference;  and  difference  may  exist  with  simultane- 
ous momentary  affections.  Consciousness  may 
awaken  in  the  discrimination  of  such  affections;  and 
self  may  at  the  same  time  be  known  as  the  one  owner 
of  the  diverse  affections.  It  would  seem  there  is 
knowledge  of  self  that  precedes  the  knowledge  of  the 
permanence  of  self. 

Some  writers  hold  that  our  knowledge  of  real  mind 
is  entirely  inferential,  on  the  assumption  that  the  men- 
tal phenomena  are  in  some  sort  detached  from  mind 
so  that  phenomena  can  be  known  while  mind  is 
entirely  unknown.  They  conclude,  then,  that  we 
infer  mind  from  phenomena,  or  reason  from  known 
phenomena  to  unknown  mind.  For  example,  we 
find  Sir  W.  Hamilton  saying  that  "the  existence  of  an 
unknown  substance  is  only  an  inference  we  are  com- 
pelled to  make  from  the  existence  of  known  phe- 
nomena." According  to  the  extreme  doctrine  of 
Kant,  phenomena  are  so  separated  from  real  mind  or 
mind  in  itself  that  they  are  known  while  mind  in  itself 
is  forever  unknown;  and,  further,  that  phenomena 
not  only  do  not  present  or  represent  properties  of  real 
blind,  but  misrepresent  them,  or  directly  contradict 
them.  For  instance,  phenomena  present  time  and 
extension;  but  real  mind  is  supposed  to  be  timeless 
and  extensionless. 

The  assumption  of  such  separation  and  contrariety 
between  mental  phenomena  and  real  mind,  can  not  be 
admitted  as  one  grounded  on  facts.  Phenomena  are 
in  immediate  relation  to  mind.  They  are  not 
detached  appearances,  but  modes  or  modifications  of 
mind,  undetachable  from  mind.  And  this  closeness 
of  relation  forbids  that  we  shall  be  conscious  or  imme- 
diately cognizant  of  phenomena,  and  not  know  mind, 


COGXITIOM     OF     REAL     MIND.  IT9 

the  one  self  and  possessor  of  phenomena,  or  know  it 
only  as  an  inference  from  them;  and  certainly  forbids 
that  phenomena  shall  contradict  the  character  of 
mind.  Phenomena,  called  "operations*'  and  "modi- 
fications" of  mind,  can  not  be  sundered  so  far  from 
mind  as  that  they  may  be  known,  and  mind  itself  be. 
at  the  same  time,  merely  a  "supposed  something,"  or 
"imknown"  and  "unknowable";  or  that  thought  may 
be  in  consciousness,  and  mind  absolutely  outside.  We 
do  not  infer  the  existence  of  mind  from  the  phenom- 
ena or  states;  we  do  not  reason  that,  because  we  are 
conscious  of  simultaneous  distinct  affections,  there 
inust  be  a  substance  comprehending  them;  that,  since 
we  can  control  affections  of  self,  there  must  be  more 
of  a  cause  than  merely  another  state  of  mind,  or  than 
the  preceding  term  of  the  series.  We  are  conscious 
of  the  mind  with  its  states,  or  of  the  states  as  inhering 
in  the  mind.  Consciousness  not  only  embraces  phe- 
nomena, but  also  reaches  down,  so  to  speak,  and  takes 
in  the  substratum  to  which  they  belong.  There  is  no 
interval  of  time,  and  no  inference.  Both  state  and 
substrate  are  grasped  at  once  in  the  same  mode  of  con- 
sciousness. The  relation  of  thought  and  thinking 
substance  is  so  close,  the  one  is  so  much  the  cause  of 
the  other,  the  other  so  inheres  in  the  one,  as  its  quality, 
mode  or  action,  that  they  both  must  appear  in  con- 
sciousness together,  indissolubly  in  consciousness  as 
they  are  in  existence.  Consciousness  does  not  pro- 
duce the  mind;  but  the  mind  is  known  in  conscious- 
ness. The  mind  exists  before  there  is  any  conscious- 
ness, and  is  in  no  sense  generated  by  it.  but  is  simply 
known.  Consciousness  is  itself  rather  generated  by 
the  internal  action  of  the  mind.  The  mind  exists 
before  it  is  awake  to  its  existence;  and  when  it  awak- 


I20  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

ens  in  all  its  conscious  states,  nothing  is  added  to  its 
real  existence  or  constitution;  but  only  its  potentiali- 
ties, so  to  speak,  are  actualized.  Locke's  singular 
doctrine  that  "personal  identity  consists  not  in  the 
identity  of  substance,  but  in  the  identity  of  conscious- 
ness," is  plainly  but  a  consequence  of  his  view  regard- 
ing the  obscure  and  indirect  cognition  of  substance; 
for  he  says:  "Self  is  not  determined  by  identity  or 
diversity  of  substance,  which  it  can  not  be  sure  of,  but 
only  by  identity  of  consciousness."  i 

The  character  of  our  knowledge  of  mind  as  imme- 
diate will  be  made  clearer  by  brief  comparison  of  it 
with  our  knowledge  of  matter.  We  shall  be  helped  in 
this  comparison,  if  we  first  give  attention  for  a 
moment  to  the  general  nature  of  phenomena.  It  has 
been  long  the  leading  view,  as  to  phenomena,  that 
there  are  two  great  classes,  namely,  the  phenomena  of 
the  "internal  sense,"  and  the  phenomena  of  the 
"external  sense";  or  the  phenomena  of  mind  or  sub- 
iect.  and  the  phenomena  of  matter  or  object.  But 
objection  may  be  well  made  to  the  indiscriminate 
application  of  the  term  "phenomena"  to  the  qualities 
of  mind  and  the  qualities  of  matter.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, there  is  but  one  class  of  phenomena,  and  that  is 
the  phenomena  of  mind,  the  pure  modes  of  mind. 
These  alone  present  themselves  in  consciousness,  or 
come  immediately  before  the  eye  of  the  mind;  and 
are  therefore  alone  properly  called  phenomena  or 
appearances.  Matter  no  doubt  has  its  qualities  as 
really  as  mind;  but  they  are  never  phenomena 
strictlv,  never  as  the  modes  of  the  mind  are.  Fur- 
thermore,  as  the  phenomena  or  modes  of  mind  alone 

(i)  Essay,  II.,  xxvii.  19  and  23. 


COGNITION      OF     REAL     MIND.  121 

enter  consciousness,  all  objects  and  ciualities,  all 
things  whatsoever,  separate  from  these  modes,  must 
be  known  by  means  of  them. 

The  knowledge  of  real  mind  is  a  special  kind  of 
knowledge,  unlike  that  of  m.atter,  because  of  the  pecu- 
liar relation  in  which  phenomena  stand  to  mind.  Phe- 
nomena proper,  the  conscious  modes  of  mind,  sensa- 
ti^Ons,  emotions,  etc..  hold  a  relation  to  the  mind  very 
different  from  their  relation  to  matter.  This  point 
deserves  more  distinct  and  full  consideration  from 
psychologists  than  it  commonly  receives.  The  men- 
tal modes  or  phenomena  belong  to  or  inhere  in  mind, 
and  not  in  matter.  They  are  immediately  related  to 
mind,  and  are  inseparable  from  it;  but  have  no  such 
connection  with  matter.  Their  relation  to  mind  may 
be  compared  to  the  relation  which  a  color  (in  the  pop- 
ular conception)  holds  to  its  rose;  their  relation  to 
extra-mental  things  may  be  compared  to  the  relation 
which  the  color  of  one  rose  holds  to  another  rose. 
Or,  the  former  is  like  the  relation  of  an  impression  to 
the  wax  in  which  it  is  made;  the  latter,  like  the  rela- 
tion of  the  impression  to  the  seal  by  which  it  was 
made.  The  difference  between  the  relation  of  the 
mental  phenomena  to  matter  and  their  relation  to 
mind,  accordingly,  is  such  that  the  question  regarding 
the  cognition  and  being  of  mental  substance  must  be 
taken  as  quite  different  from  that  regarding  the  cog- 
nition and  being  of  material  substance. 

It  is  because  of  inattention  to  this  fundamental 
difference  of  relation  that  many  have  viewed  Hume's 
skepticism  concerning  mind  as  if  it  were  a  logical 
development  from  Berkeley's  skepticism  concerning 
matter.  There  is  manifestly  no  such  connection 
between   the   conclusions   of   the   two   philosophers. 


122  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

Skepticism  concerning  matter  is  one  thing,  and  skep- 
ticism concerning  mind  is  another  thing;  for  the  sim- 
ple and  sufficient  reason,  just  given,  that  the  relation 
phenomena  hold  to  mind  has  no  likeness  to  their  rela- 
tion to  matter.  All  knowledge  is  in  and  with  the 
mental  phenomena;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  knowl- 
edges of  the  two  realities  are  of  very  diverse  character, 
and  that  skepticism  as  to  the  remoter  reality  in  no 
manner  warrants  skepticism  as  to  the  nearer.  This 
Berkeley  himself  maintained.  The  other  view,  how- 
ever, is  consistent  with  Berkeley's  notion  regarding 
the  relation  of  phenomena  or  ideas  to  the  mind.  He 
held  ideas  as  capable  of  being  entirely  detached  from 
the  mind,  so  as  that  they  could  be  successively  the 
possessions  of  different  minds;  and  gave  them  thus 
the  character  rather  of  distinct  entities,  than  of  modi- 
fications of  an  entity.  The  relation  of  ideas  to  the 
mind  was  made,  accordingly,  almost  as  loose  as  is 
their  relation  to  external  material  objects,  i  On  this 
theory  of  mind,  Hume's  denial  of  the  existence  of  real 
mind  is  indeed  but  a  natural  sequence  to  Berkeley's 
denial  of  the  existence  of  matter.  Nevertheless,  the 
denial  of  mental  substance  has  no  logical  connection 
with  the  denial  of  material  substance;  because  the 
relation  of  ideas,  sensations,  perceptions,  to  mind,  is 
not  that  loose  one  apparently  taught  by  Berkeley,  is 
nothing  like  their  relation  to  matter,  but  is  altogether 


d)  "The  things  [ideas]  perceived  by  sense  may  be  termed 
external,  with  regard  to  their  origin,  in  that  they  are  not  gen- 
erated from  within,  by  the  mind  itseU',  but  imprinted  by  a  spirit 
distinct  from  that  which  perceives  them.  Sensible  objects  may 
likewise  be  said  to  be  without  the  mind,  in  another  sense, 
namely,  when  they  exist  in  some  other  mind.  Thus  when  I 
shut  my  eyes,  the  things  I  saw  may  still  exist,  but  it  must  be  in 
another  mind."     (Principles,  Sect,  xc.) 


COGXITIOX      OF     REAL     MIND.  1 23 

different  and  closer.  Ideas  are  the  modes  of  the 
mind,  not  its  transient  possessions  distinct  from  itself. 
They  inhere  in  mind;  are  not  entities,  l)ut  the  various 
modes  of  the  mental  entity,  inseparable  from  it,  but 
separate  from  material  objects  by  a  gulf  serious 
enough  in  width. 

Because  of  this  significant  difference  of  the  rela- 
tion of  phenomena  to  mind  and  to  matter,  the  knowl- 
edge of  mind  is  evidently  prior  and  immediate,  while 
that  of  matter  is  secondary  and  relative  or  mediate. 
Sir  \y.  Hamilton,  accordingly,  in  his  assertion,  that 
the  existence  of  an  unknown  substance  is  but  an  infer- 
ience  from  the  existence  of  known  phenomena, 
expresses  the 'truth  regarding  our  knowledge  of  mat- 
ter, but  reverses  the  truth  regarding  our  knowledge 
of  mind.  In  our  knowledge  of  mind,  knowledge  and 
being  are  one  or  inseparable  —  knowledge  presents 
being;  but  in  our  knowledge  of  anything  else,  knowl- 
edge and  being  are  separate  —  knowledge  only  repre- 
sents being. 

The  doctrine  of  the  priority  and  immediateness  ot 
our  knowledge  of  mind,  and  of  its  contrast  with  the 
knowledge  of  matter  as  secondary  and  inferential, 
which  we  have  been  advocating  above,  has  but  little 
conformity  with  the  views  of  many  psychologists  of 
•both  the  monistic  and  dualistic  parties.  For  instance, 
take  the  following  statement  of  Mr.  H.  Spencer 
regarding  the  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter:  "No 
effort  of  imagination  enables  us  to  think  of  a  shock 
[in  consciousness],  however  minute,  except  as  under- 
gone by  an  entity.  We  are  compelled,  therefore,  to 
postulate  a  substance  of  Mind  that  is  aft'ected,  before 
we  can  think  of  its  affections.  But  we  can  form  no 
notion  of  a  substance  of  Mind  absolutelv  divested  of 


124  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

attributes  connoted  by  the  word  substance'  and  all 
such  attributes  are  abstracted  from  our  experiences  of 
material  phenomena.  Expel  from  the  conception  of 
Mind  every  one  of  those  attributes  by  which  we  dis- 
tinguish an  external  something  from  an  external  noth- 
ing, and  the  conception  of  the  mind  becomes  nothing. 
.  .  .  We  know  nothing  of  cause  save  as  manifested  in 
existences  we  class  as  material  —  either  our  own 
bodies  or  surrounding  things."  i  There  is  much 
implied  in  this  declaration,  but  we  are  now  concerned 
only  with  its  assertion  that  the  knowledge  of  mind 
depends  upon  or  is  abstracted  from  the  knowledge  of 
matter.  On  this  point  it  seems  directly  to  oppose  the 
truth.  We  have  been  maintaining  above  that,  to 
speak  with  strictness,  there  are  no  '"material,"  but  only 
mental,  phenomena;  that  no  molecule  or  mass  of  mat- 
ter, no  motion  or  quality  of  either,  ever  appears  in 
consciousness;  but  only  the  pure  qualities  or  sta^tes  of 
mind.  This  should  be  regarded  as  a  primary  fact  of 
mind.  On  the  ground  of  it,  all  our  knowledge  of 
matter  follows  and  depends  upon  our  knowledge  of 
mind;  it  is  a  knowledge  deduced  from  our  prior 
knowledge  of  the  pure  mental  phenomena  which  the 
qualities  of  matter  occasion  through  their  impres- 
sions, and  by  which  they  are  represented.  For  this 
reason  we  should  hold  that  our  knowledge  of  the  attri- 
butes of  matter  is  "abstracted"  from  the  phenomena  of 
mind,  and  not  the  reverse.  We  know;,  for  example, 
the  permanence  of  matter  or  of  a  material  object,  only 
by  the  similarity  of  the  successive  sensations  or  per- 
cepts which  it  excites  in,  and  which  are  known  as  the 
affections  of,  the  permanent  mind;    the  permanent 


(i)  Psychology,  I.,  pp.  626,  627. 


COGXITIOX      OF     REAL     MIND.  1 25 

mind  reasons  that  its  successive  affections  are  occa- 
sioned by  a  permanent  object.  •  And  we  know  causa- 
tion, or  the  determination  of  consequent  by  antece- 
dent, as  existing  among  material  objects,  through  our 
knowledge  of  pure  mental  causation,  which  is  experi- 
enced, for  instance,  in  the  voluntary  direction  of  the 
attention,  and  which  is  our  first  knowledge  of  causa- 
tion. It  may  be  affirmed,  therefore,  in  general,  that, 
if  our  terminology  should  follow  the  order  of  knowl- 
edge, we  should  say,  not  that  mind  is  immaterial,  but 
that  matter  is  non-mental.  We  know  matter  only  by 
abstraction  and  negation  from  our  knowledge  of 
mind. 

To  those  who  call  in  question  or  deny  the  doctrine 
of  the  immediate  knowledge  of  mind,  a  certain  con- 
cession must  yet  be  made;  which  is,  that  our  imme- 
diate knowledge  is  not  of  the  totality  and  perfection 
of  mind.  The  conscious  modes  of  mind  are  pro- 
duced by  the  mind  itself,  are  changes  caused  by  its 
own  internal  activitv  and  laws,  and  the  mind  is  imma- 
nent,  and  is  known,  in  these  modes;  but  there  are 
activities,  conditions,  peculiarities  of  internal  organi- 
zation, in  mind,  which  are  always  out  of  consciousness 
and  concealed.  The  possibility  of  this  is  implied  in 
the  pre-existence  of  mind  to  consciousness.  If  the 
mind  has  existence  before  consciousness,  some  of  its 
activities  and  properties  may  never  rise  into  con- 
sciousness. 

The  mind,  as  truly  as  the  brain,  is  a  reality  before 
phenomena.  It  does  not  become  a  reality  at  the  rise 
of  phenomena.  A  fact  worthy  of  note  here  is  the 
ease  with  which  the  materialists  postulate  an  uncon- 
scious brain  as  the  antecedent  and  producer  of  the 
conscious    phenomena.       The    rise    of    phenomena 


126  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

marks  the  transition  of  the  mind  from  a  preceding 
state  of  unconsciousness.  The  declaration  that  the 
"soul  is  what  it  does,"  is  an  inadequate  definition. 
The  soul  is  something  before  its  conscious  action,  and 
besides  all  its  action.  For  example,  its  extension  can 
be,  by  no  means,  resolved  into  mere  action.  But  at 
the  same  time,  mind  exists  and  is  revealed  in  the  con- 
scious modes  or  phenomena.  Phenomena  are  not 
thrown  ofif  by  the  mind  like  sparks.  There  is  no 
diremption.  The  mind  continues  immanent  in  phe- 
nomena. They  pre-exist  somehow  as  possibilities  in 
the  unconscious  mind.  The  m.ind  in  some  manner 
contains  potentially  all  changes  or  affections  that  will 
come  in  time,  and  contains  in  memory,  for  reproduc- 
tion, all  affections  that  have  been;  and  in  the  coming 
of  conscious  affections,  the  mind  comes  with  them. 
But  this  marvelous  change  of  the  mind  from  uncon- 
sciousness to  consciousness,  —  what  its  nature  is, 
how  it  is  effected,  how  the  conscious  exists  in  posse  or 
implicit  in  the  unconscious  and  comes  to  actuality,  — 
is  a  problem  that  will  never,  probably,  be  solved  by 
human  intelligence. 

Mind,  we  have  said,  is  immanent  in  the  conscious 
modes,  but  not  in  its  wholeness.  Thought  is  not 
coextensive  with  mind.  But  the  question  may  well 
arise  here,  How  come  we  to  kmnc  that  there  are 
nnknoivn  properties  of  mind?  What  are  the  grounds 
for  affirming  that  phenomena  are  in  community  or 
continuity  with  unconscious  activity  and  organization 
of  the  same  mind?  And  why  should  we  not  hold  with 
Berkeley,  that  phenomena  are  introduced  into  the 
mind  by  a  "governing  Spirit,"  and  are  not  generated 
or  unfolded  by  unknown  internal  faculties  and  action 
•of  mind  itself? 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  I27 

We  know  tliese  properties  mediately,  by  means  in 
part  of  our  voluntary  command  over  the  rise  of  phe- 
nomena. We  can  by  will  occasion  affections  of  mind, 
and  can  greatly  vary  the  production.  For  instance, 
by  opening  and  closing  the  eyes,  by  moving  the  body 
or  its  organs,  we  can  occasion  the  rise  and  repetition 
of  various  visual,  tactual,  and  m.uscular  sensations. 
But  while  we  can  bring  about  the  rise  of  modes  of 
mind  at  pleasure,  we  know  at  the  same  time  that  we 
do  not,  by  our  volition,  create  them.  The  volition 
and  the  sensation  are  known  in  most  intimate  relation, 
as  modes  of  self,  and  modes  of  self  which  are  occasion 
and  occasioned;  but  the  marked  difference  between 
the  modes,  and  the  contrast  and  relation  between 
what  we  know  we  do,  and  what  we  know  we  do  not, 
to  produce  the  sense-mode,  lead  to  the  inference  ofa 
causal  process  or  of  properties  below  consciousness, 
but  within  the  mind,  as  the  needed  origin  of  the  dif- 
ference. Memory  also  gives  rise  to  the  inference  of 
unconscious  mental  conditions,  or  properties  of  inter- 
nal constitution. 

In  general,  according  to  the  above  considerations, 
while  we  have  immediate  knowledge  of  mind,  this 
knowledge  has  two  chief  limitations  or  qualifications. 
First,  part  of  our  definite  knowledge  of  mind,  that  is, 
the  knowledge  of  its  permanence,  is  not  immediate, 
but  mediate  through  memory.  vSecondly,  our  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  mind  does  not  embrace  the  whole 
of  mind.  Besides  what  we  know  immediately  of 
mind,  and  what  we  know  mediately  by  memory,  but 
not  by  inference,  there  are  activities,  and  properties  of 
the  innermost  organization  of  mind,  which  we  can 
know  only  by  inference  or  conjecture,  as  the  hidden 
causes  or  conditions  of  conscious  effects.     This  infer- 


128  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

ential  knowledge  of  mind,  or  our  knowledge  as 
respects  the  wholeness  or  perfection  of  the  content  of 
mind,  is  illustrated  by  our  knowledge  of  matter.  We 
certainly  know  definitely  the  permanence  and  exten- 
sion of  a  material  object;  but  of  the  ultimate  elements, 
and  innermost  constitution,  of  the  object,  our  knowl- 
edge as  far  as  it  goes  is  only  conjectural  or  hypo- 
thetical. Something  analogous  to  this  is  true  of  our 
knowledge  of  mind. 

Hitherto  the  statements  and  argumentation  as  to 
the  knowledge  of  real  mind  may  have  appeared  to  be, 
in  part  at  least,  somewhat  general.  Let  us  therefore 
now  descend  to  consider  with  m.ore  particularity,  yet 
briefly,  what  may  be  known  of  real  mind.  To  begin 
then,  we  know  mind  as  a  temporal,  causational,  and 
spatial  unit.  In  other  words,  we  know  (i)  the  time 
or  permanence  of  the  one  mind,  (2)  its  causation  or 
power,  and  (3)  its  extension.  These  known  proper- 
ties are  not  mere  forms  of  our  thought;  they,  espe- 
cially time  and  extension,  are  not  mere  Erschein- 
ungen,  appearances,  directly  contradictory,  according 
to  the  Kantian  "transcendental  aesthetic,"  to  real 
properties  of  mind ;  but  present  attributes  of  mind  in 
itself;  the  conscious  phenomena  are  the  self-revela- 
tion of  real  mind.  Because  the  mind  possesses  these 
properties,  it  is  a  substance:  and  in  knowing  these 
properties  of  mind,  we  know  mind  as  a  substance. 

I.  Our  knowledge  of  the  Permanence,  identity, 
duration,  time,  of  the  mind  is  by  memory.  It  is 
therefore,  as  already  observed,  not  an  immediate 
knowledge.  Memory  is  not  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  the  past,  but  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
present  combined  with  representation  and  belief  of  the 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  1 29 

past.  A  present  experience  is  believed  to  represent  a 
past  experience.  Our  knowledge  of  the  permanence 
of  the  mind  is  therefore,  strictly,  a  composition  of^ 
immediate  and  mediate  knowledge.  —  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  present  existence  of  the  mind,  given 
in  that  diversity  of  affections  necessary  for  conscious- 
ness itself  at  any  moment  and  in  any  mode,  and  the 
indissoluble  belief  in  the  past  existence  of  the  mind. 

But  though  our  knowledge  of  the  past  or  perma- 
nence of  the  mind  is  mediate,  it  is  not  on  that  account 
in  any  degree  inferential;  it  is  not  the  result  of  reason- 
ing, or  a  deduction  of  the  unknown  past  from  the 
known  present.  Our  behef  of  the  mind's  past  is  a 
primitive  and  spontaneous  conviction,  which  precedes 
and  is  entirely  independent  of  reasoning.  In  this 
respect  there  is  an  inerasible  difference  between  the 
mediate  knowledge  of  the  mind  and  the  mediate 
knowledge  of  an  entity  distinct  from  the  mind.  In 
the  latter  case  there  is  a  chasm  between  the  knower 
and  the  object  known,  formed  by  a  difference  of 
nature  or  of  number  and  space;  but  in  the  former,  the 
present  knower  and  the  past  known  are  identical. 
They  are  the  same  entity  enduring  from  time  to  time, 
or  through  time.  There  is  no  difference  of  nature, 
number,  or  space;  there  is  only  the  difference  of  two 
dates  of  the  same  thing.  But  if  this  is  the  only  differ- 
ence, it  is  yet  one  of  the  most  notable  experiences  of 
the  mind. 

Apparently  the  only  adequate  or  rational  account 
that  can  be  given  of  the  belief  in  the  mind's  past  is.  not 
that  it  is  the  product  of  repeated  inference,  but  is  the 
expression  of  the  fact  that  the  mind  had  a  past,  and 
has  endured  in  identity  from  the  past  to  the  present. 
The  permanent  mind  forms  the  connection  between 
(9) 


130  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  represented  mode  and  the  representing  mode,  and 
makes  the  conviction  possible  and  supports  it.  It 
measures  the  interval  of  time  between  the  present  and 
represented  mode,  and  fixes  the  place  of  one  past  mode 
among-  other  past  modes.  We  are  convinced  that  the 
present  mode  represents  the  past  mode,  because  self 
existed  at  the  time  of  the  past  mode,  and  exists  now 
with  the  present  mode,  having  endured  through  the 
interval.  Its  endurance  is  the  ground  of  the  repre- 
sentation, and  of  the  conviction  that  the  representa- 
tion is  true.  Continuing  from  the  actual  existence  of 
the  past  mode  to  the  coming  and  consciousness  of  the 
present  representation,  it  in  a  manner  makes  the  past 
present,  or  brings  the  past  to  the  present.  In  short, 
the  ontological  fact  of  having  had  a  past  is  the  basis 
of  the  mind's  belief  in  its  past. 

Accordingly,  while  memory  is  our  knowledge  of 
the  permanence  of  the  mind,  yet  that  permanence  is 
itself  the  necessary  condition  or  ground  of  the  mem- 
ory. If  there  were  no  permanence  of  mind  there 
would  be  no  thought  or  appearance  of  the  past,  of 
change,  or  of  time.  The  reality  is  the  necessary 
ground  or  cause  of  the  thought  or  appearance. 
Without  the  former  the  latter  would  never  occur. 
Phenomenon  is  inseparable  from  mental  reality,  and 
therefore  conforms  to  reality  and  is  the  presentation 
of  reality.  Kant  has  said  that  "such  properties  as 
belong  to  things  in  themselves  can  never  be  given  to 
us  through  the  senses."  i  This  unjustifiable  and  mis- 
chievous assumption,  so  far  as  it  pertains  to  mind  and 
to  time,  presupposes  a  gulf  or  severance  between 
sense-phenomena  and  mind  in  itself  which  does  not 


(1)  Kriiik  d.  r.  V..  p.  68. 


COGNITION     OI^     REAL     MIND.  I31 

exist,  and  also  a  contrariety  between  the  properties  of 
phenomena  and  of  mind  which  is  impossible.  Phe- 
nomena are  inseparable  from  mind;  they  are  modes  or 
modifications  of  mind;  and  therefore  necessarily  pre- 
sent the  properties  of  real  mind,  and  not  the  opposite. 
We  have  the  thonght  of  time  because  time  is  an  attri- 
bute of  real  mind.  There  could  be  no  thoueht  of  the 
past  if  there  had  not  been  a  past ;  or  what  never  had  a 
past  can  never  think  of  or  recall  the  past.  Perma- 
nence of  mind  is  the  indispensable  basis  of  memory, 
as  also  of  habit  and  heredity;  and  to  this  may  be 
added  the  observation,  that  it  is  as  easy  for  the  mind 
to  be  permanent  as  for  it  to  think  of  permanence. 

The  only  plausible  alternative  to  this  view  of  mind 
is  the  doctrine  that  the  timeless  mind  or  thought 
creates  the  phenomenon  of  time.  The  postulation  of 
creative  power  for  mind  is  at  least  a  very  convenient 
one;  for  it  affords  a  ready  resource  in  manv  perplex- 
ing questions  regarding  mind.  But  it  lacks  warrant. 
There  is  no  real  evidence  that  the  mind  ever  exercises 
a  creative  function.  The  mind  no  doubt  has  remark- 
able constructive  power.  Out  of  original  materials 
furnished,  it  forms  many  compositions.  But  the 
original,  elementary  materials  themselves  are  not 
compounded  or  created.  They  are  but  presentations 
of  real  properties  of  mind  or  of  what  exists.  Our 
notions  of  long  times  are  intellectual  compositions 
from  our  notions  of  short  or  elementary  times,  or  are 
the  ideal  prolongations  of  elementary  times;  but  the 
notions  of  elementary  times,  themselves  simple  or 
uncompounded,  are  the  self-revelation  of  the  real 
times,  or  portions  of  the  real  time,  of  the  mind. 

When,  therefore,  we  have  the  thought  of  su1)iec- 
tive  permanence,  duration,  or  time,  we  are  cognizant. 


132  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

not  of  a  phenomenon  which  is  detached  from  and  is 
the  direct  opposite  of  the  character  of  real  mind,  but 
of  a  property  of  real  mind.  Our  thought  is  a  medi- 
ate knowledge  or  belief,  not  an  immediate  knowledge; 
but  it  is  a  belief  which  owes  its  existence  to  the  reality 
of  the  thing  believed  in  or  of  the  content  of  the  belief, 
and  would  not  occur  and  would  not  be  possible  with- 
out this  basis  in  reality. 

2.  The  mind  is  immediately  cognizant  of  its 
power,  in  the  control  it  manifestly  exerts  oyer  its  own 
states  or  modifications.  The  mind  is  cognizant  of 
simultaneous  and  successive  affections,  both  without 
the  consciousness  of  power  and  with  the  conscious- 
ness of  power;  and  the  two  experiences,  with  power, 
and  without,  are  a  primary  and  distinct  difference. 
Often,  we  may  say  generally,  our  thoughts  succeed 
one  another  and  flow  in  a  stream,  independently  of  our 
volition  according  to  the  hidden  laws  and  energies  of 
the  mind.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mind  can  of  its 
will  control  the  course  of  its  thoughts  to  some  extent, 
can  change  it,  can  excite  in  itself  certain  affections; 
and  in  this  the  mind  is  cognizant  not  only  of  succes- 
sion, but  also  of  power.  It  is  conscious  of  exerting 
itself,  and  of  the  effect  produced  in  itself  by  the  exer- 
tion. The  consciousness  of  the  exertion  and  the 
effect  is  a  perfectly  clear  experience,  wholly  distinct 
and  easily  distinguished  from  the  notion  of  mere  suc- 
cession. This  causation  within  the  sphere  of  the 
mind,  within  consciousness,  is  the  beginning  of  the 
notion  of  causation,  and  the  basis  of  our  whole  con- 
ception and  comprehension  of  it. 

First,  the  mind  has  power  to  control  the  course  of 
thought.  In  this  control  we  are  simultaneously  con- 
scious of  active  power  and  passive  effect,  of  the  exer- 


COGNITION      OT?     REAL     MIND.  1 33 

tion  enduring  with  its  effect.  This  consciousness  is 
universal.  Though  there  are  great  (Hfferences  among 
men  in  the  degree  of  their  subjective  power,  though 
w^ell  discipHned  minds  possess  an  extraordinary  degree 
of  it,  yet  the  least  disciplined  possess  some  degree. 
Even  in  the  simple  act  of  writing  a  letter,  there  is  a 
distinct  direction  of  the  course  of  thought,  in  the 
selection  from  the  mass  of  our  information  of  what  is 
fit  for  the  purpose  of  our  writing,  and  in  the  rejection 
of  what  is  unfit.  But  in  the  severe  command  of  the 
trained  thinker  over  his  mental  processes,  in  the  rigor- 
ous confinement  of  his  thought  to  a  definite  subject, 
in  the  resistance  to  the  powerful  tendencies  of  thought 
to  run  off  and  to  escape  close  control,  there  is  the 
exertion  and  consciousness  of  no  little  power. 

Again,  the  mind  has  power  over  the  emotions  or 
passions.  Every  one  has  experience  of  effort  to  con- 
trol or  suppress,  from  a  sense  of  prudence  or  a  sense  of 
duty,  a  rising  passion,  as  anger;  of  yielding  to  or 
resisting  urgent  feelings.  Power  to  do  this  is  the 
backbone  of  moral  character.  It  is  the  power  every 
one  does  and  must  exert  who  would  establish  any 
moral  command  and  discipline  over  himself. 

But  while  the  control  of  the  mind  over  the  course 
of  its  thought  and  over  its  feeling  is  plain,  it  is  also 
plain,  as  already  admitted,  that  the  control  is  not  all- 
embracing  and  entire.  Every  mental  faculty  over 
which  the  will  exercises  control  is  capable,  by  sub- 
jective laws,  of  action  which  is  not  controlled  by  the 
will.  For  example,  memory  may  be  commanded  by 
the  will  so  far  at  least  as  that  it  may  be  urged  to  get 
fuller  hold  upon  an  event  which  is  imperfectly  seized, 
or  to  more  perfect  recollection;  but  it  often  acts  by 
the  laws  of  association  quite  independently  of  volition. 


134  '^^^    PRINCIPLES    OP    knowledge:. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  imagination,  discovery,  and 
all  application  of  mind.  The  creations  of  the  imagin- 
ation may  be  controlled  somewhat  by  volition,  bnt  are 
often  entirely  automatic.  The  succession  and  combi- 
nation of  thought  are  determined  by  laws  that  the  will 
frequently  influences  but  little.  There  is  thus  within 
the  pure  activity  of  mind  these  two  remarkable 
spheres  of  voluntary  and  involuntary  activity  limiting- 
each  other,  the  same  faculty  acting  at  one  time  under 
the  direction  of  the  will,  at  another  time  not,  or  only 
partly.  The  fact  is  much  the  same  as  with  our  cor- 
poreal activity.  Some  of  the  organs  are  under  the 
command  of  the  will,  and  some  are  not.  Within  both 
mind  and  body  there  is  a  line  of  demarkation  between 
the  voluntary  and  involuntary  'action.  The  sphere  of 
the  will  is  plainly  l)ounded.  This  combination  of  the 
voluntary  and  involuntary,  of  the  conscious  and 
unconscious,  in  man,  is  one  of  the  most  striking  phe- 
nomena of  his  nature.  But  notwithstanding  the  fact 
of  the  voluntary  and  involuntary  with  different  facul- 
ties, and  with  the  same  faculty,  the  mind  easily  dis- 
tinguishes between  what  is  done  or  produced  in  con- 
sciousness by  its  own  will,  and  what  is  not.  The 
actions  of  the  mind  that  are  not  produced  or  con- 
trolled by  the  will,  or  that  persist  in  spite  of  the  will., 
do  not  affect  the  realit}-  of  the  voluntar}-  actions.  The 
limitations  of  the  will  do  not  destroy  the  significance 
of  what  the  will  does  and  what  is  known  within  these 
limitations.  They  serve  rather  by  contrast  to  bring 
the  volitional  action  out,  to  make  it  more  distinct  in 
consciousness. 

Of  our  thought  of  subjective  power  or  causation  it 
is  as  true  as  of  our  thought  of  subjective  time,  that  it 
is  not  a  mere  phenomenon  or  appearance  standing 


COGNT'flON     OF     REAL     MIND.  1 35 

apart  in  a  manner  from  real  mind,  and  having  no  cor- 
respondence with  a  real  property  of  mind.  The 
thonght  must  be  regarded  as  but  the  presentation  of  a 
real  process  or  fact  of  mind.  The  thought  is  insepar- 
able from  real  mind  and  by  necessit}-  expresses  a  real 
property  of  mind,  ^\'e  are  conscious  of  volition  pro- 
ducing a  mental  effect,  because  real  mind  does  act 
upon  itself,  or  to  an  extent  determines  the  succession 
of  its  states.  If  cause  and  effect  were  not  a  real  con- 
nection in  mind,  or  if  causation  were  not  a  real  func- 
tion of  mind,  the  appearance  or  thought  of  it  would  be 
forever  impossi1)le.  The  thought  must  correspond  to, 
and  not  contradict,  reality.  It  is  dependent  upon  and 
inseparable  from  the  real,  and  can  only  express  or 
present  the  real.  Therefore  in  knowing  power  or 
causation  in  mind,  we  know,  not  an  appearance  only, 
but  a  property  of  mind  in  itself. 

3.  The  extension  of  the  mind  is  a  fact  of  imme- 
diate knowledge,  given  especially  in  the  tactual  and 
visual  sensations.  In  a  single  moment  of  time,  as  in 
the  light  of  an  electric  Hash,  without  succession,  mem- 
ory, or  inference,  we  are  cognizant  of  extended  sensa- 
tion, and  of  extended  mind.  Distinguished  men 
among  later  psychologists,  as  Ward,  James,  Kuelpe, 
earnestly  maintain,  against  the  derivatist  theories  of 
extension,  that  extension  is  an  original  attribute  of 
sensation.  Of  course  the  substantialist  will  hold 
that,  as  the  sense-modes  are  extended,  the  mind  of 
which  they  are  modes  must  be  extended.  It  is  as  true 
of  extension  as  of  time,  that  the  thought  is  but  a  pre- 
sentation of  the  reality.  We  are  conscious  of 
extended  sensations  because  extension  is  a  property  of 
real  mind.  If  it  were  not  so.  such  consciousness 
would  never  be.     Because  of  the  close  relation  of  sen- 


136  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

sation  to  mind,  there  is  included,  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  extension  of  a  sensation,  the  consciousness  of 
tlie  extension  of  mind. 

According  to  Kant's  theory  of  space  or  extension, 
which  has  long  ruled  so  widely  in  philosophy,  exten- 
sion, like  time,  is  only  a  pure  subjective  form,  a  form 
of  sense.  The  theory  first  denies  that  space  or 
extended  things  have  any  existence  outside  the  mind. 
Extension  is  nothing  but  a  mode  of  the  subjective 
thought.  In  the  next  place,  the  theory  denies  that 
mind  in  itself  is  extended,  as  firmlv  as  it  denies  that 
anvthing  outside  mind  is  extended.  Extension  is 
only  a  phenomenon  of  the  unextended  mind.  And 
the  theory  yet  goes  apparently  a  very  important  step 
beyond  this.  It  assumes  that  the  phenomenon,  or  the 
sense-form  extension  itself,  is  not  extended.  There  is 
but  the  appearance  of  extension,  where  no  real  exten- 
sion whatever,  of  the  mind  itself  or  phenomenon, 
exists.  In  this  last  important  assumption,  Kant 
seems  only  to  repeat,  in  his  peculiar  phraseology,  the 
doctrine  of  Berkeley,  that  extension  is  in  the  mind 
"not  bv  way  of  mode  or  attribute,  but  only  by  way  of 
idea."  i  Thus  the  Kantian  theory  of  extension  holds 
that  no  extended  thing  exists  out  of  mind;  that  the 
mind  itself  is  not  extended;  and  that  the  subjective 
form  or  phenomenon  of  extension  itself,  which  is  the 
onlv  extension  in  existence,  is  not  really  extended. 
The  theory  therefore  ends  with  the  absurdity,  that  the 
form  of  extension  is  an  extensionle^s  form.  The  fun- 
damental assumption,  however,  of  Kant's  hypothesis 
seems  to  be  that  the  unextended  mind  creates  exten- 
sion or  the  form  of  extension,  and  causes  its  sensa- 


(i)  Principles,  XLIX. 


COGNITION     OF     RKAL     MIND.  137 

tions,  wliich  j)rjmitively,  or  in  themselves,  are  abso- 
lutely iinextended,  to  appear  as  extended. 

Kant's  doctrine  of  space  and  extension  is  as  fan- 
tastic and  unwarrantable  as  his  doctrine  of  time.  The 
severance  which  the  "transcendental  aesthetic"  sup- 
poses between  phenomenon  and  mental  ncumenon 
can  not  be  admitted.  There  can  not  be  an  appear- 
ance of  extension  in  consciousness  standing  off.  so  to 
speak,  from  the  mind  in  itself,  which  latter  is  sup- 
posed to  be  unknowable.  Phenomenon  and  noume- 
non  are  together,  are  inseparable:  the  appearance  of 
extension  must  be  an  appearance  of  mind  in  itself. 
Further,  the  apparent  extension  of  sensation  can  not 
be  only  an  appearance  or  illusion,  where  there  is  no 
real  extension:  but  is  a  real,  genuine  property  of  sen- 
sation. The  subjective  appearance  or  thought  of 
extension  is  itself  extended.  Lotze,  following  Kant, 
argues  thus:  "Ideas,  ex  parte  nostra,  do  not  generally 
admit  that  what  forms  their  content  being  predicated 
of  them.  The  idea  of  Red  is  not  itself  red,  nor  that  of 
choler  choler.  nor  that  of  a  curve  curved.  These 
instances  make  that  clear  and  credible  to  us  which  in 
itself  notwithstanding  is  most  strange:  the  nature, 
namely,  of  every  intellectual  presentation,  not  itself  to 
be  that  which  is  presented  in  it."  i  This  doctrine  can 
not  be  admitted  to  be  true  of  the  primary,  permanent, 
constitutive  attribute  of  extension.  We  are  con- 
scious of  extended  sensation,  because  the  sensation, 
the  consciousness,  is  itself  actually  extended.  We 
must  hold  that  the  percept  of  a  curve  is  itself  really 
curved.  The  percept  is  itself,  as  to  extension,  what  is 
presented  in  it.     Moreover,  the  extension  of  sensa- 


(i)  M  eta  physic,  p.  249. 


138  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

tion  or  percept  can  only  properly  be  regarded  as  an 
expression  or  presentation  of  the  real  permanent 
extension  of  mind;  snch  sensation  or  percept  occurs 
and  is  possible  only  because  it  has  its  basis  and  origin 
in  this  real  property  of  mind.  Kant  has  said:  "Time 
and  Space  .  ,  .  .  do  not  ])resent  things  in  them- 
selves." I  If  for  Space  we  here  substitute  Extension, 
the  statement,  as  far  as  it  is  applied  to  real  mind,  is  the 
direct  opposite  of  the  truth.  The  presentation  of 
extension  would  be  impossible,  if  it  were  not  imme- 
diately related  to.  and  the  immediate  expression  of, 
an  attril3Ute  of  mind  in  itself.  x\t  the  last,  it  may  be 
contended  that  it  is  as  easy  for  the  mind  to  be 
extended  as  to  think  of  extension. 

The  chief  rival  of  the  doctrine  that  the  apparent 
extension  of  sensations  and  percepts  is  real  extension, 
and  tliat  it  is  a  presentation  of  the  extension  of  real 
mind,  is  the  doctrine  that  the  unextended  mind 
creates  extension  or  the  form  of  extension,  or  pro- 
duces it  from  elements  that  are  in  themselves  abso- 
lutely unextended;  and  invests  its  unextended  sense- 
experiences  with  this  form,  /.  c,  causes  them  to  appear 
as  extended.  As  to  the  theory  of  creation,  we  must 
contend  that  it  has  no  cause  for  existence  in  the 
defects  of  the  other  theory.  Moreover,  the  postulate 
of  creative  power,  or  the  function  of  creative  synthesis, 
for  mind,  is  itself  un\varrantal:)le.  It  is  an  open  door 
for  unlimited  assumptions  regarding  the  character  and 
activity  of  mind;  but,  primarily,  it  attributes  an  effi- 
ciency to  mind  which  mind  does  not  possess.  The 
mind  is  surely  capable  of  synthesis;  but  not  of  creative 
synthesis.     It  can  construct  representations  of  exten- 


(i)    Kritik  d.  r.  J'.,  p.  70. 


COGNITION      OF     RKAL     MIND.  1 39 

sions  greater  than  tliat  of  the  body,  and  of  extensions 
immensely  great;  l)ut  in  all  such  construction,  it 
employs  elementary  extended  experiences,  whose 
extension  is  not  created  ])y  the  mind,  or  by  any  other 
agent,  but  has  its  ground  iii  and  is  the  expression  of 
the  permanent  extension  of  real  mind.  That  the  mind 
can  cause  extension  to  appear  where  there  is  no  real 
extension,  must  be  regarded  as  an  idle  supposition. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  one  or  more  of 
the  chief  objections  or  arguments  made  against  the 
theory  that  sensations  and  percepts  are  in  themselves 
really  extended  and  present  the  extension  of  the  men- 
tal substance.  The  tirst  to  be  noticed  is  the  argu- 
ment of  some,  that  if  percepts  and  the  mind  are  in 
themselves  extended,  then  the  percept  of  a  distance 
must  be  as  long  as  the  distance  perceived;  or,  the 
mind  can  not  perceive  an  exten.sion  greater  than  its 
own  or  the  body's.  "To  introduce  spatial  qualities 
bodily  into  consciousness,"  says  Prof.  B.  P.  Bowne, 
'\  .  .  .  would  lead  to  such  nonsense  as  that  the 
thought  of  the  distance  of  the  earth  from  the  sun  is 
ninety-five  millions  of  miles  long."  i  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton has  remarked;  "To  exist  as  extended  is  supposed 
necessar}-  in  order  to  think  extension.  But  if  this 
analogy  held  good,  the  sphere  of  ideal  space  which  the 
mind  can  imagine,  ought  to  be  limited  to  the  sphere 
of  real  space  which  the  mind  actually  fills."  - 

The  quaint  inferences  of  these  writers  might  have 
a  show  of  justification,  if  the  mind  did  not  possess  an 
intellect  or  a  faculty  of  synthesis  and  construction. 
But  no  reasonable  psychologist  will  dream  of  denying 

(i)   Theory  nf  Thought  and  Kiun^'Icclgc.  p.  74. 
(2)  Mctaf'hysicy.  p.  402. 


140  the:    principles    of    knowledgi;. 

such  a  faculty  to  mind.  In  this  synthetic  power,  the 
mind  has  the  complete  ability  to  form,  from  its  origi- 
nal experiences  of  very  limited  extensions,  represen- 
tations of  very  great  extensions.  There  is  no  serious 
difficulty  in  understanding,  as  will  be  found  w-hen  we 
come  to  the  direct  discussion  of  perception  and  the 
cognition  of  the  external,  how,  by  the  cooperation  of 
the  senses,  especially  the  tactual,  muscular  and  visual, 
the  mind  can  put  together  its  primitive  experiences  of 
extension  into  tlie  representation  of  a  continuous 
extension  a  thousand  times  greater  than  any  exten- 
sion it  directly  cognizes:  or  how,  on  the  basis  of  its 
narrow  immediate  knowledge  of  extension,  it  can  con- 
struct the  mediate  knowledge  of  almost  illimitable 
extension.  The  mind  possesses  the  same  power  of 
synthesis  and  construction  respecting  the  representa- 
tion of  extension,  as  it  possesses  respecting  the  repre- 
sentation of  time  and  numl^er.  By  this  power  we 
easily  think  or  treat  of  times  very  much  longer  than 
the  time  of  our  experience  or  the  length  of  our  life. 
The  thought  of  these  long  times  is  the  ideal  repetition 
and  synthesis  of  the  times  we  really  experience.  We 
can  form  the  representation  of,  or  we  can  handle  in 
thought,  numbers  infinitely  larger  than  anv  number 
we  ever  have  actual  experience  of.  This  is  done  by 
the  ideal  addition  or  continuation,  by  a  system  of 
notation,  of  the  numbers  we  have  experienced.  To 
think  of  great  extension,  on  the  basis  of  our  very 
limited  immediate  experience  of  extension,  has  no 
more  mystery,  or  more  difficulty  for  the  intellect,  than 
to  think  of  times  longer  than  our  life,  or  of  numbers 
larger  than  ^^•e  find  in  our  personal  experience.  There 
is  as  little  necessity  for  thought  to  be  as  extended  as 
the  greatest  extension  thought  of,  as  for  it  to  be  as 


COGNITION     OF     REAL     MIND.  I4I 

long  as  the  longest  time  thought  of,  or  as  numerous 
as  the  largest  number  thought  of.  ^ 

The  most  important  objection  to  the  theory  of  the 
extended  mind  is  tlie  hypothesis  that  extension  is 
incompatible  with  the  unity  of  mind.  Especially 
since  the  rise  of  Leibnitz  and  Kant,  psychologists 
have  often  been  asserting,  "nothing  in  its  own  true 
existence  can  be  extended,"  "an  extended  thing  can 
not  be  a  unit,"  "points  are  the  only  simple  things." 
But  these  men  seem  to  have  been  burdening  them- 
selves to  some  extent  with  factitious  difficulties.  We 
can  not  indeed  say  that  the  coexistence  of  extension 
and  unity  is  easily  intelligible;  but  there  appears  no 
real  reason  or  necessity  for  denying  it  of  all  mental 
phenomena  and  mind.  We  have  the  clear  and  pri- 
mary consciousness  of  extended  unitary  sensations. 

The  unity  of  the  extended  mind  must  be  different 
from  the  so-called  unity  of  a  material  object.     Matter 


(I)  Something;  slightly  analogous  to  the  propositions  we 
have  just  been  considering,  is  expressed  by  Professor  James: 
"In  some  manner  our  consciousness  is  present'  to  everything 
with  which  it  is  in  relation.  I  am  cogiiitivcly  present  to  Orion 
whenever  I  perceive  that  constellation,  but  I  am  not  dynamically 
present  there;  I  work  no  etfects."  "Cognitively  its  [the  soul's] 
presence  extends  far  beyond  the  body,  and  dynamically  it  does 
not  extend  beyond  the  brain."  (Psychology,  I.,  pp.  214,  2i5-) 
Idealists  may  have  their  own  meaning  in  such  a  pbrase  as  "to 
be  cognitively  present  to  Orion";  but  the  realist  supposes  the 
chief  fact  of  our  knowledge  of  Orion,  stated  very  briefly  and 
simply,  is,  not  that  our  mind  is  in  any  sense  present  to  Orion, 
but  that  a  notion  which  has  been  propagated  all  the  way  from 
Orion  makes  an  impression  on  our  retina,  and  from  the  sensa- 
tion so  excited  we  infer  the  existence  of  Orion.  We  thus  know 
mediately  the  most  remote  and  extensive  objects,  without  the 
mind's  presence  going  in  any  sense  whatever  beyond  the  retina 
or  the  body.  The  intellect  is  fully  equal  to  such  extensive 
mediate  knowledge. 


142  THi;      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

is  regarded  as  atomic,  and  its  unity  can  only  be  such  as 
its  atomic  character  admits  of.  The  extension  of  con- 
sciousness or  sensation  seems  to  require  that  the  mind 
should  be  non-atomic  in  its  structure;  the  spread  or 
pervasiveness  of  consciousness  demands  a  closer  con- 
sistence than  the  atomic,  or  the  absence  of  such  breaks 
and  transitions  as  an  atomical  constitution  would 
imply.  We  can  not,  howe\'er,  say  that  the  Scholastic 
dictum,  Totum  in  ioto,  cf  totum  in  qualibet  parte, 
expresses  the  exact  truth  regarding  the  unity  of  mind; 
although  it  is,  no  doubt,  right  in  its  suggestion  of  a 
great  difference  between  the  spatial  unity  of  mind  and 
the  spatial  unity  of  matter.  Extended  consciousness 
can  not  be  said  certainly  to  require  this  extraordinary 
mode  of  unity.  To  affirm  that  no  entity  can  have  real 
spatial  unity  unless  it  have  all  its  being  in  every  part,  is 
to  close  the  question  arbitrarily.  We  may  suppose 
that,  intermediate  between  this  mode  of  unity  and  the 
unity  of  a  material  object,  is  a  spatial  unity  that  admits 
of  absolute  continuity  of  consciousness,  or  of  per- 
fectly continuous  sensations  occasioned  by  external 
extended  obiects  that  are  atomic  or  discontinuous. 

But  the  impossibility  of  explaining  how  extended 
unitary  consciousness  or  sensation  can  exist,  must 
still  be  admitted.  This  is  a  case  where  it  is  as  impos- 
sible to  sht)w  how  a  thing  is,  as  it  is  impossible  to  deny 
ihat  it  is.  The  possibility  of  extended  unitary  sensa- 
tions can  not  be  denied,  since  they  exist.  They  are 
primary  facts  ot  experience. 

The  assumption  that  an  extended  thing  can  not 
be  a  unit,  is  well  met  by  the  assumption  that  our  uni- 
tary consciousness  of  extension  could  not  exist  unless 
an  extended  thing  can  be  a  unit.  Unitary  conscious- 
ness of  extension  requires  unitary  extension  of  con- 


COGNITION     OF'     REAI.     MIND.  1 43 

scionsness  and  mind.  It  is  as  impossible  to  explain 
the  knowledge  of  discontinuity  without  continuity, 
as  it  is  to  explain  the  knowledge  of  continuity  by  dis- 
continuity or  by  a  single  point.  Of  course,  the  spa- 
tial divisibility  of  the  extended  mind  is  always  think- 
able. ^^'hile  some  then  argue  that,  as  spatial  divisi- 
bility is  thinkable,  therefore  it  takes  place,  and  the 
mind  can  not  be  a  unit,  we  may  argue  with  at  least 
equal  cogency  to  the  contrary  conclusion.  Though 
divisibility  of  the  extended  mind  is  thinkable,  division 
does  not  take  place,  and  is  impossible;  and  the 
extended  mind  is  a  unit.  The  former  conclusion  is 
the  traditional  one;  but  while  tradition  is  generally 
entitled  to  our  reverence,  this  is  an  instance  where  it 
enthralls  by  its  prejudice.  Since  the  mind  is  non- 
atomic  or  perfectly  continuous,  and  actually  indivis- 
ible, in  its  being,  it  is  a  unit. 

Unity  in  space  is  no  more  difificult  to  understand 
than  unity  in  time  and  in  causation.  Mind  knows  its 
identity  through  its  changes  in  time;  it  embraces  the 
past  and  the  present  in  the  unity  of  knowledge.  Mind 
also  embraces  cause  and  effect  in  the  unity  of  its 
being  and  of  its  knowledge.  These  facts  are  accepted 
as  certain,  though  there  is  something  in  them  that  is 
inexplicable;  but  the  fact  that  the  mind  knows  unity 
in  extension,  is  no  less  explicable  and  no  less  certain 
than  they  are.  To  compass  successive  events, 
whether  associated  with  power  or  not,  and  to  compass 
points  separate  in  space,  or  to  endure  in  tim.e  and  to 
be  extended  in  space,  are  two  primary  and  coordinate 
possibilities  and  facts  of  mind. 

Some  of  the  most  determined  opposition  to  attrib- 
uting extension  to  mind,  arises  from  the  powerful 
prejudice  existing  in  many  against  supposing  that 
mind  and  matter  can  possess  a  common   property. 


144  "^^^     PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

Extension,  they  say,  is  indeed  a  property  of  matter; 
but  to  assign  it  to  mind  is  to  materialize  mind.  This 
prejudice  is  a  form  or  transformation  of  the  old  philo- 
sophical and  theological  doctrine  that  matter  or  body 
is  the  seat  of  evil,  and  that  mind  is  confined,  soiled, 
and  degraded  in  association  with  body.  It  reveals 
itself  also  in  the  contempt  sometimes  heaped,  by  the 
most  refined  spiritualists  and  transcendentalists,  upon 
mere  sensation,  as  being  something  received  from,  or 
occasioned  or  shared  by,  the  body.  To  attribute 
extension  to  mind  is  certainly  to  affirm  so  far  that 
mind  is  like  matter.  But  when  all  has  been  said,  no 
just  reason  is  produced  why  there  may  not  exist,  con- 
trary to  Spinoza,  two  substances,  both  possessing 
extension;  and  why  mind  may  not  possess  both 
thought  and  extension  in  unity,  or  be  substantia 
extensa  ct  co^ifcnis.  If,  however,  either  mind  or  mat- 
ter must  1)e  regarded  as  extensionless.  it  had  better  be 
matter,  i 

(i)  Professor  Bain  seems  to  involve  himself  in  a  singular 
contradiction  when  lie  aftirms  that  object  and  subject,  matter 
and  mind,  are  but  two  sides  of  one  substance,  or  of  a  "double- 
faced  unity,"  (Body  and  Mind,  pp.  196.  136,  134,)  and  that  yet 
the  one  face  is  extended  and  the  other  unextended.  We  do  not 
take  the  figure  too  literally  in  this  case  in  denying  the  possi- 
bility of  the  unit  s  having  one  face  extended  and  the  other 
unextended.  lie  says  further:  "'This,  then,  as  it  appears  to  me, 
is  the  only  real  difficulty  ot  the  physical  and  mental  relation- 
ship. There  is  an  alliance  with  matter,  with  the  object,  or 
extended  world;  but  the  thing  allied,  the  mind  l>roper,  has  itself 
no  extension,  and  can  not  be  joined  in  local  union."  (lb.,  p. 
136.)  But  if  mind  be  as  intimately  connected,  or  form  a  unit, 
with  nerve  matter  and  currents,  as  Professor  Bain  holds;  and 
if  the  nerve  matter  and  currents  be  extended,  as  he  affirms; 
then,  contrary  to  what  he  affirms,  must  mind  also  be  extended. 
The  faces  must  both  be  either  extended  or  unextended.  The 
latter  alternative  is  really  more  in  harmony  than  any  other  view 
with  Professor  Bain's  fundamental  teaching  regarding  the 
nature  and  origin  of  the  notion  of  extension. 


COGNITION     OF     REM,     MIND.  1 45 

Finally,  while  we  seem  quite  justifiable  in  holding 
to  extension  as  an  immediately  known  property  of  the 
unitary  mind,  there  are,  however,  certain  important 
qualifications  and  admissions  that  maist  be  made 
respecting  the  mind's  experiences  of  its  extension. 
In  the  first  place,  not  all  modes  of  mind  are  known 
as  extended;  but,  chiefly,  the  tactual  and  retinal  sen- 
sations. Many  other  modes,  emotions,  volitions,  sen- 
sations, are  not  thought  of  either  as  extended,  or  as 
spatially  outside  and  beside  one  another.  It  does  not, 
however,  necessarily  follow  from  the  real  extension  of 
the  soul,  that  all  its  affections  should  be  known,  or 
known  with  the  same  definiteness,  as  extended.  Cer- 
tain conditions  of  the  soul  may  admit  of  some  sensa- 
tions or  affections  being  known  as  definitely  extended, 
others  as  less  definitely,  and  others  as  bearing  no 
thought  or  consciousness  of  extension  at  all.  There 
is  one  point  that  must  be  conceded  by  all,  namely, 
that  it  is  far  easier  to  believe  that  some  of  the  affec- 
tions of  an  extended  mind  can  be  known  as  unex- 
tended,  than  to  believe  that  any  affection  of  an  unex- 
tended  mind  can  ever  be  known  or  appear  as 
extended. 

i\gain,  we  have  not  definite  and  full  knowledge  of 
the  place  or  region  in  the  body  occupied  by  the  mind. 
The  mind  certainly  does  not  extend  beyond  the  body; 
but  precise  knowledge  of  its  seat  and  bounds  within 
the  body  we  can  not  claim.  It  is  certainly  present  in 
the  brain.  It  seems  to  be  present  in  the  tactual  and 
retinal  expanses.  We  definitely  localize  extended 
sensations  in  the  tactual  surface.  The  prevalent  the- 
ory, that  all  localization  of  sensations  in  this  surface  is 
only  phenomenal  projection  of  sensations  from  the 
brain,  a  theory  which  we  shall  consider  hereafter,  can 

not  be  sustantiated. 
(10) 


CHAPTER    II.  ^ 


IS  THE  KNOWLEDGE  OF  REAL  MIND   RELATIVE? 

We  now  come  to  consider  the  same  question 
regarding  Real  Mind  which  we  have  already  consid- 
ered regarding  mental  phenomena,  namely,  whether 
our  knowledge  is  relative.  It  is  common  to  join  phe- 
nomena and  the  mind  in  the  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion of  relativity,  as  if  the  question  were  just  the  same 
in  regard  to  both.  This  is  a  serious  error.  It  is  the 
confusion  of  two  quite  distinct  problems.  Whether 
one  affection  or  phenomenon  of  mind  can  be  known 
out  of  contrast  with  another  or  others,  and  whether 
real  mind  can  be  known  out  of  contrast  with  another 
entity,  are  questions  that  can  not  be  answered  in  the 
same  way,  and  should  not  be  mixed  in  discussion. 

It  is  the  doctrine  of  many  that  the  knowledge  of 
mind  is  as  certainly  relative  as  that  of  the  affections 
of  mind;  that  just  as  an  afTection  or  mode  of  mind 
can  be  known  only  in  comparison  with  another  or 
others,  in  which  resemblance  and  difference  are  per- 
ceived, so  Real  Mind,  Subject,  Ego,  Self,  can  be 
known  only  in  comparison  with  Matter,  Object,  non- 
Ego,  not-Self;  that  the  knowledge  of  opposites  is 
one;  that  when  we  posit  Me  or  Self  we  do  it  only 
because  we  at  the  same  time  posit  the  not-Me  or  the 
not-Self;  that  either  is  known  only  because  it  stands 
in  comparison  and  contrast  with  the  other. 

It  has  been  granted  above  that  the  knowledge  of" 

mental  affections  is  relative.     Facts  seem  to  require 

us  to  admit  that  change,  or  rather  difference,  is  heces- 
(146)  '  .  . 


IS    KNOWLEDGE   OE   REAL   MIND   RELATIVE?         1 47 

sary  to  the  awakening  of  consciousness.  The  light  of 
the  mind  appears  to  be  kindled  by  diverse  modifica- 
tions, as  the  spark  is  struck  out  by  the  collision  of 
steel  and  flint.  While  admitting  this  view,  I  have, 
however,  contended  against  the  assumption  often, 
made  from  it,  that  the  individual  modes  compared, 
have  no  permanent  and  independent  character;  that 
they  derive  their  character  wholly  in  and  from  com- 
parison. This  assumption  is  capricious  and  ground- 
less. 

But  as  to  the  knowledge  of  real  mind,  it  can  not, 
be  granted  that  it  is  relative  —  relative,  that  is,  not 
simply  to  the  knowledge  of  its  own  modifications,  but 
'to  the  knowledge  of  another  distinct  entitv.     There 
can  be  no  question  that  we  are  constantly  thinking 
of  mind  and  matter  together;  that  we  very  often  com- 
pare them  and  set  them  in  opposition;    but  yet  the 
comparison   is   not   necessary   to   the   knowledge   of 
mind.     We  know  mind  in  comparison  with  not-mind;' 
yet  the  knowledge  of  mind  does  not  necessarily  derive 
all  from  the  comparison.      We  may  know  mind,  in' 
comparison,  in  its  independent  and  permanent  char-' 
acter,    distinguishing   it    from    not-mind.      We    may 
know  mind  without  any  comparison  at  all  with  not- 
mind. 

The  knowledge  of  mind  is  possible  in  the  com- 
parison of  its  pure  states,  qualities,  phenomena, 
among  themselves,  without  any  other,  or  objective,, 
comparison.  We  are  conscious  of  the  mental  states., 
as  we  compare  them  with  one  another  and  discern 
their  likenesses  and  differences.  The  contrasts  among 
the  mental  qualities  themselves  are  entirely  sufficient, 
for  the  consciousness  of  these  qualities,  without  any 
additional  contrasting  of  them  with  qualities  not  men- 


148  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

tal.     Now,  in  that  comparison  of  the  pure  qualities  or 
modes  of  mind  in  which  we  become  conscious  of  them, 
we  also  become  conscious  of  real  mind.     Whatever  is 
sufificient  to  excite  the  consciousness  of  the  mental 
modes    is   suf^cient   to   excite   the   consciousness   of 
mind.     Both  arise  together.     As  soon  as  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  mental  modes,  we  are  conscious  of  mind 
or  self  as  possessing  them  in  unity;    and  even  the 
so-called  "passive"  modes  are  sufficient  for  this  experi- 
ence.    The  mind  contrasts  its  diverse  affections  with 
6ne  another,  and  knows  them  as  they  resemble  and 
dift'er.     Again,  the  mind  contrasts  its  affections  with 
itself;   them  as  modes,  acts,  doings,  with  itself  as  pos- 
sessor, agent,  doer;    them  as  changing  and  passing 
states,  with  itself  as  the  permanent  entity  to  which 
they  belong.     All  is  subjective,  requiring  no  refer- 
ence  to   the   objective,    quality   or   entity,   although 
admitting  it.     To  pass  on,  as  some  do,  from  the  con- 
trast of  mental  affections  as  necessary  to  conscious- 
ness, to  the  assumption  of  the  contrast  of  mind  with 
an  opposing  entity,  as  also  necessary,  is  but  the  idle 
following  out  of  a  system  of  imaginary  contrarieties. 
If  the  question  yet  be  asked,  how  is  it  possible  for  a 
thing  to  know  itself?     how  can  the  mind  be  at  the 
same     time     both     subject     and     subject-object?     I 
answer,  the  consciousness  of  the  mental  affections  and 
of  mind  itself,  amidst  the  comparison  and  diversities 
of  the  affections,  is  a  simple,  primary,  inexplicable 
fact,  and  can  be  opposed  only  by  facts  less  certain 
than  itself.     Those  who  ask  this  question  do  it  often 
on  the  tacit  assumption  that  it  is  easier  to  understand 
how  the  mind  can  know  an  entity  distinct  from  itself, 
than  know  itself;    that  the   mind   can   better  reach 
beyond  and  grasp  or  be  conscious  of  something  out- 


IS    KNOWLDDGr;   OF   REAL   MIND   RELATIVE;?         1 49 

side  and  different  from  itself,  than  be  conscious  simply 
of  itself.  But  no  one  has  ever  shown  why  this  should 
be;  why  introversion  or  introspection  should  not  be  at 
least  as  easy  as,  if  not  easier  than,  and  also  indepen- 
dent of,  supervision  and  the  seizure  of  the  extra- 
mental.  This  is  not  the  only  unwarranted  assump- 
tion in  the  psychology  of  many  at  the  present  sup- 
ported by  determined  iteration. 

The  possibility  of  knowing  mind  apart  from  matter 
is  fully  implied  in  the  general  principle,  considered  in 
the  last  chapter,  that  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the 
cognitive  modes  is  very  different  from  the  relation  of 
anything  really  objective,  as  matter  or  another  person, 
to  these  modes.  The  cognitive  modes  are  the  modes 
or  phenomena  of  mind;  and  this  great  difference  of 
relation  manifestly  makes  it  possible  for  mind  to  know 
itself  in  its  own  diverse  phenomena,  without  neces- 
sarily deriving  any  help  for  sel'f-kn.owledge  from  the 
relation  which  its  phenomena  may  hold  to  anything 
extra-mental. 

While  contending  for  the  possibility  and  actuality 
of  knowing  mind  independently  of  any  other  entity,  I 
have  yet  admitted  that  mind  is  very  often  thought  of 
in  relation  to  objective  or  extra-mental  things.  This 
relation  is  frequently  the  most  prominent  or  marked 
fact  in  the  cognition  of  mind.  Properly  speaking, 
the  knowledge  of  mind  in  its  relation  to  the  extra- 
mental  is  a  second  and  higher  stage  in  our  knowledge 
of  mind.  In  the  rapid  advance  of  our  knowledge  of 
the  external  from  our  first  perceptions,  and  because 
of  the  importance  of  this  knowledge,  the  contrast  of 
mind  and  the  external  soon  becomes  a  positive  and 
permanent  matter  of  experience;  and  we  have  many 
sets  of  correlative  terms  to  express  it,  as  ego  and  non- 


150  The:    principles    of    knowledge:, 

ego,  self  and  not-self,  subject  and  object,  etc.  Now 
"the  great  error  of  psychologists  who  deny  the  inde- 
pendent knowledge  of  mind  is,  that  they  carry  the 
results  and  fuller  content  or  significance  of  this  second 
stage  of  the  knowledge  of  mind  back  to  the  first  stage, 
and  insist  that  because  the  relation  of  mind  to  the 
external,  of  the  me  to  the  not-me,  becomes  so  clear, 
marked,  and  certain,  knowledge  of  this  relation  must 
have  formed  part  of  our  first  consciousness  of  mind, 
that  mind  or  subject  is  never  and  can  not  be  known 
apart  from  matter  or  object.  The  fact  is,  the  not- 
self  or  the  non-ego  is  known  after  the  self  or  ego,  and 
named  negatively  from  it.  Mind  is  first  known  in 
itself,  and  afterwards  as  having  a  correlative  in 
matter,  i 

We  must  not,  however,  forget  the  fundamental 
fact  that,  though  mind  and  matter  are  known  simul- 
taneously in  comparison,  our  knowledges  of  the  two 
are  always  essentially  different.  Mind  is  known 
immediately,  because  it  stands  in  immediate  relation 
to  the  acts  of  knowing.  Matter  or  not-mind  is  not 
known  immediately,  because  it  does  not  stand  in 
immediate  relation  to  the  acts  of  knowing.  These 
acts  are  the  properties  or  modes  of  mind;    they  are 

(i)  Dr.  Mansel  says:  .  "The  first  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness is  to  the  distinct  existence  of  self  and  not-self,  —  of  the  con- 
scious subject  and  of  the  object  of  which  he  is  conscious." 
(Letters,  Lectures  and  Reviews,  p.  210.)  The  fact  seems  to  be 
rather  that  the  first  testimony  of  consciousness  is  to  the  dis- 
tinction of  different  modes  of  self  and  to  self  as  the  one  possessor 
of  the  modes.  The  knowledge  of  anything  really  different  from 
self  is  later. 

Professor  Ferrier  holds  that  "object  plus  subject  is  the 
minhmim  scilnle  per  se."  (Institutes  of  Metaphysic,  p.  no.)  If 
the  "object"  be  a  mode  of  mind,  this  is  true.  If  the  "object" 
be  something  separate  from  mind,  it  is  not  true. 


IS    KNOWLEDGE   OF   REAL   MIND    RELATIVE?         15I 

not  of  matter.  Mind  is  known  in  its  own  modes; 
matter  is  known  through  the  modes  of  mind. 
Accordingly,  while  mind  and  matter  are  known 
together,  even  by  the  same  act,  the  knowledge  of  the 
former  is  immediate,  and  that  of  the  latter  mediate; 
the  former  is  in  consciousness,  the  latter  is  outside; 
and  the  knowledge  of  mind  being  more  direct,  may 
fur  that  reason  exist  without  the  knowledge  of  matter, 
though  the  knowledge  of  matter  can  not  exist  ^vith- 
out  that  of  mind.  The  dictum  that  subject  could  not 
be  knovvU  without  object,  nor  object  without  subject, 
has  all  the  merit  and  all  the  demerit  of  a  half-truth. 
Object  can  not  indeed  be  known  without  subject, 
because  it  is  known  only  through  the  conscious  modes 
of  subject;  but  Subject,  though  it  can  not  be  known 
as  a  relative  without  the  knowledge  of  its  correlative, 
yet  as  mind,  in  its  independent  character,  it  can  be 
known  apart  from  the  knowledge  of  object,  because  it 
is  known,  not  through  the  modes  of  object,  but  imme- 
diately in  its  own  modes. 

The  doctrine  of  the  independent  knowledge  of 
subject  or  mind,  as  above  set  forth,  is  confirmed  by 
some  of  the  chief  forms  and  defences  of  the  opposite 
doctrine.  Many  who  most  earnestly  contend  that 
mind  and  matter,  or  subject  and  object,  are  and  can  be 
known  only  in  contrast  with  one  another,  make,  in 
fact,  both  subject  and  object  internal  or  subjective, 
regard  them  both  as  in  the  mind,  or  as  modes,  aspects, 
pulses,  or  parts  of  the  same  reality  —  mind. 

There  are  somewhat  different  modes  of  drawing 
the  line  between  subject  and  object  within  mind. 
Professor  Bain,  for  instance,  assigns  especially  our 
muscular  or  active  experiences  to  object,  and  our 
passive  experiences,  as  the  tactual  sensations,  to  sub- 


152  th:e    principi.es    of    knowledge;. 

ject.  First,  he  remarks  of  the  distinction  of  subject 
and  object  as  being  a  distinction  of  things  wholly 
within  mind:  "The  totality  of  our  mental  life  is  made 
up  of  two  kinds  of  consciousness  —  the  Object  con- 
sciousness and  the  Subject  consciousness.  The  first 
is  our  external  world,  our  non-ego;  the  second  is  our 
ego,  or  mind  proper.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  object 
consciousness  which  we  call  Externality,  is  still  a 
mode  of  self  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense,  but  not 
in  the  usual  restricted  sense  of  'self  and  'mind,'  which 
are  names  for  the  subject,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
object."  I  Here,  plainly,  the  external  world  and  mind 
are  both  made  purely  subjective,  but  modes  of  what 
is  commonly  and  properly  called  mind.  The  position 
becomes  yet  more  plain  by  the  express  manner  in 
which  Professor  Bain  denies  the  existence  of  matter, 
and  implicitly  everything  else  external  to  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  mind.  "Knowledge,"  he  says,  "means 
a  state  of  mind;  the  notion  of  material  things  is  a 
mental  fact.  We  are  incapable  even  of  discussing  the 
existence  of  an  independent  material  world;  the  very 
act  is  a  contradiction."  2  "Of  matter  as  independent 
of  our  feeling  of  resistance,  we  can  have  no  concep- 
tion; the  rising  up  of  this  feeling  within  us  amounts 
to  everything  that  we  mean  by  resisting  matter.  We 
are  not  at  liberty  to  say,  without  incurring  contradic- 
tion, that  our  feeling  of  expended  energy  is  one  thing, 
and  a  resisting  material  world  another  and  a  different 
thing;  that  other  and  different  thing  is  by  us  wholly 
unthinkable."  3  Next,  of  the  difference  between  Sub- 
ject and  Object  considered  as  different  modes  of  one 


(i)  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  378.  (2)  lb.,  p.  375. 

(3)  Mental  Science,  p.  199. 


IS    KNOWLEDCK   OF   REAI,   MIND   RELATIVE?         1 53 

reality:  "The  contrast  of  subject  and  object,"  says 
Professor  Bain,  "springs  originally  from  the  contrast 
of  movement  and  passive  sensation.  The  impressions 
that  we  call  feelings  of  movement,  or  active  energy 
put  forth,  are  recognized  by  us  as  different  from  the 
impressions  of  passive  sensation;  and  through  this 
difference  a  light,  so  to  speak,  is  struck  up  in  the  mind, 
an  effect  of  knowing  is  produced  in  the  transition 
made,  or  the  comparison  instituted."  ^  "We  live  a 
double  Hfe,  of  object  states  and  of  subject  states.  The 
sentiens,  or  the  mind  that  feels,  is  one  portion  of  the 
totality  of  our  being;  the  sensum,  the  thing  felt,  is  the 
alternative  or  contrasting  portion  of  our  being,  the 
attitude  of  putting  forth  actual  energy.  The  validity 
of  the  contrast  does  not  require  that  we  should  be 
both  subject  and  object  in  the  same  instant."  2 

Whether  subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  are 
entirely  within  mind,  are  but  parts  of  mind,  and 
whether  there  is  no  existence  or  object  outside  and 
independent  of  mind,  is  a  question  that  manifestly 
depends  for  its  complete  answer  upon  the  doctrine  of 
external  perception.  The  discussion  of  that  doctrine 
can  not  be  entered  upon  here;  at  the  proper  place  it 
will  receive  the  attention  its  importance  deserves.  I 
would  merely  remark  of  the  above  mode  of  distin- 
guishing subject  and  object,  that  it  is  opposed  by  very 
weighty  considerations.  The  muscular  feelings,  in 
themselves,  are  in  reality  as  purely  subjective  as  any 
of  the  so-called  passive  feelings  whatsoever.  They 
come  to  form,  it  is  true,  an  important  part  of  our 
notions  of  external  realities,  and  have  an  immediate 


(i)  Emotions  and  Will,  pp.  593,  594. 
(2)  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  3S2. 


154  the;    principles    oe    knowledge. 

reference  to  such  realities;  but  that,  notwithstanding 
this  reference,  they  are  not  in  themselves  as  subjective 
as  the  most  passive,  sensations,  is  not  proved,  and  that 
they  constitute  these  notions  to  the  extent  Professor 
Bain  supposes,  is  untenable,  in  fact,  and  untenable  on 
his  own  primary  assumptions.  The  muscular  feel- 
ings are  taken  as  being,  originally,  pure  time  feelings, 
or  as  forming,  originally,  only  pure  time  series,  and 
not  spatial  series.  The  ingenious  trifling  by  which 
Professor  Bain  endeavors,  as  others,  to  deduce  our 
notions  of  space,  externality,  extension  and  matter, 
chiefly  from  these  pure  time  experiences,  I  have 
treated  of  elsewhere  and  characterized  in  proper 
terms.  To  endeavor,  in  addition,  to  maintain  that  the 
muscular  feelings  constitute,  not  only  our  notions  of 
space  and  matter,  but  space  and  matter  themselves,  is 
but  a  farther  step  on  the  road  of  inconclusiveness. 
The  theory  in  no  measure  answers  that  just  and  car- 
dinal question,  How,  from  pure  temporal,  spatially 
unextended,  subjective  experiences,  can  our  notions 
of  space  and  of  extended  external  objects  arise? 
Idealists  from  Kant  to  the  present  have  beaten  around 
this  great  question,  and  have  made  loud  pretensions 
to  having  answered  it.  They  have  not  succeeded. 
Between  the  import  of  that  question  and  the  import 
of  their  best  answers,  is  a  great  and  undeniable  want 
of  correspondence.  '  The  question  yet  remains  on 
their  hands  an  unanswered  and  very  serious  problem. 
The  difference  between  subject  and  object  has 
been  held  by  some  monists  to  consist,  or  to  reveal 
itself,  chiefly  in  the  difference  between  sensations  and 
memories,  or  the  vivid  and  the  faint  manifestations  of 
mind.  "Each  order  of  manifestations,"  says  Mr.  H. 
Spencer,  "carries  with  it  the  irresistible  implication  of 


IS  KNowLEDGi;  o'e  RDAiv  MIND  rel,ative;  ?      155 

some  power  that  manifests  itself;  and  by  the  words 
ego  and  non-ego  respectively,  we  mean  the  power  that 
manifests  itself  in  the  faint  forms  and  the  power  that 
manifests  itself  in  the  vivid  forms. "i 

The  doctrine  that  mind  and  matter,  subject  and 
object,  both  exist  within  and  together  constitute  what 
is  commonly  called  mind,  is  monism  in  its  simple  char- 
acter. It  stands  directly  opposed  to  dualism  in  its 
simple  character,  which  is  that  an  extended  world 
exists  beyond  and  independent  of  mind,  though 
related  to  mind  as  a  part  of  the  same  general  system 
or  creation,  and  that  this  outside  and  independent 
world  is  alone  properly  called  object. 

Monism  is  certainly  right  in  maintaining  that  mind 
may  know  itself,  or  distinguish  its  active  and  passive, 
vivid  and  faint,  modes.  It  is  right  in  the  confirma- 
tion it  impliedly  gives,  by  its  whole  character,  to  the 
doctrine  I  have  above  sought  to  maintain,  that  the 
mind  may  know  its  modes  and  itself  by  subjective  con- 
trasts alone,  without  necessary  help  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  real  extra-mental;  but  to  call  mind  or  any 
of  its  modes,  or  any  complex  of  them,  when  thought 
of,  "object,"  is  the  abuse  of  a  word  growing  out  of  the 


(i)  I'irst  Principles,  p.  154. 

Hegel  remarks  of  the  relation  of  subject  and  object  to  each 
other  in  knowledge  and  existence:  "The  aim  of  knowledge  is 
to  divest  the  objective  world  that  stands  opposed  to  us  of  its 
strangeness,  and,  as  the  phra?e  is,  to  find  ourselves  at  home  in 
it;  which  means  no  more  than  to  trace  the  objective  world 
back  to  the  notion,  —  to  our  innermost  self.  We  may  learn 
from  the  present  discussion  the  mistake  of  regarding  the  antithesis 
of  subjectivity  and  objectivity  as  an  abstract  and  permanent  one. 
The  two  correlatives  are  wholly  dialectical.  The  notion  is  at 
first  only  subjective;  but  without  the  assistance  of  any  foreign 
material  or  stuf?  it  proceeds,  in  obedience  to  its  own  action,  to 
objectify  itself."     (Lo^iic  (Wallace,  ist  Ed.),  p.  289.) 


156  THi;      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

fnndamental  error  of  a  theory.  The  only  proper 
term  to  be  appHed  in  the  case  is  "subject-object,"  the 
word  "object"  being  left  to  denote  extra-mental 
things  and  their  qualities.  These  things  and  quali- 
ties have  no  such  relation  to  mind,  as  mind  and  its 
qualities  have  to  mind  itself,  and  are  alone  properly 
called  objective. 

This  theory  that  mind  and  the  extra-mental,  sub- 
ject and  object,  are  but  modes  of  the  one  mind,  or  of 
the  same  entity  or  power,  or  are  differentiated  from 
the  same  subjective  notion,  has  its  strongest  support 
in  the  apparent  favor  of  the  principle,  that  all  objec- 
tive things  are  known  through  subjective  modes. 
This  principle  is  true;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  true 
that  the  distinct  and  independent  existence  of  extra- 
mental  things  is  assured  to  us  by  the  facts  of  external 
perception  so-called;  and  the  duality  of  subject  and 
object  thus  proved  has  never  been  reduced  to  a  real 
unity.  We  have  this  duality;  and  all  efforts  to  make 
it  appear  a  real  unity  have  ended  in  some  doctrine  less 
satisfactory  than  dualism,  having  gone  farther  than 
normal,  consistent  and  trustworthy  thought  can 
ever  go. 

Some  very  important  facts  of  external  perception 
are,  however,  as  is  well  known,  strongly  appealed  to 
in  the  interest  of  monism;  as,  for  example,  the  fact 
that  colors,  though  they  seem,  and  are  confidently 
taken  by  many,  to  be  qualities  of  things  which  I  have 
assumed  to  be  properly  called  objects,  are  in  reality 
quahties  of  mind,  sensations,  objectivized  or  pro- 
jected, so  to  speak,  by  the  mind,  —  a  fact  out  of 
which  idealists  and  monists  do  not  fail  to  make  all  that 
rightly  can  be  made,  and  often  a  great  deal  more, 
towards  proving  that  all  qualities  and  entities  sup- 


IS    KNOWLEDGE   OF   REAL   MIXD    RELATIVE?         I57 

posed  to  be  objective  are  really  subjective.  But  this 
and  the  like  facts  of  objectivization  can  be  shown  con- 
clusively, I  believe,  to  be  consistent  with  dualistic 
realism:  I  will  say  more,  are  expHcable  only  by  dual- 
istic realism. 

There  have  been  some  psychologists,  not  monists, 
but  emphatic  dualists,  who  have  yet  subscribed  to  the 
view  that  subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  are 
given  together  in  consciousness,  and  necessarily. 
Different  arguments  are  used  in  support  of  the  view; 
as,  that  the  knowledge  of  opposites  and  relatives  is 
one,  etc.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says:  "In  the  act  of 
sensible  perception,  I  am  conscious  of  two  things;  — 
of  myself  as  the  perceiving  subject,  and  of  an  external 
reality,  in  relation  with  my  sense,  as  the  object  per- 
ceived. Of  the  existence  of  both  these  things  I  am 
convinced;  because  I  am  conscious  of  knowing  each 
of  them,  not  mediately,  in  something  else,  as  repre- 
sented, but  immediately  in  itself,  as  existing.  Of  their 
mutual  independence  I  am  no  less  convinced;  because 
each  is  apprehended  equally,  and  at  once,  in  the  same 
indivisible  energy,  the  one  not  preceding  or  determin- 
ing, the  other  not  following  or  determined;  and 
because  each  is  apprehended  out  of,  and  in  direct  con- 
trast to,  the  other."  ^  Dr.  Mansel  remarks:  "Every 
state  of  consciousness  necessarily  implies  two  elements 
at  least:  a  conscious  subject,  and  an  object  of  which 
he  is  conscious.  .  .  .  That  of  which  I  am  directly  con- 
scious may  be  an  object  numerically  distinct  from 
myself,  or  it  may  be  a  modification  of  my  own  mind."  ^ 
Dr.  McCosh  accepts  the  same  view:    "I  believe  that 


(i)   Edition  of  Reid'i  VVorks,  Note  A,  p.  747. 
(2)   Prolegomena  Log.,  pp.  20,  21. 


158  the;    principIvEs    of    knowledge. 

in  our  conscious  sense-perceptions  we  know  both  the 
self  and  the  not-self  in  one  concrete  act."  ^ 

This  doctrine  rests  mainly  on  an  assumption 
expressly  made,  as  has  been  already  remarked,  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  that  sensations  and  sense-perceptions 
are  not  pure  modes  of  mind,  but  modes  of  both  mind 
and  matter  or  body  as  they  are  united.  Of  this 
assumption  it  must  be  said  that,  though  it  sounds 
differently  in  words,  it  stands  in  perilous  intimacy  in 
fact  with  the  monistic  doctrine,  that  nervous  change 
and  sensation,  mind  and  matter,  are  but  faces  or. 
modes  of  the  same  reahty.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how 
any  one  can  accept  the  former  and  disown  the  latter. 
Dualists  certainly  can  not  consistently  make  this 
assumption.  For,  if  mind  and  matter  give  them- 
selves "equally,"  "immediately,"  and  "at  once,"  in  the 
same  indivisible  "concrete"  "energy,"  "state,"  or 
"act,"  it  will  long  puzzle  any  dualist  to  show  that 
mind  and  matter  are  not  in  fact  the  same,  or  modes  of 
the  same  thing.  Such  perfect  unity  in  phenomenon 
will  make  it  hard  indeed  to  prove  plurality  or  contra- 
riety of  existence.  The  assumption  is  baseless.  Sen- 
sations and  perceptions  are  pure  affections  of  mind. 
It  has  never  been,  proved  that  they  have  any  material 
element,  quality,  or  part  in  them.  We  may  appreciate 
the  zeal  for  dualism  that  is  behind  this  assumption, 
and  is  in  reality  its  procuring  cause;  but  yet,  in  this, 
instance,  it  is  zeal  not  according  to  knowledge;  it  is 
zeal  that  seizes  upon  and  blindly  supports  a  most 
questionable  assumption,  that  risks  too  much  on  an. 
assumption  which  is  not  needed.  Sensations  and  per- 
ceptions have  indeed  a  prompt  and  positive  reference 


(i)    Fundamental  Truth,  p.  240. 


IS  knowledge;  of  rual  mind  relative?      159 

to  external  things  or  excitants;  but  still  they  are 
surely,  in  themselves,  with  this  reference,  as  purely 
subjective  as  any  idea,  feeling,  or  passive  experience. 

Simply  to  assume  for  a  primary  principle,  as  is  done 
by  many  a  priori  dualists,  that  both  mind  and  matter 
are  known  with  like  immediacv  and  certaintv  in  the 
same  mode  or  modes  of  mind,  is  to  theorize  about 
mind  whfle  ignoring  some  of  the  chief  facts.  On  their 
part  it  is  quite  arbitrary,  unless  they  are  to  be  allowed 
the  unqualified  employment  of  transcendental  princi- 
ples. Mind  and  matter  are  known,  it  is  true,  by  the 
same  identical  modes  of  mind;  self-consciousness  and 
sense-perception  are  combined  in  the  same  indivisible 
cognitive  act,  and  are  not  different  acts;  nevertheless, 
if  mind  and  matter  are  different  entities,  and  if  knowl- 
edge is  possible  only  in  and  through  the  modes  or  acts 
of  mind,  or,  in  other  words,  if  mind,  and  not  matter,  is 
the  knower,  then  our  knowledge  of  mind  and  of  mat- 
ter can  not  be  equally  direct.  The  knowledge  of  mind 
is  immediate,  because  the  modes  of  knowledge  are  its 
modes.  But  the  knowledge  of  matter  can  not  be  the 
same,  because  the  modes  of  knowledge  are  not  its 
modes.  From  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  case,  as' 
viewed  by  dualists  themselves,  only  mind  can  be 
known  immediately,  and  matter  only  mediately.  In 
the  same  modes  of  mind,  indeed,  both  mind  and  mat- 
ter are  known,  mind  immediately,  matter  mediately. 

The  above  doctrine  of  the  a  Priori  dualists  gives  to 
consciousness  an  extension  which  has  no  warrant. 
The  sphere  of  consciousness,  as  has  been  long  the 
general  view,  is  wholly  within  mind.  The  contents  of 
consciousness  are  mind  and  the  modes  or  phenomena 
of  mind;  matter  and  its  attributes  are  outside,  and  do 
never  enter.     The  distinction  which  Sir  W.  Hamiltori 


l6o  THE      PRINCIPIvES     OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

and  others  make  between  consciousness  and  self-con- 
sciousness, or  rather  between  the  two  species  of  con- 
sciousness —  consciousness  of  the  not-self,  and  con- 
sciousness of  self  —  must  be  regarded  as  untenable.  ^ 
There  is  in  fact  only  one  kind  of  consciousness,  and 
that  is  self-consciousness,  the  consciousness  of  the 
mind  and  its  states.  Both  in  the  assumption  of  com- 
pound (mental  and  corporeal)  sense-perceptions,  and 
of  this  extended  range  of  consciousness.  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton and  his  followers  make  a  great  and  unwarrant- 
able departure  from  the  more  common  and  tenable 
dualistic  views. 

The  principle  that  the  knowledge  of  opposites  is 
one,  is  brought  to  the  support  of  the  doctrine  that 
both  mind  and  matter,  or  their  qualities,  are  in  con- 
sciousness   and    known    immediately    and    together. 
Undoubtedly  the  knowledge  of  opposites  is  one;  as  of 
the  opposites  long  and  short,  right  and  left.     The 
knowledge  of  counterparts  is  one;  as  of  husband  and 
wife.     The  knowledge  also  of  such  relatives  as  father 
and  son  is  one.     To  know  either  member  of  any  of 
these  pairs,  is  to  know  the  other.     And  this  principle, 
we  may  grant,  would  be  applicable  also  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  if  they 
were  real  opposites.     But  they  are  not  real  opposites. 
They  are  indeed  different  from  one  another  numeri- 
cally and  essentially;    they  stand  in   relation;    they 
affect  one  another;  but  they  are  as  certainly  not  strict 
opposites  as  a  feather  and  the  air  in  which  it  floats,  or 
a  stone  and  the  space  in  which  it  rolls,  are  not.     To 
hold  that  mind  and  matter  are  opposites  like  long  and 


(i)  There  are  other  varieties  or  divisions  of  consciousness 
specified  by  some  psychologists,  which  seem  to  be  the  dis- 
coveries of  erratic  or  overrefined  analysis. 


IS    KNOWLEDGE   OF   REAI,   MIND    RELATIVE?         l6l 

short,  and  that,  consequently,  the  knowledge  of  the 
mind  implies  the  knowledge  of  matter,  as  the  knowl- 
edge of  long  implies  the  knowledge  of  short,  is  a 
specimen  of  the  loosest  reasoning,  and  seems  not 
worthy  of  a  serious  attempt  to  refute. 

The  answer  now  given  to  the  question,  whether 
the  knowledge  of  real  mind  is  relative,  is,  in  brief,  that 
mind    or    subject,    though    commonly    thought    of 
together  with  matter  or  object,  because  of  their  near 
and  constant  relation,  may  be  and  is  known  without 
necessary   help    from    the   knowledge    of   the    latter. 
Subject  and  object  are  distinct  realities;  all  knowledge 
is  in  and  by  the  modes  of  the  subject;    consequently, 
object  can  not  be  known  immediately  as  are  subject 
and  its  modes,  and  is  not  therefore  necessarily  known 
with  them.     The  contrasts  within  the  sphere  of  mind 
itself,  among  its  diverse  phenomena,  bring  about,  or 
are  suf^cient  for,  the  knowledge  of  the  mental  modes 
and  of  mind,  apart  from  the  knowledge  of  everything 
else;  and  all  our  knowledge  of  mind  in  its  relations  to 
matter  is  possible  and  exists  through  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  mind  and  the  mediate  knowledge  of 
matter.     The    ultimate    question    and    mystery    how 
introspection  can  be,  how  the  mind  can  be  both  sub- 
ject and  subject-object  —  in  short,  how  self-conscious- 
ness is  possible  —  is  a  problem  common  to  all  the- 
ories, and  appears  insoluble. 

To  put  mind  and  matter  both  within  the  sphere  of 
mind,  or  to  make  them  only  parts  or  modes  of  mind, 
is  to  posit  within  mind  a  greater  difference  than  we 
aie  conscious  of  existing  there.  The  mind  differs 
from  its  conscious  modes,  and  these  differ  from  one 
another  in  quality  and  in  external  reference;  but  the 
active  and  passive,  the  vivid  and  faint,  modes  are  both, 
(11) 


1 62  THE     PRINCIPLES     OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

in  themselves,  entirely  subjective,  in  no  degree  objec- 
tive; both  hold  essentially  the  same  close  relation  to 
mind,  and  the  same  distant  relation  to  not-mind. 
Within  mind  we  are  conscious  of  both  identity  and 
difference;  but  the  identity  is  far  greater  than  that 
between  mind  and  matter,  and  the  difference  is  far 
less.  In  thus  separating  mind  and  matter  in  knowl- 
edge and  in  existence,  we  do  not  make  their  relation 
more  "mechanical"  than  the  simple  facts  make  it,  nor 
destroy  the  unity  of  the  universal  system  to  which 
both  belong  as  parts. 


BOOK   II. 

INTELLECTION. 


INTELLECTION. 


CHAPTER   L 
GENERAL  NATURE  OF  INTELLECTION. 

There  are,  as  was  indicated  above,  two  grand 
stages  in  knowledge.  The  first  is  the  cognition  of  the 
simple  and  primary  modes  of  mind,  of  their  relation 
internally  to  the  one  mind,  and  of  their  simplest  rela- 
tions to  one  another  —  of  these  relations  so  far  at  least 
as  they  are  necessary  to  the  existence  or  awakening 
of  consciousness.  This  stage  of  knowledge  is  limited; 
but  it  is  yet  very  important,  because  it  includes  the 
elements  and  beginnings  of  all  knowledge.  Hereto- 
fore, we  have  been  chiefly  concerned  with  it.  The 
second  stage  in  knowledge  is  that  of  synthesis  or  con- 
struction proper,  and  is  by  far  the  more  extensive 
of  the  two.  Human  knowledge  taken  in  its  whole 
compass  is  chiefly  synthetic,  consisting  as  such,  for 
the  most  part,  of  definite  compounds  of  different  kinds 
and  of  more  or  less  complexity.  Out  of  the  simple 
and  primary  modes  and  elements,  the  mind  constructs 
its  concrete  distinct  notions  of  individual  things,  real 
and  imaginary,  some  of  which  are  of  very  little,  some 
of  very  much,  complexity;  and  out  of  the  notions  of 
individuals  it  constructs  logical  concepts  or  generali- 
zations, some  of  which  are  very  extensive,  including 
a  great  host  of  individuals. 

Some  writers  contend  that  svnthesis,  or  what  I 
( 165  ) 


1 66  THE     PRINCIPLES     OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

call  the  second  chief  stage  of  knowledge,  is  alone 
entitled  to  the  name  knowledge;  especially,  that  a 
thin  Of  is  known  onlv  when  classified,  etc.  This  doc- 
trine  appears  to  be  somewhat  erroneous  both  in  what 
it  expresses  and  in  what^^  implicates.  No  doubt, 
when  anything  is  classified,  and  known  and  definitely 
fixed  amidst  many  relations,  there  is  a  great  increase 
and  advance  of  knowledge.  But  there  is  real  knowl- 
edge before  any  real  classification,  and  as  the  indis- 
pensable condition  of  classification.  The  qualities 
and  elements  'which  enter  into  complex  notions  have 
an  individual  and  comparatively  permanent  character; 
and  complex  notions,  as  sense-perceptions,  have  an 
individual  and  permanent  character  before  they  enter 
into  concepts.  This  character  may  be  known  and  is 
known  to  a  degree.  I  do  not  say  without  any  contrast- 
ing or  comparison,  yet  before  the  formation  of  definite 
perceptions  and  logical  aggregates.  The  elements  of 
synthetic  knowledge,  if  never  known  without  some 
comparison  with  one  another,  are  known  in  their 
individual  and  permanent  character,  in  this  compari- 
son. They  do  not  derive  their  character  from  their 
relations;  and  all  perceptions  of  relations  beyond  the 
simplest,  all  formation  of  notions  and  concepts,  is 
possible  on  the  previous  existence  and  cognition  of 
the  individual  character  of  the  priman,'  modes  and 
elements.  This  is  our  primary  knowledge;  and  no 
knowledge  is  more  important  and  worthy  of  the 
name. 

I  do  not,  however,  contend  for  the  existence  of  a 
hard  line,  or  a  marked  break,  between  the  two  stages 
of  knowledge.  Consciousness  is  present  from  begin- 
ning to  end.  It  does  not  lose  hold  of  the  primary 
cognitions,  at  least  as  representations  of  memory,  no 


GKNElEAI.     NATURE     OI?      INTEX.WQTION.  1 67 

# 

matter  into  what  complex  syntheses  they  may  enter. 
The  conviction  that  mind  is  the  one  possessor  of 
knowledge  is  universal.  The  compounds  of  the 
second  stage  are  formed  from  elements  furnished  in 
the  first.  Particularly  as  to  method,  the  fact  of  com- 
parison, of  discrimination,  of  the  discovery  of  resem- 
blance and  difference,  is  coextensive  with  knowledge, 
characterizing  it  from  first  to  last.  This  fact  is  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  consciousness  and  the  most 
elementary  knowledge.  It  is  the  means  of  form- 
ing all  compound  cognitions  up  to  the  highest.  But 
there  is  a  significant  difference  between  the  degree 
of  comparison  necessary  to  the  excitation  and  first 
experiences  of  consciousness,  to  the  cognition  of  the 
elementary  modes  and  their  simplest  relations,  to  all 
cognitions  where  the  individual  character  of  these 
modes  is  chiefly  considered,  and  little  attention  given 
to  their  relations,  even  the  simplest;  and  the  degree 
necessary  to  the  formation  of  the  definite  and  fixed 
syntheses  of  sense-perception  and  the  judgment. 

The  Intellect  is  the  general  faculty  of  synthetic 
knowledge  proper.  All  that  is  ever  made  out  of  the 
simple  and  pure  materials  or  elements  of  knowledge 
is  the  work  of  the  intellect.  All  the  processes  that 
effect  or  result  in  synthesis,  as  abstraction,  compari- 
son, unification,  are  the  workings  of  the  intellect.  In 
short,  all  knowledge  beyond  that  of  the  primary 
modes  of  mind  in  their  simplest  relations,  and  in  their 
relations  to  the  mind  itself,  is  the  work  of  the  intellect, 
including  also  all  references  to  external  realities.  But 
synthesis  or  construction  is  the  chief  function  of  this 
great  faculty,  and  we  shall  give  most  attention  to  it. 
Under  the  intellect  are  comprehended  several  special 


1 68  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

faculties;   as  those  of  Sense-Perception,  Imagination, 
Logical  Conception. 

The  most  important  question  to  be  considered  in 
the  discussion  of  the  Intellect  is  this:  What  are  the 
original  and  primary  materials  of  the  intellect,  and 
what  is  their  source  or  sources?  This  general  ques- 
tion includes  a  subordinate  question  that  deserves 
special  attention,  namely,  Does  the  intellect  con- 
tribute anything  from  itself  to  the  materials  furnished 
to  it;  or,  in  other  words,  is  it  purely  a  constructive 
faculty,  using  in  its  compositions  only  the  elements 
given  it,  or  is  it  both  creative  and  constructive? 

I.  (a)  As  to  this  general  question,  especially  as 
to  the  question  of  the  character  and  extent  of  the 
materials  employed  by  the  intellect,  I  answer,  the 
sensations,  emotions,  and  volitions  are  the  original 
materials  of  the  intellect.  They  constitute  the  whole 
of  them.  All  formations  of  the  intellect  from  first 
to  last  are  made  out  of  these  elements  and  the  memo- 
ries of  them.  The  limits  to  human  knowledge  are 
the  limits  determined  by  the  sensations,  emotions, 
and  volitions. 

These  original  and  distinct  elementary  materials 
are  variously  combined.  For  example,  those  com- 
plex modes,  our  notions  of  external  inanimate  things, 
are  formed  largely  out  of  sensations.  Again,  our 
notions  of  our  fellow  men,  and  of  human  relations, 
social,  political  and  religious,  include  sensations;  but 
include  also  large  contributions  from  the  emotions 
and  volitions.  My  notion  of  the  physical  magnitude, 
figure  and  motions  of  another  person,  is  constructed 
in  a  great  degree  from  my  sensations;  but  my  notion 
of  his  internal  character  and  of  what  is  termed  his 
conduct,  very  important  objects  of  knowledge,  con- 


GENERAL     NATURE     OE     INTElvEECTlON.  1 69 

tain  manifestly  leading  constituents  from  my  emotions 
and  will.  The  idea  of  another  person,  as  to  the 
wholeness  of  his  character,  would  be  very  imperfect, 
if  the  intellect  had  only  sensations  to  construct  it 
out  of.  Our  ideas  of  the  Deity  and  the  divine  gov- 
ernment have  constituents  from  sense,  emotion,  and 
will. 

On  the  present  point  there  seem  to  be  not  a  little 
confusion  and  error  in  the  thinking  of  some  meta- 
physicians. For  instance,  in  the  first  place,  undue 
prominence  has  been  given  to  sensation  in  intellec- 
tion,—  a  fact  that  has  occasioned  some  quite  just, 
and  some  quite  unjust,  application  of  the  opprobrious 
term  "sensationalism."  Again  there  are  mistake  and 
confusion  reeardine:  the  relation  of  the  emotions  and 
also  the  volitions  to  intellection.  Some  apparently 
exclude  the  emotions  and  volitions  altogether  from 
intellection,  and  assign  them  to  other  provinces  of 
the  mind;  or  make  them  the  modes  or  operations 
of  faculties  distinct  from  and  coordinate  with  the 
intellect.  This,  as  we  have  already  endeavored  to 
show,  is  to  form  an  arbitrary  division  within  mind, 
and  is  very  far  from  the  truth.  Emotions  and  voli- 
tions are  as  really  materials  of  the  intellect  as 
sensations.  They  enter  as  really  into  those  high  and 
complex  notions,  just  mentioned  above,  as  sensations. 
Without  them  those  notions  could  not  be  formed. 
The  ideas  a  man  has  of  his  fellow^  men  as  certainly 
contain  emotions  —  those,  for  instance,  of  love,  obli- 
gation, hatred,  —  or  the  remembrances  of  them,  as 
visual  and  tactual  sensations.  The  knowledge  of  the 
emotional  character  and  conduct  of  men  is  certainly 
a  no  less  important  part  of  our  notions  of  them,  than 
the  knowledge  of  their  size,  w^eight,  color,  etc.;    but 


1 70  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

such  knowledge  or  representation  is  possible  only  by 
means  of  our  own  impulses  and  conduct,  i 

(b)  Taking  sensations,  emotions,  and  volitions  as 
being  all  with  equal  reality  the  materials  of  the  intel- 
lect, and  also  as  constituting  the  whole  of  these  mate- 
rials, being,  according  to  the  classification  already 
given,  the  whole  of  the  primary  affections  of  mind, 
let  us  consider  them  with  respect  to  the  question  of 
their  source  or  sources,  and  with  special  reference 
to  the  question  whether  there  are  an  internal  and  an 
external  source.  It  will  contribute  much  to  the  clear- 
ness and  satisfactoriness  of  our  discussion,  if  we  shall 
give  first  some  consideration  to  the  views  of  Locke 
and  Kant  on  this  important  subject. 


(i)  It  is  well  remarked  by  Dr.  Mansel:,  "In  speaking  of 
Imagination  as  the  test  of  Conception,  we  do  not  accede  to  the 
ultra-sensationalism  of  Condillac,  nor  even  to  the  modified  doc- 
trine of  Laromiguiere,  who  derives  from  the  senses  the  whole 
matter  of  our  knowledge.  Individualii^e  your  concepts  does  not 
mean  sensationalize  them,  unless  the  senses  are  the  only  sources 
of  presentation.  If  I  am  immediately  conscious,  for  example, 
of  an  exercise  of  will,  as  an  individual  act  taking  place  within 
me,  the  phenomena  of  volition  become  a  distinct  class  of 
presentations,  coordinate  with,  not  subordinate  to,  those  of  the 
senses,  and  capable,  like  them,  of  being  represented  by  the 
imagination  and  thought  upon  by  the  understanding.  If  I 
am  conscious  of  emotions  of  joy  or  sorrow,  of  anger  or  fear, 
existing  as  present  individual  states  of  mind,  distinct  from 
sensible  impressions,  these,  in  like  manner,  must  be  considered 
as  data  for  thought,  furnished  by  intuition."  (Prolegomena  Log., 
pp.  43,  44.)  Some  metaphysicians  indiscriminately  rank  as  sen- 
sationalists all  who  reject  a  priori  knowledge.  But  there  is 
surely  a  great  dififerenee  between  pure  sensationalists  and  those 
psychologists  who,  while  rejecting  a  priori  knowledge,  regard 
emotions  and  volitions  as  distinct  and  original  classes  of  presen- 
tations and  give  them  a  high  place  as  materials  of  intellection. 
The  doctrine  of  these  latter  holds  very  important  ground  above 
pure  sensationalism. 


GENERAIv     NATURE     OF     INTELLElCTlON.  17I 

Locke    assumes,    as    is   well   known,    two    grand 
sources  of  the  ''materials  of  thinking"  —  Sensation 
and  Reflection.     He  says:     '"These  two  are  the  foun- 
tains  of  knowledge  from  \vhence   all  the   ideas   we 
have  or  can  naturally  have  do  spring.  ,    First,  our 
senses  conversant  about  particular  sensible  objects, 
do  convey  into  the  mind  several  distinct  perceptions 
of  things,  according  to  those  various  ways  wherein 
those  objects  do  affect  them;   and  thus  we  come  by 
those  ideas  we  have,  of  yellow,  white,,  heat,  cold,  soft, 
hard,  bitter,  sweet,  and  all  those  which  we  call  sen- 
sible qualities;    which  when  I  say  the  senses  convey 
into  the  mind,  I  mean,  they  from  external  objects 
convey  into  the  mind  what  produces  there  those-  per- 
ceptions.    This  great  source  of  most  of  the  ideas  we 
have,  depending  wholly  upon  our  senses,  and  derived 
by  them   to   the   understanding,   I   ca.ll   Sensation. 
Secondly,  the  other  fountain,  from  which  experience 
furnisheth  the  understanding  with  ideas,  is  the  per- 
ception of  the  operations  of  our  own  mind  within  us, 
as  it  is  employed  about  the  ideas  it  has  got;    which 
operations,  when  the  soul  comes  to  reflect  on  and 
consider,  do  furnish  the  understanding  with  another 
set  of  ideas,  which  could  not  be  had  from  things  with- 
out;   and  such  are  perception,   thinking,   doubting, 
believing,  reasoning,  knowing,  willing,  and   all  the 
different  actings  of  our  own  minds;   which  we  being 
conscious  of,  and  observing  in  ourselves,   do  from 
these  receive  into  our  understandings  as  distinct  ideas, 
as  we  do  from  bodies  affecting  our  senses.     This 
source  of  ideas  every  man  has  wholly  in  himself;   and 
though  it  be  not  sense,  as  having  nothing  to  do  with 
external  objects,  yet  it  is  very  like  it,  and  might  prop- 
erly enough  be  called  internal  sense.     But  as  I  call  the 


172  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

other  Sensation,  so  I  call  this  Reelection,  the  ideas 
it  affords  being  such  only  as  the  mind  gets  by  reflect- 
ing on  its  own  operations  within  itself."  ^  He 
denominates  sensation  and  reflection,  in  the  above 
extract,  also  as  the  internal  and  external  sense. 
These  terms  he  uses  again  as  follows:  "External  and 
internal  sensation  are  the  only  passages  that  I  can 
find  of  knowledge  to  the  understanding.  These 
alone,  as  far  as  I  can  discover,  are  the  windows  by 
which  light  is  let  into  this  dark  room."  ^ 

Ivocke's  sensation  plainly  includes  what  are  com- 
monly called  sensation  and  sense-perception;  that  is, 
individual  sensations  and  the  compounds  made  largely 
of  them  which  constitute  our  notions  of  individual 
objects.  One  of  the  most  important  points  to  be  con- 
sidered in  regard  to  lyocke's  doctrine  is  his  view  of  the 
relations  that  sensations  hold,  on  the  one  side,  to  the 
mind,  and,  on  the  other,  to  external  objects.  I  have 
already  had  occasion  briefly  to  remark  on  the  great 
defects  of  Locke's  teaching  on  this  fundamental  ques- 
tion, and  the  diversity  of  understanding  among  phil- 
osophers regarding  his  views.  It  seems  idle  to 
attempt  to  extract  anything  definite  and  complete  on 
the  nuestion  from  anv  statement   or  collocation   of 

i. 

statements  of  Locke.  He,  however,  makes  no  preten- 
sions to  definiteness;  rather,  he  expressly  professes 
ignorance. 

He  distinctly  denies  that  sensations  are  modifica- 
tions of  mind.  "For  my  mind,  when  it  sees  a  colour  or 
figure  is  altered,  1  know,  from  the  not  having  such 
or  such  a  perception  to  the  having  it;  but  when  to 
explain  this.  I  am  told  that  either  of  these  perceptions 


(i)  Essay,  II.,  i.  3.  4.  (2)  lb.,  II.,  xi.  17. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OE   INTELLECTION.     1 73 

is  a  modification  of  the  mind,  what  do  I  conceive 
more,  than  that  from  not  having  such  a  perception  my 
mind  is  come  to  have  such  a  perception?  which  is 
what  I  as  well  knew  before  the  word  modificatio)i  was 
made  use  of,  which  by  its  use  has  made  me  conceive 
nothing  more  than  what  I  conceived  before."  i  He 
remarks  again,  as  to  the  incomprehensibihty  of  the 
rise  of  sensations  and  of  their  relation  to  the  mind: 
"By  the  'nature  of  ideas'  therefore  is  meant  here  their 
causes,  and  manner  of  production  in  the  mind,  i.  e.,  in 
what  alteration  of  the  mind  this  perception  [of  ideas] 
consists;  and  as  to  that,  I  answer,  no  man  can  tell; 
for  which  I  not  only  appeal  to  experience,  which  were 
enough,  but  shall  add  this  reason,  viz.,  because  no  man 
can  give  any  account  of  any  alteration  made  in  any 
simple  substance  whatsoever;  all  the  alteration  we  can 
conceive  being  only  of  the  alteration  of  compounded 
substances,  and  that  only  by  a  transposition  of 
parts."  '•  The  obscurity  in  Locke's  mind  is  shown 
further  by  his  using  the  term  idea  with  reference  both 
to  the  internal  sensation  and  the  external  quality  pro- 
ducing it.  Sensations  and  perceptions  are  thus  left 
between  the  mind  and  the  external  objects  said  to 
produce  them,  without  any  clear  and  definite  state- 
ments as  to  the  particular  characters  of  their  opposite 
relations  to  the  mind  and  the  objects.  We  can  infer 
from  such  expressions  as  "produce  in  the  mind," 
"excite  in  the  mind,"  "causes  of  ideas  in  us,"  3  used 
with  reference  to  sensations,  that  Locke  believed  that 
sensations  hold  a  closer  relation  to  the  mind  than  to 


(i)  Exam,  of  P.  Malebranche's  Opinion,  sect.  48.     See  sects. 
39  and  8. 

(2)  Remarks  upon  N orris,  sect.  2.     See  sects.  17,  18. 

(3)  Exam.  P.  Mai,  sects.  15,  16. 


174  THi;      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWIvEDGE;. 

the  external  excitants;  but  what  may  be  the  difference 
of  the  two  relations;  what  may  be  the  comparative 
dependence  of  sensations  for  origination  upon  the 
mind  on  the  one  hand,  and  upon  the  external  'object 
on  the  other/what  they  owe  to  the  one  and  what  they 
owe  to  the  other,  he  does  not  with  any  precision  indi- 
cate. I 

Reflection,  according  to  Locke,  is  the  "perception 
of  the  operations  of  our  own  mind  within  us,"  as 
thinking,  willing.  Emotions  are  included  in  these 
operations,  as  appears  from  the  last  words  of  the  same 
section  from  which  the  above  chief  extract  regarding 
reflection  was  taken:  "The  term  operations  here  I 
use  in  a  large  sense,  as  comprehending  not  barely  the 
actions  of  the  mind  about  its  ideas,  but  some  sort  of 
passions  arising  sometimes  from  them,  such  as  is  the 
satisfaction  or  uneasiness  arising  from  any  thought." 

Owing  to  the  obscurity  of  Locke's  language,  there 
has  been  some  difference  of  view  among  philosophers 
as  to  whether  he  meant,  by  Reflection,  memory  com- 
bined wnth  fixed  attention,  or  self-consciousness.  The 
latter  is  more  commonly  held  to  be  his  meaning.  This 
view  is  apparently  justified  by  Locke's  use  of  the  terms 
"conscious"  and  "consciousness.^'  '  Gonsciousness  he 
distinctly  defines  as  the  "perception  of  what  passes  in 


(])  Locke's  view  of  the  closer  relation  oi  sense-perceptions 
to  the  mind  is  illustrated  by  the  following  remarks  he  makes 
regarding  the  pleasures  and  pains:  "By  pleasure  and  pain,  I 
must  be  understood  to  mean  of  body  or  mind,  as  they  are  com- 
monly distinguished;  though  in  truth  they  be  only  different 
constitutions  of  the  mind,  sometimes  occasioned  by  disorder-  in 
.the  body,  sometimes  by  thoughts  of  the  mind."  (Essay,  II., 
XX.  2.)  "To  speak  truly,  they  are  all  of  the  mind;  though  some 
have  their  rise  in  the  mind  from  thought,  others,  in  the  body 
from  certain  modifications  of  motion."    .(/!».,  .xxi*. 41.)  .-.; 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  INTELEECTION.     1 75 

a  man's  own  mind."  i  This  is  about  identical  with 
the  import  of  the  following  definition  of  "refiection": 
"By  reflection,  then,  in  the  following  part  of  this  dis- 
course, I  would  be  understood  to  mean  that  notice 
which  the  mind  takes  of  its  own  operations,  and  the 
manner  of  them;  by  reason  whereof  there  come  to  be 
ideas  of  these  operations  in  the  understanding."  2 
Reflection  being  then  apparently  the  same  as  con- 
sciousness, it  is  well  enough  to  remark  that  Locke's 
■expression,  "ideas  of  reflection,"  or  "ideas  of  the  oper- 
ations of  the  mind  within  us,"  can  not  properly  signify 
anything  more  than  the  operations  themselves;  the 
"ideas"  and  "operations"  are  identical.  Conscious- 
ness is  not  a  faculty  different  from  other  known  facul- 
ties of  the  mind,  as  those  of  "reasoning,"  "willing," 
"believing,"  etc.;  but  is  the  general  faculty  of  which 
they  are  species.  An  act  of  consciousness  is  not  dif- 
ferent from  a  known  "operation"  of  mind,  but  is 
identical  with  it;  or  the  operation  is  a  special  mode  of 
consciousness.  It  should  be  similarly  remarked  of 
sensation,  that  Locke's  expression  "ideas  of  sensa- 
tion" can  not  properly  mean  anything  more  than 
simply  sensations. 

Further,  as  regards  the  relation  that  Locke  holds 
to  exist  between  sensation  and  reflection,  it  should  be 
observed  that  sensations  are  the  materials  with  which 
those  operations  of  the  mind  that  come  under  the 
cognizance  of  reflection,  as  thinking,  believing,  will- 
ing, passion,  are  concerned.  He  says  on  this  point: 
"In  time  the  mind  comes  to  reflect  on  its  own  opera- 
tions about  the  ideas  got  by  sensation,  and  thereby 
stores  itself  with  a  new  set  of  ideas,  which  I  call  ideas 


(.1)   lissay,  II.,  i.  19.  (2)  lb.,  II.,  i.  4. 


176  THE     PRINCIPLES     OE     KNOWLEDGE. 

of  reflection."  i  "The  mind  receiving  the  ideas,  men- 
tioned in  the  foregoing  chapters,  from  without,  when 
it  turns  its  view  inward  upon  itself,  and  observes  its 
own  actions  about  those  ideas  it  has,  takes  from 
thence  other  ideas,  which  are  as  capable  to  be  the 
objects  of  its  contemplation  as  any  of  those  it  received 
from  foreign  things."  2  Accordingly,  the  ideas  of 
sensation  (sensations)  precede  the  ideas  of  reflection 
in  the  order  of  time,  and  are  their  subject-matter. 

This  is  the  simple  character  of  Locke's  "Reflec- 
tion" as  given  by  Locke  himself.  But  much  less  has 
been  made  of  it  by  many  writers  than  he  ever  designed 
should  be  made,w4ierel)y  his  relation  to  sensationalism 
has  been  greatly  misrepresented;  and  also,  on  the 
other  hand,  much  more  has  been  made  of  it  by  many 
writers  than  he  ever  designed,  whereby  his  relation  to 
the  0  priori  philosophy  has  likewise  been  greatly 
misrepresented. 

It  is  a  very  pertinent  and  important  question 
respecting  the  two  sources  of  the  "materials  of  think- 
ing" announced  by  Locke,  whether  they  are  really  dis- 
tinct, whether,  even  on  Locke's  own  fundamental 
principles,  they  are  as  distinct  as  they  are  represented 
to  be  in  the  formal  passages  in  which  they  are  set 
forth,  and  especially  whether  they  can  be  properly 
distinguished  as  "external"  and  "internal." 

Locke's  most  noted  French  followers  held  that 
they  were  not  really  distinct;  that  sensation  is  the 
only  source  of  knowledge,  and  that  reflection  is  a 
development  from,  or  is  identical  with,  sensation. 
This  conclusion  was  a  deduction  chiefly  from  Locke's 
principle,  just  noticed,  that  sensations  are  the  subject- 


(i)  Essay,  II.,  i.  24.  (2)  Jb.,  II.,  vi.  i. 


GKNKRAL  XATURK   OF   INTELLECTION.     1 77 

matter  of  the  operations  or  ideas  of  reflection.  If 
reflection  concerns  itself  with  sensations  alone  as  its 
original  matter,  it  can  only  be,  they  said,  a  derivation 
from  sensation,  or  the  consciousness  of  sensations  and 
their  compositions. 

That  such  a  distinction  can  not  be  properly  made 
between  Sensation  and  Reflection,  or  the  ideas  of  sen- 
sation and  the  ideas  of  reflection,  as  Locke  affirms, 
especially  not  the  distinction  that  the  former  are 
external  and  the  latter  internal,  appears  certain.  But 
the  order  of  the  unification,  of  the  two  should  be  the 
reverse  of  that  taken  by  the  sensationalists;  that  is, 
instead  of  regarding  reflection  as  derived  from  or 
essentially  the  same  as  sensation,  sensation  should  be 
regarded  as  but  a  mode  of  reflection. 

Locke  distinguishes  the  relations  which  sensations 
and  the  operations  of  reflection  hold  to  the  mind,  by 
declaring  that  sensations  are  "produced,"  "excited," 
"caused"  in  the  mind  by  external  or  "extrinsical" 
objects;  but  that  the  operations  of  reflection  are,  on 
the  contrary,  "intrinsical"  or  "of  our  own  mind  within 
us,"  are  "furnished"  by,  or  have  their  "source"  wholly 
in,  the  mind  itself.  But  what  may  be  the  difference  in 
their  relations  to  the  mind,  between  an  idea  "pro- 
duced" in  the  mind,  and  an  idea  having  its  "source" 
in  the  mind  itself,  —  that  is,  between  a  sensation  and 
a  mode  of  reflection,  —  Locke  does  not  make  clear. 
He  is  confused  here,  as  he  is  everywhere  else,  regard- 
ing these  fundamental  and  most  important  relations. 

The  truth  as  to  the  relation  of  sensations,  in  them- 
selves, to  the  mind  is,  that  they  are  not  so  loosely 
related  to  the  mind  as  l^ocke  seems  to  regard  them; 
nor  entirely  distinct  and  objective  as  Berkeley  makes 
them;   nor  both  subjective  and  objective,  mental  and 

(12) 


178  THE      PRINCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

corporeal,  as  some  later  writers  represent  them;  but 
are  purely  subjective  or  internal,  like  the  operations  or 
ideas  of  reflection;  they  are  as  really  and  entirely 
"within"  us  as  reasoning  and  wiUing,  are  as  pure  oper- 
ations and  modifications  of  mind.  Accordingly,  sen- 
sations and  the  ideas  of  reflection  are,  in  themselves  or 
as  acts,  alike  of  an  internal  origin,  or  are  modes  of  the 
one  self-consciousness;  and  the  two  sources  of  the 
materials  of  knowledge  denominated  "external"  and 
""internal"  are,  so  far  as  the  fact  that  they  are  both 
internal  goes,  really  but  one. 

But  if  sensations  are  as  really  internal,  as  really 
ideas  or  facts  of  consciousness,  as  the  so-called  "oper- 
ations of  our  own  mind,"  there  are  3^et,  no  doubt,  sig- 
nificant differences  between  the  two  as  internal. 
There  are  unlike  difl"erences,  because,  in  part  at  least, 
of  the  variety  of  acts  which  Locke  specifies  as 
belonging  to  reflection.  For  instance,  the  difference 
between  sensation  and  some  modes  of  reflection  is 
largeh^  one  of  complexity.  This  difference  of  com- 
plexity is  the  only  one  believed  in  by  some  of  Locke's 
sensationalistic  followers.  But  between  sensation 
and  the  operations  of  willing  and  passion  or  emotion, 
there  are  differences  not  only  of  complexity,  but  also 
of  kind.  Neither  emotion  nor  volition  is  derived 
from  or  compounded  of  sensations.  They  are  both 
original  modes  of  mind  or  variations  of  experience. 
True,  they  follow  sensations,  are  called  up  by  them, 
move  with  reference  to  them,  are  in  general  subse- 
quent in  the  order  of  development;  yet  they  are  not 
developed  from  sensations,  they  are  original  modifica- 
tions of  mind  excited  primarily,  it  may  be,  by  sensa- 
tions, —  are  pure  original  modes  of  mind  occasioned 
bv  preceding  pure  modes  of  mind.     Another  import- 


GENERAL     NATURE     OF     INTELLECTION.  1 79 

ant  difference  is,  that  sensations  in  general  are  directly 
excited  by  external  things  and  have  a  direct  reference 
in  consciousness  to  them;  but  many  of  the  ideas 
of  "reflection"  have  not  such  direct  excitation  and 
reference. 

It  is  this  last  difference  of  external  excitation  and 
reference  which  is  tlie  only  real  ground  that  Locke 
could  have  for  designating  and  distinguishing  sen- 
sation   and    reflection    as    "external"    and    "internal 
sense.''     These  terms  which  have  figured  so  promi- 
nently in  the  discussions  of  knowledge  from  the  time 
of  Locke  to  the  present,  as  we  shall  have  occasion 
hereafter  to  notice  further,  have  been  often  used,  as 
they  are  used  by  Locke,  to  denote  an  essential  differ- 
ence in  character,  to  denote  something  really  external 
and  something  really  internal;  in  short,  to  express  all 
the  difference  which  is  properly  meant  by  the  words 
external  and  hilcnial.     This  is  a  fundamental  error. 
Considered  in  themselves,  in  their  real  constitution 
and  character,  sensations  are  as  truly  internal  as  the 
ideas  or  modes  of  "reflection."     Both  classes  are  pure 
subjective  modes,  or  modes  of  consciousness,  existing 
in   the  same   close   relation   to   mind.     To   call   one 
■"external"  and  the  other  "internal,"  is  exalting  what 
can  be  only  a  difference  of  occasion  and  reference,  to 
the  prominence  of  an  actual  difference  of  place  and 
nature.     Sensations  are  pure  modes  of  consciousness 
arising  by  the  direct  action  of  external  things;   ideas 
of  "reflection,"  many  of  them  at  least,  are  pure  modes 
of  consciousness  arising  by  the  internal  processes  of 
the  mind,  without  being  immediately  occasioned  by. 
and  without  such  immediate  reference  to,   external 
things.     Both  classes  are  alike,  in  themselves,  abso- 
lutelv  internal. 


l8o  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

On  the  ground,  therefore,  of  the  real  nature  of 
sensations,  as  pure  affections  of  mind,  and  of  the  real 
nature  of  consciousness,  as  universally  cognizant  of 
the  mental  phenomena  and  as  not  distinct  from  these 
phenomena,  it  seems  to  be  clear  that  Locke's  two 
sources  of  the  "materials  of  thinking,"  considered 
with  reference  to  the  inner  character  of  these  mate- 
rials, are  not  really  two,  but  only  one;  that  is,  one  is 
not  really  external  and  the  other  alone  internal,  but 
both  are  alike  purely  internal  or  subjective.  Sensa- 
tion being  a  mode  of  mind  distinct  from  the  external 
object  which  "produces,"  "excites,"  or  "causes"  it 
in  the  mind,  and  receiving  no  contribution  to  its  inner 
nature  from  this  object,  but  receiving  all  its  elements 
from  the  mind  itself  —  in  a  word,  forming  a  pure 
affection  of  mind  —  belongs  as  really  and  wholly 
tmder  reflection  or  consciousness,  as  any  operation 
specified  by  Locke.  Its  source  "every  man  has 
wholly  in  himself."  The  ideas  of  "sensation"  and  the 
ideas  of  "reflection"  are  both  alike  produced  by  the 
mind  from  within,  and  are  only  different  modes  of  the 
one  general  faculty,  consciousness.  It  must  here  be 
acknowledged  that,  considering  the  prominence  given 
by  Locke  to  the  distinction  of  the  two  sources  of 
knowledge,  his  discussion  of  it  is  confused  and  imper- 
fect to  a  degree  which  the  age  he  wrote  in  does  not 
wholly  excuse,  and  which  has  brought  down  upon 
him  severe  and  deserved  censure. 

Kant  announces  with  as  great  emphasis  as  Locke 
the  "external"  and  the  "internal  sense"  as  the  sources 
of  the  "matter"  or  "manifold"  of  phenomena  and 
knowledge.  He  says:  "By  means  of  the  external 
sense  (a  property  of  our  mind)  we  represent  to  our- 
selves  objects   as   external   to   ourselves,   and   as   an 


ge;ne;raIv    nature;    of    intellkction.         i8i 

aggregate  in  space."  By  the  internal  sense  "the 
mind  views  itself  or  its  internal  state."  i  But  there  is 
more  marked  inconsistency  in  Kant's  use  of  the  terms 
"external"  and  "internal,"  to  denote  the  sources  of 
the  matter  of  knowledge,  than  in  Locke's;  for  Kant 
holds  in  fact  that  the  external  sense  is  a  function  of 
the  mind,  that  the  "phenomena  of  our  external  sense" 
are  not  external  to  us,  but  are  really  internal,  2  "in 
us,"  "in  our  thoughts,"  are  affections  or  "modifica- 
tions" of  the  mind;  affirming  also,  at  least  in  the 
Prolegomena  and  second  edition  of  the  Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  3 


(i)  Kritik  d.  r.  I'.,  p.  58.  The  terms  are  seen  also  in  the 
following  passages:  "In  the  transcendental  aesthetic  we  have 
undeniably  proved  that  bodies  are  mere  phenomena  of  our 
external  sense,  and  not  things  in  themselves."  {lb.,  p.  591.) 
"External  objects  (bodies)  are  mere  phenomena,  consequently 
are  nothing  more  than  a  mode  of  my  representations,  v^hose 
objects  exist  only  through  these  representations,  but  severed 
from  them  are  nothing.  Therefore  external  things  exist  just 
as  well  as  I  myself  exist,  and  both  truly  on  the  immediate  wit- 
ness of  my  self-consciousness;  but  with  this  difference,  that  the 
representation  of  myself,  as  the  thinking  subject,  is  referred 
only  to  the  internal  sense,  but  the  representations  which  indicate 
extended  realities  are  referred  also  to  the  external  sense." 
(lb.,  p.  599-) 

(2)  "However  our  representations  may  spring,  whether  they 
be  produced  by  the  influence  of  external  things  or  by  internal 
causes,  whether  they  have  arisen  a  priori  or  empirically  as  phe- 
nomena, as  modifications  of  the  mind,  they  yet  belong  to  the 
internal  sense."  (Kritik  d.  r.  J'.,  p.  567.)  "Phenomena  are 
not  things  in  themselves,  but  the  mere  play  of  our  representa- 
tions, and  these  prove  in  the  end  to  be  determinations  of  the 
internal  sense."     (lb.,  p.  569.) 

(3)  "Objects  in  themselves  are  not  at  all  known  to  us;  what 
we  call  external  objects  are  nothing  btit  mere  representations 
of  our  sensibility,  whose  form  is  space,  but  whose  true  correlate, 
i.  e.,  the  thing  itself,  is  not  at  all  known  by  them,  nor  can  be 
known,  but  concerning  which  indeed  there  is  never  in  experience 
any  inquiry."     (Kritik  d.  r.  V..  p.  64.) 


1 82  THE      PRINCIPI.es      OF     KNOWIv^DGE. 

that  they  are  excited  by  real  but  unknown  external 
objects,  and  not  produced  by  the  spontaneity  of  the 
mind  itself,  i  He  calls  one  sense  external;  but  in 
reality  makes  it  a  purely  subjective  property  or 
faculty.  2 

Kant  is  here  chargeable  with  the  blunder  (of  which 
he  is  not  the  last  exemplar)  of  believing  one  theory 
and  using  the  language  of  another.  His  two  senses 
are,  in  his  own  conception,  both  really  internal;  the 
matter  of  the  phenomena  of  both  is  internal;  though 
the  phenomena  of  the  external  sense  are  excited  by 
external  objects,  or  though  the  mind,  in  coming  into 
the  possession  of  these  phenomena,  is  affected  by 
external  objects,  it  does  not  receive  an  atom  or  ele- 
ment of  the  phenomena  from  them.  3     Accordingly, 


(i)  Prclcgoiiicva,  sect   13,  Anm.  II. 

Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  pp.  55,  56.  See  pp.  607,  608:  "External 
phenomena,  as  all  other  thoughts,  belong  to  the  thinking  sub- 
ject, only  they  bear  in  themselves  the  illusion  that,  since  they 
represent  objects  in  space,  they  detach  themselves,  as  it  were, 
from  the  mind,  and  appear  to  hover  outside  of  it." 

(2)  An  able  student  and  expounder  of  Kant  thus  remarks 
on  the  pure  subjectivity  of  Kant's  external  sensation:  "This 
particularisation  constituted  to  Kant  an  a  priori  subjective 
machinery  —  form  —  by  which  our  sensations  (matter  —  a  pos- 
teriori, in  that  they  are  excited  by  causes  external  to  ourselves, 
but  subjective,  quite  as  much  as  the  a  priori  elements,  in  that 
they  are  simply  our  oivn  states)  are  taken  up  and  converted  or 
projected  into  the  connected  world  of  experience  or  of  per- 
ceptive objects.  In  this  way,  each  of  us  inhabits  a  universe  of 
his  own  subjective  sensational  states  (still  namable  inner  or 
outer)  reticulated  into  nexus,  law,  and  systein  by  his  own  sub- 
jective intellectual  functions,"  etc.  (Stirling,  Secret  of  Hegel, 
I.,  p.  228.     See  Text-Book  to  Kant,  pp.  368,  369.) 

(3)  But  there  is  considerable  difficulty  connected  with 
Kant's  assertion  that  mind  is  affected  by  real  external  objects. 
For  while  at  one  time  Kant  makes  external  objects  the  cause 
of  the  rise  of  sensations  in  the  mind,  at  another  time    he  in 


gene;ral    nature;    of    intellection.         183 

instead  of  using  language,  as  he  was  bound  to  do,  that 
recognizes  the  fundamental  fact,  as  he  believed  it.  of 
the  essential  sameness  of  the  two  senses,  and  also  the 
sameness  of  the  "matter"  furnished  bv  them,  in  that  it 
is  in  both  cases  purely  internal,  purely  mental  affec- 
tion; he  takes  terms  that  suppress  this  sameness  and 
that  hoist  into  prominence  altogether  undue  the  dif- 
ference of  the  mode  of  production  by  the  mind.  It  is 
to  be  borne  in  mind,  then,  that  Kant's  "external 
sense"  is  but  a  part  of  his  "internal";  and  that 
though  his  language  might  lead  us  at  times  to  sup- 
pose he  held  to  two  sources  of  the  matter  of  knowl- 
edge, the  one  external  and  the  other  internal,  he  really 
holds  to  but  one,  which  is  internal,  and  really  makes 
all  the  matter  of  knowledge  pure  mental  affection. 

Many  later  and  recent  writers  have  affirmed,  with 
more  distinctness  and  emphasis  than  Locke  and  Kant, 
the  existence  of  two  sources  of  the  matter  of  knowl- 
edge; naming  them  external  and  internal  sense,  per- 
ception, experience,  or  perception  and  self-conscious- 
ness. Sir  W.  Hamilton  remarks:  "Under  the  general 
faculty  of  cognition  is  thus,  in  the  first  place,  dis- 
tinguished an  Acquisitive,  or  Presentative,  or  Recep- 
tive Faculty;  and  this  acquisitive  faculty  is  subdivided 
into  the  consciousness  of  the  non-ego,  or  External 
Perception,  or  Perception  simply,  and  into  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  ego,  or  Self-consciousness,  or  Inter- 
nal Perception.  This  acquisitive  faculty  is  the  faculty 
of  Experience.     External  perception  is  the  faculty  of 


effect  declares  them  to  be  causationless,  as  he  declares  them 
to  be  also  timeless  and  speechless;  causation  being  considered 
as  only  a  form  of  subjective  thought.  These  diverse  statements 
are  believed  by  many  to  constitute  a  palpable  and  incurable 
contradiction  in  Kant's  philosophy. 


184  the;    principIvDS    of    knowlkdge;. 

external,  self-conscioi.isness  is  the  faculty  of  internal, 
experience.  If  we  limit  the  term  Reflection  in  con- 
formity to  its  original  employment  and  proper  signifi- 
cation, —  an  attention  to  the  internal  phaenomena,  — 
reflection  will  be  an  expression  for  self-consciousness 
concentrated."  1  This  doctrine  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
rests  upon  his  erroneous  view,  which  we  have  had 
already  occasion  to  refer  to,  that  the  modes  of  external 
perception  are  in  part  really  external,  —  that  is,  that 
some  at  least  of  their  constituent  material  comes  from 
outside  the  mind,  that  the  mind  is  receptive  of  a  real 
external  element,  and  that  we  are  conscious  of  the 
extra-mental;  and  also  that,  on  the  other  hand,  inter- 
nal perceptions  or  states  are,  in  their  nature,  internal 
or  subjective  in  a  sense  that  can  not  be  affirmed  of  the 
external,  and  are,  in  a  very  important  sense  above  the 
external,  the  effects  of  the  productive  action  of  the 
mind.  "Perception,"  says  Sir  W.  PTamilton  again, 
"is  only  a  special  kind  of  knowledge,  and  sensation 
only  a  special  kind  of  feeling;  and  KnozvJedge  and 
Feeling,  you  will  recollect,  are  two  out  of  the  three 
great  classes  into  which  we  primarily  divided  the 
phaenomena  of  mind.  .  .  .  Perception  proper  is  the 
consciousness,  through  the  senses,  of  the  qualities  of 
an  object  known  as  different  from  self;  Sensation 
proper  is  the  consciousness  of  the  subjective  affection 
of  pleasure  or  pain,  which  accompanies  that  act  of 
knowledge.  Perception  is  thus  the  objective  element 
in  the  complex  state,  —  the  element  of  cognition;  sen- 
sation is  the  subjective  element,  —  the  element  of 
feeling."  2  Here,  as  at  other  places,  the  conscious 
complex  perceptive  state  is  held  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.  274.  (2)  lb.,  p.    335. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF   INTELLECTION.     1 85 

to  have,  not  simply  an  objective  reference,  but  a  real 
objective  element,  which  element  is  a  quality  or  quali- 
ties of  matter,  so  that  the  inner  constitution  of  the 
perceptive  state  is  partly  material  or  corporeal.  The 
chief  fact  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  in  mind  in  these 
passages  of  course  is,  that  we  have  a  sure  knowledge 
both  of  the  mind  and  extra-mental  realities.  This 
fact  is,  no  doubt,  a  fundamental  one;  but  his  state- 
ment of  the  mode  of  knowledge,  in  which  he  is  fol- 
lowed by  many  a  priori  dualists,  is  indefensible.  It 
does  not  rightly  and  clearly  distinguish  between  the 
source  and  the  excitant  of  the  cognitive  phenomenon. 
The  truth  and  proper  mode  of  statement  is,  that, 
as  to  the  inner  nature  of  the  so-called  external  percep- 
tions, they  are  as  purely  and  wholly  internal  or  sub- 
jective as  the  internal  perceptions.  They  derive  no 
element  whatever  from  withoi.it.  All  their  constituent 
parts  or  properties  are  provided  by  the  mind,  just  as 
in  the  case  of  the  most  relined  internal  states.  The 
sensations  of  color  and  of  touch  are  as  purely  mental 
and  internal  as  the  most  exquisite  emotion  or  the 
most  subtile  or  remarkable  form  of  thought;  they  are 
as  pure  modes  of  self-consciousness  and  as  clearly 
reveal  self.  But  though  the  external  and  internal  per- 
ceptions differ  not  as  to  internal  nature,  since  the 
former  are  as  purely  subjective  and  modes  of  self-con- 
sciousness as  the  latter,  they  yet  differ  in  regard  to 
excitation  and  reference.  Here  is  the  element  of 
truth  in  the  distinction  of  the  external  and  internal 
perceptions.  The  former  are  excited  directly  by 
external  objects;  the  latter  arise  more  from  the  spon- 
taneous labor  of  the  mind.  Yet  in  the  excitation  of 
perception,  the  external  realities  contribute  nothing 
to  the  matter  of  the  perception.     They  only  move  the 


1 86  THE      PRINCIPIvES      OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

mind;  and  the  resulting  perception  owes  all  its  inner 
nature  to  the  productivity  of  the  mind.  The  result- 
ing perception,  however,  though  purely  subjective  in 
nature,  doubtless  embraces  the  double  consciousness 
of  its  relation  to  the  mind  and  its  reference  to  external 
things.  The  same  individual  perceptive  mode  is  a 
mode  of  self-consciousness,  and  also  has  a  reference  to 
the  not-self.  The  mind  is  therefore  as  productive, 
though  not  as  spontaneous,  in  regard  to  perception 
as  in  regard  to  any  of  its  phenomena.  The  so-called 
external  perceptions  are  external,  not  because  they 
contain  any  constituent  element  from  the  external, 
but  merely  because,  though  pure  mental  effects,  they 
are  occasioned  by  external  excitants  and  have  an 
immediate  reference  to  them.  The  mind  produces 
these  affections  wholly,  in  that  it  provides  all  the  mat- 
ter of  them;  but  produces  them  on  excitation  from 
outer  objects,  not  from  its  own  movement  or  spon- 
taneity. The  "external"  perceptions  get  their  name, 
then,  not  from  their  nature  or  real  place,  but  from 
their  occasion.  It  is  something  remarkable  that  this 
mere  difference  of  excitation  and  directness  of  exter- 
nal reference  should  have  led  to  the  formation  of  as 
prominent  a  distinction  am.ong  the  mental  states  as 
that  of  "external"  and  "internal"  perception  has  long 
been;  and  to  the  denial  or  entire  neglect,  often,  of  the 
sameness  of  inner  nature,  tlie  real  identical  pure  sub- 
jectivity, of  the  two  classes  of  perceptions.  The  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  however,  enables  us  to  account 
for  it. 

From  these  considerations  we  may,  in  brief,  con- 
clude that  the  different  original  materials  of  intelli- 
gence have  but  one  origin,  which  is  internal,  in  the 
mind  itself;   and  are  one  in  nature,  so  far  as  being  all 


GENERAL   NATURE   OF   INTELLECTION.      1 87 

purely  subjective  or  mental.  Some  have  a  direct 
external  occasion,  and  some  an  internal  occa- 
sion. These  materials,  as  has  been  above  said, 
are  the  three  classes  of  affections,  sensations,  emo- 
tions, and  volitions  —  the  original  affections  of  mind. 
They  are  all  modes  of  consciousness,  and  are  all  con- 
served by  memory.  Sensations,  though  excited  from 
without,  form  in  themselves  as  pure  internal  states  or 
perceptions  as  emotions  and  volitions;  and  emotions 
and  volitions  enter  as  really  into  the  so-called  external 
cognitions  as  sensations,  though  in  many  cases  not  to 
the  same  degree,  or  not  as  prominently  Or  strikingly. 
Whether  there  are  different  internal  sources  of  knowl- 
edge, and  in  what  sense,  will  be  considered  presently. 

2.  From  the  consideration  of  the  general  question 
regarding  the  character  and  source  of  the  materials  of 
intellection,  let  us  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  par- 
ticular and  important  question  mentioned  at  the  out- 
set as  coming  under  it,  viz.,  Whether  the  Intellect,  the 
architect  of  knowledge,  contributes  anything  of  itself 
to  the  materials  given  it  in  sensation,  emotion  and 
volition;  or  whether  it  is  both  constructive  and  cre- 
ative. The  question  is  to  be  understood  as  embracing 
the  inquiry  whether  the  synthetic  power  of  the  mind 
even  in  its  highest  action  contributes  anything  what- 
soever to  the  materials  of  knowledge.  This  question 
is  very  closely  related  to,  or  in  a  large  part  identical 
with,  the  much  discussed  question  of  the  comparative 
activity  and  passivity  of  the  mind  in  knowledge. 

(a)  Locke  clearly  distinguishes  between  the  activ- 
ity and  passivity  of  the  mind  in  knowledge.  In  the 
reception  of  the  materials  of  knowledge,  he  declares 
the  mind  is  passive.  To  the  activity  of  the  mind  or 
the  intellect  he  ascribes  nothing  more  than  the  power 


1 88  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

to  "repeat  and  join  together  its  ideas,"  the  materials 
from  sensation  and  reflection.  He  says  upon  this 
important  su1)ject:  "Thus  the  first  capacity  of  human 
intellect  is,  that  the  mind  is  fitted  to  receive  the 
impressions  made  on  it,  either  through  the  senses  by 
outward  objects,  or  by  its  own  operations  when  it 
reflects  on  them.  This  is  the  first  step  a  man  makes 
towards  the  discovery  of  anything,  and  the  ground- 
work whereon  to  build  all  those  notions  which  ever 
he  shall  have  natvu'ally  in  this  world.  All  those  sub- 
lime thoughts  which  tower  above  the  clouds,  and 
reach  as  high  as  heaven  itself,  take  their  rise  and  foot- 
ing here:  in  all  that  good  extent  wherein  the  mind 
wanders,  in  those  remote  speculations  it  may  seem  to 
be  elevated  with,  it  stirs  not  one  jot  beyond  those 
ideas  which  sense  or  reflection  has  offered  for  its  con- 
templation. In  this  part  the  understanding  is  merely 
passive;  and  whether  or  not  it  will  have  these  begin- 
nings, and,  as  it  were,  materials  of  knowledge,  is  not 
in  its  own  power;  for  the  ol)jects  of  our  senses  do, 
many  of  them,  obtrude  their  particular  ideas  upon  our 
minds  whether  we  will  or  not;  and  the  operations  of 
our  minds  will  not  let  us  be  without,  at  least,  some 
obscure  notions  of  them.  No  man  can  be  wholly 
ignorant  of  what  he  does  when  he  thinks.  These 
simple  ideas,  when  offered  to  the  mind,  the  under- 
standing can  no  more  refuse  to  have,  nor  alter,  when 
they  are  imprinted,  nor  blot  them  out,  and  make  new 
ones  itself,  than  a  mirror  can  refuse,  alter,  or  obliterate 
the  images  or  ideas  which  the  objects  set  before  it  do 
therein  produce."  ^  ''The  dominion  of  man  in  this 
little  world  of  his  own  understanding,  being  much 


(r)  Essay,  II.,  i.  24,  25. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  TNTEELECTION.     1 89 

what  the  same  as  it  is  in  the  great  world  of  visible 
things,  whereirp  his  power,  however  managed  by  art 
and  skill,  reaches  no  farther  than  to  compound  and 
divide  the  materials  that  are  made  to  his  hand;    but 
can  do  nothing  towards  the  making  the  least  particle 
of  new  matter,  or  destroying  one  atom  of  what  is 
already  in  being."  i     "We  have  hitherto  considered 
those  ideas,  in  the  reception  whereof  the  mind  is  only 
passive,  which  are  those  simple  ones  received  from  • 
sensation  and  reflection  before  mentioned,  whereof 
the  mind  can  not  make  one  to  itself,  nor  have  any 
idea  which  does  not  wholly  consist  of  them.     But  as 
the  mind  is  wholly  passive  in  the  reception  of  all  its 
simple   ideas,   so  it   exerts  several   acts   of  its   own, 
whereby  out  of  its  simple  ideas,  as  the  materials  and 
foundations  of  the  rest,  the  others  are  framed.     The 
acts  of  the  mind  wdierein  it  exerts  its  power  over  its 
simple  ideas,  are  chiefly  these  three:     i.   Combining 
several  simple  ideas  into  one  compound  one,  and  thus 
all  complex  ideas  are  made.     2.  The  second  is  bring- 
ing two  ideas,  whether  simple  or  complex,  together, 
and  setting  them  by  one  another  so  as  to  take  a  view 
of  them  at  once,  without  uniting  them  into  one,  by 
which  way  it  gets  all  its  ideas  of  relations.     3.  The 
third  is  separating  them   from  all  other  ideas   that 
accompany  them  in  their  real  existence:    this  is  called 
abstraction,  and  thus  all  its  general  ideas  are  made. 
This  shows  man's  power,  and  its  ways  of  operation  to 
be  much  the  same  in  the  material  and  intellectual 
world.     For  the  materials  in  both  being  such  as  he 
has  no  power  over,  either  to  make  or  destroy,  all  that 
man  can  do  is  either  to  unite  them  together,  or  to  se^ 


(i)  Essay,  II.,  ii.  2. 


190  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

them  by  one  another,  or  wholly  separate  them."  1 
"Even  the  most  abstruse  ideas,  how  remote  soever 
they  may  seem  from  sense,  or  from  an^y  operations  of 
our  own  minds,  are  yet  only  such  as  the  understand- 
ing frames  to  itself,  by  repeating  and  joining  together 
ideas  that  it  had  either  from  objects  of  sense,  or  from 
its  own  operations  about  them."  2 

In  harmony  with  this  view  of  the  passivity  of  the 
mind  in  gaining  the  materials  of  knowledge,  Locke 
compares  the  mind  to  an  "empty  cabinet,"  a  "dark 
room,"  "white  paper."  "The  senses,"  says  he,  "at 
first  let  in  particular  ideas,  and  furnish  the  yet  empty 
cabinet."  3  "External  and  internal  sensation  are  the 
•only  passages  that  I  can  find  of  knowledge  to  the 
understanding.  These  alone,  as  far  as  I  can  discover, 
are  the  windows  by  which  light  is  let  into  this  dark 
room."  4  "Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind  to  be,  as  we 
say,  white  paper,  void  of  all  characters,  without  any 
ideas;  how  comes  it  to  be  furnished?"  5  These  illus- 
trations are,  however,  imfortunate,  like  some  other 
notable  ones  employed  in  philosophy,  in  darkening 
instead  of  illuminating  their  object.  They  have  been 
the  occasion  of  much  misconstruction  and  extrava- 
gant criticism  of  Locke's  philosophy.  Some  have 
taken  him  literally,  supposing  him  to  make  the  mind 
.as  passive,  or  as  dead  a  blank,  as  a  sheet  of  white 
paper.  His  theory  of  knowledge  has  been  thought 
by  many  as  by  Leibnitz,  to  be  embodied,  in  brief,  in 
the  old  proposition,  A^/7  est  in  intcllectu  quod  non  fuerit 
prills  in  sensu;  and  Leibnitz  made  the  famous  appen- 


(,i.)  Essay,  II.,  xii.   i.  (2)  lb.,  II.,  xii.  8. 

{?)  Ik.,  I.,  ii.  15.  (4^  lb.,  II.,  xi.  17. 

(5)  lb.,  II..    i.  2. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  INTELEECTION.     I9I 

dix  to  it.  nisi  intcllectus  ipse,  as  expressing  a  necessary 
complement  to  Locke's  teaching. 

But  while  Locke  undoubtedly  emphasizes  the 
passivity  of  the  mind  in  the  reception  of  the  matter  of 
knowledge,  no  attentive  and  impartial  reader  can 
declare  that  he  does  not  recognize  to  some  extent  the 
internal  constitution,  life,  power,  activity  of  intellectus 
ipse.  He  certainly  distinguishes  between  the  mind, 
or  the  capacity  to  know,  and  knowledge.  He 
ascribes  consciousness,  various  faculties,  including  a 
very  important  synthetic  power,  to  the  mind.  True, 
he  denies  to  the  synthetic  action  of  the  mind,  or  intel- 
lection proper,  any  ability  to  add  anything  to  the  con- 
scious contents  possessed  from  the  twofold  sense,  or 
to  contribute  much  or  little,  under  the  specious  name 
form,  to  the  real  substance  of  knowledge;  and  limits 
this  action  to  dividing,  repeating,  compounding,  what 
is  made  ready  to  hand;  which  is  certainly  a  simple 
view  compared  with  the  extraordinary  assumptions  of 
many  later  writers  as  to  the  productivity  or  creative 
function  of  intelligence. 

Especially,  according  to  Locke's  theory  of  pass- 
ivity and  activity,  our  ideas  of  external  realities  are 
complex  ideas  formed  by  the  synthetic  power  of  the 
mind  out  of  simple  ideas  (sensations);  but  in  the  com- 
position of  these  complex  ideas  the  power  of  synthesis 
is  not  so  unqualified  or  arbitrary,  or  so  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  the  external  things  themselves,  as  that  the 
ideas  ha\'e  no  real  conformation  to  the  things,  i  In 
particular,  Locke  makes  our  ideas  of  external  things 
resemblances  of  them  as  to  the  primary  qualities. 

The   question   of  the   comparative  passivity   and 


([)  Essay.  II..  xii.  i,  and  xxiv. 


192  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

activity,  or  receptivity  and  spontaneity,  of  the  mind  in 
knowledge  rose  to  full  expression  and  prominence 
with  Kant,  and  has  filled  a  large  space  in  the  science 
of  knc^wledge  ever  since.  With  some  resemblance, 
there  is  a  marked  difference  between  his  theory  and 
that  of  Locke.  Kant's  general  view  is  given  in  the 
following  passage,  which  contains  his  noted  Coper- 
nican  illustration,  and  was  written  probably  with  spe- 
cial reference  to  Locke:  "Hitherto  it  has  been 
assumed  that  all  our  knowledge  must  conform  to  the 
objects;  but  all  attempts  to  determine  anything  about 
them  a  priori,  through  notions  whereby  our  cogni- 
tions might  be  extended,  have  under  this  presupposi- 
tion come  to  nothing.  Let  us  try,  therefore,  whether 
we  may  not  succeed  better  with  the  problems  of  meta- 
physics on  the  assumption  that  objects  must  conform 
to  our  knowledge.  This  now  agrees  better  with  the 
desired  possibility  of  a  knowledge  that  should  deter- 
mine something  concerning  objects  before  they  are 
given  to  us.  Our  condition  here  is  just  like  that  of 
Copernicus;  who,  when  he  could  not  succeed  in  the 
explanation  of  the  celestial  motions  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  whole  starry  host  revolved  around  the 
observer,  considered  whether  it  would  not  be  better  to 
assume  that  the  observer  revolves  and  that  the  stars 
remain  at  rest.  In  metaphysics  we  may  experiment 
in  the  same  manner  concerning  the  perception  of 
objects.  If  perception  must  conform  to  the  nature 
of  the  objects,  then  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  know 
anything  of  it  a  priori;  but  if  the  object  (as  an  object 
of  the  senses)  conforms  to  the  nature  of  our  faculty  of 
perception,  then  I  can  quite  easily  conceive  this  pos- 
sibility." I     The  substance  and  intent  of  this  passage 

(i)  Kriiik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  18. 


GE^NKRAL     NATURE     OF     INTl^LLECTlON.  1 93 

is  condensed  in  the  brief  declaration  that  the  "under- 
standing makes  nature.''  Locke's  theory  similarly 
condensed  would  amount  only  to  the  declaration,  that 
the  understanding,  by  means  of  its  complex  ideas, 
represents  nature,  i 

Let  us  descend  to  the  particulars  of  this  doctrine. 
Kant  finds  two  elements  in  every  phenomenon  or 
knowledge,  viz.,  "matter"  and  '"form."  2  This  is  the 
second  of  the  two  most  important  distinctions  marked 
by  him  in  his  analytical  handling  of  the  mind.  First, 
he  distinguishes  between  noumenon  and  phenome- 
non, and  separates  them.  Here,  secondly,  within 
phenomenon,  he  distinguishes  and  separates  "matter" 
and  "form."  This  second  distinction,  as  drawn  by 
Kant,  was  not  recognized  by  Locke,  and  has  been 
represented  as  a  great  advance  upon  him  and  of  the 
highest  importance  in  itself.  "Matter"  Kant  describes 
as  the  crude  or  raw  material  of  perceptions  (den  rohen 
Stoff  sinnlicher  Eindruecke).  3  Of  forms  or  forms 
there  are  said  to  be  two  species:  first,  the  forms  of 
sense,  of  which  there  are  two,  space  and  time  —  space 
being  the  form  of  the  external  sense,  and  ^ime  of  the 
internal,  or  rather  of  both;  and,  secondly,  the  cate- 
gories of  the  understanding,  among  the  chief  of 
which  are  unity,  substantiality,  and  causality;  both 
species  having  probably  the  same  root  or  origin.  As 
an  illustration  of  the  union  of  matter  and  form  in  j^er- 
ception,  we  may  take  a  colored  surface.     The  mere 


(i)  Locke  says:  "Solidity,  extension,  figure,  motion,  and 
rest  would  be  really  in  the  world,  as  they  are,  whether  there 
were  any  sensible  being  to -perceive  them  or  not."  (Essay,  II., 
xxi.  2.)  Kant  holds  that  these  properties  are  in  the  world 
because  they  are  put  into  it  by  the  percipient  mind. 

(2)    Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  56.  (3)  lb.,  p.  33. 

(13) 


194  THE    principi,e:s    of    knowledge. 

color  is  the  matter;  the  extension,  duration,  and 
unity  are  the  forms.  The  apparent  objectivity  and 
independence  are  also  the  effect  of  the  forms. 

Now  Kant  assigns  the  matter  of  knowledge  to  the 
passivity  or  receptivity  of  the  mind;  and  the  forms, 
especially  the  forms  of  the  understanding,  the  cate- 
gories, to  its  productivity  or  spontaneity.  The  mat- 
ter is  said  to  be  given  to  the  mind,  to  be  received  by 
the  mind,  to  be  a  posteriori.  The  forms  are  said  to  lie 
a  priori  in  the  mind,  to  be  pre-existent  conditions  of 
the  possibility  of  knowledge,  to  arise  from  the  spon- 
taneity of  the  mind  itself,  to  be  supplied  by  the  faculty 
of  cognition.  We  are  to  understand,  then,  that  in 
knowledge  the  matter  is  received,  as  something  exter- 
nal or  distinct,  into  the  forms  as  a  net-work,  or  that 
the  forms  are  ap])lied,  as  something  distinct,  to  the 
matter.  The  affections  of  sense  excite  the  mind  to 
bring  forward  its  a  priori  forms.  But  though  Kant 
distinguishes  matter  and  form  thus  as  to  character  and 
origin,  it  should  be  observed  he  holds  that  they  are  not 
known  apart,  but  always  appear  together  in  conscious- 
ness. He  says  indeed  of  form  that  it  is  an  "addition 
which  we  do  not  distinguish  from  the  basal  matter 
until  long  practice  has  made  us  attentive  to  it,  and 
qualified  us  to  separate  it."  i 

As  to  the  relative  importance  of  matter  and  form, 
Kant  remarks:  "Neither  notions  without  perception 
in  some  manner  corresponding  to  them,  nor  percep- 
tion without  notions,  can  furnish  a  cognition."  2 
"Without  sensibility  no  o1)ject  would  be  given  to  us, 
and  without  understanding  no  object  would  be 
thought.     Thoughts  without  a  content  are  void;   per- 


(i)  Kriiik  d.  r.   J\,  p.  .33.  (2)   lb.,  p.  81. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OE  INTEELECTION.     1 95 

ceptions  without  notions  are  blind.  Therefore  it  is 
just  as  necessary  to  make  notions  sensational  (that  is, 
to  add  to  them  an  object  in  perception)  as  to  make 
perceptions  intellectual  (that  is,  to  bring  them  under 
notions).  .  .  .  The  understanding  can  perceive  noth- 
ing, and  the  senses  think  nothing.  Only  in  their 
union  can  knowledge  arise."  ^  The  importance  of 
the  categories  of  the  understanding  to  sense-percep- 
tions is  worthy  of  special  note.  Kant  seems  to  attrib- 
ute all  spatial  unity,  even  the  spatial  unity  of  a  mere 
color,  as  that  of  a  piece  of  white  paper,  not,  as  w^e 
might  expect,  to  the  sense-form  space,  but  to  the  cate- 
gory of  the  understanding. 

We  may  brietiy  observe  further  that,  according  to 
Kant,  another  productive  faculty  besides  the  under- 
standing, a  faculty  concerned  with  the  highest  intel- 
lection, is  reason  with  its  three  ideas  of  the  soul,  the 
world,  and  God.  These  ideas  are  much  farther 
removed  from  the  matter  of  phenomena  or  experience 
than  the  notions  of  the  understanding.  They  are  not 
constitutive  of  knowledge,  but  only  regulative;  that 
is,  they  do  not  enter  into  the  body  of  real  knowledge 
as  the  categories  do,  but  are  only  principles  or  sche- 
mata for  the  guidance  of  the  understanding  to  the 
highest  synthesis.  ''Reason,"  says  Kant,  "never 
holds  a  direct  relation  to  an  object,  but  only  to  the 
understanding,  and  by  means  of  the  understanding 
comes  to  its  own  empirica.1  employment.  It  there- 
fore forms  no  notions  (of  objects),  but  only  arranges 
them  and  gives  them  that  unity  which  they  are  capa- 
ble of  having  in  their  greatest  possible  extension.  .  .  . 
Reason  has  therefore,  for  its  proper  object,  only  the 


(i)  Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  82. 


196  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

understanding  and  its  arranging  purpose.  As  the 
understanding  unites  the  manifold  in  the  object 
through  notions,  so  reason,  for  its  part,  unites  the 
manifold  of  notions  through  ideas,  since  it  gives  to 
the  operations  of  the  understanding  to  aim  at  a  certain 
collective  unity,  as  they  would  otherwise  be  concerned 
only  with  a  distributive  unity."  i  ''Pure  reason  which 
appeared  to  promise  us  at  first  nothing  less  than  an 
extension  of  our  knowledge  beyond  all  limits  of 
experience,  contains,  when  properly  understood, 
nothing  but  regulative  principles,  which  truly  give 
greater  unity  than  the  empirical  use  of  the  under- 
standing can  attain.  And  this  they  do  by  pushing  out 
the  goal  of  the  progress  of  the  understanding  so  far 
that  they  bring  the  agreement  of  the  understanding 
with  itself,  through  systematic  unity,  to  the  highest 
possible  grade.'"  2 

But  under  all  intellection,  as  the  foundation  prin- 
ciple of  it,  Kant  puts  the  synthetical  "unity  of  apper- 
ception," or  the  ''unity  of  consciousness."  "Under- 
standing is,  to  speak  generally,  the  faadty  of  cognitions. 
These  consist  in  the  definite  relation  of  given  repre- 
sentations to  an  object.  An  object  is  that  in  the 
notion  of  which  the  manifold  of  a  given  perception  is 
united.  Now  all  union  of  representations  requires  a 
unitv  of  consciousness  in  the  svnthesis  of  them. 
Hence  it  is  the  unity  of  consciousness  which  alone 
determines  the  relation  of  representations  to  an  object, 
consequently  their  objective  validity,  and  the  fact  of 
their  becoming  cognitions;  and  on  it  therefore  rests 
the   possibility   of  the   understanding  itself."  3     The 


(i)  Kritik  d.  r.  V.,  p.  436.  (2)  /&.,  469. 

(3)  lb.,  pp.  118,  119. 


GKNERAI,     NATURE     OF     IlSrTELLECTlON.  1 97 

understanding  itself  "is  nothing"  more  than  the  faculty 
of  binding  a  priori,  and  of  bringing  the  manifold  of 
given  representations  under  the  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, which  is  the  supreme  principle  in  all  human 
knowledge."  i  The  categories  of  the  understanding 
appear,  accordingly,  to  be  only  different  modes  or 
functions  of  the  "unity  of  consciousness." 

Kant's  scheme  of  intellection  can  not  be  defended 
against  the  charge  of  being,  in  no  small  degree,  arbi- 
trary and  inconsistent.  Especially  his  division  of  the 
active  and  passive,  or  productive  and  receptive, 
spheres  of  mind,  and  the  implied  serious  diremption 
of  the  "matter"  of  knowledge  from  the  "forms,"  (tak- 
ing the  latter  as  including,  with  the  forms  of  sense 
and  the  categories  of  the  understanding,  also  the 
ideas  of  reason"),  are  groundless.  Thev  were  made 
not  in  obedience  to  the  requirement  of  facts,  but  in 
much  disregard  of  them. 

We  notice  first  the  assignment  of  the  matter  of 
knowledge,  the  pure  or  crude  affections  of  sense,  to 
the  passivity  or  receptivity  of  the  mind.  The  passiv- 
ity as  to  matter  is  expressed  by  the  terms  given  and 
received.  The  matter  is  said  to  be  given  to  the  mind, 
and  received  by  the  mind.  Kant's  use  of  these  terms 
in  this  reference  can  only  be  regarded  as  the  abuse  of 
them.  He  manifests  in  them  the  same  inexactness, 
the  same  holding  to  one  view  and  employing  the  lan- 
guage of  another,  which  we  saw  above,  when  consid- 
ering his  doctrine  of  the  two  senses,  in  his  use  of  the 
word  "external."  These  terms  can  only  properly 
imply  that  something  is  actually  communicated  to  the 
mind  by  the  unknown  external  objects  supposed  to 


(i)  Kritik  d.  r.  J\,  p.   117. 


198  THE      PRINCIPI.es      QE      KNOWLEDGE. 

affect  it;  or  that  the  mind  actually  receives  something- 
into  itself  from  external  sources.  But  thousfh  this  be 
the  only  proper  meaning  of  the  words,  it  can  not  be 
consistently  the  meaning  of  Kant.  For  he  really 
holds  that  the  raw  materials  of  special  sense  are  not  at 
all  imparted  to  the  mind  by  external  things,  or 
received  from  them;  but  are  in  fact  subjective,  pure 
affections  of  mind,  at  most  only  excited  in  the  mind 
by  the  influence  of  external  things.  These  materials 
have  their  source  and  place  solely  in  the  mind.  The 
mind  must  produce  them,  if  not  by  its  spontaneous, 
vet  by  its  excited  action.  The  only  sense,  accord- 
ing! v,  in  which  they  can  be  said  to  be  given  or 
received,  is,  that  they  are  given  by  the  mind  to  itself 
or  received  from  itself:  and,  therefore,  instead  of  the 
mind  being  passive  as  to  their  origin,  it  is  really  in  a 
very  important  sense  active. 

If  the  matter  of  knowledge  be  thus  in  reality  fur- 
nished by  the  mind  itself,  it  is  evident  that  there  can 
be  no  such  difference,  as  to  origin,  between  matter 
and  form  as  Kant's  formal  terms  require.  Matter  is, 
in  fact,  as  truly  sul3Jective  and  as  truly  the  production 
of  the  mind,  as  form.  There  does  not  remain  even 
the  difference,  that  form  is  the  eff'ect  of  the  spon- 
taneous action,  but  matter  the  effect  of  the  excited 
action,  of  mind;  for  Kant  as  expressly  makes  the 
sense-matter  the  occasion  of  the  appearance  of  the 
a  priori  forms,  as  he  makes  external  things  the  occa- 
sion of  the  appearance  of  the  sense-matter.  From 
these  considerations  we  may  justly  conclude  that 
Kant's  distribution  of  the  so-called  matter  and  form 
of  knowledge,  the  one  to  the  receptivity,  the  other  to 
the  productivity,  of  the  mind,  is  but  an  example  of 
contradictorv  and  erratic  analysis. 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF   INTELEECTlON.     1 99 

But  the  most  serious  point  in  this  distribution  of 
the  matter  and  form  of  knowledge  is  the  simple  sever- 
ance, in  itself,  of  matter  and  form  implied  in  it.  The 
assumption  of  the  original  severance  of  matter  and 
form,  is,  as  I  remarked  above,  one  of  the  two  chief 
results  of  the  Kantian  criticism  and  analysis.  The 
other  is  the  direm.ption  of  phenomenon  and  mental 
noumenon.  Roth  results  stand  on  the  same  level. 
They  must  be  regarded  as  two  of  the  most  serious 
errors  in  mental  analysis  that  have  ever  been  promul- 
gated and  applauded.  The  latter  has  already  been 
considered.  Phenomena  are  not  things  floating  in 
the  sphere  of  consciousness  and  known  apart  from  the 
mind,  with  m.arked  qualities  entirely  different  from 
those  of  the  mind  in  itself;  they  are  not  produced  by 
the  mental  noumenon,  and  then  thrown  off  as  it  were 
to  a  distance;  l)nt  are  modes  of  mind,  stand  in  exist- 
ential relation  to  mind;  and  mind  is  known  imme- 
diately with  them.  Kant's  opposing  view,  regarding 
especially  the  isolation  of  the  forms  of  sense,  space 
and  time,  is  something  truly  remarkable.  The  forms 
of  sense  he  declares  ''lie  already  a  priori  in  the  mind"; 
but  he  also  declares  it  as  fundamental  that  they  are 
not  properties  of  mind  in  itself,  that  mind  in  itself  is 
extensionless  and  timeless.  We  are  to  understand 
him  as  holding  that  an  extensionless  and  timeless 
mind  has  lying  in  itself  space  and  time;  or,  at  least, 
that  such  a  mind  possesses  a  priori  the  conditions  of 
extended  and  enduring  phenomena,  or  the  faculty  of 
forming  and  projecting  such  phenomena  into  con- 
sciousness and  into  the  extended  and  enduring  world. 
This  is  to  ascribe  to  the  mind  an  extraordinary  power 
of  productivity.  That  a  spaceless  mind  should  form 
and  project  extended  objects  and  the  whole  extended 


200  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

world,  would  indeed  be  something  miraculous.     But 
the  supposition  of  it  is  fanciful  and  baseless. 

Likewise    of    the    severance    of    '"matter"     and 
''form."     They  are  not  originally  separate  and  then 
brought  together  by  the  intellect,  matter  being  put 
into  form,  or  form  being  applied  to  matter,  and  so  pre- 
sented in  consciousness;    but  matter  and  form  are 
from  the  first  undivided.     They  are  distinguishable 
elements  of  the  same  indivisible  original  mental  modi- 
fications.     The  extension,  duration,  and  unity  of  a 
sensation  of  color  are  not  elements  originally  severed 
from  the  special  quality  of  the  color;    but  are  origi- 
nally and  indivisibly  combined  with  it.     The  notion  of 
causation  is  not  an  element  existing  originally  apart 
from  perceptions  of  cause  and  effect  or  of  some  ante- 
cedents and  consequents;  but  is  from  the  first  in  indi- 
visible union  with,  or  a  constitutive  element  of  the 
perceptions.     Matter  and  form  are  always  together  in 
consciousness.     There  is  no  good  ground  for  going 
beyond  consciousness  in  our  assumptions  and  holding 
that  they  are  at  any  time  separate.      It  should  be 
remarked  that,  in  the  words  matter  and  form,  we  have 
another  capital  instance  of  Kant's  perverse  use  of  lan- 
guage.    It  is  undeniable  that  what  he  calls  form  con- 
stitutes a  large  portion  of  the  very  matter,  or  sub- 
stance,   proper    of    knowledge.      With    him    "form" 
means   very   much   more   than   form;   and   "matter" 
means  very  much  less  than  matter.     He  takes  the 
original  and  undetachable  properties  of  the  real  mat- 
ter of  knowledge  to  make  his  detached  forms. 

(h)  I  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  the  views  of 
Locke  and  Kant  regarding  especially  the  general 
question  of  the  receptivity  and  productivity  of  the 
mind  in  knowledge,  because  no  discussion  of  intellec- 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF   TNTEI.LECTION.     20I 

tion  can  do  well  without  the  light  which  the  discus- 
sion of  this  question,  by  these  two  great  minds, 
affords.  Let  us  now  proceed,  without  further  con- 
siderable detention  of  this  kind,  to  seek  the  answer  to 
the  question  with  which  we  started:  Does  the  Intel- 
lect, or  the  synthetic  faculty,  proper  contribute  any- 
thing of  itself  to  the  matter  of  knowledge? 

We  have  already  reached  the  conclusion  that  the 
materials  of  knowledge  consist  of  the  sensations,  emo- 
tions, and  volitions.  We  have  also  reached  the  con- 
clusion that  these  materials  have  not  two  sources,  one 
external  and  one  internal;  but  have  only  an  internal 
or  subjective  source.  The  materials  are  all  alike  pure 
subjective  affections.  It  is  now  necessary,  in  the 
first  place,  to  consider  somewhat  the  activity  of  the 
mind  in  the  production  of  the  materials  of  knowledge, 
of  which  it  is  the  only  real  source.  This  will  help  us 
to  the  proper  discrimination  of  the  action  of  the  mind 
in  intellection  from  this  preceding  action  in  providing 
materials  for  intellection. 

The  mind  is  productively  active  in  the  rise  of  the 
materials  of  knowledge;  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  so 
far  passive  or  so  far  qualified  in  this  activity,  as  that  it 
greatly  depends,  for  the  movement  to  produce,  upon 
the  impression  of  external  things.  The  materials  of 
knowledge  come  wholly  from  the  innate  faculties  of 
the  mind  itself;  but  they  are  dependent  on  stimula- 
tion from  without.  It  is  therefore  a  great  exaggera- 
tion of  the  passivity  and  receptivity  of  the  mind  to 
compare  it,  even  with  reference  to  sensation,  to  a  sheet 
of  white  paper,  a  mirror,  etc.  It  must  be  granted  that 
the  mind  is  open  to  the  impressions  of  outer  things, 
just  as  a  sheet  of  paper  is  to  the  pen  of  a  writer;  and 
that   sense-perceptions  would  not  occur,   any  more 


202  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

than  characters  on  the  paper,  without  the  external 
agency.     But  here  the  resemblance  ends,  leaving  an 
important    difference.     The    outer    agency  actually 
communicates  something  to  the  paper;  but  not  to  the 
mind.     The  characters  are  wholly  given  to  the  paper 
by  the  writer;    the  perceptions  are  wholly  produced 
by  the  mind.     The  external  object  only  excites  or 
moves  the  mind,  and  the  mind  furnishes  the  percep- 
tion of  itself,  without  receiving  the  least  particle  from 
the  exciting  object.     Like  the  paper,  then,  the  mind 
is  subject  to  the  impression  of  external  things;    but 
unlike  the  paper  it  possesses  internal  action  and  pro- 
ductive powers  which  supply  the  whole  of  the  ele- 
ments of  perceptions.     The  living,  active,  productive 
mind  responds  to  excitation  from  without  by  furnish- 
ing the  perceptions  entirely.    A  mirror  is  a  little  closer 
illustration  of  the  mind  than  a  sheet  of  paper.       The 
mind  affords  pictures,  just  as  the  glass  or  metallic  sur- 
face;   but  1:)etween  the  two  cases  is  yet  the  cardinal 
difference  that  the  mirror  only  reflects  the  pictures 
given  to  it,  while  the  mind  makes  its  pictures  within 
itself,  receiving  not  the  least  element  of  them  from 
without.     The  mirror  is  a  mere  reflector.     The  mind 
is  wholly  the  producer.     Like  the  mirror,  it  is  affected 
from  the  outside,  and  its  pictures  in  certain  particulars 
truly  represent  the  outer  affecting  objects;    but  yet. 
entirely  unlike  the  mirror,   it  produces  its   pictures 
wholly  by  its  own  internal  powers.     The  mind  thus 
resembles  a  sheet  of  paper  and  a  mirror,  in  being  sub- 
ject to  impulse  from  without:    but  differs  from  them 
by  the  very  important  fact  that  it  possesses  produc- 
tive power,  of  which  they  possess  absolutely  none. 
The  mind  is  therefore  receptive,  from  the  fact  that  it 
receives  excitation;  but  with  the  excitation  it  receives 


gi;ne:rai.    nature    of    intellkction.         203. 

no  material  from  the  external  exciting  things.  This 
it  originates  of  itself.  Nothing  passes  from  them  into 
the  mind,  and  enters  as  a  constituent  element  into  the 
sensation,  making  it  a  subjective  and  objective  com- 
pound; as  would  be  the  case  if  the  mind  were  really 
receptive  in  sensation. 

But  there  is  a  difference  regarding  the  properties 
of  the  primary  and  indivisible  material  units  of  knowl- 
edge that  must  not  be  passed  without  consideration. 
Properties  are  purely  subjective  and  inseparable;   but 
they  may   yet   have   different   relations   to   the   pro- 
ductivity of  the  mind.     They  may  be  in  cases  loosely 
distinguished  as  contingent  or  variable  and  perma- 
nent.    For  example,  in  a  sensation  of  color,  the  spe- 
cial quality  of  color  may  be  distinguished  as  variable, 
from  the  extension  as  permanent.     They  are  dift'er- 
ently  related  to  the  mind  as  to  origination.     The  spe~ 
cial  quality  is  the  contingent  production  of  a  faculty; 
but,  in  the  strictest  use  of  language,  the  extension  of 
the  sensation  can  not  be  said  to  be  a  production  of  the 
faculty.     There  is  evolution  or  change  in  the  rise  of 
the  special  quality;   but  the  extension  is  rather  only  a 
revelation   of  the   same   constituent   and   permanent 
quality  of  the  faculty  or  mind  itself.     In  the  rise  of  the 
contingent  quality,  the  mind  may  be  said  to  produce; 
but  in  the  extension  of  the  sensation,  the  mind  seems 
only  to  express  its  constitutional  quality,  extension. 
There  is  here,  within  mind  and  knowledge,  a  singular 
union  of  the  relation  of  substance  and  attribute  with 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.     What  has  just  been 
said  of  extension  may  be  in  part  said  of  duration  or 
time. 

There  is  not,  however,  with  this  difference  as  to 
origination  between  color  and  extension,  any  such 


204  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

primitive  separation  of  the  two  properties  in  source 
and  existence  as  is  assumed  by  Kant.  There  is  no 
reason  whatever  to  suppose  that  they  are  ever  apart, 
whether  beneath  or  before  consciousness,  or  in  its 
primitive  stages.  Extension  is  not  added  to  color 
from  a  different  source  in  the  mind,  but  is  something 
from  which  the  color  was  never  separate.  From  the 
first  they  are  properties  of  the  same  indivisible  phe- 
nomenon, extended  color.  They  rise  together  from 
the  same  source  by  the  inexplicable  working  of  the 
mind.  The  Associationalist  psychologists  assume  the 
union  of  color  and  extension  in  the  same  sensation  as 
one  of  the  chief  instances  of  the  inseparable  associa- 
tion of  originally  separate  elements.  But  they  clearly 
fail  to  establish  the  assumption  by  any  new  evidence. 
They  have  never  proved  or  made  probable  that  the 
two  elements  which,  in  advanced  intelligence,  appear 
inseparable,  were  ever  apart.  There  are  instances,  no 
doubt,  of  originally  separate  elements  entering  into 
very  close  and  lasting  associations;  but  it  is  yet  to  be 
shown  that  color  and  extension  make  one  of  them. 
Among  the  qualities  belonging  to  the  mind  itself 
before  experience  as  well  as  after  experience,  we  must 
count  extension,  and  also,  in  the  proper  sense,  time  or 
duration.  Extension  can  not  be  a  form  in  and  under 
the  command  of  the  mind,  and  yet  not  be  a  real  quality 
of  mind;  it  can  not  be  a  mere  a  priori  condition  of  the 
mind's  thought,  and  not  an  attribute  of  the  mind's 
being.  That  such  a  form  as  extension  should  lie  in, 
or  be  in  an}^  manner  the  product  of,  an  unextended 
mind,  is  incredible.  Extension  is  a  constitutive  prop- 
erty of  mind,  existing  before  phenomena  appear  and 
after  they  disappear.  Considered  in  this  light,  it  may 
be  properly  said  to  "lie  already  a  priori  in  the  mind," 


gene;ral    nature;    of    intellection.         205 

or  to  be  a  pre-existent  condition  of  the  possibility  of 
experience.  When  in  due  time  experience  begins,  or 
the  mind  is  excited  to  produce  the  "matter"  of  phe- 
nomena, this  matter  appears  invested  with  the  form 
extension.  In  its  rise  it  l)ears  with  it  this  form  or 
property  of  the  mind.  In  the  origination  of  the 
material  or  experiential  productions,  the  mind 
imparts,  so  to  speak,  its  own  a  priori  quality;  it 
expresses  in  these  productions  its  own  anterior  prop- 
erty; and  matter  and  form  arise  indivisibly.from  the 
same  origin.  Extension  is  then,  first,  a  constituent 
property  of  mind,  given  by  the  Creator  in  the  origina- 
tion of  mind;  and  becomes,  secondly,  the  property  of 
the  contingent  productions  of  the  mind.  It  makes 
part  of  the  original  and  primary  matter  of  knowledge; 
the  sense  form  and  the  sense  matter  are  rightly  recog- 
nized and  named  in  their  indissoluble  character,  by 
Locke,  as  "materials  of  knowledge."  We  have  here 
illustrated  for  us  in  part  the  proper  meaning  of  Leib- 
nitz's celebrated  supplement  of  nisi  intcllectus  ipse,  to 
the  principle,  Nil  est  in  intellectn  quod  non  fiierit  prius  in 
sensu.  The  mind  itself,  with  its  internal  organization 
and  properties,  precedes  every  sensation  and  every 
mode  of  consciousness.  All  modes  become  what  they 
are  by  the  prior  organization  of  mind. 

What  has  been  just  said  of  the  productivity  of  the 
mind  in  sensation,  is,  in  general,  true  of  its  productiv^- 
ity  in  regard  to  all  the  divisions  of  the  materials  of 
knowledge.  In  particular,  while  there  are  different 
origins  or  faculties  embraced  within  the  unity  of  the 
one  mind  for  the  diverse  classes  of  materials,  there  is 
no  difference  of  origins  for  what  are  called  in  the 
Kantian  phraseology  "matter"  and  "form."  Sense 
form  arises  from  the  same  source  as  matter.     The  two 


206  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

are  the  indivisible  properties  of  primary  and  elemen- 
tary mental  affections  or  modes.  Likewise  of  the 
forms  or  categories  of  the  understanding,  as  unity  and 
causality.  They  are  not  forms  or  conditions  of 
thought  originally  foreign  to  the  matter  of  thought, 
and  brought  and  applied  to  it  from  a  different  source. 
These  forms  have  no  origin  and  existence  apart  from 
the  matter  of  thought.  They  and  ''matter"  are  not 
only  together  in  consciousness,  but  are  inseparable  as 
possibilities  from  the  very  first.  And  likewise  even 
of  the  so-called  ideas  of  reason,  as  the  idea  of  God. 
These  ideas  can  not  l^e  originally  entirely  aoart  from 
and  above  the  matter  of  knowledge,  and  from  their 
high  place  operate  only  as  rules,  plans,  or  schemata, 
directing  the  understanding  to  the  highest  unity;  but 
are,  in  origin  and  existence,  indivisible  from  the  ele- 
mentary matter  of  knowledge.  The  idea  of  God  has 
no  origin,  existence,  possibility,  or  l^asis,  apart  from 
this  original  and  elementary  matter. 

We  now  come  directly  to  the  central  question  of 
our  discussion:  What  is  the  nature  of  the  action  of 
the  mind  in  Intellection?  What  work  is  left  for  the 
Intellect?  Is  it  in  any  real  sense  productive  or  cre- 
ative? If  matter  and  form  are  so  closely  related  in 
origin,  as  affirmed  above;  if  they  arise  together,  indi- 
visible, by  the  same  primary  and  unitary  exertions  of 
mind;  then  the  highest  function  of  the  intellect  is 
synthesis  or  construction,  without  origination;  its 
office  can  only  be,  substantially,  that  assigned  to  it  by 
Locke  —  to  divide,  compare,  combine,^  and  repeat  the 
materials  set  to  its  hand.  The  intellect  is  the  mind 
analyzing  and  synthesizing  its  multiple  and  varied 
experiences.  It  discerns  the  constituent  properties  of 
the  primary  and  unitary  mental  affections;  it  discerns 


GF.NERAL     NATURE     OE     INTELLECTION.  207 

the  relations  among  these  affections;  consolidates 
these  relations;  by  combining  and  repeating  the  orig- 
inal material  units  makes  large  artificial  units;  but 
does  not  originate  or  create.  To  ascribe  to  the  intel- 
lect such  originating  power  as  the  Kantian  and  a  priori 
philosophy  ascribes  to  it,  is  but  robbing  the  original 
and  elementary  matter  of  thought  of  its  chief  proper- 
ties to  set  up  and  ornament  in  the  mind  a  high  dis- 
tinct fictitious  faculty.  , 

Particulars  and  details  of  these  general  statements 
will  be  given  with  some  fullness  in  subsequent  chap- 
ters.    I  shall  only  notice  here  briefly  a  main  fact  or 
two.     The  question  might  be  asked,  Does  the  Intel- 
lect really  contribute  nothing  original  to  the  unity,  as 
the  spatial  unity,  of  our  great  complex  cognitions; 
and  to  at  least  the  principal  relations  between  the 
mental  states  or  between  objects,  as,  for  example,  the 
relations  of  resemblance  and  causation?     As  to  the 
spatial  unity  of  complex  cognitions,  I  answer  that  it  is 
at  most  but  a  composition  made  by  the  intellect  out  of 
the   spatial   unities   of  the    original   and   elementary 
materials.     The  visual  perception  of  a  wide  prospect 
is,  as  to  its  spatial  extension,  but  a  composition  and 
representation  of  the  spatial  extension  of  simple  and 
antecedent  sensations.     Similarly  as  to  relations,  the 
intellect  is  active,  but  not  originative.     Compare  two 
different  colors  of  the  same  superficial  magnitude,  a 
red  and  a  blue.     We  immediately  perceive  the  resem- 
blance in  magnitude.     Now  this  resemblance  is  not  a 
third  something  distinct  from  the  two  colors ;  it  is  not 
produced  by  the  intellect  in  the  act  of  comparison; 
the  perception  of  it  is  not  a  third  perception  distinct 
from   the   perceptions  of  the   two   colors,   or  is   not 
acquired  by  the  change  of  attention  from  one  color  to 


208  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  other.     The  resemblance  belongs  to  the  two  col- 
ors as  they  stand  in  juxtaposition  within  the  one  con- 
sciousness of  the  indivisible  mind.     It  is  as  much  the 
property  of  the  two  colors,  in  their  connection,  as  any 
property  is  the  property  of  either  in  separation.     The 
perception  of  it  is  no  act  distinct  from  the  perception 
of  the  colors.     All  the  comparative  faculty  does  in  the 
case  is  simply  to  observe  intently  the  relation  as  it 
already  exists  between  or  in  the  colors.     Certainly  the 
resemblance  would  not  be  cognized,  if  the  colors  did 
not  stand  side  by  side  in  comparison;    but  it  is  not 
brought  or  contributed  to  them  by  the  intellect,  as 
they  thus  stand;   it  is  brought  by  or  involved  in  the 
colors  themselves.     When  any  two  perceptions  are 
compared,  as  to  resemblance,  they  form  in  fact  a  com- 
plex mode  of  mind;  and  the  resemblance  is  solely  the 
quality  of  the  complex  mode,  belonging  to  its  parts 
as  they  coexist  in  the  mode;  and  are  contributed  from 
no  source  whatever  distinct  from  themselves.     What 
has  been  said  of  the  resemblance  of  the  two  colors  as 
to  magnitude,  may  be  said,  in  general,  of  their  differ- 
,  ence  as  to  special  quality.     The  difference  is  not  a 
third  something  apart  from  the  two  colors  themselves, 
the  red  and  the  blue,  contributed  from  a  different 
source  in  the  mind;  the  perception  of  it  is  not  an  act 
distinct  from  the  perception  of  them;   but  the  differ- 
ence is  the  property  of  the  two  colors  as  they  coexist 
and  constitute  one  complex  mode  of  mind,  and  is  so 
perceived.  The  intellect  is  often  called  the  faculty  of 
relations,  and  is  rightly  so  called;   not  because  it  pro- 
duces relations  or  originates  the  perception  of  rela- 
tions in  an  act  distinct  from  and  above  and  over  the 
complex  perception  of  the  things  related,  but  because 


GENERAL     NATURE     OF     INTELLECTION.  209 

it    intensely    considers    and    consolidates    relations 
among  the  original  materials  of  thought. 

No  relation  has  been  more  discussed  and  is  more 
important  than  that  of  cause  and  effect.  Its  existence 
and  perception  have  been  by  many  made  especially 
dependent  on  a  high  faculty  of  intelHgence  apart  from 
the  faculties  supplying  the  materials  of  thought. 
How  Kant  makes  it  the  chief  form  or  category  of  the 
understanding,  is  well  known.  But  every  theory 
which  makes  the  causal  relation  something  primarily 
distinct  from  the  two  terms  of  the  relation,  or  the  per- 
ception of  it  an  act,  in  kind  and  origin,  distinct  from 
and  superior  to  the  consciousness  or  perception  of  the 
two  terms  in  their  juxtaposition,  is  but  an  instance  of 
the  arbitrary  and  erroneous  diremption  of  form  from 
matter,  which  we  have  dwelt  on  above.  The  relation 
of  causation  is  given  and  cognized  with  the  two  events 
bound  by  it.  It  is  the  property  of  the  two  events  in 
their  coexistence.  Our  first  and  fundamental  knowl- 
edge of  causation  is  of  that  between  events,  or  cause 
and  effect,  within  the  mind  —  between  a  volition  and 
its  subjective  effect.  Now  when  we  perceive  an 
instance  of  this  relation  in  the  mind,  it  is  not  because 
a  form  of  thought  has  been  applied  from  another  men- 
tal source  to  the  events,  or  that  a  superior,  originative 
act  of  intelligence  invisibly  combines  itself  in  its 
results,  in  consciousness,  with  the  perception  of  the 
two  events;  but  the  relation  is  perceived  in  the  same 
act  with  the  perception  of  the  events,  because  it  is  the 
original  and  inseparable  property  of  the  two  events, 
or  is  originally  involved  in  them.  The  power  that 
reveals  itself  in  causation  is  the  property  of  the  cause 
or  antecedent  in  itself.  The  passivity  of  the  effect  is 
the  property  of  the  eff'ect  in  itself.     True,  the  cause 

(14) 


210  THIC      PRINCIPIvKS      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

would  not  be  known  as  a  cause  apart  from  the  effect, 
nor  the  effect  known  as  an  effect  apart  from  the  cause; 
they  are  known  as  such  only  in  their  coexistence;  yet 
not  because  something  is  added  to  them  in  their  coex- 
istence, which  does  not  really  belong  to  or  is  not 
involved  with  themselves.  The  relation  of  causation 
is  perceived  with  them  because  it  belongs  to  them. 
The  cognition  of  subjective  cause  and  effect  is  a  com- 
plex mode  of  mind  embracing  the  two  events,  and  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  the  property  of  the  com- 
plex mode,  coming  from  no  source  other  than  that  of 
the  primary  and  material  elements  themselves.  The 
work  of  intellection,  in  the  cognition  of  causation,  is 
the  careful  observation  and  the  intensification  of  a 
relation  existing  in  fact  before  it,  and  deriving  no 
original  contribution,  material  or  formal,  from  it. 

Notwithstanding  these  various  illustrations  and 
proofs  of  the  doctrine  that  the  intellect  is  only  a  con- 
structive or  synthetic,  but  not  an  originative  or  crea- 
tive faculty,  the  inquiry  might  be  still  pressed  on  us. 
Are  there  not  ideas,  as  those  of  mathematical  quanti- 
ties, and  high  aesthetic  and  moral  ideals,  which  have 
something  more  in  them  than  is  ever  found  in  our  ele- 
mentary experiences?  From  what  experiences,  for 
example,  do  we  derive  or  construct  the  perfection 
of  the  geometrical  straight-line,  cube,  sphere?  I 
acknowledge  that  this  inc[uiry  has  significance,  and 
can  not  be  ignored.  These  perfect  notions  do  go 
beyond  our  actual  sense  and  elementary  experiences; 
nevertheless,  they  do  not  require  us  to  take  essentially 
different  ground  for  intellection.  1  can  here  only 
point  out  in  brief  the  fact  that  all  such  notions  are 
reached,  or  become  matters  for  our  use,  by  a  gradual 
approximation.     The  mind  perceives  a  gradation  of 


GE:ne:RAI,     nature     of     intellection.  211 

quality  in  actual  experience.  Having  become  famil- 
iar with  this  gradation,  it  pursues  it  beyond  actual 
experience  to  an  idea  more  perfect  than  is  given  in 
actual  experience.  However,  though  the  mind  thus 
goes  beyond  the  elementary  and  real  experiences,  it 
would  never  do  so  if  it  had  not  received  direction  and 
impulse  from  regular  gradations  clearly  given  m 
experience.  These  gradations  serve  as  plans,  rules, 
schemata,  for  the  guidance  and  excitation  of  the  intel- 
lect; performing  an  ofifice  somewhat  similar  in  char- 
acter to  that  ascribed  by  Kant  to  the  principles  or 
schemata  of  reason.  Kant  chiefly  errs  in  entirely 
divorcing  the  schemata  of  reason  from  the  original 
experiential  materials. 

The  action  of  the  intellect,  accordinsflv,  seems  to 
be  wholly  constructive,  contributing  nothing  original 
to  knowledge.  I'he  intellect  is  simply  the  mind  con- 
sidered in  its  chief  analytic  and  synthetic  operations 
with  the  original  materials  furnished  by  sense,  emo- 
tion, and  volition.  Out  of  these  materials,  presented 
and  represented,  without  adding  of  itself  anything 
original,  it  forms  all  of  our  synthetic  knowledge.  The 
"matter"  of  these  materials  supplies  all  the  matter  that 
enters  into  any  construction  of.the  intellect;  and  their 
form,  all  the  form.  The  construction  is  purely  a  close 
synthesis  of  their  matter,  and  its  form  a  synthesis  of 
their  form  or  forms;  just  as  a  wall  of  cut  stone 
contains  only  the  matter  of  the  stones  built  into  it, 
its  magnitude  being  but  the  composition  of  tlieir 
magnitudes. 

Intellection  makes  some  very  important  presuppo- 
sitions. I  proceed,  in  conclusion,  to  treat  briefly  of 
them.     The  chief  presupposition  of  intellection  is  the 


212  THE      PRINCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

unity  of  consciousness  and  the  mind.  All  unities  and 
relations  of  thought  are  based  on  the  unity  of  the 
mind,  and  by  it  are  made  organic  and  living.  We 
liave  already  seen  how  strongly  Kant  emphasized  the 
importance  of  the  unity  of  consciousness  in  knowl- 
edge, declaring  it  to  be  the  basis  of  "the  possibility  of 
the  existence  of  the  understanding  itself,"  and  the 
highest  principle  of  "all  human  knowledge."  But, 
unfortunately,  by  his  extreme  analysis  of  conscious- 
ness and  the  mind.  —  by  his  diremption  of  phenome- 
non from  mental  noumenon,  of  form  from  matter,  of 
intelligence  from  emotion  in  ethics  and  religion,  —  he 
also  greatly  opposed  the  principle  in  its  full  and  proper 
import. 

There  are  three  chief  stages,  grades,  or  modes  of 
the  unity  of  consciousness.  The  iirst  is  the  unity  of  a 
primary  individual  affection  of  mind:  as,  for  example, 
the  spatial  unity  of  a  simple  sensation  of  color.  This 
unity  is  a  constitutive  property  of  the  simple  original 
sensation,  and  is  of  the  first  significance  to  knowledge; 
but  seems  to  be  entirely  disregarded  in  its  true  char- 
acter by  Kant  and  his  school.  The  second  mode  of 
unity  is  the  unity  which  embraces  all  the  different 
affections  of  mind,  no  matter  how  loosely  or  tran- 
siently related;  and  consists  in  the  knowledge  that 
these  diverse  affections  belong  to,  are  the  modifica- 
tions of,  the  one  self.  It  is  possible  by  virtue  of  the 
relation  that  all  affections  hold  to  the  one  mind.  The 
third  mode  of  unity  is  that  belonging  to  the  definitive 
and  comparatively  permanent  groups  of  the  primary 
affections  and  elements,  which  constitute,  for  exam- 
ple, our  sense-perceptions,  as  of  an  apple,  a  house,  a 
horse,  and  our  concepts,  as  of  man,  matter.  This 
form  of  unity  is  but  an  advanced  stage  of  the  second, 


GENERAI,  NATURE  OF  INTELLECTION.     213 

a  tightening-  or  intensification  of  its  loose  associa- 
tions: or  these  aggregates  are  but  crystalHzations, 
fixed  groups,  within  the  common  consciousness  of 
unity  that  constitutes  the  second  form.  This  third 
mode  of  unity  is  intellection  proper;  and  by  compari- 
son of  it  with  the  others  the  distinct  character  of  intel- 
lection is  clearly  perceived.  The  unity  of  intellection 
is  embraced  in  the  general  unity  constituting  the  sec- 
ond mode  above  mentioned;  a  fact  which  Kant  recog- 
nized in  making  the  "unity  of  consciousness"  the  basis 
of  the  understanding.  Intellection  is  an  elective  and 
intenser  unification  of  the  elementary  mental  aiTec- 
tions.  It  forms  into  close  unities  and  groups  affec- 
tions alread}'  existing  in  that  general  or  universal 
unity  which  holds  all  affections  within  itself  by  reason 
of  their  being  the  affections  of  the  one  mind.  It  is  a 
specialization  of  unity,  it  makes  unities  within  unity; 
but  contributes  no  original  matter.  The  unification 
of  intellection  has  three  grand  modes,  which  include 
all  its  units  and  relations,  —  the  spatial,  the  temporal, 
and  the  causational. 

We  may  here  observe  how  great  an  error  it  is  to 
classify  the  intellect  with  the  faculties  of  emotion  and 
volition,  as  if  it  were  coordinate  with  them.  These 
two  faculties  with  that  of  sensation,  are  primary  and 
originative,  faculties  of  original  matter;  but  the  intel- 
lect is  only  synthetic.  It  should  not,  therefore,  be 
classified  with  them;  but  only  as  a  constructive 
faculty. 

Further,  intellection  presupposes  Memory  and  the 
Laws  of  Association  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  memory. 
These,  however,  are  not  coordinate  with  the  unity  of 
the  mind,  but  are  rather  only  specializations  of  it. 
Without  memory  there  would  be  no  intellection.     By 


214  the;    principles    of    knowledge. 

far  the  larger  part  of  its  materials  are  representations, 
by  memory,  of  past  sensations,  emotions,  and  voli- 
tions, and  its  own  past  compositions  of  them.  Even 
our  ordinary  and  apparently  immediate  perceptions  of 
external  objects  are,  as  to  their  elements,  only  in  part 
immediate,  and  often  in  great  part  memories.  Sim- 
ple and  simultaneous  affections  of  mind  have  their 
unitv.  Memorv  gives  unitv  to  successive  affections 
in  representations:  and  makes  the  experiences  or 
acquisitions  of  all  our  years  available  for  the  synthesis 
of  intelligence. 

The  ideas  of  the  mind  are  all  bound  together  as 
the  ideas  of  the  one  self;  but  there  are  besides  ten- 
dencies in  ideas  that  are  often  together  to  form  them- 
selves into  tenacious  unions,  so  that  the  recovery  of 
one  will  liring  up  with  it  instantaneously  and  irresist- 
ibly the  others.  The  laws  of  association  underlie  all 
definitive  and  fixed  aggregates  formed  within  the  gen- 
eral unity  of  the  mental  phenomena.  The  office  of 
these  laws  is  simply  to  associate  or  unite;  but  a  vigor- 
ous school  of  philosophy  hold  that  they  have  also  an 
originative  function,  that  something  appears  in  or 
comes  out  of  associations  which  did  not  enter  with 
the  constituent  ideas;  and  thus  give  to  these  laws  an 
office  similar  to  that  of  Kant's  categories.  This  doc- 
trine, though  supported  with  ability,  has  hitherto 
failed  to  show  its  warrant.  An  important  question 
regarding  association  is,  what  causes  those  repeated 
concurrences  that  are  the  condition  of  strong  associa- 
tions among  ideas?  Admitting  that  ideas  upon  fre- 
quent concurrence  become  inseparably  associated,  we 
may  yet  go  back  and  inquire  after  the  causes  of  the 
frequent  concurrence.     These  causes  are  chiefly  the 


GliXERAL     NATURE     OF      INTELLECTION.  215. 

primary  excitants  of  the  affections  of  the  mind,  inde- 
pendent of  the  mind  and  external. 

Again,  a  primary  presupposition  for  intellection 
are  those  antecedent  energies  or  impulses  that  urge 
the  mind  on  to  synthesis  and  definite  synthesis.  The 
question  arises  with  reference  to  intellection,  Why  do 
not  the  elementary  affections  of  mind  remain  in  the 
isolation  or  loose  association  in  which  they  originally 
appear,  instead  of  grouping  themselves  definitely? 
The  question  is  identical  to  some  extent  with  the 
question  of  the  "causes  of  philosophy."  We  must 
admit  some  original,  innate  impulses,  as  love  for 
unity,  satisfaction  and  relief  afi'orded  by  the  percep- 
tion of  unity,  which  urge  the  mind  to  its  intellectual 
operations.  There  is  in  the  mind  the  love  of  all  kinds 
of  unity,  as  the  unity  of  resembling  objects  or  of 
classes,  the  unity  of  design,  the  unity  of  cause  and 
effect.     The  feelino-  of  delieht  in  unitv  is  one  of  the 


'is    ^^    ^'^"b 


T 


original  and  simple  emotions. 

But  it  should  be  observed  that  this  feeling  does 
not  precede  and  give  the  impulse  to  the  primary  per- 
ceptions of  unity;  it  succeeds  them.  The  feeling 
does  not  prompt  to  the  primary  discoveries  of  rela- 
tions. It  does  not  itself  discover  them  nor  give  any 
faculty  the  power  to  discover  them.  The  feeling  fol- 
lows these  discoveries.  Instead  of  exciting  to  make 
them,  or  begetting  anticipations  of  them,  it  is  itself 
aroused,  though  not  originated,  by  them  when  made. 
Neither  the  pleasure  of  unity,  nor  the  principle  of 
anticipation  or  philosophical  presumption,  nor  any 
power  or  instinct,  gives  the  intellect  the  materials  or 
the  impulse  to  the  primitive  perceptions  of  relations, 
or  the  power  to  anticipate  relations,  simplicity,  sym- 
metrv,    uniformit^^    unitv.      But   after   the   first    dis- 


2l6  THE      PRINCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

coveries  of  unity,  and  after  the  emotion  has  been 
aroused  by  these  discoveries,  it  then  reacts  on  the 
intellectual  faculty,  stimulates  to  verification  and  fur- 
ther discoveries,  and  helps  to  facility  and  the  habit  of 
unification  and  generalization ;  not  however  by  giving 
this  faculty  the  power  to  discover  or  actually  leading 
it,  but  simply  by  impelling  it  to  use  its  own  energies 
and  the  materials  given  it  in  preceding  experience,  and 
also  by  itself  entering  at  length  into  the  materials  of 
the  intellect  and  becoming  a  part  in  the  more  com- 
plex syntheses.  By  consequence.  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
seems  to  be  in  error  when  he  says.  The  love  of  unity 
"leads  us  to  anticipate  in  nature  a  corresponding  uni- 
formity: and  as  this  anticipation  is  found  in  harmony 
with  experience,  it  not  only  affords  the  efficient  cause 
of  philosophy,  but  the  guiding  principle  to  its  discov- 
eries"; ^  for  he  appears  to  imply  that  the  emotion  of 
the  love  of  unity,  before  and  independently  of  all  per- 
ception of  unity,  leads  the  intellect  in  the  search  for 
and  cognition  of  unity. 

The  second  emotion  which  impels  the  intellect  is 
allied  to  the  first.  It  is  the  feeling  of  relief  and  satis- 
faction which  attends  the  discovery  of  simxilarity  and 
unitv.  Nature  presents  such  a  vast  number  of  objects 
to  the  mind  of  man  as  not  only  taxes,  but  even  over- 
v.'helms  his  powers  of  knowledge,  and  excites  a  pecu- 
har  feeling  of  uneasiness  and  distraction.  Any  dis- 
covery, therefore,  of  likeness,  of  species  and  classes, 
among  the  innumerable  individuals  greatly  assists  the 
mind  in  the  comprehension  and  mastery  of  them. 
"The  mind,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  "is  finite  in  its 
powers  of  comprehension;    the  objects,  on  the  con- 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.  49. 


GENEKAL  NATURE  OE  INTELLECTION.     217 

* 

trary,  which  are  presented  to  it  are,  in  proportion  to 
its  limited  capacities,  infinite  in  number.  How  then 
is  this  disproportion  to  be  equalized?  How  can  the 
infinity  of  nature  be  brought  down  to  the  finitude  of 
man?  This  is  done  Iw  means  of  Classification. 
Objects,  though  infinite  in  number,  are  not  infinite  in 
variety;  they  are  all.  in  a  certain  sort,  repetitions  of 
the  same  common  qualities,  and  the  mind,  though  lost 
in  the  multitude  of  particulars,  —  individuals,  can 
easily  grasp  the  classes  into  which  their  resembling 
attributes  enable  us  to  assort  these."'  i  This  grasp 
and  mastery  not  only  dispel  the  feeling  of  distraction 
in  the  observation  of  numerous,  at  first  apparently 
unrelated,  individuals,  but  produce  a  feeling  of  posi- 
tive satisfaction.  For  the  same  reason,  any  conjec- 
ture or  image  of  unity,  or  of  greater  unity,  among 
ol^jects  arouses  this  same  feeling.  The  feeling  of  dis- 
satisfaction, it  should  be  observed,  is  awakened  by  the 
multiplicity  of  objects  wdiich  nature  ofters  to  the  mind. 
It  arises  because  of  the  oppression  of  this  multiplicity, 
before  the  perception  of  classes  and  unities.  In  the 
first  discovery  of  classes  and  unity,  the  feeling  does 
not  impel  the  mind  or  lead  it  in  the  direction  or  to  the 
place  where  they  are  to  be  found.  Nor  is  it  asso- 
ciated with  any  craving  for  unity  which  is  active 
a  priori,  or  before  and  independently  of  the  original 
perceptions  of  unity,  anticipating  the  judgment.  The 
contrary  view  is  apparently  received  by  many,  but  it 
seems  to  be  illusory.  The  feeling  of  oppression  is  a 
blind  feeling,  and  originally  can  not  help  itself,  but  can 
only  await  the  relief  brought  by  the  comparative 
faculty  acting  independently  of  it.       But,  doubtless, 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.  466. 


2l8  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

when  discoveries  of  similarity  and  unity  in  the  multi- 
plicity of  phenomena  are  made  by  the  original  energy 
of  the  comparative  faculty  itself,  and  when  the  feeling 
of  relief  and  satisfaction  arises,  this  feeling  then  reacts 
upon  the  faculty  and  impels  it  to  exert  itself  beyond 
what  it  would  do  of  itself.  The  inherent  energy  of 
this  faculty  would  not  of  itself,  perhaps,  carry  very  far 
forward  the  work  of  generalization,  if  the  emotions 
awakened  by  th.e  first  perceptions  of  relations  did  not 
come  to  its  support  and  excite  it  to  further  percep- 
tions. But  certainly  neither  these  emotions  nor  any 
a  priori  principles  give  it  the  power  to  perceive  or  per- 
ceive for  it.  As  the  perceptions  of  similarity  and  gen- 
eralizations advance,  the  influence  of  these  emotions 
on  the  faculty  of  relations  increases  and  becomes  con- 
firmed in  the  settled  conviction  of  the  uniformity  of 
nature. 

■  The  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  the  gen- 
eral form  of  assurance  that  attaches  itself  to  universal 
judgments.  This  belief  has  been  by  some  reckoned 
among  the  innate  cognitive  principles  of  the  mind. 
Its  true  nature  and  history  appear  to  be,  that  it  is  a 
feeling  aroused  in  the  mind  by  the  perceptions  of  the 
uniformity  and  classes  in  nature,  and  grows  in 
strength  as  these  perceptions  multiply.  It  associates 
itself  with  the  love  of  unity,  and  with  the  feeling  of 
satisfaction  which  follows  upon  the  discovery  of  uni- 
formity in  multiplicity;  and  by  this  association  assur- 
ance reaches  its  highest  power,  confirming  the  facul- 
ties of  perception  and  comparison  in  their  advances 
and  impelling  them  to  farther  steps.  These  feelings, 
it  is  then  admitted,  singly  and  combined,  become  in 
time  a  great  influence  behind  the  generalizing  powers 
of  the  mind,  and  play  an  important  part  in  scientific 


GENlSRAL     NATURE     OF      INTELLECTION.  219- 

ach/ancement.  Their  influence  however  is  not  invari- 
'dh]y  o'ocd.  It  becomes  in  cases  immoderate  and 
extravagant,  out  of  proportion  to  the  knowledge  of 
facts.  The  trust  in  the  uniformity  of  nature,  joining 
itself  to  the  love  of  unity  and  to  the  feeling  of  relief 
in  discovering  unity,  flatters  the  tiniteness  and  imper- 
fections of  the  mind  in  its  generalizations,  and  begets 
a  powerful  assurance  for  very  incomplete  inductions.' 
Judgments  are  received  with  full  confidence  as  gen- 
eral, which  are  far  from  l^eing  established  by  sufficient 
observations.  Often  men  hold  with  the  intensest  con- 
viction to  general  propositions  which  more  intelligent 
persons  know  to  be  false.  Professor  Bain  says  on  this 
point:  "The  respectable  name  'generalization,'  imply- 
ing the  best  products  of  enlightened  scientific 
research,  has  also  a  different  meaning,  expressing  one 
of  the  most  erroneous  impulses  and  crudest  deter- 
minations of  untutored  human  nature.  To  exteild 
some  familiar  and  narrow  experience,  so  as  to  compre- 
hend cases  the  most  distant,  is  a  piece  of  mere  reckless 
instinct,  demanding  the  severest  discipline  for  its  cor- 
rection." I 

A  third  emotion  which  excites  the  mind  to  gener- 
alization, and  which  agrees  with  the  two  preceding  in 
the  principles  of  operation  dwelt  upon,  is  Wonder. 
Sir  ^^^  Hamilton  says  of  it:  "This  feeHng,  though  it 
can  not,  as  some  have  held,  be  allowed  to  be  the  prin- 
cipal, far  less  the  only,  cause  of  philosophy,  is,  how- 
ever, a  powerful  auxiliary  to  speculation:  and,  though 
inadequate  to  account  for  the  existence  of  philosophy 
absolutely,  it  adequately  explains  the  preference  with 
which  certain  parts  of  philosophy  ha\'e  been  culti- 


(r;i   Emotions  and  Will.  pp.  539,  540. 


220  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

Abated,  and  the  order  in  which  philosophy  in  general 
has  been  developed. "^ 

With  these  chief  conditions,  —  the  nnity  of  the 
mind,  memory  and  association,  and  the  impelling 
feelings,  —  and  the  original  materials  supplied  in 
indissoluble  or  simple  phenomena,  sensations,  emo- 
tions, and  volitions,  all  the  work  of  the  human  intel- 
lect is  accomplished,  all  its  syntheses  are  formed,  with- 
out the  help  of  originative  association  and  regulative 
principles,  without  forms  of  thought  considered  as 
distinct  from  the  being  of  the  mind  and  distinct  in 
origin  from  the  "matter"  of  the  primary  affections  of 
mind,  or  as  existing  and  operative  between  the  'mat- 
ter" of  knowledge  and  the  unit}'  of  consciousness. 
Special  illustration  and  proof  of  these  and  the  other 
main  positions  taken  in  the  above  general  account  of 
the  intellect  will  be  given  in  the  chapters  on  its  sev- 
eral faculties  and  operations  immediately  to  follow, 
and  in  the  remaining  parts  of  the  work. 

The  faculties  or  functions  of  the  intellect  are  Per- 
ception, Imagination,  and  the  Logical  Faculty  or  the 
faculty  of  concepts,  judgments,  and  reasoning,  called 
also  the  facultv  of  Elaboration. 


(i)  Metaphysics,  p.    55. 


CHAPTER    II. 
PERCEPTION. 

Descending  from  the  consideration  of  the  general 
nature  of  intelligence  to  that  of  particular  faculties  and 
operations,  let  us  begin  with  Perception.  By  percep- 
tion is  meant  the  faculty,  and  the  action,  by  which  we 
form  our  notions  of  external  individual  realities  and 
the  external  world.  It  is  the  intellect  considered  as 
the  framer  of  these  notions.  The  sphere  of  percep- 
tion is  extensive,  but  definite.  It  is  to  be  understood 
as  including  not  only  our  notions  of  material  objects, 
but  also  our  notions  of  objects  possessing  both  mental 
and  material  properties,  as  animals,  men.  My  notion 
of  another  person  in  his  full  character  as  a  complex 
material  and  spiritual  being,  is  a  perception  proper. 
No  doubt  the  knowledge  of  the  two  classes  of  prop- 
erties involves  distinct  stages  of  knowledge;  the 
knowledge  of  the  corporeal  precedes  and  is  the 
medium  of  that  of  the  spiritual;  but  the  resulting  con- 
crete individual  notion  of  the  different  and  succes- 
sively cognized  properties,  is  rightly  called  a  percep- 
tion. The  term  sense-perception  is  often  used  to 
denote  a  large  part  and  the  whole  of  what  is  here 
called  perception;  but  this  compound  term  is  some- 
what objectionable,  because  the  first  part  of  it,  sense, 
recognizes  sensations  as  if  they  were  the  only  elements 
of  perceptions,  and  overlooks  all  other  elements. 
Sensations  certainly  hold  a  very  important  and  con- 
spicuous place  in  perceptions;  but  their  place  does 
not  warrant  us  in  distinctly  noticing  them,  and  in  leav- 

(  221  ) 


222  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

iv.g  Other  elements  as  distinctly  nnnoticecl.  Even  in 
the  perception  of  a  mere  material  object,  as  an  apple, 
or  a  stone,  there  is  an  important  element  which  sense 
does  not  supply.  That  element  is  the  idea  of  power. 
The  notion  of  every  material  object  includes  the  idea 
of  power;  for  we  only  know  such  an  object  as  an 
external  cause  and  resistance.  Now  this  important 
element  is  given,  not  by  sense,  but  by  our  volitional 
faculty.  The  muscular  sensations  are  indeed  very 
closely  associated  with  the  idea  of  power,  and  by  asso- 
ciation and  proportionate  variation  become  a  measure 
of  internal  volitional  exertion  and  of  external  resist- 
ance; but  this  idea  is  not  originally  involved  in  or 
given  with  these  sensations  as  a  constitutive  element; 
it  comes  from  the  will  alone.  Our  notions  of  the  sim- 
plest external  things  thus  involve  more  than  sensa- 
tions, and  can  not  with  entire  precision  be  called  sense- 
perceptions.  Into  our  notions  of  the  more  complex 
external  realities,  as  our  fellow  human  beings,  enter 
yet  other  elements.  The  full  notion  of  another  per- 
son holds  elements  contributed  by  sense,  will,  and  the 
emotions. 

We  shall  now  go  on  to  consider  the  properties  of 
the  elementary  materials  of  perceptions,  especially  of 
the  sense-elements,  sensations.  Sensations  are  the 
first  affections  of  consciousness,  and  by  their  contri- 
Initions  and  excitations  the  mind  proceeds  to  its  most 
advanced  and  comprehensive  inferences  and  views 
regarding  all  external  realities.  It  should  be  distinctly 
remarked,  however,  that  in  our  present  discussion  the 
elements  of  perceptions  and  perceptions  will  be  con- 
sidered simply  in  their  pure  character  as  subjective 
modes,  or  in  themselves;   their  relation  and  reference 


PI.RCnPTlON.  223 

to  extra-mental  objects,  of  which  they  are  the  repre- 
sentative notions,  being  left  for  the  most  part  without 
special  notice. 

I.  General  Nature  and  Classification  of  Sensations: 

Sensations  are  those  states  of  consciousness  which 
are  occasioned  in  the  main  by  the  action  of  external 
things,  and  generally  have  their  seat  in  distinct  organs. 
In  being  thus  excited  by  the  operation  of  external 
things  upon  particular  organs,  they  differ,  as  already 
said,  from  emotions,  which  are  mostly  subsequent  to 
and  dependent  upon  com.plex  cognitive  states  and 
processes,  and  are  not  distinctly  localized;  although 
particular  emotions  reveal  themselves  by  peculiar 
bodily  manifestations,  as  the  smile,  pursed  brows, 
tears.  In  short,  sensations  are  occasioned  by  the  con- 
dition of  the  physical  organ,  as  this  is  produced  by 
external  affection,  or  by  internal  change,  as  depletion, 
nourishment,  disease;  emotions  are  occasioned  by 
cognitions.  Sensations  and  emotions  agree  in  being 
both  pleasurable  and  painful;  although  some  of  both 
kinds  are  indifferent. 

There  are  two  main  classes  of  sensations.  First, 
sensations  of  Common  Sense  or  Sensus  Vagus,  includ- 
ing those  associated  with  the  digestive,  circulatory, 
and  respiratory  systems,  as  hunger,  thirst,  warmth, 
suffocation,  dull  pain,  those  having  their  seat  in  the 
muscular  tissue,  called  the  muscular  sensations,  and 
others.  These  are  mostly  deep-seated.  Secondly, 
sensations  of  the  Five  Senses,  —  smell,  taste,  hearing, 
touch,  sight.  These  are  peripheral,  and  the  most  dis- 
tinctly localized.  In  the  multiplicity,  \ariety,  and  dis- 
crimination of  its  sensations,  the  human  mind  is  a 
marvel. 


2  24  the;    principles    of    knowli;dge. 

2.  Sensations  are  Pure  Modes  of  Mind. 

I  have  already  had  occasion  to  announce  and 
emphasize  the  pure  mental  character  of  sensations.  I 
have  done  this  in  opposition  to  monists,  and  also  to 
certain  leading  dualists,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  his 
school.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says:  "Sensation  is  an 
affection  neither  of  the  body  alone  nor  of  the  mind 
alone,  but  of  the  composite  of  which  each  is  a  con- 
stituent; and  the  subject  of  Sensation  may  be  indiffer- 
ently said  to  be  in  our  organism  (as  animated)  or  in 
our  soul  (as  united  with  an  organism).  For  instance, 
hunger  or  colour  are,  as  apprehended,  neither  modes 
of  mind  apart  from  body,  nor  modes  of  body  apart 
from  mind."  i  According  to  this  statement,  sensa- 
tion is  as  really  and  fully  dependent  upon  the 
body  as  upon  the  mind.  It  is  not  simply  depen- 
dent upon  the  body  as  its  objective  occasion, 
while  deriving  its  entire  constitution  from  the  mind; 
but  derives  from  the  body  some  of  its  constitutive 
material.  This  view  issues,  as  I  have  before  remarked, 
in  the  negation  of  the  duality  of  human  nature  as  con- 
sisting of  mind  and  body.  For,  if  we  begin  by  mak- 
ing the  individual  sensation  an  affection  of  both  mind 
and  bpdy,  we  can  not  in  the  end  deny  that  mind  and 
body  are  but  one  entity.  In  affirming  unity  and  indi- 
viduality of  coexisting  mental  and  material  phenom- 
ena, we  have  no  ground  left  for  affirming  duality  of 
entities. 

Though  this  doctrine  of  composite  sensation,  when 
closely  considered,  is  found  to  negate  dualism,  yet  it 
has  been  upheld  by  these  philosophers  altogether  in 


(i)   Edition  of  Reid's  Works,  p.  884. 


PKRCEI'TION.  225 

the  supposed  interests  of  dualism.  Tliey  make  it  the 
corner-stone  of  dualism.  The  end  in  view  is  to  bring- 
the  properties  of  body  or  matter,  as  those  of  mind, 
within  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  and,  therefore,  of 
absolute  certainty;  and  entirely  out  of  the  sphere  of 
uncertainty,  probability  or  inference.  They  shut  out 
idealism  or  monism,  they  suppose,  by  giving  con- 
sciousness the  same  hold  upon  the  qualities  of  matter 
as  it  has  upon  the  qualities  of  mind,  and  the  full  power 
to  distinguish,  or  the  inability  to  confound,  the  two 
classes  of  qualities.  But  their  efil'ort  is  futile.  They 
effect  not  the  establishment,  but  only  the  confusion,  of 
dualism.  Their  fundamental  principle  obliterates  that 
most  important  line,  the  line  between  what  we  are 
conscious  of  and  what  we  are  not  conscious  of,  or 
between  what  we  know  immediately  and  what  we 
know  only  mediately.  We  are  not  conscious  of  any 
properties  of  matter.  To  attempt  to  introduce  such 
properties  into  consciousness  is  sheer  violence.  The 
child  and  the  savage  are  most  clearly  conscious  of  sen- 
sations, bu.t  are  altogether  ignorant  of  possessing  a 
brain,  or  ner\-e  ^^esicles,  fibers,  or  currents  —  those 
jihysical  elements  that  are  commonly  believed  to  be  in 
proximate  relation  to  mind.  The  same  is  the  case 
with  every  one,  until  he  has  learned,  in  a  roundabout 
way,  of  his  internal  physical  possessions.  Sir  W. 
jiamilton  and  his  followers  suppose  that  we  are  con- 
scious of  a  property  of  matter  in  sensation,  because  in 
sensation  we  are  conscious  of  extension.  They  hold, 
in  the  words  of  the  chief,  that  "in  the  consciousness  of 
sensations  relatively  localized,  and  reciprocally  exter- 
nal, wc  have  a  veritable  apprehension,  and,  conse- 
quently, an  immediate  perception  of  the  affected 
(15) 


226  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

organism,  as  extended,  divided,  figured,  etc."  i  We 
are  conscious,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  of  extension  in 
sensation;  but  it  is  not  the  extension  of  the  material 
organism,  it  is  the  extension  of  the  sensation  itself  as  a 
pure  mode  of  mind.  The  extension  of  the  material 
organism  we  are  not  conscious  of,  but  can  know  only 
mediately.  In  attributing  the  extension,  of  which  we 
are  conscious  in  sensation,  to  the  body,  these  phil- 
osophers separate,  not  merely  in  thought,  but  in  fact, 
the  properties  of  the  same  individual  sensation,  assign- 
ing one  property  to  the  mind  and  another  to  the  body. 
Their  action  is  quite  arbitrary.  They  pronounce 
against  the  express  deliverance  of  consciousness. 
Consciousness  reveals  in  the  same  individual  modes  of 
mind,  sensations,  extension  joined  with  the  other  con- 
stituent qualities;  and  what  consciousness  thus  gives 
as  joined  in  the  same  original  individual  mental  mode, 
must  not  be  put  asunder. 

(  Leading  monists  hold  that  sensation  is  not  a  pure 
mode  of  mind  considered  as  an  entity  distinct  from 
matter,  but  is  one  side  or  face  of  the  same  change  of 
which  the  molecular  motion  of  the  nervous  matter  is 
the  other  face.  Underlying  this  view  is  the  doctrine 
that  mind  and  matter  are  but  modes  of  the  same  "ulti- 
mate reality,"  or  constitute  a  "double-faced  unity"; 
which  fact  indicates  to  us  the  monistic  issue  of  the 
doctrine  of  composite  sensation  as  taught  by  the 
above-mentioned  dualists. 

That  sensation  and  nervous  action  are  but  -the 
inner  and  outer  aspects  of  the  same  change,  and  that 
mind  and  matter  are  sides  of  the  same  unitv,  is  held 
on  the  observed  correspondence  between  mental  and 


(i)   Edition  of  Rcid's  JJ'orks,  p.  884. 


PERCEPTION.  227 

nervous  changes.  Important  facts  showing  the  close 
relation  of  mental  and  physical  action  have  been 
always  open  to  common  observation;  as,  the  con- 
tem.poraneous  development  of  mi'id  and  body;  the 
physical  expression  of  feelings;  the  eftects  of  intoxi- 
cants, narcotics,  poisons,  and  impurities;  the  phe- 
nomena of  in.sanity.  In  later  times  this  relation  has 
been  unfolded  with  much  scientific  precision  and  thor- 
oughness, being  the  special  subject  of  the  "new 
psychology."  As  to  sensations,  much  light  has  been 
thrown  on  their  dependence  upon  the  condition  of  the 
nervous  structure  as  respects  exhaustion,  the  amount 
and  richness  of  the  nourishment  furnished  it  through 
the  blood,  and  so  forth.  There  is  enough  in  these 
facts  to  put  the  close  relation  and  correspondence 
between  sensation  and  nervous  change  beyond  ques- 
tion. But  there  is  not  enough  to  prove  that  sensation 
and  nervous  change  are  two  sides  of  the  same  identical 
event. 

As  to  this  question,  the  important  fact  must  be 
admitted,  that  we  are  conscious  of  sensations,  but  are 
not  in  the  least  conscious  of  nervous  changes  or  of  the 
nervous  elements;  that  sensations  are  within  con- 
sciousness, but  the  nervous  elements  and  their 
changes  without.  No  person  ever  cognized  imme- 
diately, or  straight  across,  any  part  or  change  of  the 
nervous  matter,  by  means  of  the  immediate  or  near 
relation  that  mind  is  generally  supposed  to  hold  to 
nervous  matter.  Every  person  is  clearly  conscious  of 
sensations;  but  discovers  that  he  possesses  nervous 
elements  as  the  conditions  of  sensations,  not  in  the 
sensations  themselves.  Init  mediately  by  them  and 
other  affections.  I  do  not,  for  instance,  immediatel) 
know  by  the  tactile  feelino-,  of  which  I  am  conscious 


2  28  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

in  the  point  of  my  finger,  that  there  are  nerves  and 
touch  corpuscles  there;  l)ut  can  know  them  only  by  a 
roundabout  knowledge,  or  mediately,  through  the 
assistance  of  the  eye  armed  with  a  microscope,  or  of 
the  testimony  of  another  observer,  or  of  reasoning 
from  post-mortem  observations  on  others;  and  their 
changes  I  can  know  only  less  directly  yet.  i  It  is 
therefore  unquestionable  that  the  nervous  elements 
and  changes  are  outside  of  consciousness. 

And  they  are  not  only  outside  of  consciousness,, 
but  outside  of.  or  existentially  separate  from,  mind. 
This  is  proved  by  the  marked  diiTercnce  between  the 
nervous  structure  and  molecular  motion;--,  as  these  are 
commonly  conceived,  and  conscious  sensations:  and 
also  by  the  marked  resemblance  between  the  nervous 
molecular  motions  and  the  molar  and  molecular 
motions  of  material  realities  which  are  clearly  cog- 
nized to  be  spatially  exterior  to  and  apart  from  the 
mind.  No  events  can  be  more  unlike  than  the  sup- 
posed motions  or  oscillations  of  nervous  molecules 
and  sensations.  This  is  true  as  respects  the  special 
quality,  and  also  the  spatial  extent  and  memory,  of 
sensations.  How  dissimilar  are  the  vivid  conscious- 
ness of  the  sensation  of  heat  and  molecular  vibra- 
tion! -     That  the  consciousness  of  the  spatial  exten- 


(i)  "Sensation."  says  Taine,  "is  perceived  directly,  com- 
pletely, and  at  once,  but  the  action  of  the  nervous  system  is 
proved  indirectly,  incompletely,  and  very  slowly."  {On  Intclli- 
scncc.  p.   loi.) 

(2)  Mr.  H.  Spencer,  while  distinctly  favoring  the  doctrine 
of  the  "twofold  aspect,"  yet  says:  "Can  we  then  think  of  the 
subjective  and  objective  activities  as  the  same?  Can  the  oscil- 
lation of  a  molecule  be  represented  in  consciousness  side  by 
side  with  a  nervous  shock,  and  the  two  be  recognized  as  one? 
No  efTort  enables  us  to  assimilate  them.     That  a  unit  of  feeling 


PERCEPTION'.  229 

sion  and  unity  of  sensation,  and  the  atomicity  of  ner- 
vous matter,  should  coexist  as  the  properties  of  the 
same  entity,  appears  whohy  impossible.  Equally 
impossible  appears  the  like  coexistence  of  the  memory 
and  association  of  sensations  with  the  atomicity  and 
constant  mutability  of  the  nervous  matter.  These 
important  differences  between  sensation  and  nervous 
structure  and  action  seem  positively  to  forbid  the 
theory  of  the  "twofold  aspect."  and  to  favor  dualism. 
They  forbid  the  marked  supremacy  often  given  by 
advocates  of  this  theory  to  the  "objective"  aspect,  by 
which  the  theory  comes  to  be  but  disguised  material- 
ism. They  certainly  forbid  the  supposition  based  on 
the  "continuity  of  faith."  or  on  any  mode  of  inference, 
that  sensation  is  a  derivation,  evolution,  or  transfor- 
mation from  nervous  molecular  motions.  They,  on 
the  contrary,  warrant  us  in  holding  that,  notwith- 
standing the  close  relation  and  remarkable  parallelism 
between  nervous  changes  and  sensations,  these  are  the 
qualities  of  different  entities;  or,  that  nervous  matter 
and  organization  contain  from  the  first  very  much 
more  than  mere  nervous  matter  and  organization,  i 
What  is  proved  by  the  great  dissimilarity  between 


has  nothing  in  common  with  a  unit  of  motion  becomes  more 
than  ever  manifest  when  we  bring  the  two  into  juxtaposition." 
(Psychology,  I.,  p.  158.)  The  difference  is  too  great  to  subsist 
in  a  "double-faced  unit." 

(t)  Some  hold  indeed  that  in  the  elements  of  matter  there 
are  elements  of  mind,  elements  or  beginnings  of  sensibility  or 
consciousness,  or,  in  the  words  of  Professor  Clifford,  "pieces 
of  mind-stuff"  (Lectures  and  Essays,  II.,  p.  83):  and  that  with 
the  organization  of  the  elements  of  matter  into  the  brain  there 
goes  a  corresponding  organization  of  the  elements  of  mind  into 
the  human  mind,  —  and  with  the  dissolution  of  brain,  a  corre- 
sponding dissolution   of  mind. 


230  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

the  molecular  motions  of  the  nervous  substance  and 
sensations    is    confirmed    by    the    great    similarity 
between  these  motions  and  the  motions  of  objects 
which  by  perception  we  know  to  be  external  to  and 
absolutely  severed  from  the  mind.     We  clearly  per- 
ceive many  objects  that  are  detached  from  our  organ- 
ism, that  often  neither  aflect  it  nor  are  afifected  by  it. 
The  elements  and  elemental  changes  of  the  nervous 
matter  are  as  much  like  those  of  some  of  these  objects, 
as  they  are  unlike  the  sensations  or  changes  of  the 
mind:    we  may  therefore  well  conclude  that  the  ner- 
vous matter  should  be  put  on  the  side  of  these  external 
objects,  aijd  apart  from  the  agent  of  sensations  or  the 
mind;  that,  though  the  nervous  matter  is  closer  to  the 
mind  than  they  are,  its  existential  separation  from  the 
mind  is  as  real  as  theirs.     So  long  as  we  perceive  sen- 
sate  and  insensate  objects  that  are  clearly  severed  from 
our  mind  and  organism,  and  from  one  another,  so 
long  at  least  may  we  hold  that  the  nervous  matter  is 
an  entity  different  from  the  mind  or  subject  of  sensa- 
tions, and  is  not  only  a  mode,  face,  or  part  below  con- 
sciousness, of  the  same  entity. 

The  two  views  (t)  that  sensations  are  complex 
modes,  as  being  modes  of  both  body  and  mind,  and 
(2)  that  they  are  sides  or  faces  of  double-faced  unities, 
seem  therefore  both  alike  to  be  unwarrantable  assump- 
tions.    Sensations  are  neither  the  individual  modes  of 
two  entities,  nor  parts  or  sides  of  the  modes  of  one 
entity.     The  two  entities  do  not  share  in  the  same 
individual  modes;    and  the  one  entity  can  not  have 
modes  of  such  extremely  unlike  faces.     The  former 
view  can  end  only  in  the  identification  of  mind  and 
matter;    the  latter  preserves  a  semblance  of  duality, 
which,  however,  is  onlv  an  illusion,  a  mere  shadow  of 


PERCEPTION.  231 

the  real  duality  of  being.  Sensations  are  pure  modes 
of  mind,  holding  in  their  composition  no  elements 
from  matter.  The  properties  of  matter  are  outside 
and  existentially  separate  from  them.  Sensations  are 
bright  subjective  appearances,  and  as  such  are  cog- 
nized by  all;  their  supposed  objective  aspects  have 
never  been  directly  cognized  by  any  one.  Sensations 
are  cognized  immediately  in  their  integrity.  We 
have,  no  doubt,  good  grounds  for  inferring  physical 
changes  corresponding  to  sensations;  but  these 
changes  must  be  held  to  be  existentially  different  from 
sensations,  because  they  are  so  unlike  sensations,  and 
so  hke  changes  of  things  well  known  to  be  spatially 
apart  and  detached  from  mind.  Dualism  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  pure  subjectivity  of  sensations  have 
not  yet  been  logically  displaced  by  monism,  double- 
faced  or  simple. 

Idealistic  monists  suppose  that  they  largely  escape 
the  troubles  and  the  controversy  regarding  the  rela- 
tion of  sensation  to  nervous  matter,  by  their  doctrine 
that  only  mind  is  known  immediately;  that  all 
so-called  matter  can  be  known  only  mediately 
through  the  modes  of  the  mind;  that  physical  facts 
exist  for  our  intelligence,  and  apart  from  our  intelli- 
gence would  be  as  if  they  did  not  exist,  or  be  really 
without  existence;  that  matter  is  but  the  idea  and 
composition  of  the  mind,  i     According  to  this  doc- 


(i)  "Here  now  we  see  why  it  is  all  but  indififerent  whether 
we  speak  of  a  mental  or  physical  organization,  and  therefore 
we  might  so  often  use  the  neutral  expression;  for  every  physical 
organization,  even  if  I  can  demonstrate  it  under  the  microscope 
or  with  the  knife,  is  still  only  my  idea,  and  can  not  differ  in  its 
nature  from  what  T  call  mental."  (Lange,  Hist.  Materialism, 
Thomas  tr.,  III.,  p.  205.) 


232  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

trine,  mind  has  the  same  supremacy  over  matter  thai 
materiaHsts  give  to  matter  over  mind;'  matter  can 
not  1^e  independent  of  or  coordinate  with  mind,  or 
materia]  actions  with  mental  actions,  and  most  cer- 
tainly mind  can  not  be  a  derivative  from  the  material 
motions  and  groupings,  —  can  not  he  a  face,  or  a 
coordinate,  or  derivative,  of  its  own  ideal  formation. 2 
As  to  the  facts  that  the  mental  phenomena  are 
immediately  known,  that  all  material  realities  and 
events  can  be  known  only  mediately  by  them,  that  all 
percepts,  as  to  elements  and  composition,  are  of  the 
mind,  are  as  purely  subjective  as  any  phenomena  what- 
ever, that  the  knowledge  of  mind  and  its  modes,  as  it 
is  the  most  direct,  is  the  most  certain  of  all  knowledge, 
we  have,  as  has  l^ecome  plain  from  what  has  been 
already  said,  no  controversy  with  the  idealists.  These 
facts  we  fully  admit.  But  to  admit  them  does  not 
imply  the  admission  of  idealistic  monism,  or  the  doc- 
trine that  sensations  have  no  independent  and  purely 


(i)  "To  the  assertion  that  thought  is  a  modification  of 
matter  we  may  always,  with  equal  right,  oppose  the  contrary 
assertion  that  all  matter  is  merely  the  modification  of  the 
knowing  subject,  as  its  idea."  "The  whole  world  exists  only 
in  and  for  l<nowledge,  and  without  it  is  not  even  thinkable." 
(Schopenhauer,  The  World  as  11 'ill  and  Idea,  Haldane  and  Kemp 
trs.,  I.,  pp.  35  and  38.) 

(2)  "If  the  unity  of  intelligent  consciousness  be  the  'other 
side'  of  the  succession  of  tremors,  it  is  certainly  not  its  product, 
nor  that  of  the  force  by  which  this  succession  is  explained,  but 
the  prills  or  presupposition  of  their  existence,  as  an  existence 
for  us;  in  short,  while  every  other  'many-in-one'  is  a  many-in- 
one  for  consciousness,  consciousness  is  a  many-in-one  for  itself, 
which  can  not  logically  be  derived  from  those  combinations  of 
phenomeKa  which,  alike  as  phenomena  and  as  combined,  only 
exist  for  it."  (Green's  Philosophical  Works,  p.  445.  See  pp. 
466,  467.) 


PERCEPTIOX.  233 

objective  excitants.  It  is  a  fundamental  fact  of 
knowledge  (though  a  fact  at  present  very  far  from 
receiving  just  recognition),  that  pure  modes  of  mind 
may  represent,  and  may  Ije  known  to  represent, 
things  distinct  and  absolutely  severed  from  them- 
selves; that  even  the  same  mental  mode  may  give  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  itself  and  a  mediate  knowl- 
edge  of  something  different  and  apart  from  itself,  and 
that  a  sufficiently  clear  demarkation  can  be  made 
l)etween  what  is  thus  given  immediately  and 
mediately.  The  clear  percepts  and  ideas  thus  acquired 
of  realities  outside  of  mind  stand  as  firmly  against 
idealistic  monism  as  against  the  theory  of  the  "two- 
fold aspect."  Each  of  these  theories  has  to  this  time 
altogether  failed  to  interpret  these  percepts  and  ideas 
into  consistency  with  itself:  and  for  this  reason,  in 
part,  has  failed  to  overthrow  the  dualism  that  they 
appear  to  sustain.  Further  consideration  of  the  fact 
of  representative  knowledge  just  referred  to,  which  is 
the  main  principle  of  the  perception  of  the  external, 
must  be  postponed  until  we  come  to  that  part  of  this 
work  devoted  especially  to  it. 

As  we  contended  against  the  theory  of  composite 
sensation,  and  that  of  the  "twofold  aspect,"  on  behalf 
of  the  pure  subjectivity  of  integ'ral  sensations,  so  we 
thus  likewise  contend  against  idealism,  on  behalf  of 
the  pure  subiectivity  of  sensations  coexistent  with  the 
pure  objectivity  of  realities  that  excite  them,  but 
admitting  that  objective  activities  are  closely  related 
to,  are  the  conditions  of,  the  subjective  sensations. 
Sensation,  though  ]-)urely  subjective,  has  not  that 
supremacy  over  the  associated  physical  action  wliich 
idealism  claims,  just  as  the  physical  action  has  not 


234  '^^^      PRINCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

that  supremacy  over  sensation  claimed  for  it  by  mater- 
ialism; but  the  mental  and  physical  actions  are  dis- 
tinct as  operations  of  different  entities. 

3.   The  Qualities  of  Sensations. 

Sensations  are  individual,  or  existentially  simple; 
but  they  have  properties  or  characteristics  \\hich  are 
clearly  discriminated.  The  chief  of  these  character- 
istics are  Special  Quality,  Pleasure  and  Pain,  Time  or 
Duration,  and  in  many  cases  Spatial  Extension. 

{a)  As  to  Special  Quality,  there  are  marked  differ- 
ences among  the  sensations.  Tastes,  touches,  colors, 
feelings  of  muscle,  are  clearly  unlike.  These  differ- 
ences are  primary,  and  can  not  be  made  plainer  than 
thev  are  to  every  one's  consciousness  from  the  first. 
Their  diverse  conditions  in  the  mind  may  be  contem- 
poraneous with  the  origin  of  the  mind. 

(h)  Of  Time  it  is  common  to  enumerate  Dura- 
tion, Succession,  and  Simultaneity,  as  three  modes. 
All  these  modes  are  revealed  by  sensations.  But  time 
is  a  universal  quality  of  the  mental  states.  Other 
states  possess  it  as  really  as  sensations.  The  latter 
are  peculiar  only  in  the  great  distinctness,  and  in  the 
frequency  and  prominence  in  intellection,  of  their  time 
modes. 

When  a  sensation  or  any  state  of  mind  continues 
unbroken,  v^'e  are  cognizant  of  its  duration.  This  is  a 
simple  foundation  fact  of  mind.  When  a  sensation  is 
broken  and  repeated,  or  when  different  kinds  of  sen- 
sations follow  one  another,  at  long  or  short  intervals, 
we  are  cognizant  of  a  temporal  series  or  of  succession. 
When  different  sensations  run  in  parallel  lines,  with- 
out break,  or  with  equal  breaks,  we  are  cognizant  of 
simultaneity. 


PERCEFTION.  235 

Duration  or  Time  is  a  property  of  sensations  them- 
selves, and  of  all  other  mental  affections.  It  is  not  a 
mere  form  originating  in  a  different  source  in  the 
mind,  which  is  imposed  upon  the  special  quality  of 
sensations,  or  receives  the  special  sensations,  tastes, 
sounds,  colors,  into  itself;  but  originates  with  the  sen- 
sations, from  the  same  source,  and  is  inseparable  from 
them.  From  the  real  duration  of  sensations  and  of 
our  other  affections,  the  intellect  forms,  by  composi- 
tion, conceptions  of  duration  many  times  longer  than 
our  personal  experience.  The  intellect  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  time,  if  it  were  not  for  the  real 
times  of  sensations  and  the  other  primary  modes  of 
mind.  These  are  the,  so  to  speak,  elementary  times 
of  cognition. 

The  duration  of  the  mind  itself  is  the  a  priori  con- 
dition of  the  duration  of  sensations.  Duration  being 
a  property  of  the  mind  itself  is  necessarily  a  property 
of  its  faculties  and  of  their  special  modes  or  produc- 
tions. The  doctrine  that  duration  is  a  form  of  sense, 
originating  in  the  mind,  or  existing  in  the  mind  as  a 
precondition  of  actual  sensation  or  experience,  but  yet 
not  a  property  of  the  mind  in  itself,  —  belonging  only 
to  the  mind's  thinking  and  not  to  the  mind's  being,  — 
is,  as  before  observed,  one  of  the  results  of  the  Kantian 
dissection;  l:)ut  seems  to  be  a  thoroughly  arbitrary 
and  unintelligible  supposition.  There  is,  indeed, 
much  regarding  time  which  we  can  not  understand; 
we  are  altogether  unable  to  conceive  its  beginning  or 
its  end;  the  perception  and  measurement  by  the  mind 
of  its  own  duration,  the  embrace  of  the  past  and 
present  of  a  sensation  in  a  unitary  cognition,  is  a  fact 
of  knowledge  standing  coordinate  in  its  simpHcity  and 
inexpHcability  with  the  fact  of  self-consciousness;  but 


236  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

for  all  this,  there  is  no  sufilcient  ground  for  consider- 
ing duration  as  something  apart  from  the  substance 
of  the  mind,  or  from  the  mind  in  itself,  or  to  suppose 
that  the  mind  holds  within  itself  the  form  of  time,  but 
is  yet  in  its  own  being  timeless. 

A  sensation  is  known  as  endurinsr,  or  as  being 
successively  l)roken  and  renewed,  on  the  primary  con- 
dition that  the  mind,  or  what  amounts  to  the  same 
thing,  the  faculty  which  produces  the  sensation  in  its 
special  quality,  possesses  duration.  Duration  is  the 
a  priori  property  of  the  faculty,  or  belongs  to  it  before 
sensation  or  consciousness  begins.  When,  therefore, 
any  faculty  or  sense  produces  a  sensation,  it  imparts 
to  the  sensation  duration.  The  sensation  is  a  mode  of 
the  faculty,  and  possesses  and  reveals  the  duration  of 
the  faculty  of  which  it  is  a  mode.  If  the  sensation  be 
interrupted  and  renewed,  the  succession  of  the  inter- 
ruptions and  renewals  is  known  by  the  unbroken  dura- 
tion of  the  faculty  successively  producing  the  sensa- 
tion. The  permanency  of  the  mental  substance  is 
then,  as  we  have  before  argued,  the  precondition  in  a 
manner  which  will  n.ever  probably  be  understood,  of 
our  knowledge  of  the  duration  and  succession  of  sen- 
sations and  all  mental  affections.  The  duration  of  a 
sensation,  however,  is  its  own  inseparable  quality. 
Duration  is  not  something  phenomenal  or  real  con- 
tributed or  conveyed  to  it  from  some  source  in  the 
mind  different  from  its  own,  but  is  combined  with  it  in 
indivisil")le  origination  and  existence. 

Our  original  and  primary  knowledge  of  time  and 
our  standard  of  the  measurement  of  time  are  derived 
from  the  sensations  and  other  modes  of  the  mind. 
Although  time  is  a  quality  of  all  realities,  subjective 
and  objective,  yet  our  first  and  m.ost  immediate  know!- 


PERCEPTION.  237 

edge  of  it  is  as  an  attribute  of  the  mind  and  its  affec- 
tions. Locke  remarlcs  on  this:  "It  is  evident  to  any 
one  who  will  but  ol^serve  what  passes  in  his  own  mind, 
that  there  is  a  train  of  ideas  which  constantly  succeed 
one  another  in  his  understanding,  as  long  as  he  is 
awake.  Reflection  on  these  appearances  of  several 
ideas,  one  after  another,  in  our  minds,  is  that  which 
furnishes  us  with  the  idea  of  succession;  and  the  dis- 
tance between  any  parts  of  that  succession,  or  between 
the  appearance  of  any  two  ideas  in  our  minds,  is  that 
we  call  duration."  ^  Having  acquired  the  idea  of  time 
originally  in  this  manner,  we  can  mediately  apprehend 
the  time  of  extra-mental  things. 

It  is  a  question  whether  the  mind  can  measure  the 
time  interval  between  two  sensations  or  mental  states, 
without  having  the  interval  filled  up  with  other  states 
connecting  them;  in  other  words,  whether  the  cessa- 
tion of  all  mental  activity  between  two  sensations  an 
hour  apart  would  make  the  perception  of  the  time 
between  them  impossible.  If  it  should,  this  would 
seem  to  establish  the  doctrine  that  the  mind  is  always 
active.  It  is,  however,  conceivable  that  the  mind  may 
learn  to  measure  intervals  v^-hich  were  not  filled  with 
thoughts,  by  intervals  which  were;  making  the  meas- 
urement by  means  of  th.e  comparative  vividness  and 
distinctness  of  the  remembered  or  remote  terms. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  sensations  reveal  not 
only  duration,  l)ut  real  or  absolute  duration;  or,  in 
other  words,  furnish  an  absolute  unit  or  measure  of 
time.  This  point  it  is  especially  necessary  to  consider, 
owing  to  the  confusion  introduced  into  the  science  of 
perception  by  forms  of  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 


(i)  Essay.  II.,  xiv.  3. 


238  THE     PRINCIPLES     OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

knowledge.  It  is  held  by  some  that  sensations  give 
only  relative  knowledge  of  time,  or  comparative  dura- 
tion, but  not  real  duration.  This  appears  to  be  a  cap- 
ital error.  True,  sensations  do  afford  the  notion  of 
relative  time  —  i.  e.,  one  sensation  is  known  by  com- 
parison as  longer  or  shorter  than  another,  or  equal 
to  it.  But  sensations  may  be  known  and  are  known 
in  their  real  or  absolute  duration.  Even  if  a  sensa- 
tion, as  was  remarked  in  a  preceding  chapter,  is 
known  or  distinguished  in  consciousness  only  by  com- 
parison with  another  or  others,  and  therefore  its  dura- 
tion, like  every  other  attribute,  is  known  only  by  com- 
parison with  that  of  another  or  others,  yet  this  rela- 
tive knowledge  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  and 
the  fact  of  the  knowledge  of  its  real  duration.  With 
the  notion  of  longer,  shorter,  and  equal  duration, 
gained  in  comparison,  there  is  simultaneously  gained 
also  the  notion  of  the  real  duration  of  a  sensation. 
The  cognition  of  comparative  length  does  not  con- 
tradict, interfere  with,  or  exclude,  the  cognition  of  real 
length. 

We  do  not  forget  here  the  fact  that  the  mind  varies 
to  some  extent  in  its  estimates  of  the  experiences  of 
the  same  duration;  that,  for  example,  a  pleasant  series 
of  sensations  often  seems  shorter  than  an  unpleasant 
one  of  the  same  real  duration.  But  the  mind  can  cor- 
rect and  unify  its  time  estimates  by  means  of  its  own 
ordinary  experiences.  It  calls  to  its  aid  various  instru- 
ments, as  the  hour-glass  and  the  clock;  which  means 
that  it  calls  in  its  space  measurements  to  help  it  in  its 
time  measurements;  and  we  do  attain  to  the  uniform 
measurement  of  time.  However,  it  always  remains 
true  that  the  perception  of  the  duration  and  of  the  real 


PliRCEPTlON.  239 

duration  of  the  subjective  states  is  a  primary  condition 
of  the  use  and  worth  of  every  external  aid  or  instru- 
ment, from  the  crduest  to  the  most  perfect.  The 
unaided  sense  is  remarkably  acute  with  many  persons 
in  time  discriminations.  It  can  distinguish  between 
the  times  of  the  right  and  left  swings  of  the  pendulum. 
of  a  clock  not  standing  plumb,  when  the  ticks  differ  by 
only  one-thirtieth  of  a  second.  Astronomers  divide 
seconds  accurately  into  tenths. 

(c)  Let  us  pass  to  consider  the  Extension  and 
Place  of  sensations.  Extension,  spatial  extension,  is 
an  attribute  of  sensations;  but  it  can  hardly  be  called 
a  universal  attribute ;  at  any  rate  there  are  great  differ- 
ences among  the  senses  in  definiteness  of  estimation. 
The  sensations  of  touch  and  sight  surpass  all  others, 
revealing  precise  and  distinct  spatial  dimension.  Sen- 
sations of  the  other  special  senses  and  of  the  organic 
sensibility  reveal  nt  best  only  very  indefinite  spatial 
diffusion  and  limitation.  One  ground  of  this  diversity 
in  regard  to  extension  is,  doubtless,  a  difference  in  the 
physical  conditions  of  sensations.  The  visual  and 
tactual  senses  are  gifted  with  very  remarkable  nervous 
plexus  and  expanses,  which  would  seem  to  favor  more 
definite  diffusion  and  discrimination  than  are  found 
in  the  other  senses. 

But  though  extension,  at  least  precise  extension, 
is  a  less  universal  quality  of  sensations  than  duration, 
it  is  as  real  a  quality.  The  extension  revealed  by  a 
tactual  sensation,  as  when  a  silver  coin  is  laid  or 
])ressed  in  the  palm  of  the  hand,  or  the  extension  of  a 
color,  is  a  real  quality  of  the  sensation,  inseparable 
from  it  in  origin  and  existence,  though  in  a  manner 
separable  by  abstraction.  It  is  no  addition  or  append- 
age to  the  sensation,  comino:  from  some  other  source, 


240  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

or  power,  or  j^lace  in  the  mind  or  out  of  it,  but  is  an 
attribute  of  the  sensation.  It  is  not  a  form  that  is 
imposed  upon  the  (luah'ty  or  matter  of  the  sensation, 
but  is  associated. with,  and  is  a  real  quality  of  the  mat- 
ter, from  the  first.  Proof  of  this  is  the  testimony  of 
consciousness.  We  are  conscious  of  the  sensation 
and  its  extension  in  union;  we  are  never  conscious  of 
them  in  separation;  and  there  is  no  reason  for  holding 
them  as  being  ever  j.part. 

Probably  many  who  would  grant  that  duration  is 
an  original  attribute  of  sensations,  would  deny  that  ex- 
tension is.  Psychologists  generally  have  assumed  an 
important  difference  between  the  relation  of  duration 
and  the  relation  of  extension  to  the  mental  affections. 
It  has  been  held  a]Dparently  by  many  that  duration  is 
revealed  primarily  and  immediately  only  by  the  pure 
subjective  modes,  but  extension  certainly  not.  Dura- 
tion is  referred  to  the  internal  sense,  extension  to  the 
external.  "Time."'  says  Kant,  "is  nothing  else  than 
the  form  of  internal  sense  —  that  is,  of  the  perception 
of  ourself  and  our  internal  state.  For  time  can  not  be 
a  determination  of  external  phenomena."  ^  "Space  is 
nothing  else  than  only  the  form  of  all  phenomena  of 
external  sense  -—  that  is,  the  subjective  condition  of 
sensibilitv,  under  which  alone  external  perception  is 
possible  to  us."'  2  But  as  according  to  Kant's  princi- 
ples, and  in  reality,  Ijoth  the  external  and  the  internal 
sense,  both  outw'ard  and  inward  phenomena,  are  in 
their  whole  contents  and  form  purely  internal  or  sub- 
jective in  place  and  origin,  duration  must  be  a  cjualit}' 
of  so-called  outward  phenomena,  and  extension  of 
inward.      Kant  himself  savs;    "Time  is  the  formal  con- 


(Tj   Kritik  d.  r.   ]'.,  p.  6;.  (2)   lb.,   p.   61. 


PKRCEI-TIOX.  241 

dition  (7  pi  iori  of  all  phenomena  whatsoever.  Space, 
the  pure  form  of  all  external  perception,  is  limited  as 
an  a  priori  condition  merely  to  external  phenomena. 
But  since  all  representations,  whether  they  have  exter- 
nal things  as  objects  or  not,  still  belong  in  themselves, 
as  determinations  of  the  mind,  to  the  internal  state, 
and  since  the  internal  state  itself  comes  under  the 
formal  condition  of  internal  perception,  /.  r.,  time,  it 
follows  that  time  is  a  condition  a  priori  of  every  phe- 
nomenon. It  is  the  immediate  condition  of  internal 
phenomena  (our  soulsj  and  thereby  also  the  mediate 
condition  of  external  phenomena. "^  But  if  the  real 
subjectivity  of  both  "internal"  and  ''external"  phe- 
nomena in  themselves  makes  time  the  forni  of  "all 
phenomena  whatsoever,"  including  the  "external,"  it 
also  as  certainly  makes  spatial  extension  the  form  of 
internal  phenomena,  so  far  as  those  internal  phe- 
nomena which  reveal  it  are  concerned.  All  phe- 
nomena, "outward"  and  "inward,"  being  in  theii 
nature  purely  subjective  or  mental,  not  duration  only, 
but  both  dvu\ation  and  spatial  extension  in  equal  real- 
ity, are  subjective  or  mental  qualities.  No  adequate 
argument  can  be  produced  to  show  that  extension  is 
less  a  real  and  original  attribute  of  sensations  than 
duration.  The  cognition  01  the  extension  of  a  visual 
or  tactual  sensation  is  surely  as  immediate,  clear,  and 
certain,  as  that  of  the  duration.  It  is  even  more  so, 
for  in  a  single  moment  we  are  conscious  of  the  whole 
extension  of  at  least  small  sensations;   but  the  past  of 


(i)  lb.,  p.  67.  'Time,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  closely  fol- 
lowing Kant,  "is  a  notion  even  more  universal  than  space,  for 
while  we  exempt  from  occupying  space  the  energies  of  mind, 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  these  as  not  occupying  time."  (Meta- 
physics, p.  528.) 

(16) 


242  THE      PRINCIPI^KS      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

a  sensation  we  can  not  be  said  to  be  conscious  of,  but 
to  know  only  representatively.  Kant,  however,  on 
the  contrary,  gives  great  superiority  to  the  idea  of 
time  over  that  of  extension,  even  making  it  in 
instances,  apparently,  the  condition,  basis,  or  original, 
of  the  idea  of  extension. 

But  if  duration  and  extension  are  both  attributes 
of  sensations,  they  differ  greatly  as  attributes.  Dura- 
tion is  not  a  constituent  quality  of  sensations,  like 
•extension.  It  adds  nothing  to  the  sensation;  it  forms 
no  real  element  of  it.  Duration  is  nothing  but  the 
continuance  of  the  sensation,  contributing  no  element 
to  its  being  or  inner  nature.  Extensioii,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  a  constituent  quality  of  the  sensation.  With- 
out it  the  sensation  could  not  be  what  it  is  at  any 
moment. 

The  tactual  and  visual  sensations,  as  wss  above 
o1:)served,  reveal  spatial  extension  and  m.easurements 
most  distinctly.  Some  who  deny  that  extension  is  an 
original  equality  of  sensations,  make  a  special  point  cf 
color  and  extension;  holding  that  while  color  always 
appears  extended,  and  can  not  be  thought  apart  from 
extension,  this  is  the  result  of  an  acquired  association. 
Our  inability  to  separate  color  and  extension  is 
unquestionable.  It  is  true  that  we  may  be  more 
intent  at  one  time  upon  the  color,  at  another  upon  the 
extension:  but  there  is  no  real  separation  in  thought 
of  color  from  extension.  And  that  color  and  exten- 
sion were  ever  separate  in  l)eing  and  thought  is  a  sur- 
mise which  does  not  appear  to  have  a  glimmer  of  evi- 
dence. As  far  as  there  is  evidence,  the  connection 
between  color  and  extension  in  present  thought  is  but 
the  expression  or  continuation  of  an  original  union 


PERCEFTION.  243 

between  them.  That  color  is  associated  with  the 
notion  of  distance  out,  is,  we  may  suppose,  the  result 
of  successive  experiences,  but  that  it  is  associated  with 
superficial  extension  is  an  original,  unacquired  con- 
nection. Color  was  never  separate  from  extension, 
and  therefore  was  never  welded  to  it  by  association. 
Color  itself  is  extended.  Extension  is  its  original 
constituent  property,  i 

The  primary  condition  of  the  extension  of  sensa- 
tions is  the  extension  of  the  mind  itself.  The  mind 
can  not,  with  reason,  be  regarded  as,  in  its  own  being. 
extensionless,  and  yet  as  containing  within  itself 
extension  or  space  as  a  mere  (7  priori  form  of  its 
thought.  Rather,  extension  can  be  and  is  a  form  or 
condition  of  thought  or  sensation,  because  extension 
is  an  original  property  of  the  mind's  being  or  sub- 
stance. On  the  view  that  extension  is  a  property  of 
the  mind's  substance,  it  is  intelligible  that  extension 
should  be  an  a  priori  condition  of  perception;  but 
apart  from  this  view,  the  assumption  of  such  an  a 
priori,  innate  condition  must  always  appear  arbitrary. 
The  doctrine  of  Berkeley  and  others  that  extension  is 
in  the  mind  as  "idea"  only,  and  not  as  "attribute,"  is 
thoroughly  pedantic  and  mystical.  It  has  never  been 
shown  that  there  is  any  more  difficulty  for  us  in  the 
mind's  being  extended  than  in  the  mind's  thinking 
extension. 

The  separation  of  either  duration  or  extension,  or 
both,  from  the  special  cjuality  or  matter  of  sensation. 


(i)  Some  valuable  remarks  on  the  association  of  color  and 
extension  are  made  by  Stumpf,  Urspntng  der  Rauiin'orstclliiiig. 
p.   108  et  seq. 


244  '^^^      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

as  forms  or  content,  having  a  very  different  origin 
from  that  of  the  matter,  and  as  essentiallv  distinct 
from  it,  is  entirely  untrue  to  the  facts  of  mind.  The 
further  analysis  which  ascribes  these  forms  to  the 
mind's  thought  and  denies  them  to  the  mind's  being, 
is  but  a  rude  divorcement  of  the  modes  of  the  mind 
from  the  mind  itself.  A  singular  and  stubborn  delu- 
sion of  modern  psychology  is  the  supposition  that  the 
notion  of  extension  must  be  accounted  for  at  all 
hazards  in  some  other  way  than  as  being  an  original,, 
constitutive  property  of  sensation  itself,  and  of  sensa- 
tion as  expressing  in  this  particular  a  property  of  real 
mind. 

The  very  decided  opposition  of  many  to  the  doc- 
trine that  sensations  are  in  themselves  extended,  and 
have  the  basis  of  their  extension  in  the  extension  of  the 
mind,  arises  from  various  grounds;  as,  the  supposed 
difficulties  presented  by  the  structure  and  action  of 
the  nervous  organism,  and  others.  It  is  believed,  on 
facts  pertaining  to  the  structure  and  action  of  the  ner- 
vous organism,  that  the  mind  is  seated  only  in  the 
brain  or  the  internal  nervous  masses,  and  that  there- 
fore sensation,  sensibility,  or  consciousness  occurs 
onlv  in  the  brain;  that  there  is  no  sensibility  in  the 
nervous  expanses  of  the  external  sense  organs,  but 
that  the  irritation  of  these  expanses  is  conveyed  to  the 
p-anelia  of  the  brain  and  there  excites  sensation;  that 
the  extended  irritation  of  these  expanses,  in  penetrat- 
ing to  the  brain,  loses,  so  to  speak,  its  extension, 
or  converges  to  excite  unextended  sensations.  It  is 
held  that  out  of  unextended  sensations  excited  in  this 
manner  the  unextended  mind  constructs  the  notion  of 


PE;Rcii:pTioN.  245 

extended  sensation,  or.  on  occasion  of  the  stimula- 
tion, creates  and  supplies  the  notion  of  extension,  i 
We  must  grant  it  hardly  admits  of  question  that 
the  mind  is  chiefly  concentrated  within  the  brain,  and 
that  its  chief  synthetic  and  highest  operations  are  car- 
ried on  with  the  instrumentality  of  the  brain.  It  is 
probable  even  that  without  the  cooperation  of  the 
mind  in  the  brain  there  can  be  no  consciousness  and 
no  knowledge  at  all,  no  sensation  most  indefinite  as  to 
quality,  duration,  and  place,  at  any  extremity.  Sen- 
sations distinct  as  to  these  properties  appear  to 
require  the  operation  of  the  brain,  and  of  the  mind  in 
this  "general  center  of  nervous  connections"  from 
whence  it  may  hold  relations  best  with  all  points  of  the 
body,  and  where  if  exercises  in  full  its  powers  of  com- 
parison, discrimination,  and  synthesis;  —  which  facts, 
however,  do  not  disallow  the  diftusion  and  continuity 
of  the  sensitive  agent  in  the  external  sense  organs  and 
expansions,   and  the   immediate   experience   or  con- 


(i)  "All  those  geometrical  relations  which  exist  among 
the  sense-stimuli  and  among  the  nervous  excitations  they  occa- 
sion must  completely  disappear  in  the  moment  when  they  pass 
over  into  the  soul ;  for  in  its  point  of  unity  there  is  no  room 
for  their  expansion.  ...  In  the  unity  of  consciousness  these 
spatial  divisions  no  more  exist  than  the  rays  of  light  which 
fall  from  various  points  on  a  converging  lens  continue  to  exist 
side  by  side  in  the  focal  points  at  which  they  intersect.  .  .  . 
The  single  impressions  exist  together  in  the  soul  in  a  com- 
pletely non-spatial  way  and  are  distinguished  simply  by  their 
qualitative  content,  just  as  the  simultaneous  notes  of  a  chord 
are  heard  apart  from  one  another,  and  yet  not  side  by  side  with 
one  another,  in  space.  From  this  non-spatial  material  the  soul 
has  to  re-create  entirely  afresh  the  spatial  image  that  has  dis- 
appeared/' (Lotze,  Metaphysic,  pp.  484,  485.  See  H.  Spencer's 
Psychology.  I.,  p.  2^:  and  Hartmann's  Philosophy  of  the  Vncon- 
sciotis.  I.,  p.  2?>S-^ 


246  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

sciousness  in  them  of  simple  affections  of  extended 
sense,  i  The  relations  of  the  mind  to  the  centers  of 
the  brain,  or  of  mental  changes  to  the  molecular 
changes  of  these  centers,  are  not  known  so  well,  or  in 
such  a  manner,  as  that  they  are  known  to  exclude  the 
possibility  of  the  presence  of  the  mind  in  the  outer 
nervous  extremities.  If  mind  may  dwell  in  the  cells 
of  the  brain,  or  if  it  may  be  in  immediate  relation  to 
the  currents  along  the  brain  fibers,  why  may  it  not  be 
also  in  immediate  relation  to  the  outer  ends  and 
masses  of  the  same  fibers  and  the  same  matter? 

Let  us  descend  to  particulars.  As  to  the  retina 
and  ocular  sensibility,  it  is  held  that  the  sensitive  prin- 
ciple can  not  be  present  and  diffused  in  the  retina,  for 
the  reason  that  when  the  optic  nerve  is  cut  blindness 
follows,  the  retina  though  sound  and  perfect  gives  no 
sign  of  sensibility;  and  besides,  when  the  stump  of  the 
interior  portion  of  the  nerve  is  irritated,  flashes  of 
light  are  experienced.  It  is  further  said,  and  truly, 
that  when  the  retina  or  the  eye  has  been  extirpated, 
flashes  of  light,  and  even  more  definite  and  regular 
sensations,  are  experienced  on  irritation  of  the  optic 
nerve;  and  the  inference  is  drawn  therefrom  that  the 
centers  of  the  brain  are  alone  the  organs  and  seat  of 


(i)  Sir  W.  Hamilton  remarks:  "There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  whole  organism  of  the  sense,  from  periphery  to  centre, 
must  co-operate  simultaneously  in  perception;  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  place  the  mind  at  the  central  extremity  alone."  (Ed 
of  Reid's  Works,  p.  248.)  That  the  sensibility  of  the  retina  is 
qualified  by  the  action  of  the  cerebral  centre  of  vision  seems 
to  be  proved  by  certain  facts  of  the  so-called  consecutive  images 
and  of  the  mixture  of  colors.  It  has  been  suggested  by  a  French 
writer  that  "there  exists  a  sort  of  cerebral  retina  each  point 
of  which  is  in  intimate  connection  with  corresponding  points 
of  the  peripheral  retina." 


PERCKPTION.  247 

visual  sensibility.  It  is  held,  moreover,  that  various 
facts  of  visual  perception,  as  erect  and  single  vision, 
apparent  magnitudes,  the  filling  of  the  "blind  spot/' 
show  the  work  of  a  high  "psychical"  or  "creative" 
faculty,  above  mere  sensibility. 

But  these  and  the  like  conclusions  have  be^n  too 
hastily  drawn,  and  are  apparently  unwarrantable. 
The  fact  that  sensibility  is  entirely  absent  from  the 
retina  after  the  severance  of  the  optic  nerve,  does  not 
prove  that  it  was  entirely  absent  before  the  severance. 
Such  loss  of  sensibility  we  might  expect.  So  serious 
a  dismemberment  of  the  nervous  apparatus  as  the  sev- 
erance of  the  optic  nerve  (or  commissure,  as  it  may  be 
called)  amounts  to,  may  well  be  supposed  to  lead  to 
the  loss  of  sensibility  in  the  retina.  Sensibility  ceases 
in  the  retina,  and  continues  in  the  brain,  because  the 
retina  is  the  external  and  inferior  organ,  and  is  not, 
instead  of  the  brain,  the  grand  central  one  collecting 
the  mental  energies  towards  itself.  If  a  limb  be  cut 
from  a  body,  the  body  continues  to  live,  but  the  limb 
dies.  It  ceases  to  participate  in  the  life  of  the  body. 
Likewise,  the  retina,  when  severed  from  the  nervous 
system,  ceases  to  participate  in  the  sensibility  of  its 
system.  Again,  if  one  hemisphere  of  the  brain  be 
paralyzed  or  destroyed,  all  the  mental  functions  may 
be  carried  on  bv  the  instrumentalitv  of  the  other.  ^ 


(i)  "When  one  hemisphere  is  removed  or  destroyed  by  dis- 
ease, motion  and  sensation  are  abolished  unilaterally,  but  mental 
operations  are  still  capable  of  being  carried  on  in  their  com- 
pleteness through  the  agency  of  the  one  hemisphere.  The  indi- 
vidual who  is  paralyzed  as  to  sensation  and  motion  by  disease 
of  the  opposite  side  of  the  brain  (say  the  right),  is  not  paralyzed 
mentally,  for  he  can  still  feel  and  will  and  think,  and  intelligently 
comprehend  with  the   one  hemisphere.     If  these  functions  are 


248  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

This  certainly  does  not  prove,  as  all  will  admit,  that 
the  paralyzed  hemisphere  was  never  a  seat  and  organ 
of  consciousness;  just  as  little  does  the  fact  that  after 
the  detachment  or  extirpation  of  the  retina  we  con- 
tinue to  experience  certain  visual  sensations,  prove 
that  there  ne\'er  was  sensibility  in  this  "expanded 
ganglion."  The  definite  and  regular  sensations  that 
we  have  with  the  retina,  compared  with  the  flashes 
and  indefinite  ones  that  are  had  without  it,  indicate 
the  importance  of  the  instrumentality  of  the  retina. 

The  conclusion  that  the  filling  of  the  "blind  spot," 
the  phenomena  of  erect  and  single  vision,  the  vast 
apparent  extensions  of  visual  perceptions,  are  not 
consistent  with  the  view  that  we  are  capable  of 
extended  definite  sensibility  in  the  retina,  has  not  been 
verified.  The  great  magnitudes  which  we  perceive  by 
vision  are  easily  and  fully  explained  by  the  associa- 
tion of  the  visual  sensations  with  the  tactual  and  mus- 
cular. The  small  real  extension  of  the  retinal  sensa- 
tions excited  by  external  light  from  large  objects, 
becomes,  by  association  with  the  tactual  sensations 
excited  by  the  same  objects,  representative  of  the 
extension  of  the  tactual  sensations;  and  by  associa- 
tion with  both  the  tactual  and  muscular  sensations, 
heli)ed  by  the  conviction  of  the  existence  and  impor- 
tance of  external  objects,  sight  measures  all  objects 
l)v  the  standard  of  touch.  For  these  reasons  we  do 
not  think  of  the  real  extension  of  retinal  sensations, 
but  onl\-  of  the  real  extension  of  touch  and  the  exter- 
nal objects  represented  by  them;    just  as  we  do  not 


not  carried  on  with  the  same  vigor,  they  at  least  do  not  appear 
to  suffer  in  respect  of  completeness."  (Ferrier,  Functions  of  the 
Brain,  p.  257.) 


PERCEPTION.  249 

think  of  colors  as  existing  in  the  mind  where  they 
really  are,  but  as  the  properties  of  external  objects,  i 

As  the  influence  of  the  tactual  and  muscular  sensa- 
tions, and  of  the  inferences  made  from  them,  upon 
vision,  accou.nts  for  the  representation,  by  the  small 
retinal  sensations,  of  the  great  magnitudes  of  external 
things,  so  this  influence,  if  not  entirely  sufficient,  goes^ 
a  long  way  in  the  explanation  of  erect  and  single 
vision.  As  touch  brings  vision  to  adopt  its  standard 
of  measurement  for  objects,  or  to  translate  its  own 
magnitudes  into  the  magnitudes  of  touch,  so  touch 
])rings  vision  to  adoi:)t  the  number  and  posture  it 
assigns  to  objects,  and  to  neglect  the  number  and 
posture  of  its  own  sensations. 

The  filling  up  of  the  "blind  spot"  is  placing 
extended  sensation  where  there  really  is  no  sensation, 
anfl  has  been  assumed  to  be  the  work  of  a  creative 
psychical  activity.  But  this  phenomenon  seems  to  be 
adequately  accounted  for,  if  regarded  as  a  work  of  the 
imagination,  founded  on  the  real  continuity  of  the 
remaining  parts  of  the  image,  the  movement  of  the 
eye.  and  the  conviction  of  the  continuity  of  the  exter- 
nal reality.- 

The  remarkable  discrete  nervous  elements  of  the 
retina,  or  the  fact  that  these  are  separated  from  one 


( 1 )  Berkeley  en-oneously  held  that  visible  and  tangible  ideas 
and  magnitudes  are  absolutely  different,  that  the  visible  are, 
by  an  "arbitrary  connexion,"  "signs"  of  the  tangible.  But  what- 
ever may  be  the  difference  between  the  real  extensions  of  visual 
and  tactual  sensations,  and  whatever  may  be  the  agreement  not- 
withstanding ?.£  to  .standard  of  measurement,  the,  retinal  and 
tactual  suifaces  yet  are  alike  in  the  primary  fact  that  each  is 
an  original  seat  of  superficial  sensibility.  This  fact  is  a  primary 
condition  of  the  remarkable  association  between  the  two  senses. 

(2)  See  Stumpf,   Ursprnng  d.  RaumforstcUung,  p.  82. 


250  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

another  by  elements  not  nervous,  might  seem  to 
oppose  the  possibiHty  of  extended  or  continuous  sen- 
sation in  the  retina.  ^  But  these  discrete  elements, 
essential  to  fine  space-discriminations,  can  not  be 
assumed  to  make  a  spatially  continuous  sensation 
impossible.  The  nervous  expanse  must  be  supposed 
to  perform  the  extraordinary  double  ofiice  of  afford- 
ing the  conditions  of  both  a  discretum  and  a  continuum, 
of  both  discrete  and  continuous  sensation.  Where 
the  nervous  elements  are  apart,  sensation  is  continu- 
ous; and  indeed  continuity  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
the  knowledge  of  all  discontinuity;  but  we  must  admit 
that  microscopic  observation  on  the  outside,  as  intro- 
spection on  the  inside,  does  not  enable  us  to  discover 
the  ultimate  conditions  of  the  diffusion  and  spatial 
continuity  of  the  sensitive  agent  and  sensation  in  the 
retinal  tissues.  2 

None  of  the  facts  which  we  have  been  considering 
appears  to  oppose  or  to  be  out  of  harmony  with  the 
possibility  of  extended  sensibility  in  the  retina,  or  to 
authorize  the  assumption  that  sensation  takes  place 
solely  in  the  brain,  and  can  not  also  take  place,  in  any 
manner  or  degree,  in  the  retina.  Favoring  the  reality 
of  this  sensibility  is  the  sameness  in  constituent  ele- 
ments between  the  "expanded  ganglion"  of  the  retina 


(t)  Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologic,  2nd  ed.,  II.,  p.  69. 

(2)  An  instance  of  the  extreme  discrimination  of  retinal 
sensibility  is  the  fact  that  "the  figure  of  a  man  six  feet  high, 
seen  at  the  distance  of  ten  yards,  makes  at  the  cornea  a  visual 
angle  of  11  deg.  30  min.,  and  forms  upon  the  retina  an  image 
which  is  less  than  half  a  millimetre  (one-fiftieth  of  an  inch)  in 
length;  and  yet  an  abundance  of  details  are  distinctly  per- 
ceptible within  this  space."  ^Dalton's  Human  Physiology,  p.  626.) 
And  with  the  "abundance  of  details"  we  have  as  clearly  and 
immediately  also  the   spatial   continuity   of  the  image. 


PERCEPTION.  25 1 

and  the  internal  ganglia.  It  is  surely  as  reasonable  to 
believe  that  extension  is  the  property  of  sensation  in 
the  retina,  as  that  it  is  the  creation  of  a  punctual  or 
unextended  agent  amidst  a  similar  nervous  mass 
within  the  brain.  Further,  this  sensibility  seems  to  be 
positively  required  by  the  remarkable  correspondence 
between  the  visual  sensations  and  the  figures  delin- 
eated on  the  retina  by  external  light. 

As  to  tactual  sensibility,  it  is  supposed  by  many 
that,  though  tactual  sensations  appear  to  be  situated 
and  to  be  extended  at  the  superfices,  they  only  appear 
so,  and  are  not  really  so.  This  conclusion,  as  to 
localization,  is  thought  to  be  supported  by  the  fact 
that  sensations  are  projected  to  the  outer  ends  of 
hairs  and  nails,  to  the  outer  end  of  a  stick  held  in  the 
hand,  and  to  the  extremities  of  lost  limbs,  —  to  places 
where  they  certainly  can  not  in  reality  be.  These  false 
projections,  it  is  assumed,  prove  that  placing  sensa- 
tions at  the  superfices  is  a  false  projection.  I  have 
treated  of  these  facts  at  some  length  in  my  work  on 
Perception.  They  can  not  annul  the  positive  con- 
sciousness of  tactual  sensations  situate  at  the  peri- 
phery. Sensations  would  very  probably  never  be 
projected  to  the  place  of  a  lost  limb  if  they  had  not 
been  previously  often  experienced  in  the  limb.  Pro- 
jections to  the  outer  ends  of  insensible  parts,  or  of 
sticks  indenting  the  superfices,  seem  to  be  possible 
only  on  the  condition  that  sensibility  is  in  the  super- 
ficies. There  would  be  no  knowledge  of  these  parts 
and  objects,  and  consequently  no  projection  of  sensa- 
tions, including  visual  sensations,  to  them,  without 
original  extended  sensibility  in  the  superficies.  The 
causes  of  such  projections  are  not  hard  to  understand. 


252  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE;. 

Our  clear  consciousness  of  extended  sensation  at  the 
periphery  is  the  condition  of  the  fallacious  projection 
of  sensations  beyond  the  periphery;  but  criticism  has 
not  hitherto  succeeded  in  showing  that  this  conscious- 
ness of  peripheral  sensation  is  itself  fallacious  pro- 
jection. I 

(r)  Even  if  sensation  is  not  felt  in  tlie  organ,  e.  g..  a  finger, 
until  excitation  has  been  conveyed  from  it  through  the  nerves 
to  the  brain,  the  fact  still  remains  that  the  sensation  is  felt  as 
if  in  the  finger.  It  is  impossible  to  prove  that  this  localization 
of  sensation  in  the  finger  is  a  delusive  projection  from  the  brain, 
effected  through  the  visual  or  through  any  other  sense  distinct 
from  the  tactual.  Apparently  the  only  tenable  view  therefore 
is  that,  be  the  physical  conditions  what  they  may,  sensation 
is  localized  in  the  finger  because  it  is  in  the  finger. 

It  is  the  theory  of  some  that  the  tactual  sensations  are 
localized  by  the  muscular  sensations  of  our  moving  organs. 
This  theory  supposes,  in  effect,  that  sensations,  which,  differing 
in  intensity,  if  not  in  quality,  are  all  in  themselves  or  originally 
without  extension  and  known  spatial  position,  are  able  to  give 
extension  and  position  to  other  sensations,  or  to  cause  them  to 
appear  as  extended,  separate,  and  localized.  This  is  to  suppose 
that  spatial  extension  and  place  are  derived  from  temporal  suc- 
cession and  place,  and  is  perfectly  idle.  There  is  no  such  sudden 
and  m.arvelous  development  in  knowledge  of  a  perfectly  new 
thing.  Besides,  if  the  muscular  and  other  motor  sensations 
are,  as  all  others  are  thought  to  be,  but  pure  unextended 
experiences  solely  within  the  brain,  it  would  seem  to  be  quite 
impossible  for  them  to  localize  extended  tactual  sensations  in 
limbs  distant  from  the  brain.  How  can  they  point  to  places 
which  are  so  far  awaj'  and  which  they  themselves  can  not  imme- 
diately know? 

Many,  who  hold  that  sensations,  including  the  tactual  and 
muscular,  occur  only  in  the  brain,  say  that  we  project  sensa- 
tions to  the  places  at  the  periphery  where  the  nerves  normally 
terminate  and  are  irritated  by  external  excitants.  But  they 
never  give  a  satisfactory  and  tenable  account  of  how  we  acquire 
our  first  knowledge  of  the  peripheral  localities,  and  the  external 
excitants,  or  have  in  that  knowledge  an  occasion  or  guide  for 
the  projection  of  sensations,  or  how  we  come  first  to  project 
sensations   to  them.     That  failure  is  fatal  to  their  theory. 


PERCEPTIOX.  253 

Our  primary  cognition  of  trinal  extension  occurs 
with  cutaneous  and  deep  sensation  at  the  periphery, 
the  primary  physical  condition  of  which  are  probably 
the  sensory  nerves  distributed  to  skin  and  muscle. 
Pressure  upon  the  surface  or  the  grasping  of  the  flesh 
occasions  this  cognition.  Tt  is  not  probable  that  the 
idea  of  trinal  extension  is  originally  derived  from  the 
idea  of  superficial  extension  and  sensations  accom- 
panying the  movements  of  our  limbs. 

Because  of  the  facts  of  projection  above  consid- 
ered, and  other  phenomena,  many  psychologists  hold 
that  extension  is  no  original  quality  of  sensation  as  it 
appears  to  be,  but  is  a  quality  supplied  to  sensations 
by  a  creative  act  of  mind,  or  is  the  product  of  "psychi- 
cal synthesis"  in  the  brain,  i 

Kant  seems  to  teach  that  the  perception  or  repre- 
sentation of  even  the  shortest  line  is  the  act  or  result 
of  figuring   a   succession   of  units.  -     This   doctrine 


(i)  "As  in  the  synthetic  judgment  a  new  predicate  is  given 
to  the  subject,  and  as  in  chemical  synthesis  from  certain  ele- 
ments a  composition  arises  with  new  properties:  so  also 
psychical  synthesi*;  furnishes,  as  a  new  product,  the  spatial 
arrangement  of  the  sensations  entering  into  it."  (Wundt.  Phys. 
Psychologic,  2nd  ed.,  II..  p.  28.  The  same  author's  TJicoric  d. 
Sinnesivahrnehmung,  p.  444.) 

Lotze  reg.nrds  the  notion  of  extension  as  a  "reaction"  and 
"creation"  of  the  unexhausted  but  inscrutable  nature  of  the  soul, 
occasioned  primarily  by  external  sense-stimultts.  (Metapliysic, 
p.  476.)  He  says  again:  "What  is  the  reason  that  the  soul, 
receiving  from  things  manifold  impressions  which  can  only 
be  to  begin  with  imextended  states  of  its  own  receptive  nature, 
is  obliged  to  envisage  them  at  all  under  the  form  of  a  space 
with  parts  outside  each  other''  The  cause  of  this  marvelous 
transfiguration  could  only  be  found  in  the  peculiar  nature  of 
the  soul,  but  ic  never  will  be  found."     (lb.,  p.  207.) 

(2)   "I  can  not  represent  to  myself  any  line,  however  small 


254  '^^^      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

Stands  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  fact.  By  vision, 
in  the  instantaneous  Hght  of  a  single  electric  spark,  in 
a  time  too  short  for  the  eye  to  move  or  the  mind  to 
draw  or  construct  anything,  we  clearly  cognize  lines 
and  surface.  There  is  no  real  evidence  that  the  cog- 
nition is  the  result  of  present  or  past  synthesis  or 
creation.  By  touch  also  we  cognize  short  lines  instan- 
taneously, without  drawing,  synthesis,  or  memory. 
As  to  long  lines,  however.  Kant's  doctrine  of  synthesis 
is  no  doubt  true.  The  notion  of  a  long  line  is  the 
result  of  picturing  a  succession  of  units.  But  of  what 
kind  of  units?  Not  ultimately  of  non-spatial  or  unex- 
tended,  as  the  punctualists  assert,  but  of  extended. 
The  notion  of  a  long  line  is  constructed  out  of  the 
original^^  and  simple  notions  of  short  lines.  There  is 
thus  no  creation  of  spatial  length  out  of  nothing,  or 
out  of  pure  succession:  but  short  lengths  are  known 
in  simple  sensations  and  in  single  moments  of  time; 
and  long  ones  are  known  by  the  memory  and  syn- 
thesis of  short  ones.  The  first  simple  cognitions  of 
extension,  lineal,  superficial,  and  trinal,  are  only  of 
small  quantities,  not  of  the  whole  body,  nor  of  the 
whole  of  limbs,  and  are  also  vague.  From  these 
small  portions,  with  the  aid  principally  of  the  muscular 
and  other  sensations  attending  the  motions  of  the 
locomotive  organs,  especially  the  arm.s,  the  mind 
advances  rapidly  to  the  definite  unitary  knowledge  of 
the  v.hole  volume  of  the  body. 

A   primary   condition   of   all   is   the   presence   of 
extended    sensil^ility    in    the    extended    sense-organ. 

it  may  be,  without  drawing  it  in  thought,  that  is,  without  pro- 
ducing from  a  point  all  parts  successively,  and  thus  for  the  first 
figuring  this  intuition.''     (Kritik  d.  r.  W,  p.  156.) 


PERCEPTION.  255 

Irritation  is  no  doubt  transmitted  to  the  brain  in  the 
cognition  of  extended  sensation;  but  sensibihty  is  not 
only  in  the  brain,  it  is  also  in  the  external  nervous 
expanse;  and  extensions  corresponding  to  the  exten- 
sions of  external  irritations  are  known  and  localized 
at  the  periphery  by  the  extended  sensitive  agent. 
They  are  not  created  within  the  brain  out  of  non- 
spatial  sensations  and  projected  by  this  agent  consid- 
ered as  punctual  and  situate  in  the  brain  alone.  That 
the  percipient  agent  regarded  as  non-extended  can 
construct  out  of  intensive  unextended  sensations  the 
notion  of  extension,  or  can  from  its  own  non-exten- 
sion furnish  either  extension  or  the  thought  of  exten- 
sion and  space,  must,  we  believe,  be  given  up  in  the 
end  as  something  whoUv  mvstical  and  incredible.  It 
seems  to  be  necessary  to  begin  the  science  of  knowl- 
edge with  the  assumption  of  the  notion  of  extension  as 
an  original  and  simple  element  of  knowledge;  iiot, 
however,  by  making  this  notion,  as  Kant  did,  a  form 
of  thought  as  distinguished  from  the  matter  of 
thought;  but  by  making  it  a  quality  of  the  matter  of 
thought  itself,  and  repudiating  the  Kantian  separa- 
tion of  sense-form  from  sense-matter. 

In  recapitulation,  I  remark  especially  regarding 
the  cognition  of  the  extension  of  sensations,  that  it  is 
original,  simple,  and  absolute. 

T.  The  cognition  of  the  extension  of  sensations  is 
original  and  not  derived.  It  stands  coordinate  in  this 
respect  with  the  notions  of  time  and  force.  It  is  as 
certainly  a  primordial  element  of  knowledge  as  either 
of  these  latter  notions;  and  is  at  least  of  equal  impor- 
tance. Man}'  labored  attempts,  however,  have  been 
made  to  show  that  the  idea  of  extension  is  derived 


256  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE). 

from  the  idea  of  time  or  from  the  ideas  of  time  and 
force.  The  efforts  of  the  English  psychologists, 
Brown,  Bain,  Mill,  and  vSpencer,  to  this  end,  I  have 
examined  at  some  length  elsewhere.  The  reasoning" 
of  these  writers  on  this  subject  is  a  striking  instance 
of  fallacious  assumption  and  procedure,  a  curious  tra- 
vesty of  scientific  thinking.  Their  theory  reduces  the 
idea  of  extension  to  the  mere  memory  of  a  time  series; 
with  some,  the  memory  especially  of  a'  time  series  of 
muscular  sensations  or  "sensations  of  force."  Time 
is,  in  brief,  declared  to  be  an  irreversible,  extension  a 
reversible,  sequence.  But  all  the  proof  we  can  have 
against  any  doctrine  concerning  the  mind,  is  against 
this  one.  The  consciousness  of  the  extension  of  sen- 
sations is  as  early,  original,  and  emphatic,  as  the 
knowledge  of  the  duration,  succession,  and  simul- 
taneity, or  the  time,  of  sensations.  The  quality  of 
extension  has  indisputably  testimony  of  at  least  equal 
worth  to  that  of  time;  there  is  no  warrant  for  declar- 
ing it  not  equal,  and  giving  the  superiority  of  original- 
it}^  or  even  of  precedence  or  clearness,  to  the  idea  of 
time.  The  doctrine  of  derivation  is,  in  truth,  a  primary 
assum])tion  of  the  systems  of  identity  or  pantheism 
and  dialectic  development;  as,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  of  originality  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  dual- 
ism. The  denial  of  the  originality  of  the  cognition  of 
spatial  extension  and  separation,  takes  along  with  it 
the  denial  of  plurality  of  beings,  or  the  assumption 
that  all  things  and  phenomena  are  but  the  changes  or 
transformations  of  the  same  spaceless  unit.  But  as 
far  as  the  logic  of  the  derivatists  is  concerned,  the  doc- 
trine of  originality  stands  firmly  intact  on  these  two 
facts:    iirst,  the  consciousness  of  extended  sensatron; 


PERCEPTION.  257 

secondly,  the  absolute  failure  of  all  attempts  hitherto 
to  prove  that  this  consciousness  is  derived  from  the 
consciousness  or  experience  of  time  or  of  the  unex- 
tended. 

2.  Our  primarv  cognitions  of  extension  are  simple. 
There  can  be  no  question  that  our  notions  of  large 
extensions  or  objects  and  spaces,  and  even  of  large 
tracts  of  our  superficies,  are  compound,  being  combi- 
nations made  by  putting  together  simultaneously  or 
successively  original  and  simple  extensions.  A  sim- 
ple retinal  sensation  may  represent  the  combination 
of  many  tactual  sensations.  But  it  must  be  accepted 
as  a  primary  principle,  that  our  notions  of  great 
extended  wholes  can  not  be  formed  out  of  unextended 
simples,  as  the  notions  of  mathematical  points;  but 
must  be  formed  out  of  simple  notions  of  small  exten- 
sions. They  are  formed  from  a  succession,  but  it  is  a 
succession  of  extended  elements  or  parts.  Further- 
more, simplicity  is  not  inconsistent  with  ideal  divisi- 
bility.    One  can  not  think  of  a  limit  to  the  divisibility 

.  *       .        .  . 

into  parts  of  any  extended  thing;    but  simpHcity  may 

remain  while  conceivable  divisibility  goes  on.  The 
extended  sensation  produced  by  the  pressure  of  a 
piece  of  silver  in  the  palm  of  the  hand  is  a  simple 
sensation,  is  not  the  result  of  simultaneous  or  suc- 
cessive combination  of  parts;  but  yet  is  ideally  divisi- 
ble; not  compounded  of  parts,  it  is  separable  ideally 
into  parts.  Moreover,  sensations  of  less  extension 
mav  be  excited  in  the  palm  by  objects  of  less  exten- 
sion, these  varying  simple  extensions  being  possible 
on  the  common  basis  of  the  unity  of  the  mind  itself  in 
extension, 

3.  It  is  to  be  remarked  of  extension,  as  it  was  of 
time,  that  our  cognitions  are  not  of  relative  quantities 
(17) 


258  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

only,  but  also  of  real  or  absolute  quantities.  We  dis- 
cern the  relative  extension  of  a  lineal  tactual  sensa- 
tion, that  it  is  shorter  than  one,  longer  than  another; 
but  with  these  relative  perceptions,  touch  gives  also 
perceptions  and  a  unit  or  standard  of  real  extension. 
The  real  extension  of  a  sensation  is  known  contem- 
poraneously with  its  comparative  extension.  The 
knowledge  of  the  latter  can  not  be  said  to  be  more 
necessary  to  that  of  the  former,  than  the  knowledge 
of  the  former  is  to  that  of  the  latter.  The  compara- 
tive knowledge  is  not  more  certain  than  the  real,  and 
can  by  no  means  exclude  it.  Many  psychologists 
and  physiologists  have  strenuously  argued  against  this 
view.  The  experiments  of  the  German  Weber,  and  of 
others  who  have  followed  him,  with  the  tactual  sensi- 
bility, are  supposed  to  prove  that  there  is  no  percep- 
tion of  real  magnitude  by  touch,  because  touch  shows, 
on  different  regions  of  its  surface,  great  diversity  in 
fineness  of  spatial  discrimination  and  in  estimation  of 
the  same  real  extension.  It  may  be  confidently  main- 
tained, regarding  the  diversity  in  the  estimates  of  the 
same  real  distance,  that  more  has  been  deduced  from 
the  Weberian  experiments  than  they  at  all  warrant; 
and  the  doctrine  that  the  tactual  sense  is  in  general 
uniform  in  its  measurements,  and  affords  the  cogni- 
tion of  real  extension  and  an  absolute  unit  or  standard, 
meets  with  no  serious  opposition  from  them,  i  Great 
uniformity  of  tactual  measurement  is  certainly  a  fact 
of  actual  experience,  and  a  very  important  element  in 
the  unity  of  individual  and  social  life;  and  there  is  no 
proof  that  this  uniformity  is  dependent  essentially  on 


(i)  I  have  treated  of  Weber's  experiments  in  my  work  on 
Perception,  pp.  275-288. 


PIvRCKPTlON.  259 

any  faculty  other  than  the  tactual  sense  itself.  We 
may  conclude,  then,  that  in  touch  we  have  sensations 
of  absolute  spatial  extension,  possessing  at  least  the 
same  degree  of  uniformity  and  perfection  as  was 
claimed  for  our  perceptions  of  real  time;  and,  in  the 
science  of  knowledge,  may  start  with  them  as  being 
among  the  original  elements  or  units  of  knowledge. 

So  much  for  sensations.  We  have  given  this  some- 
what extended  consideration  to  them  because  of  their 
variety,  and  in  order  to  ascertain  their  true  character. 
It  is  far  too  common  with  psychologists  to  mistake  the 
character  of  sensations,  and  to  attribute  some  of  their 
chief  properties  to  other  actions  of  the  mind;  and,  for 
this  reason,  our  discussion  is  not  likely  to  escape  the 
charge  of  altogether  lacking  philosophical  insight  and 
comprehension,  from  those  especially  who  find  no 
fault  with  the  arbitrariness  of  the  transcendental  or 
the  derivatist  analysis  and  synthesis  of  the  intellectual 
phenomena. 

Rut  notwithstanding  the  prominence  and  impor- 
tance in  perceptive  intelligence  of  the  sensations,  espe- 
cially of  the  tactual,  visual,  and  muscular,  they  are  not 
more  important  than  the  notion  of  force,  which  is  sup- 
plied by  the  will;  for,  although  we  may  be  cognizant 
of  subjective  extension  apart  from  the  experience  of 
force,  we  can  have  no  notion  of  external  extended 
realities  without  the  notion  of  force.  And  if  we  take 
perception  with  the  breadth  given  it  above,  as 
including  the  notions  of  real  external  composite, 
material  and  mental,  beings,  then  it  is  indebted  to  the 
emotions  for  significant  contributions.  Our  notion  of 
a  man  in  his  integrity  as  a  concrete  individual,  possess- 
ing corporeal  and  mental  attributes,  contains  the  ideas 
of  his  magnitude,  color,  and  of  his  volitional  and  emo- 


26o  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWI.EDGE. 

tional  powers;  or.  in  other  words,  contains  represen- 
tative elements  from  onr  ow^n  sense,  volitional,  and 
emotional  experiences. 

Perception,  in  itself,  as  a  process,  is  the  synthesis 
or  construction  of  these  diverse  subjective  elements 
into  notions  of  external  individual   things   and    the 
external  world.     The  elementary  materials,  coexist- 
ing primarily  in  the  loose  relations  of  general  con- 
sciousness, in  which  all  affections  of  mind  are  known 
as  belonging  to  the  one  mind,  are  combined  into  close 
and  permanent  groups,  forming  special  unities  within 
the  general  unity  of  consciousness.      A  foundation 
condition  of  every  perception  is  the  frequent  associa- 
tion of  the  sense  and  other  elements  that  enter  into  it. 
The}^  adhere  more  closely  to  one  another,  and  less 
closely  to  other  modes  of  mind,  because  they  have 
been  often  occasioned  together.     Through  frequent 
simultaneous  association  they  have  come  to  form  a 
complex  mode  or  to  cohere,  so  that  when  any  one  of 
them  occurs  it  immediately  recalls  the  others.     No 
peculiar  or  distinct  principle  of  unity  is  needed  to 
account   for  the   perceptive   grouping.     It   is  but   a 
special  unification  in  the  unity  that  embraces  all  affec- 
tions of  mind  by  virtue  of  the  unity  of  the  mind.     Per- 
ceptive   intellection    is    thus    not    a    voluntary,    or 
designed,  but  an  involuntary,  grouping.     The  cohe- 
sion of  the  groups  is  simply  persistent  association  of 
elements  that  were  originally  brought  together,  not 
by  the  purpose  of  the  mind,  but  by  the  concurrence 
of  external  occasions. 

But  though  perception  is  synthetic,  though  it  may 
be  properly  said  "to  make,"  or  "actively  to  construct," 
our  notions  or  representations  of  external  realities,  ^et 
it  is  not  originative;  it  can  not  be  properly  said  to  con- 


PERCEPTION.  261 

tribute  of  itself  anything  to  t]ie  matter  of  notions,  or 
to  make  tbem,  even  partially,  out  of  materials  not  sup- 
plied to  it  in  the  simple  original  elementary  experi- 
ences. Perception  does  not  contribute  extension  and 
duration  to  its  complex  notions.  These  properties 
belong  to  the  materials  before  and  independently  of 
perception  proper.  Every  notion  of  a  large  extension 
is  but  a  complex  formed  of  notions  of  small  simple 
extensions  given  in  sensations.  The  tactual  sensation 
produced  by  a  stone  laid  in  the  palm,  and  which  forms 
part  of  the  elementary  matter  of  the  perception  of  the 
stone,  is,  as  such,  before  it  enters  firmly  into  the 
notion  of  the  stone,  a  primary  extended  unit.  All  the 
unity  of  a  perception  in  its  extension  is  but  the  unity 
of  an  elementary  simple  extended  sensation  or  of  a 
combination  of  such  sensations. 

The  office  which  memory  performs  in  perceptive 
intellection  is  a  very  important  one.  Without  mem- 
ory there  would  be  little  or  no  perception  proper; 
because  perceptions  are  combinations  of  present  and 
remembered  affections.  My  perception  of  yonder 
tree  is  such  a  combination.  The  present  affections 
are  ocular,  both  retinal  and  muscular:  the  remem- 
bered affections  are  recalled,  through  association,  by 
the  ocular,  and  are  in  part  tactual  sensations  and  mus- 
cular and  other  of  the  motor  sensations.  But  such 
recall  of  past  affections  by  present,  im.plies  their  previ- 
ous coexistence  and  association.  Memory  is  not, 
however,  as  we  should  still  bear  in  mind,  necessary  for 
the  perception  of  small  extensions,  but  only  of  large. 
A  small  extension  may  be  perceived,  as  to  all  points, 
simultaneously  or  in  a  single  moment.  Large  exten- 
sions are  perceived  by  a  succession  of  sensations,  and 
therefore  by  the  aid  of  memory.     The  eye,  at  perfect 


262  THE      PRINCIPLES      OP      KNOWLEDGE. 

rest,  can  perceive  in  a  moment  a  great  expanse; 
although  it  is  true  that,  while  the  perception  of  exten- 
sion is  original  to  the  eye,  in  its  retinal  impressions, 
and  is  possible  in  an  instant,  without  memory,  yet  the 
retinal  perceptions  are  always  interpreted,  as  to  the 
external  expanse  which  they  represent,  by  the  tactual 
sensations  and  bv  the  muscular  sensations  of  the  loco- 
motive  organs,  i 

We  add,  in  conclusion,  that  perceptions  are,  in 
themselves,  purely  mental  or  subjective.  This  fol- 
lows from  the  fact  that  the  elementary  affections  of 
which  they  are  composed,  are  purely  subjective.  The 
reference  of  perceptions  to  external  realities  is  also  a 
purely  subjective  addition  to  them.  But  though  our 
perceptions  are  entirely  subjective,  and  though  they 
are  all  that  we  have  immediately  to  do  with  in  external 
cognition,  this  does  not  support  the  idealistic  view 
that  there  are  no  real  objective  things  which  our  per- 
ceptions correspond  to  or  represent.  My  perception 
of  a  distant  tree  with  its  varied  foliage  is  purely  sub- 
jective; still  there  certainly  exists  at  that  place  a  real 
objective  tree  independent  of  the  mind,  invested,  so  to 
speak,  in  my  subjective  perception  projected  to  it, 
through  which  it  is  known.  The  mind  makes  our 
notions  or  representations  of  nature,  but  it  does  not 
make  nature;  and  the  fact  that  these  notions  are  made, 
or  are  composite,  does  not  prove  that  they  can  not  be 


(i)  A  notable  fact  is  the  vividness  of  the  represented  ele- 
ments in  percepts.  Sully  remarks  on  this:  "Our  perceptions 
■though  really  compounded  of  sensations  and  ideational  elements, 
take  on,  as  a  whole,  the  superior  sensuous  vividness  of  the 
former."  (Human  Mind,  I.,  p.  191.)  He  asserts  again  that  it 
is  of  the  essence  of  the  percept  to  appear  ''as  a  perfectly-welded 
whole."     (lb.,  p.  210.) 


PIIRCEI'TION.  263 

true  representations  in  important  respects  of  external 
things. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  seems  to  deny  the  pure  sub- 
jectivity of  perceptions.  He  thus  distinguishes  sensa- 
>  lion  proper  from  perception  proper:  ''Sensitive  Per- 
ception, or  Perception  simply,  is  that  act  of  Conscious- 
ness whereby  we  apprehend  in  our  body,  (a)  Certain 
special  affections,  whereof  as  an  animated  organism  it  is 
contingently  susceptible;  and  (b)  Those  general  rela- 
tions of  extension  under  which  as  a  material  organism  it 
necessarily  exists.  Of  these  Perceptions,  the  former, 
which  is  thus  conversant  about  a  subject-object,  is  Sen- 
sation proper;  the  latter,  which  is  thus  conversant 
about  an  object-object,  is  Perception  proper."  i  By 
being  "conversant  about  an  object-object,"  he  means 
more  than  an  immediate  and  decided  reference  to  the 
material  object.  Consciousness  of  the  object  is 
implied;  and  with  this,  apparently,  that  perception 
proper  contains  a  real  objective  element.  But  this 
doctrine  Sir  W.  Hamilton  certainly  never  made  good. 
Sensation  and  perception  are  alike  in  their  pure  sub- 
jectivity, and  neither  can  embrace  the  consciousness 
of  an  object-object.  Perception  has  a  reference  to 
external  things,  but  does  not  give  them  immediately: 
it  contains  the  consciousness  of  extension,  but  the 
extension  is  of  a  sensation  or  sensations  that  enter 
into  it,  and  not  of  an  object-object.  In  his  view  of 
perception,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  seriously,  though  sub- 
tilely,  confounds  the  spheres  of  subject  and  object,  of 
consciousness  and  inference. 

The  contrast  between  sensation  and  perception,  as 
to  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  is  again  more  particu- 


(i)   Kdition  of  Rcid's  Works,  pp.  876,  877. 


264  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

larly  set  forth  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  in  his  well-known 
view,  "that,  above  a  certain  point,  the  stronger  the 
Sensation,  the  weaker  the  Perception;  and  the  dis- 
tincter  the  perception  the  less  obtrusive  the  sensation; 
in  other  words,  though  Perception  proper  and  Sensa- 
tion proper  exist  only  as  they  coexist,  in  the  degree  or 
intensity  of  their  existence  they  are  always  found  in  an 
inverse  ratio  to  each  other."  i  Those  who  make  sub- 
ject and  object  a  distinction  within  mind  or  thought 
bring  out  the  distinction  most  prominently  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  perception.  In  the  following  we  have  Pro- 
fessor Bain's  adaptation  of  the  principle  just  quoted 
from  Sir  W.  Hamilton  regarding  the  comparative 
strength  of  sensation  and  perception:  "In  sensation 
we  are  subject  and  object  by  turns.  We  are  object 
when  attending  to  the  form  and  magnitude  of  a  con- 
flagration; we  are  subject  when  we  give  way  to  the 
emotional  effect  of  the  luminous  blaze.  Now, 
although  the  name  Sensation  is  used  for  both  states, 
Perception  is  the  better  word  for  the  object  atti- 
tude."2 

The  varying  intensity  of  sensation  and  perception 
is  a  fact  of  experience;  but  it  is  not  to  be  interpreted, 
either  in  accordance  with  the  dualist's  or  the  monist's 
theory,  on  the  supposition  that  perception  is,  in  itself, 
any  more  objective  than  sensation.  This  inverse 
intensity  is  a  difference  between  elements  of  the  same 
pure  subjectiv^e  states.  I  may  be  more  attentive  to 
the  pleasure,  or  pain,  or  special  quality  of  a  sensation 
or  perception,  than  to  its  extension  or  external  refer- 
ence;   or   more   to   the   latter   than   to   the   former; 


(i)  Edition  of  Reid's  Works,  p.  880. 
(2)  Emotions  and  Will,  p.  583. 


PERCEPTION.  265 

neither  entirely  excludes  the  other  from  conscious- 
ness. But  the  extension,  or  the  reference  to  external 
things,  of  a  sensation  or  perception,  is  as  purely  sub- 
jective, in  itself,  as  any  element  or  attachment  of  the 
perception,  as  its  pleasure,  or  its  pain,  or  special  qual- 
ity. Real  objects,  object-objects,  are  extra-mental. 
To  put  subject  and  oi)ject.  as  varying  elements,  within 
the  percipient  act,  or  to  attribute  real  objectivity  to 
the  act,  as  an  act,  or  to  any  element  of  it,  is  the  funda- 
mental error  of  monism. 


CHAPTER    III. 
IMAGINATION. 

Imagination  is,  like  memory,  a  mode  of  the  repre- 
sentative power  of  the  mind,  of  the  power  that  is 
primarily  representative  of  our  past  subjective  experi- 
ences. Its  special  range  or  work  has  been  variously 
defined,  and  variously  contrasted  with  that  of  memory. 
In  comparison  with  one  another,  these  two  faculties 
may  be  defined,  in  general  terms,  thus:  Memory  is 
the  faculty  of  Literal  Representation;  Imagination  is 
the  faculty  of  Constructive  Representation.  Memory 
represents  past  presentations  or  experiences  as  they 
occurred;  Imagination  represents  past  experiences, 
not  as  they  occurred,  but  in  new  and  original  forms 
and  combinations. 

It  is  very  common  to  classify  both  imagination  and 
memory  as  intellectual  faculties.  But  taking  the 
intellect  with  the  definition  above  given  of  it,  as  espe- 
cially the  synthetic  power  proper  of  the  mind,  only  the 
imagination  can  be  strictly  denominated  intellectual, 
and  not  memory.  Imagination  and  memory  have 
close  kinship  in  that  both  are  representative  faculties; 
but  the  distinct  analytic  and  constructive  action  of  the 
former  makes  it  distinctly  intellectual.  It  might 
indeed  be  said  of  memory  that,  while  not  in  itself  con- 
structive like  imagination,  but  at  most  only  represen- 
tative of  syntheses  already  formed,  it  may  be  justly 
called  intellectual,  in  so  far  as  it  represents  the  syn- 
theses of  the  intellect  including  those  of  the  imagina- 
tion ;  yet  from  its  more  general  character  as  the  repre- 

(  266  ) 


IMAGINATION.  267 

sentative  of  all  past  experiences,  primary  and  intellect- 
ual, simple  and  complex,  it  can  not  be  rightly  classed 
as  intellectual,  but  must  be  put  with  the  most  general 
faculties  of  the  mind.  Accordingly,  T  have  treated  of 
it  in  n-ear  association  with  consciousness.  Memory  is 
the  recovery  of  all  past  experiences,  simple  and  com- 
plex; as  consciousness  is  the  cognition  of  all  present 
experiences,  simple  and  complex. 

Imagination  being,  as  appears  in  contrast  with 
memory,  a  faculty  of  intellect,  the  next  step  is  to 
determine  its  distinct  character  as  such,  especially  in 
comparison  with  the  intellectual  faculty  already  con- 
sidered. Perception.  Imagination  is  intellectual 
because,  in  general,  from  the  reproductions  of  mem- 
ory it  selects  qualities  and  parts,  and  combines  them 
into  new  wholes.  And  it  not  only  selects  and  then 
unites  the  different  elements,  but  very  often  refines, 
diminishes,  enlarges  them,  and  by  this  means  makes  of 
them  highly  idealized  syntheses.  The  representations 
of  the  imagination  are  all  individual  notions,  and 
nearly  all  concretes.  Here  there  is  an  important 
agreement  between  perception  and  imagination. 
Perceptions  are  of  singles,  as  of  a  tree,  a  house,  an 
expanse  of  country,  the  starry  sky.  The  construc- 
tions of  the  imagination  are  singles,  .as  ideal  trees, 
ideal  scenes,  characters,  models,  standards,  etc.  Both 
faculties  plainly  distinguish  themselves  in  this  respect 
from  the  faculty  of  general  notions. 

As  to  the  materials  which  it  employs  in  its  con- 
structions, the  imagination  is  universal;  that  is,  it 
employs  all  the  elementary  materials  of  knowledge, 
sensations,  emotions,  and  volitions.  Memory  repro- 
duces all  these  materials,  and  imagination  uses  them 
all.     The  name  of  the  faculty  gives  special  promi- 


268  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

nence  to  the  visual  sensations;  but  though  the  visual 
sensations  are  very  conspicuous  in  very  many  of  the 
ideals  of  the  imagination,  other  sensations  are  used; 
and  not  sensations  alone,  but  all  the  primary  experi- 
ences of  the  mind.  Imagination  may  form  an  ideal 
man,  a  Liliputian,  limiting  itself  to  sense  or  corporeal 
qualities;  but  it  need  not  so  limit  itself;  it  may  work 
into  its  ideal  many  elements  from  all  the  faculties  of 
original  matter.  The  ideal  of  lago  is  not  formed  sim- 
ply of  such  qualities  as  might  strike  only  the  eye  and 
the  senses;  but  also  of  hypocrisy  and  treachery,  of 
concealed  and  vile  motives  and  vohtions;  the  passions 
and  impulses  which  the  corporeal  motions  and  atti- 
tudes indicate,  must  be  reckoned  as  part  of  the  ideal. 
And  by  the  medium  of  his  drama  the  poet  enables  our 
imaginations,  to  some  extent  at  least,  to  construct 
from  sense,  emotional,  and  volitional  experiences,  the 
complex  character  in  his  own  mind's  eye.  Milton's 
Satan  is  not  purely  a  being  of  huge  bulk,  stretching 
"many  a  rood"  upon  the  ]:)urning  lake,  but  a  being 
possessing  or  claiming  also 

"th'  unconquerable   will, 
And  study  of  revenge,  immortal  hate." 

From  the  whole  range  of  the  primary  experiences, 
conserved  and  reproduced  by  memory,  the  imagina- 
tion forms  its  varied  and  wonderful  constructions, 
artistic,  poetical,  mathematical,  the  conjectures  of  the 
inventor,  the  models  of  character  and  taste,  etc.  In 
the  universal  character  of  the  materials  used,  imagina- 
tion and  perception  have  a  point  of  agreement.  They 
agree  also  in  the  entire  subjectivity  of  their  syntheses. 
The  elements  employed  by  both  faculties  being  purely 
subjective,  their  synthetic  products  are  also  purely 
subjective. 


IMAGINVTION.  269 

In  the  important  facts,  that  it  employs  elements 
from  all  our  primary  experiences,  and  that  its  produc- 
tions are  individual  notions  and  wholly  subjective, 
imagination  resembles  perception.  There  are  impor- 
tant facts  in  which  it  does  not  resemble  perception. 
In  the  first  place,  imagination  employs  only  repre- 
sented materials,  but  perception  presented.  It  is  true 
that,  as  we  noted  above,  perception  uses,  along  with 
its  presented,  also  represented  materials,  the  repro- 
ductions of  memory;  but  if  it  were  not  for  the  pre- 
sented materials,  perceptions  would  not  be  percep- 
tions, but  rather  only  memories.  Imagination  uses 
represented  matter  alone,  the  reproductions  furnished 
to  it  by  memory. 

There  is  a  marked  difference  between  the  two 
faculties  in  the  decided  reference  to  external  things 
which  accompanies  perceptions,  and  is  absent  from 
imaginations.  Perceptions  are,  it  is  true,  as  purely 
subjective,  and  as  much  compositions  by  the  intellect, 
as  imaginations;  but  in  the  firm  belief  that  they  repre- 
sent real  external  objects,  they  have  a  very  important 
adjunct  that  imaginations  lack.  Perceptions  being  as 
purely  mental  in  their  elements,  and  as  really  syn- 
thetic, as  imaginations,  it  becomes  an  interesting- 
question  how  they  come  to  differ  in  regard  to  external 
reference.  To  discuss  this  question  fully  would 
require  us  to  go  farther  into  the  subject  of  external 
perception  than  we  can  go  at  this  point;  but  it  may 
be  remarked  that,  between  a  perception  and  an 
imagination,  the  mind  is  conscious  of  the  primary  and 
fundamental  difference  between  a  sensation  and  the 
idea  of  it,  between  a  presentation  and  a  representa- 
tion. Further,  and  more  particularly,  the  mind  is 
conscious  of  its  own  agency  far  more  in  the  composi- 


270  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

tion  of  imaginations  than  in  the  composition;  of  per- 
ceptions. 1  do  not  say  that  imaginations;  as,  for 
example,  the  conjectures  and  presumptions  of  the 
inventor  and  discoverer,  and  the  ideals  of  the  artist 
and  poet,  are  the  products  of  the  will  working-  through 
the  imagination.  For  what  we  construct  by  vohtion 
must  exist  beforehand  in  idea;  and  therefore,  if 
imaginations  are  the  constructions  of  the  will,  they 
must  have  existence  before  they  are  formed;  never- 
theless, in  the  rise  of  the  syntheses  of  the  imagina- 
tion, there  is  voluntary,  and  often  very  close  and  con- 
tinuous, application  of  the  mind  to  the  materials 
which  associate  themselves  in  these  syntheses.  Upon 
this  indirect  action  of  the  will  imagination  is  far  more 
dependent  than  perception.  In  perception  the  mind 
knows  itself  as  much  more  dependent  upon  agencies 
beyond  consciousness  and  distinct  from  itself. 

Such  are  the  main  characteristics  of  imagination  as 
to  its  materials  and  products,  and  in  comparison  with 
the  faculties  of  memory  and  perception.  It  is  a  sec- 
ondary faculty,  like  memory;  but  is  narrower,  being  a 
special  mode  of  the  intellectual  power.  It  is  con- 
structive, while  memory  is  only  reproductive.  Like 
perception  it  concerns  itself  only  with  individuals;  but 
its  highly  artificial  concretes  are  without  supposed  or 
known  correspondence  to  external  and  real  objects. 

The  presuppositions  or  antecedent  conditions  of 
imagination  are  worthy  of  some  consideration.  I 
have  already  remarked  on  the  dependence  of  imagina- 
tion upon  memory.  All  the  materials  employed  by 
the  imagination  are  the  reproductions  of  memory; 
and  niemorv  is  therefore  a  fundamental  condition  of 
imagination,  as  it  is  of  all  other  intellectual  processes. 
The  office  of  the  imagination  is  to  effect  special  forms 


IMAGINATION.  27 1 

and  compositions  out  of  the  materials  given  by 
memory. 

The  laws  of  association  play  an  important  part  for 
imagination.  The  operations  of  the  imagination  are, 
no  doubt,  as  was  above  observed,  to  some  degree 
under  the  influence  of  the  will;  but  they  are  more 
under  the  involuntary  laws  of  association.  One  ele- 
ment draws  another  to  it  by  some  law  of  association, 
and  thus  the  works  of  the  imagination  grow^  to  com- 
pleteness. 

Imagination  requires,  again,  the  work  of  analysis, 
partition,  and  selection  or  abstraction.  It  does  not 
simply  combine  into  larger  wholes  the  wholes  fur- 
nished by  memory;  but  selects  parts  and  qualities 
obtained  by  analysis  of  these  wholes  and  by  abstrac- 
tion, and  makes  therefrom  special  constructions. 
Imagination  may  stop  with  the  refinement  of  an  entity 
or  element  gotten  by  analysis  or  abstraction,  and  not 
go  on  to  synthesis;  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  the 
geometrical  straight  line,  the  notion  of  which  is  indi- 
vidual, but  not  strictly  concrete. 

The  rank  of  the  imagination  among  the  intellect- 
ual powers,  and  its  practical  importance,  are  high.  In 
the  ideal  refinements,  expansions,  and  combinations 
which  it  effects,  it  is  truly  a  remarkable  power.  It 
holds  a  primary  place  in  the  series  of  faculties  which 
forward  our  thought  from  its  simple  and  primitive 
elements  and  beginnings  to  its  m^ost  elaborate  con- 
structions and  farthest  reaches.  Imagination,  follow- 
ing perception,  takes  the  representations  produced  by 
memory  in  conformity  with  the  original  experiences, 
and  by  analysis,  selection,  refinement,  combination, 
presents  a  whole  realm  of  ideal  individual  products, 
giving  a  great  diversification  and  expansion  to  our 


272  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE). 

cognitive  life.  Any  one  may  readily  see  how  much 
imagination  contributes  to  our  intellectual  experi- 
ences, by  considering  how  confined  these  experiences 
would  be  if  we  were  limited  in  our  representations  to 
the  verisimilar  reproductions  of  memory. 

Imagination  is  concerned  in  every  science  and  in 
every  human  interest.  The  fine  arts  are  peculiarly  its 
creations;  but  the  severest  sciences,  tnathematics, 
mechanics,  ethics,  are  greatly  dependent  on  it.  In 
no  department  of  science  and  practical  art  does  the 
mind  push  forward  aimlessly  or  labor  blindly,  but  is 
lead  by  ideals.  It  follows  the  course  of  an  imagined 
track.  It  works  under  the  light  of  an  ideal  model. 
There  have  been  instances,  it  is  true,  of  the  mind's 
making  progress  by  mere  accident  or  stumbling;  but 
there  is  very  little  progress  for  which  the  imagination 
does  not  deserve  the  credit  of  leadership.  It  is  not 
denied  that  the  imagination  somictimes  leads  into  the 
mazes  and  bogs  of  error,  and  causes  the  waste  of 
energy  and  life  in  the  pursuit  of  vagaries  and  the 
attempt  of  impossibilities;  but  with  all  proper  abate- 
ment, it  yet  remains  true  that  in  most  cases  of 
advancement  in  science  and  art,  in  invention  and 
reform,  the  imagination  has  taken  the  initiatory  steps 
by  supplying  ideals  of  possible  accomplishments. 

But  it  does  not  come  within  the  purview  of  this 
chapter  to  enter  into  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  rela- 
tions of  the  imagination  to  the  sciences,  of  its  office  as 
leader,  and  of  other  important  though  subordinate 
questions.  Our  treatment  must  be  restricted  to  the 
chief  characteristics  of  the  faculty.  We  now  pass, 
therefore,  to  consider  the  fundamental  and  interesting 
question,  Whether  the  imagination  in  any  degree 
creates  anything,   or  contributes  from   itself  to   the 


IMAGINATION.  273 

materials  supplied  in  the  reproductions  of  memory; 
or  whether  its  products  and  syntheses  have  no  con- 
stituents whatever  in  them  beyond  the  elements  from 
memory?  Both  sides  of  this  question  have  had  advo- 
cates. Some  have  contended  that  the  highest  con- 
structions of  the  imagination  contain  nothing  except 
what  is  given  in  the  memory  of  presentations.  Others 
have  contended  that  in  at  least  some  of  the  products 
of  imagination  there  are  manifestly  characteristics 
that  Avere  never  given  in  any  presentations.  They 
instance,  among  other  ideals,  mathematical  figures. 
Hues,  surfaces,  solids.  It  is  admitted,  of  course,  that 
we  perceive  through  the  senses  lines,  surfaces,  and 
solids;  but  it  is  claimed  that  by  no  analysis  of  them 
and  rearrangement  of  elements  can  the  perfect,  ideal- 
ized figures  of  geometry  be  formed. 

As  to  the  question  of  the  creative  ability  of  imagin- 
ation, it  can  not  be  maintained  that  the  imagination 
strictly  originates  any  matter;  that  it  supplies  from 
itself,  besides  arrangement,  something  which  the  pre- 
sentative  powers  do  not  supply.  Imagination  is  not  a 
presentative  power.  As  to  materials,  it  must  be 
ranked  with  the  secondary  or  representative  faculties 
of  the  mind.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  can  not  be 
denied  that  the  ideals  of  the  imagination,  in  cases, 
possess  properties,  besides  mere  synthesis,  which  can 
not  be  said  in  strictness  to  have  previously  appeared 
"  in  experience.  This  is  true  not  of  geometrical  figures 
alone;  and  apparently  requires  for  the  imagination 
creative  energies. 

We  must  allow  to  the  imagination  the  peculiar 
power  to  follow  a  tendency,  a  course  of  variation,  a 
clew  perceived  in  experience,  beyond  what  it  was  ever 
known  to  reach.     This  unquestionable  power  to  fol- 
ds) 


274  '^^^^      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

low  a  variation  manifested  in  experience,  by  some 
property  or  properties  of  things,  farther  than  it  has 
ever  been  actually  cognized,  is  suflicient  to  account 
for  all  the  apparent  originations  of  the  imagination. 
The  idealized  figures  of  geometry  afford  a  marked 
instance  of  this  peculiar  faculty.  Take  the  straight 
line.  Strictly  speaking,  the  geometrical  straight  line 
is  not  a  composition  of  the  imagination,  but  a  refine- 
ment of  the  straight  lines  of  perception.  The  straight 
lines  we  perceive  are  really  elongated  solids,  and  are 
not  perfectly  straight.  But  we  arc  furnished  in  them 
with  all  the  material  that  ever  goes  into  the  most 
idealized  or  perfect  line.  The  work  of  the  imagina- 
tion is  not  the  origination  of  matter,  but  is  abstraction 
and  refinement  wrought  on  the  gross  matter  of  per- 
ception. From  the  straight  line  of  perception  the 
breadth  and  depth  are  taken,  and  the  length  is  left; 
and  its  crooked  places  are  made  straight.  The  work 
of  the  imagination  here  is  progressive;  but,  let  it  be 
observed,  it  is  a  progression  that  simply  pursues  a 
course  of  progression  cleai^ly  revealed  already  in  our 
experience.  We  have  the  distinct  experience  of  per- 
ceiving lines  which  vary  in  thickness  to  extreme  fine- 
ness. But  experience  never  furnishes  lines  that  have 
only  length.  Here  imagination  comes  in,  and,  pursu- 
ing the  course  of  variation  or  gradation  in  fineness 
clearly  revealed  by  perception,  carries  this  variation  to 
a  point,  to  a  limit,  which  was  never  cognized  by  per- 
ception. The  same  principle  is  true  of  straightness. 
What  we  call  straight  lines  in  experience,  are  not  per- 
fectly straight.  We  do  not  perceive  such  lines;  but 
such  lines  we  employ  in  geometry.  The  imagination 
attains  to  the  geometrical  straight  line  by  following  a 
gradation,  which  is  clearly  seen  in  experience,  to  a 


IMAGINATION.  275 

length  that  is  never  seen  in  experience,  supporting 
itself  by  the  perceived  line.  We  have  constant  expe- 
rience of  Hnes  varying  in  crookedness,  and  reaching  to 
almost  absolute  straightness.  The  imagination  fol- 
lowing this  course  of  variation  is  able  to  go  a  step 
beyond  experience,  to  the  geometrical  limit,  —  sup- 
porting itself,  however,  necessarily  and  always  by  the 
grosser  perceived  line.  If  the  imagination  does  not 
actually  picture  the  geometrical  straight  line  in  its 
perfection,  it  still,  at  the  least,  makes  it  possible  for 
us  to  employ  this  line,  in  demonstrations,  with  the 
greatest  ease. 

The  idealization  which  transforms  perceived  fig- 
ures into  geometrical  ones  is  in  all  cases  of  the  char- 
acter which  has  just  been  described.  It  depends  upon 
the  power  of  the  imagination  to  follow  a  clew  or  order 
of  variation  a  stage  further  than  is  cognized  by  per- 
ception. This  power  constitutes  the  originality  of 
the  imagination.  The  imagination  does  not  contrib- 
ute to  the  materials  of  its  idealized  lines  or  entities. 
It  contributes  only  to  the  form.  And  in  this  its  con- 
tribution is  suggested  by  perception  or  experience; 
it  only  follows  along  a  course  of  variation,  in  a  road, 
in  a  direction,  distinctly  pointed  out  by  real  experi- 
ence. It  simply  completes  an  approximation  or  pro- 
cess which  was  nearly  completed  by  perception.  It 
does  not  advance  to  the  idea  of  perfect  straightness 
independently,  of  itself,  without  guidance;  but  does  it 
by  following  a  line  of  gradation  clearly  and  fully 
revealed  to  it  by  sense.  If  now  we  consider  what 
imagination  owes  to  experience  of  both  matter  and 
guidance,  it  is  plain  that  there  is  nothing  left  which 
entitles  this  faculty  to  claim  real  originality.     If  it 


276  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE     KNOWLEDGE. 

produced  .the  idea  of  perfect  straightness  by  its  own 
motion  and  original  procedure,  without  having  set 
before  it  by  experience  the  gradation  that  carried  us 
nearly  to  perfect  straightness,  and  without  the  con- 
,stant  support  of  perceived  lines,  then  it  would  be  said 
with  some  right  to  be  creative:  but  as  the  case  stands, 
imagination  is  rather  only  a  remarkable  copyist. 

Here  rises  an  important  question  as  to  the  action 
of  the  imagination  regarding  mathematical  figures: 
What  moves  the  imagination  to  its  work  of  idealiza- 
,tion?  why  do  we  not  stop  with  the  figures  of  experi- 
ence? why  go  on  thus  beyond  the  reach  of  experi- 
ence? The  movement  is  undoubtedly  excited,  in  part 
at  least,  by  manifest  convenience,  by  practical  advan- 
tage or  necessity. 

In  our  ordinary  experience,  mechanical  conven- 
ience or  necessity  often  leads  us  to  form  as  fine  and 
straight  a  line,  or  as  perfect  a  surface,  as  possible;  and 
by  successive  efforts  we  may  make  a  marked  improve- 
ment on  our  first  attempt.  A  carpenter  by  repeated 
and  careful  effort  can  plane  to  a  straighter  edge,  can 
.make  a  surface  nearer  and  nearer  a  level.  Thus  we 
not  only  may  observe  the  gradation  of  straightness  in 
lines,  or  of  perfection  in  surfaces,  but  are  often  led  or 
compelled  by  our  experience  to  the  distinct  consider- 
ation and  appreciation  of  it.  The  advantages  of 
going  as  far  as  we  can,  in  perfecting  figures,  do  not 
cease  to  be  apparent  when  we  have  done  our  best, 
but  continue  apparent;  and  thus  form  a  stimulant  to 
the  imagination  to  push  on  beyond  the  range  of  expe- 
rience, in  the  direction  which  experience  reveals,  to 
the  geometrical  limits.  The  very  limits  of  experience 
iexcite  adventures  beyond  them.      In  cases,  it  is  mani- 


IMAGINATION.  277- 

fest  that  imagination  has  to  take  but  a  step,  and  not  a 
very  long  step,  beyond  experience. 

The  imagination  carries  on  such  idealization  in 
every  department  of  its  work,  and  not  in  the  mathe- 
matical only.  Its  office  is  not  simply  reconstruction 
or  rearrangement,  but  also  the  construction  of  the 
elements  given  to  it  in  more  perfect  forms  than  they 
ever  appeared  in  experience.  It  is  so  as  to  aesthetic 
and  moral  ideals.  But  this  idealization,  in  its  farthest 
and  most  perfect  advances,  is  made  in  lines  clearly 
indicated  by  experience.  Imagination  goes  beyond 
experience  because  experience  itself  distinctly  points 
out  the  road;  and  while  imagination  is,  as  was 
remarked  above,  a  leader  of  thought  and  Hfe,  yet  it  is 
itself  led  in  this  manner,  primitively,  by  experience. 
Thus  imagination  derives  from  experience  both  mate- 
rials and  direction;  and  on  these  two  gifts  all  its 
productions  are  dependent.  It  possesses  no  original- 
ity distinct  from  them. 

In  regard  to  the  causes  of  the  idealization  of  the 
imagination  or  the  impulses  behind  it,  they  are  the 
same,  in  general,  as  those  to  knowledge.  The  love  of 
unity,  and  wonder,  move  imagination  as  they  move 
our  original  acquisitive  powers.  The  conveniencies 
and  necessities  or  interests  of  life  are,  as  was  above 
noted,  to  be  considered.  Subjects  and  events  that  are 
important  in  history  as  causes  or  effects,  or  have 
marked  moral  qualities,  attract  the  imagination.  The 
Iliad  is  probably  based  on  great  real  events.  The 
importance  and  interest  of  these,  together  with  the 
impulse  to  give  them  unity,  to  fill  up  the  vacancies  of 
tradition,  and  to  glorify  the  whole,  moved  the  poetic 
imagination.     Paradise  Lost  is  based  on  events  of  the 


278  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF     KNOWLEDGE. 

greatest  moral  significance.     The  aim  of  the  poet  was 

the  highest,  to 

"assert  eternal  Providence 
And  justify  the  ways  of  God  to  men." 

Taking  the  limited  revelation  of  events  and  characters 
given  in  the  Scriptures,  he  has  wrought  them  into  a 
grand  idealized  whole,  filling  up  the  picture  from  his 
own  imagination.  The  limits  of  our  knowledge  of 
important  objects  and  events  excite  the  imagination 
to  make  excursions  beyond  them  and  to  supply  what 
appears  to  be  wanting. 


CHAPTER    IV. 
LOGICAL  THOUGHT. 

The  intellectual  processes  which  have  occupied  our 
attention  to  this  point  are  concerned  chiefly  with  the 
formation  of  individual  concrete  notions.  Percepts 
and  imaginations  are  the  representations  of  individual 
things  or  collections  of  individuals  taken  as  aggre- 
gates. We  now  advance  to  the  consideration  of  the 
most  complex  and  highest  operations  of  the  intellect, 
namely,  those  concerned  especially  with  the  compari- 
son of  individuals  and  the  formation  and  application 
of  general  abstract  notions  or  concepts. 

The  significance  of  this  advance  in  intellection  is 
manifest.  To  form  concrete  notions  out  of  the  pri- 
mary individual  affections  of  mind  is  the  first  and 
lower  stage  of  intellection.  As  a  stage  it  has  great 
distinct  importance.  It  carries  us  from  the  infinite 
multiplicity  of  the  single  phenomena  of  mind  to  defi- 
nite and  fixed  groups.  But  above  this  stage  of  intel- 
lection is  another.  Though  our  concrete  individual 
notions  constitute  a  remarkable  sum  of  groups  of  our 
primary  experiences,  still  these  groups  or  congeries, 
the  syntheses  of  perception  and  imagination,  are 
themselves  so  numerous  and  various  as  to  confound 
and  oppress  the  mind.  From  this  plane,  then,  the 
mind  rises  to  a  higher  range  of  synthesis,  to  the  col- 
lection of  our  concrete  notions  under  concepts  or 
class  notions,  or  the  objects  represented  by  them 
into  classes.     This  second  remarkable  move  of  the 

intellect  brings  the  greatest  relief  to  the  mind  by  the 
(  279 ) 


28o  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

comprehension  and  mastery  it  makes  possible  of  the 
infinity  of  objects  or  our  concrete  notions  of  them. 
Intellection  accordingly  has  two  main  stages.     Begin- 
ning with  our  diverse  primary  simple   experiences, 
sensations,   emotions,   and   volitions,   it,   in   the   first 
place,  combines  them  into  congeries  more  or  less  per- 
manent, the  notions  of  distinct  objects;   in  the  second 
place,  it  combines  these  concrete  notions  of  objects 
under  concepts,  or  collects  their  objects  into  classes. 
This  second  and  advanced  intellection  which  we 
have  now  to  examine  is  the  work  of  what  is  called  the 
Logical  Faculty,  Judgment,  or  the  Faculty  of  Com- 
parison.    The   operations   of  this   faculty   are    com- 
monly divided  into  three  species,  closely  related  and 
interdependent,  viz..  Conception,  Judgment,  and  Rea- 
soning.    The  first  has  to  do  with  the  formation  of 
general  notions  or  concepts;    the  others,  in  general, 
with  the  comparison  of  attributes,,  concretes,  and  con- 
cepts, and  the  detection  of  agreement  or  some  relation 
among  them.     These  three  operations,  however,  are 
fundamentally  the  same;    they  are  all  forms  of  judg- 
ment.    Judgment,  in  general,  is  the  cpmnarison  of 
things  and  the  cognition  of  resemblance  and  differ- 
ence.    TvOgical  conception,  judgment,  and  reasoning 
are  modes  of  comparison.  .  . 

But  as  comparison  or  judgment  seems  to  be  a  con- 
dition of  consciousness,  and  to  be  required  in  every 
species  of  knowledge,  it  becomes  important  to  deter- 
mine the  special  character  of  logical  judgment.  It 
has  been  already  seen  that  our  primary  experience, 
the  consciousness  of  the  elementary  individual  affec- 
tions of  mind,  implies  judgment.  Consciousness 
seems  to  awake  in  the  act  of  discriminatiop.  We  are 
conscious  of  an  affection  in  the  consciousness, of  its 


LOGICAL     THOUGHT.  28 1 

difl'erence  from  another  or  others.  The  single  affec- 
tion does  not  owe  its  character  to  the  contrast;  it  has 
its  own  original,  independent  character,  and  thereby 
makes  comparison  on  one  side  possible;  but  it  is 
known  in  its=  independent  character  only  as  it  is  con- 
trasted with  others.  In  the  consciousness  of  this 
affection  of  mind,  we  tacitly  judge  it  is  not  that. 
When  we  pass  from  the  elementary  states  of  mind  to 
concrete  ones,  perceptions  and  representations,  we 
find  that  comparison,  discrimination,  and  judgments 
take  place  likewise  in  the  consciousness  of  them. 

The  comparison  or  judgment  required  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  elementary  experiences,  and  of  the 
perceptive  and  representative  syntheses,  has  this 
peculiarity:  it  regards  the  differences  of  things  rather 
than  the  resemblances.  Its  tendency  is  not  to  com- 
bine the  things  compared,  but  to  perfect  their  individ- 
ualization. Every  primary  affection,  and  also,  there- 
fore, every  complex,  has  its  own  character,  which  it 
reveals  in,  but  does  not  derive  from,  comparison. 
Some  comparison  being  necessary  for  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  simple  and  complex  modes,  continued 
comparison  of  them,  especially  as  to  their  differences,' 
brings  out  their  independent  character  fully,  separates 
them  distinctly  from  one  another,  makes  their  bound- 
ing lines  clear  —  in  a  word,  intensifies  the  conscious- 
ness of  their  individuality. 

The  judgment  strictly  of  the  logical  faculty  differs 
from  that  of  the  primary  consciousness  and  intellec- 
tion in  having  respect  to  the  resemblances  of  objects 
rather  than  to  the  differences.  True,  the  cognition  of 
resemblance  always  accompanies  that  of  difference, 
and  of  difference  that  of  resemblance;  but  logical 
intellection  does  not  mark  the  differences  or  disagree- 


282  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

mcnts  of  things  so  much  as  the  agreements.  It  does 
not  tend  to  individualize,  but  to  assimilate,  or  to  com- 
bine individuals  by  their  common  qualities.  Accord- 
ingly it  unites  objects,  on  the  basis  of  their  agree- 
ment, into  classes;  and  from  known  agreements  infers 
unknown. 

Let  us  proceed  to  consider  more  particularly  the 
processes  of  the  logical  faculty,  according  to  the  com- 
mon classification  of  conception,  judgment,  and  rea- 
soning. It  should  be  first  remarked  that  the  logical 
faculty  has  to  do  immediately  only  with  the  simple 
and  complex  modes  of  mind,  not  with  the  external 
things  or  the  things  represented  or  revealed  by  them. 
There  is,  no  doubt,  the  assumption  that  the  subjective 
modes,  in  very  many  instances,  resemble  or  corre- 
spond to  external  things;  we  speak  of  the  things  as  if 
they  were  immediately  con.sidered;  but  we  in  fact 
immediately  consider  only  the  modes  of  the  mind, 
conscious  at  the  same  time  of  their  reference  to  things. 
With  the  truthfulness  of  this  reference,  however,  or 
the  degree  and  manner  of  the  correspondence  of  the 
subjective  states  to  things,  the  logical  processes  in 
general  have  nothing  directly  to  do;  although  indeed 
the  external  reference  is,  in  itself,  one  of  the  most 
important  and  extraordinary  acts  of  the  logical  fac- 
ulty, a  most  remarkable  leap  of  the  mind  from  the 
known  to  the  unknown.  Locke's  definition  of  knowl- 
edge, as  being  "the  perception  of  the  connexion  and 
agreement  or  disagreement  and  repugnancy  of  any 
of  our  ideas,"  is  more  fitly  the  definition  of  logical 
intellection. 

But  though  the  subjective  modes  or  notions  are 
the  things  primarily  considered  in  logical  intellection, 
as  in  intellection  in  general,  we  must  yet  recognize 


LOGICAL     THOUGHT.  283 

also,  in  addition  to  the  confident  objective  reference  of 
very  many  of  these  notions,  the  fact  that  words,  Hke 
signs  in  algebra,  are  very  often  employed  in  logical 
thought  when  there  is  a  faint  or  very  inadequate  con- 
sciousness of  the  notions  signified  by  them.  Words 
are  used,  as  signs,  for  notions.  Among  words, 
thoughts,  and  extcrnci  things,  there  are  certain  intimate 
and  very  remarkable  relations.  Thoughts  are  formed 
to  things,  words  to  thoughts,  and  the  sciences  of  the 
three  mingle  with  one  another  in  a  curious  and  inter- 
esting manner.  "Signs,  thoughts  and  exterior 
objects,'."  says  Professor  Jcvons,  ''may  be  regarded  as 
parallel  and  analogous  series  of  phenomena,  and  to 
treat  any  one  of  the  three  series  is  equivalent  to  treat- 
ing either  of  the  other  series."  ^ 

Conception  is  the  cognition  of  a  quality  or  quali- 
ties in  which  a  number  of  things  agree,  or  as  common 
to  them.  The  product  of  the  cognition  is  called  a 
general  notion  or  a  concept.  For  example,  we 
observe  the  difterent  kinds  of  triangles,  equilateral, 
isosceles,  scalene,  and  cognize  the  common  property, 
three-sidedness,  with  the  inseparable  property,  trian- 
gularity. The  cognition  of  these  properties  as  com- 
mon to  the  different  triangles,  is  conception.  The 
result  is  the  concept  triangle,  the  notion  constituted 
by  the  two  inseparable  properties. 

There  are  three  main  species  of  notions  which 
should  be  distinguished  from  one  another,  in  order 
clearly  to  cognize  each  of  them.  These  are  the  indi- 
vidual abstract  notion,  the  individual  concrete  notion, 
and  the  general  notion  or  concept;  or  the  notion  of 
an  attribute,  the  notion  of  a  concrete  object,  and  the 


(i)  Principles  of  Science,  p.  9. 


284  THE      PRINCIPLES      OE      KNOWLEDGE. 

notion  of  the  attribute  or  attributes  in  which  a  num- 
ber of  things  are  seen  to  agre^.  The  coficept  implies" 
a  reference  to  a  plurality  of  things.  : 

Conception  requires  comparison  and  abstractioii. 
We  cognize  the  commbri  properties  of  a  number  of 
objects  only  by  comparing  the  objects-.  In  compari- 
son we  discern  these  properties.  By  fixing  attenti^in 
upon  them  they  are  abstracted  in  thought  from  the 
other  properties  of  the  concrete  things  compared,  and 
especially' unified.  The  result  is  a  concept.  As  to 
abstraction,  however,  we  must  not  affirm,  that  there 
is  absolute- severance  in  thought  of  the  attributes' 
comprehended  in  the  concept  from  the  attributes  not 
comprehended;  but  only  that  attention  is  chiefly  con-* 
centrated  on  the  former.  The'mrrid  can  distinguish 
attributes  whidi  are  inseparable  in  existence  and 
thought,  and  attend  16  one  more  fiilly  by  partial  neg- 
lect of  the  others!  The  concept  bieing  in  this  manner 
the  product  of  comparisori,  may  be  regarded  as  a  con- 
densation of  judgments,  into  which  it  may  be  again 
explicated.  •  ' 

It  shourd,*howev^r,  be  carefiilly  observed  of  con- 
cepts that,  though  they 'are  spoken  of  as  distinct 
notions  of  distinct  attributesrthey  can  not  be  pictured; 
represented,  or  realized  in  thought,  in  this  separate 
character,  or  as  absolute:  A  concept  can  be  realized 
in  thought  only  as  the  notion  of  an  attribute  or  attri- 
butes of  one  of  the  individual  things  classified  by  it.' 
The  concept  triangle  can  be  pictured  only  as  a  part 
of  the  concrete  notion  of  some  particular  triangle. 

'Connected 'with  tb^  formation  of  concepts  is  the 
significant  fact  of  naming  them.  The  importance  of 
names  consists  chiefly  in  giving  permanency  to  con- 
cepts.    On  this   Sir  W.   Hamilton  remarks:     "The 


LOGICAL-     THOUGHT.  285 

.concept  thus  forn:^ed  by  ,an^  abstractipn  pf  the  resem- 
bling from  the  non-resembHng  quahtie,s,  pi  objects, 
, would  again  fall  back  into  the  confusion  and  iphnitude 
from  which  it  has  been  called  out,  were  it  not  rendered 
.permanent  for  cons^ciousness  by  being  fixed  and  rati- 
fied in  a  verbal  sign."  i  These  verbal  signs  are  class- 
names. 

It  has  been  long  an  important  matter  of  contro- 
versy among  philosophers,  in  what  the;  generality  of 
concepts  really  consists.  Of  later  philosophers,  some 
have  held  that,  as  a  concept  can  not  be  represented 
in  thought  as  something  separate  or  apart,  but  can 
,only  be  a  portion  of  the  representation  of  one  of  the 
individuals  belonging  to  its  class,  concepts  have  no 
generality  at  all,  and  that  the  only  general  things  are 
names.  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  says:  "General  concepts, 
therefore,  we  have,  properly  speaking,  none;  we  have 
only  complex  ideas  of  objects  in  the  concrete;  but  we 
are  able  to  attend  exclusively  to  certain  parts  of  the 
concrete  idea;  and  by  that  exclusive  attention  we 
enable  those  parts  to  determine  exclusively  the  course 
of  our  thoughts  as  subsequently  called  up  by  associa- 
tion; and  are  in  a  condition  to  carry  on  a  train  of 
meditation  or  reasoning  relating  to  those  parts  only, 
exactly  as  if  we  were  able  to  conceive  them  separately 
from  the  rest.  What  principally  enables  us  to  do  this 
is  the  employment  of  signs,  and  particularly  the  most 
efficient  and  familiar  kind  of  signs,  viz.,  Names."^ 
A  name  may  call  up  any  of  the  individuals  of  the  class 
denoted  by  it,  1)ut  forms  a  specially  close  association 


(t)  Logic,  pp.  97,  98. 

(2)   Exam.  Hamilton,  II..  p.  63. 


286  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

with  the  cominon  attribute  or  attributes  contained  in 
the  concept  of  the  class. 

This  theory  makes  no  essential  difference  between 
an  individual  abstract  notion  and  a  concept.  The 
concept  is  but  an  abstract  notion  of  one  or  more 
attributes  of  an  individual  thing.  This  view  does  not 
seem  to  answer  to  the  facts.  A  concept  must  be 
allowed  to  possess  a  species  of  generality  in  itself.  It 
has  a  manifest  reference  not  only  to  a  single  thing,  but 
to  a  plurality.  And  it  is  only  the  generality  of  con- 
cepts that  can  lead  to,  or  account  for.  the  generality 
of  names.  Names,  no  doubt,  greatly  support  thought 
in  the  retention  and  use  of  concepts,  and  in  successive 
ascents  in  generalization;  but  yet  they  follow  the 
lead  of  thought.  They  do  not  become  general  with- 
out thought,  but  only  because  of  the  generality  of 
thought.  A  name  is  made  general  as  the  effect  and 
the  sign  of  the  generality  of  thought. 

"Their  whole  generality,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
of  concepts,  "consists  in  this,  —  that  though  we  must 
realize  them  in  thought  under  some  singular  of  the 
class,  we  may  do  it  under  any."  "Concepts  have  only 
a  potential,  not  an  actual,  universality;  that  is,  they 
are  only  universal,  inasmuch  as  they  may  be  applied 
to  any  of  a  certain  class  of  objects,  but  as  actually 
applied  they  are  no  longer  general  attributions,  but 
only  special  attributes."  "They  fall  back  into  more 
special  determinations  of  the  individual  object  in 
which  they  are  represented."  ^ 

As  to  the  fact  that  a  concept  can  only  be  actually 
represented  as  a  part  of  the  notion  of  some  individual 
of  its  class,  there  appears  to  be  general  agreement. 


(i)  Logic,  pp.  92,  97,  96. 


LOGICAL     THOUGHT.  287 

The  chief  matter  is,  what  is  the  character  or  power  of 
the    concept    when    so    represented?      The    concept, 
though  pictnrable  only  as  a  part  of  the  representation 
of  an  indivickial.  is  distinctly  something  more  than  a 
mere  part  of  the  individual  notion,  or  than  an  abstract 
idea.     It  is  still  truly  a  general  abstract  idea.     It  is  so 
because  it  bears  a  positive  reference  to  other  individ- 
uals  besides   the   one   in    the   notion   of  which   it   is 
included.     It  not  only  may  be,  but  actually  is,  applied 
to  others.      In  the  representation  of  a  concept,  there 
is.   with  the  image   of  some   individual   owning   the 
(jualilies  comprehended  by  the  concept,  at  the  same 
time  the  consciousness,  faint  it  may  be,  but  certain, 
of  images  of  other  individuals  owning  the  same  quali- 
ties with  perhaps  differences  of  mode.     The  concept 
realized  in  the  notion  of  a  particular  individual  refers 
to,  or  recalls,  v.ith  more  or  less  distinctness,  notions 
of  other  individuals  possessing  the  common  qualities; 
recalling  with  more  vividness  the  common  qualities 
with  their  differences  of  mode.     The  concept  may 
not  only  be  realized  in  any  one  of  its  singulars,  but 
when  realized  recalls  others  of  the  singulars.     The 
concept  triangle  may  be  represented  in  the  image  of  a 
particular  equilateral  triangle;   but  with  the  represen- 
tation, there  is  simultaneously  the  consciousness  of 
other  individuals  of  the  class,  and  especially  of  their 
quality   of   three-sidedness   with    diversity   of   mode. 
The  concept  or  general  abstract  notion  differs  from 
the  individual  abstract  in  thus  reviving  in  representa- 
tion the  association  of  an  individual  of  a  class  with  its 
fellows,  calling  special  attention  to  the  class-qualities; 
and    this    generality    of    concepts    is    the    necessary 
ground  of  the  generality  of  names. 


288  the;    principles    qf    knowledge. 

What  are  the  requisite  conditions  and  the  occasion 
of  forming  general  notions?  All  the  conditions  are 
given  in  experience  and  the  ordinary  powers  of  the 
mind.  The  matter  of  concepts  is  supplied  from  the 
notions  of  individual  concretes.  Concepts  are  made 
of  the  common  qualities  of  individuals.  The  unity  of 
concepts  has  nothing  more  mysterious  in  it  than  the 
unity  of  perceptions.  The  cognition  of  the  relations 
among  individuals,  of  the  resemblances  and  differ- 
ences, is  no  extraordinary  intellection.  Generaliza- 
tion is  a  distinct  advance  in  synthesis  beyond  percep- 
tion and  representation;  but  it  requires  no  faculty  to 
supply  new  material  to  thought,  no  high  ''a  priori" 
regulating  law  or  laws,  no  forms  which  impart  extra- 
ordinary attributes  to  thought.  In  generalization  the 
■mind  is  commonly  impelled  to  the  work.  What 
impels,  however,  is  emotion,  and  not  any  extraordi- 
nary regulating,  divining,  knowing  principle  or 
instinct.  The  emotions  that  concern  themselves  with 
generalization  are  the  same  as  those  already  ^noticed 
as  standing  behind  intellection  in  general,  —  the  love 
of  unity,  the  relief  to  the  mind  in  acquiring- mastery 
of  the  multiplicity  and  variety  of  objects  presented  to 
it,  etc.  But  no  emotion  impels  or  leads  the  mind  in 
the  first  acts  of  conception  and  generahzation.  These 
acts  are,  so"  to  speak,  pure  intuitions,  the  direct  recog- 
nitions of  the  relations  of  presentations  and  represen- 
tations; not  made  or  occasioned  by  any  impulse  or 
directive  law,  but  exciting,  when  made,  emotions 
which  act  in  turn  on  the  logical  processes  and  confirm 
and  urge  them  on.  Even  abstraction  has  been 
referred  by  some  to  a  '"native"  intellectual  impulse. 
Such  an  assumption  seems  gratuitous.  Making  a 
particular  attribute  of  an   individual,   or  a  common 


LOGICAL     THOUGHT.  289 

attribute  of  a  number  of  individuals,  a  special  object 
of  attention,  is  only  ordinary,  experiential  action  of 
mind. 

The  reverse  of  the  common  doctrine  of  the  gen- 
eral notion  or  concept  is  held  by  Hegel.  He  con- 
tends that  the  notion,  instead  of  being  derived  from 
individuals,  is  itself,  on  the  contrary,  the  prius  and 
entity  from  which  individuals  are  evolved  by  dialectic 
development.  The  notion  is  not  an  abstraction  from 
individuals,  but  individuals  are  the  product  of  the 
self-active  evolving  notion.  "It  is  a  mistake,"  he 
says,  "to  suppose  that  by  the  operation  of  abstraction, 
and  by  colligating  the  points  possessed  in  common 
by  the  objects,  our  agency  frames  the  notions  of  them. 
Rather  the  notion  is  the  genuine  first,  and  things  are 
what  they  are  through  the  action  of  the  notion,  imma- 
nent in  them,  and  revealing  itself  in  them."  i 

We  pass  to  the  consideration  of  Judgment.  "To 
Judge,"  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  "is  to  recognize  the 
relation  of  congruence  or  of  confliction,  in  which  two 
concepts,  two  individual  things,  or  a  concept  and  an 
individual,  compared  together,  stand  to  each  other. 
This  recognition  considered  as  an  internal  conscious- 
ness is  called  a  Judgment;  considered  as  expressed 
in  language,  it  is  called  a  Proposition  or  Predication.^'  2 

Judgment,  as  was  above  observed,  is  implied  in  all 
consciousness  and  intellection,  because  we  know  an 
elementary  affection  of  mind  or  any  synthesis  of  such 
affections,  only  by  discriminating  it  from  others.  We 
cognize  that  this  or  that  is  an  affection  of  mind  or 
that  this  or  that  is  the  quality  of  an  individual.  Such 
judgments  may  be  simple  perceptions  or  representa- 


(i)  Logic  (Wallace,  ist  ed.),  p.  253.  (2)  Logic,  p.   159 

(19) 


290  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

tions;  they  may  tend  only  to  make  the  character  of 
individuals  more  distinct,  or  to  perfect  their  individ- 
ualization. Logical  judgment,  strictly  so-called,  does 
not  emphasize  or  perfect  the  individuality  of  the 
things  considered  in  it,  and  keep  them  apart;  but 
holds  them  together  in  comparison,  regarding  espe- 
cially their  relative  character. 

Judgments  announced  are  propositions.  To 
propositions,  it  is  affirmed  by  many,  truth  and  false- 
hood belong;  or,  that  the  terms  true  and  false  are 
applicable  to  the  relations  of  our  notions  to  one 
another,  rather  than  to  the  relations  of  our  notions 
to  the  things  which  they  represent.  This  is  in  con- 
formity with  the  principle  noticed  already,  that  the 
logical  faculty  is  concerned  immediately  with  the 
modes  and  representations  of  the  mind,  and  not  with 
the  represented  realities;  although  the  correspon- 
dence of  subjective  modes  with  outer  realities  is  con- 
fidently assumed.  We  may  conveniently  distinguish 
between  logical  or  formal  and  real  truth;  regarding 
the  former  as  the  conformity  of  notions  to  one 
another,  the  latter  as  the  conformity  of  notions  to 
realities. 

Reasoning  is  a  special  mode  of  judgment;  it  is,  in 
general,  the  comparison  of  two  notions  by  means  of  a 
third.  There  is  especially  in  reasoning  the  supposi- 
tion of  an  agreement  or  relation  which  has  not  been 
observed,  on  the  ground  of  an  agreement  or  relation 
which  has  been;  and  the  proof  or  verification  of  the 
supposition.  Two  kinds  of  reasoning  are  commonly 
recognized,  Induction  and  Deduction.  The  former 
is  reasoning  from  particulars  to  generals;  the  latter  is 
reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars.  They  are 
very  closely  related.     It  has  been  maintained  that  a 


LOGICAL      THOUGHT.  29 1 

third,  and  the  fundamental,  type  is  reasoning  from 
particulars  to  particulars.  "All  inference,"  says  Mr. 
J.  S.  Mill,  "is  from  particulars  to  particulars."  i 

A  primary  mode  of  valid  reasoning  is  as  follows: 
A  number  of  things  that  have  the  attributes  A,  B,  C, 
have  also  the  attribute  D.  A  certain  other  thing 
agrees  with  them  in  having  the  attributes  A,  B,  C; 
it  therefore  has  the  attribute  D.  The  distinctive  char- 
acteristic of  this  and  of  everv  instance  of  reasoning  is 
the  leap  of  thought  from  the  observed  to  the  unob- 
served, from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  Judgment 
may  concern  itself  with  what  has  been  observed;  but 
in  reasoning  judgment  advances  from  observed 
agreements  or  relations  to  unobserved,  or,  in  general, 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  From  the  com- 
parison of  the  observed  fall  of  bodies  near  the  earth 
with  the  observed  fall  of  the  moon,  the  mind  of  New- 
ton sprang  to  the  supposition  that  the  motion  of  the 
remote  body  was  governed  by  the  same  force  and 
law  as  that  of  the  near  ones.  This  supposition  and 
the  verification  of  it,  together  with  the  farther  infer- 
ences to  which  it  immediately  led,  are  reckoned  the 
most  extraordinary  achievement  of  human  reason. 
From  the  observed  similarity  of  the  appearances  of 
lightning  and  electricity,  Franklin  made  and  verified 
the  happy  conjecture  that  lightning  is  electricity. 

Here  rises  an  interesting  and  important  question 
for  epistemology:     What  is  the  cause,  ground,  prin- 


(i)  Logic,  Sth  (Amer.)  ed.,  p.  146. 

■'The  most  general  type  of  reasoning  is  to  infer  from  one 
particular  fact  to  another  particular  fact  of  the  same  kind;  the 
likeness  being^both  the  means  of  suggestion  and  the  justification 
of  the  transfer  of  properties."     (Bain,  Logic,  p.  8.) 


292  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

ciple,  of  this  peculiar  movement  of  the  mind  in  reason- 
ing, —  of  the  leap  of  thought,  the  anticipation,  the 
presumption,  going  beyond  the  known  to  the 
unknown?  On  this  question,  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
remarks:  "When  our  experience  has  revealed  to  us  a 
certain  correspondence  among  a  number  of  objects, 
we  are  determined,  by  an  original  principle  of  our 
nature,  to  suppose  the  existence  of  a  m^ore  extensive 
correspondence  than  our  observation  has  already 
proved,  or  may  ever  be  able  to  establish.  This  ten- 
dency to  generalize  our  knowledge  by  the  judgment, 
—  that  where  much  has  been  found  accordant,  all  will 
be  found  accordant,  —  is  not  properly  a  conclusion 
deduced  from  premises,  but  an  original  principle  of 
our  nature,  which  we  may  call  that  of  Logical,  or  per- 
haps better,  that  of  Philosophical,  Presumption."  i  Mr. 
J.  S.  Mill  says  on  the  same  question:  "We  conclude 
from  known  instances  to  unknown  by  the  impulse  of 
the  generalizing  propensity."  2  By  "logical  pre- 
sumption" and  the  "generalizing  propensity,"  these 
writers  seem  to  mean  the  same  thing,  namely,  the 
belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature. 

There  appear  to  be  two  principal  causes  of  the 
presumption  in  reasoning.  The  first  cause  are  the 
laws  of  association  of  ideas,  especially  the  laws  of 
resemblance  and  contiguity;    the  second  is  the  con- 


(i)  Logic,  p.  450.  In  the  following,  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
appears  to  identify  the  principle  of  "Logical  Presumption"  with 
the  "instinctive"  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature:  "Applied 
Induction  rests  on  the  constancy,  the  uniformity  of  nature,  and 
on  the  instinctive  expectation  we  have  of  this  stability.  This 
constitutes  what  has  been  called  the  principle  of  Logical  Pre- 
sumption."    (Logic,  p.  451.) 

(2)     Logic,  p.   154- 


I.OGICAL,     THOUGHT.  293 

viction  of  the  uniformity  and  constancy  of  nature. 
Our  first  inferences  are  probably  solely  the  sugges- 
tions of  association;  and  in  such  a  manner  as  this: 
A  concrete  individual,  B,  is  perceived  to  resemble 
another  concrete,  A,  in  the  possession  of  certain 
attributes.  We  surmise,  without  perceiving,  that  B 
resembles  A  also  in  the  possession  of  some  other  par- 
ticular attribute,  which  we  have  already  observed  A  to 
possess,  and  which  is  probably,  for  some  cause,  con- 
spicuous or  notable.  The  surmise  is  the  effect  of  the 
laws  of  association.  Having  really  perceived  the  par- 
ticular attribute  in  A,  in  association  with  the  attri- 
butes common  to  both  A  and  B,  when  we  perceive  B 
the  thought  of  the  particular  attribute  is  called  up 
because  the  attribute  has  been  already  perceived  in 
association  with  the  common  attributes  as  existing 
in  A.  The  central  part  or  act  in  inference  is  the 
spontaneous  association  of  ideas. 

The  second  great  cause  of  the  presumption  in 
reasoning  or  inference  is  the  belief  in  the  uniformity 
and  stability  of  nature.  There  is  a  significant  differ- 
ence among  psychologists  as  to  the  character  or  origin 
of  this  belief.  Some,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  regard  it 
as  an  innate  or  original  tendency  of  the  mind ;  not  as 
dependent  upon,  but  as  independent  of,  the  experi- 
ence or  perception  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  and  as 
therefore  leading  us  in  particular  instances  to  expect 
or  anticipate  uniformity  before  uniformity  has  been 
perceived.  Others  hold  that  the  belief  rises  out  of,  or 
is  wholly  occasioned  by,  the  experiential  knowledge 
of  the  uniformity  of  nature;  that  it  is  not  an  original 
principle  of  the  mind  operating  before  or  indepen- 
dently of  such  knowledge,  and  leading  us  to  presume 


294  '^'HE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

or  anticipate  uniformity,  but  arises  upon  the  knowl- 
edge of  uniformity,  and  grows  in  strength  with  the 
increase  of  knowledge. 

The  latter  theory  seems  to  be  in  greater  harmony 
with   the   facts.     That    nature   is    uniform,   becomes 
indeed  a  powerful  conviction  of  the  mind;   but  it  is  a 
conviction   which  is   excited  and  developed  by  the 
previous  frequent   cognitions   of  the   similarity   and 
agreement  in  nature.     It  does  not  precede  all  such 
cognitions  and  lead  or  urge  the  mind  on  to  them,  or 
enable  the  logical  faculty  to  make  them,  or  make  them 
itself;  but  is  itself  excited  first  by  them;  though  when 
thus  excited  it  becomes  an  impelling  force  to  the  mak- 
ing of  inferences.     The  first  cognitions  of  the  uni- 
formity of  nature  are  purely  experiential.     We  cog- 
nize resemblances  simply  as  they  exist,  and  because 
they  exist,  by  the  pure  experiential  intuition  and  syn- 
thesis of  the  comparative  faculty.     The  mind  at  first 
perceives  instances  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  with- 
out being  in  the  least  influenced  by  any  instinctive 
expectation  of  uniformity.     The  discovery  or  infer- 
ence of  the  similarities  of  nature  is,  therefore,  at  first  a 
pure  act  of  comparison  and  association,  to  which  the 
feelings  of  pleasure,  relief,  assurance,  attach  them- 
selves. 

The  great  fact  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  we  soon 
begin  in  our  experience  to  observe.  We  rapidly  per- 
ceive that  "objects  though  infinite  in  number  are  not 
infinite  in  variety";  that  there  is  not  total  diversity  in 
the  qualities  and  relations  of  things,  that  the  world  is 
not  a  chaos  of  unlikenesses  and  fortuitous  concur- 
rences, but  that  there  is  much  uniformity  and  perma- 
nence of  quality  and  conjunction.     Then,  on  occasion 


LOGICAL,     THOUGHT.  295 

of  these  experimental  cognitions,  rises  the  propensity 
to  expect,  anticipate,  presume,  uniformity  where  it 
has  not  been  perceived  or  greater  uniformity  than  has 
been  perceived. 


CHAPTER    V. 

LANGUAGE  AND  SYMBOLS. 

Language  is  not  in  the  strict  sense  the  product  of 
a  peculiar  faculty  of  mind  and  knowledge;  but  its 
relations  to  the  chief  intellectual  operations  are  of 
such  importance  that  it  deserves  consideration  by  the 
side  of  these  operations. 

The  most  conspicuous  use  of  language  is  as  a 
medium  for  the  communication  of  thought.  But  it  is 
of  equal  importance,  as  already  in  part  indicated,  to 
the  inner  processes  of  thought,  especially  in  their  most 
advanced  stages.  The  relation  of  language  to  the 
subjective  operations  will  be  chiefly  considered  here. 

1.  The  first  service  of  language  to  be  noticed  is 
the  great  support  it  gives  to  memory  in  the  preserva- 
tion and  reproduction  of  knowledge.  The  names  of 
general  ideas  especially  become  by  association  closely 
attached  to  the  ideas,  and  are  used  by  memory  as 
signs  and  registers  of  the  ideas.  To  such  terms  cling 
a  great  many  concrete  ideas. 

2.  Language  greatly  abbreviates  thought.  This 
it  does  by  giving  us  symbols  which  we  may  use  for 
perceptions  and  concepts  without  thinking  of  their 
content,  or  of  anything  more  than  a  small  part  of  their 
content.  Thought  would  be  very  laborious  and  slow, 
if  we  were  obliged  to  bring  up  the  whole  or  most  of 
the  matter  of  our  ideas  when  we  employ  them,  or 
could  never  think  securely  and  safely  without 
doing  so. 

3.  But  the  greatest  service  of  language  is  the  aid 
f  296) 


LANGUAGE  AND  SYMBOLS.  297 

it  gives  to  thought  in  its  farthest  reaches  and 
advancement.  Language  is  not  necessary  for  the 
existence  of  thought.  We  can  perceive,  remember, 
imagine,  generalize  without  it;  but  the  highest  oper- 
ations of  the  imagination  and  the  generalizing  facul- 
ties are  impossible  without  it. 

Let  us  observe,  first,  how  language  and  symbols 
support  the  imagination  and  enable  us  to  handle  in 
thought  objects  which  imagination  may  partially,  but 
not  wholly,  represent.  There  are  objects  which  the 
imagination  may  picture  in  part,  but  not  wholly, 
either  because  of  their  great  extent,  or  because  of 
their  great  complexity  or  multiplicity  of  parts.  Space 
and  time  are  examples  of  the  former;  a  chiliagon,  or 
polygon  of  a  thousand  sides,  of  the  latter.  The 
imagination  may  employ  also  more  perfect  things 
than  it  can  actually  or  perfectly  picture;  as  mathe- 
matical figures.  The  imagination  can  easily  picture 
a  volume  of  space.  The  largest  representable  volume 
is  difificult  to  tell;  it  doubtless  varies  with  the  imagina- 
tive capacity  of  individuals;  but,  in  any  case,  it  is  very 
small  compared  with  the  vast  spaces  that  are  taken 
account  of  b)'-  all  minds  of  ordinary  cultivation.  Men 
talk  intelligently  of  the  dimensions  of  the  earth,  of  the 
distance  of  the  moon,  of  the  sun,  of  the  fixed  stars; 
and  yet  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  any  human  imagina- 
tion to  picture  these  great  lengths.  Imagination 
may  run  out  along  these  lines,  but  with  its  utmost 
struggles  to  proceed,  to  hold  on  to  what  it  has  gone 
over,  and  to  reach  over  more,  it  soon  finds  its  limits. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  it  in  regard  to  time.  We 
talk  of  ages  and  long  stretches  of  time;  while  the 
largest  capacity  to  imagine  duration  is  limited  to  a 
comparatively  small  number  of  years.     Likewise  with 


298  THE     PRINCIPLES     OE     KNOWLEDGE. 

objects  of  numerous  parts  or  phases,  and  large  collec- 
tions of  individuals.  We  can  easily  picture  a  poly- 
gon of  a  few  sides.  But  increase  in  the  number  of  the 
sides  does  not  proceed  far  until  it  passes  beyond  the 
Cc'pacity  of  representation.  And  yet  we  reason  cor- 
rectly and  securely  about  any  polygon  until  its  sides 
become  by  division  infinite  in  number  and  infinitesi- 
mal in  size,  and  it  is  transmuted,  if  it  be  a  regular  one, 
into  a  circle.  It  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  imagina- 
tion to  picture  a  very  considerable  number  of  parts  or 
individuals  of  an}'^  kind;  as  a  thousand  coins,  horses, 
acres. 

Now,  as  there  is  nothing  more  common  in  life 
than  to  deal  with  or  reason  about  magnitudes  and 
numbers  of  individual  objects  which  are  greatly 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  imaginative  or  representative 
power,  it  becomes  an  interesting  question  to  consider 
how  the  mind  is  able  to  do  this.  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  the  aid  language  and  signs,  especially  the 
signs  of  arithmetical  numeration,  give  to  the  mind. 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  first,  that  our  power  to  han- 
dle immeasurable  quantities  is  always  dependent 
chiefly  upon  our  power  to  picture  small  quantities. 
We  go  from  the  imaginable  to  the  unimaginably  great 
or  the  infinite.  For  instance,  we  can  deal  intelli- 
gently and  easily  with  unpicturable  space  or  spaces 
and  magnitudes  only  on  the  basis  of  our  pictures  of 
hmited  ones.  From  such  basis,  then,  the  mind  must 
in  all  cases  proceed.  How  does  it  proceed?  By  the 
aid  of  symbols  and  the  law  of  numerical  notation. 
Grant  that  the  mind  can  picture  an  expanse  of  a  thou- 
sand miles  in  diameter,  such  as  might  be  seen  from 
the  top  of  a  very  high  mountain,  and  that  this  is  the 
limit   of  the   imaginative   power.     The   mind   is   yet 


LANGUAGE  AND  SYMBOLS.  299 

capable  of  dealing  in  thought  with  an  expanse  of  10, 
TOO,  or  1,000  thousand  miles  in  diameter,  by  means 
of  these  symbols  and  the  decimal  law  with  which  they 
are  arranged.  Any  space  or  dimensions  increasing 
regularly  by  a  certain  principle  can  be  followed  by 
thought  in  its  increase  to  any  extent  after  this  increase 
ceases  to  be  picturable.  Thought  is  supported  in  its 
flight  by  the  numerical  symbols  and  law.  The  mind 
does  not  picture  the  increase,  but  clearly  sees  its  rate. 
It  reasons  confidently  of  the  increase,  however  great 
it  may  be,  because  it  knows  that  it  is  the  regular  mul- 
tiplication of  an  imaginable  quantity  denoted  by  a  cer- 
tain symbol;  and  may  be  itself  imaginable  if  taken  in 
parts,  one  part  at  a  time.  In  other  words,  the  largest 
magnitudes  are  easily  thought  of,  because  the  symbol 
or  figure  which  stands  for  an  imaginable  part  of  them 
holds  a  very  definite,  clear  and  intelligible  relation,  in 
position  and  value,  to  the  symbol  or  figures  which 
stand  for  them. 

The  same  principles  apply  to  our  thought  of  great 
lengths  of  time,  and  of  objects  having  many  identical 
parts,  and  large  collections  of  individuals.  In  all  its 
extreme  flights  representative  thought  supports  itself 
by  a  system  of  notation  in  which  the  characters  have  a 
perfectly  distinct  and  most  easily  intelligible  relative 
place  and  value.  It  deserves  to  be  remarked  here  that 
these  flights  should  not  be  called  the  operations  of 
pure  thought.  They  are  possible  only  on  the  ground 
of  our  actual  experience.  They  have  in  all  cases  the 
support  of  the  perceptible  and  imaginable.  They  are 
the  repetitions  of  experience  arranged  in  a  series  in 
one  direction.  So  much  for  the  importance  of  sym- 
bols to  our  thinking  of  individuals  possessing  unpic- 


300  THE      PRINCIPIvES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

turable  dimensions,  or  innumerable  parts  or  phases, 
and  of  multitudes  of  individuals. 

We  pass  to  notice,  in  the  second  place,  the  impor- 
tance of  symbols  to  the  judgment  and  generalizing 
faculty.  Here  language  is  of  primary  importance  to 
the  preservation,  abbreviation,  and  advancement  of 
thought.  Language  is  not  indispensable  to  the  gen- 
eralizing power;  but  advanced  generalizations  are 
impossible  without  its  aid.  The  first  step  or  steps  in 
classification  take  the  mind  from  the  familiar  and 
clear  region  of  the  concrete,  into  the  region  of  the 
abstract  and  general.  Now  if  thought  had  no  means 
of  fixing  its  act  or  movement,  it  could  hardly  make  a 
permanent  advance.  It  would  lose  its  step  and  fall 
back  to  the  place  of  the  original  concretes  from  which 
it  started.  But  if  by  some  symbol  or  word  the  mind 
pretty  accurately  marks  the  advance,  it  makes  it  more 
certainly  a  possession  of  the  memory.  Further,  the 
word  becomes  a  means  of  great  abbreviation,  because 
it  enables  us  to  deal  with  the  general  or  class  at  once 
without  going  through  the  long  labor  of  calling  up  all 
or  many  members  of  the  class;  and,  especially  by 
registering  and  abbreviating  thought,  makes  possible 
progress  in  a  long  ascending  series  to  the  highest 
notions.  On  this  subject  I  take  the  following  pass- 
age from  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Logic,  pp.  98,  99:  "A 
sign  is  necessary  to  give  stability  to  our  intellectual 
progress,  —  to  establish  each  step  in  our  advance  as  a 
new  starting-point  for  our  advance  to  another  beyond. 
A  countrv  mav  be  overrun  bv  an  armed  host,  but  it  is 
only  conquered  by  the  establishment  of  fortresses. 
Words  are  the  fortresses  of  thought.  They  enable  us 
to  realize  our  dominion  over  what  we  have  already 
overrun  in  thought;    to  make  every  intellectual  con- 


language;    and    symbols.  301 

quest  the  basis  of  operations  for  others  still  beyond. 
Or  another  illustration:  Yon  have  all  heard  of  the 
process  of  tunnelling,  of  tunnelling  through  a  sand- 
bank. In  this  operation  it  is  impossible  to  succeed 
unless  every  foot,  nay  almost  every  inch  in  our  prog- 
ress, be  secured  by  an  arch  of  masonry,  before  we 
attempt  the  excavation  of  another.  Now,  language 
is  to  the  mind  precisely  what  the  arch  is  to  the  tunnel. 
The  power  of  thinking  and  the  power  of  excavation 
are  not  dependent  on  the  word  in  the  one  case,  on  the 
mason-work  in  the  other;  but  without  these  subsid- 
iaries, neither  process  could  be  carried  on  beyond  its 
rudimentary  commencement.  Though,  therefore, 
we  allow  that  every  movement  forward  in  language 
must  be  determined  by  an  antecedent  movement  for- 
ward in  thought,  still,  unless  thought  be  accompanied 
at  each  point  of  its  evolution,  by  a  corresponding  evo- 
lution of  language,  its  further  development  is 
arrested." 

We  have  now  considered  intellection  in  its  differ- 
ent stages  of  perceptive,  imaginative,  and  logical  syn- 
thesis. The  original  elemental  materials  of  all  intel- 
lection are  the  primary  affections  of  mind  —  sensa- 
tions, emotions,  and  volitions.  The  wholes  of  per- 
ception, the  wholes  of  imagination,  and  the  wholes 
of  Ic'gic,  are  formed  entirely  out  of  them  present  and 
represented. 

First,  perception  employing  these  elementary 
materials  in  their  simplest  forms,  combines  them  into 
our  notions  of  material  and  external  things.  Sec- 
ondly, imagination,  selecting  attributes  and  parts 
from  the  perceptive  concrete  notions,  and  using  all  the 
primary  mental  affections,  forms  many  and  remark- 


302  THE      PRINCIPLES      OF      KNOWLEDGE. 

able  representative  and  ideal  compounds,  which 
become  the  permanent  possession  of  the  race  as  they 
are  embodied  in  works  of  literature,  art,  and  inven- 
tion. Next  comes  the  logical  faculty.  By  this 
classes  are  formed  by  selecting  a  common  attribute  or 
attributes  from  the  primary  experiences  and  concrete 
percepts  and  representations,  and  the  mind  advances 
to  surprising  and  very  extensive  generalizations  oi  all 
the  objects  and  events  of  experience.  When  thought 
has  reached  the  farthest  point  possible  by  its  unaided 
power,  it  takes  language  and  signs  to  its  assistance; 
and  is  thereby  able  to  handle,  with  perfect  ease,  indi- 
viduals and  collections  that,  in  their  magnitude  or 
complexity  and  number,  many  times  surpass  the  com- 
pass of  the  perceptive  and  representative  powers;  and 
is  further  able  to  rise  to  notions  of  universal  compre- 
hension, and  thus  to  get  and  hold  a  marvelous  mas- 
tery over  the  infinity  of  the  individuals  of  experience, 
reasoning  of  them  rapidly  and  safely. 


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